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ABSTRACT
Voluntary Financial Disclosure 
And
The Unlisted Securities Market Companies: 
An Empirical Investigation
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the Unlisted 
Securities Market (USM) companies disclose financial 
information voluntarily. Also examined are the hypotheses 
of the possible determinants of voluntary disclosure that 
have been developed from the agency theory, theories of the 
firm, and the informational risk theory literature.
To measure voluntary financial disclosure, a disclosure 
index was constructed from items of information that appear 
or could appear, in corporate annual reports, but had not 
contemporaneously been specified either by the U.K. 
Companies Acts, the U.K. Accounting Standards Committee, or 
The London Stock Exchange. Using the disclosure index to 
compute quantitative voluntary disclosure values for the 
sample, the chosen hypotheses of voluntary disclosure were 
then tested.
The cross-industry analysis of voluntary disclosure 
indicates that voluntary disclosure occurs for every company 
sampled. Also, there is substantial variation in the 
quantity voluntarily disclosed by the companies in the 
sample.
The cross-industry analysis of the incentives of 
voluntary disclosure employs the regression statistical 
technique, after consulting the results of an initial 
statistical investigation and the literature. The results 
indicate that the probability of USM companies disclosing 
information voluntarily increases with firm's size, 
percentage of foreign turnover, gearing, and the existence 
of executive share option schemes. Also, the analysis shows 
that the probability of USM companies disclosing information 
voluntarily decreases with the percentage of directors' 
equity. Industrial sector, however, shows mixed results 
concerning the sign of the relationship.
Furthermore, according to the cross-industry analysis, 
the probability of USM companies disclosing information 
voluntarily decreases with firm's profitability.
Finally, the analyses do not lend support to the 
proposed relationships between levels of voluntary 
disclosure and the auditing firm, number of the non­
executives on the Board of Directors, and the number of 
substantial shareholders.
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CHAPTER
ONE-----
INTRODUCTION
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This research has two general objectives. Firstly, it aims 
to explore the nature and extent of current voluntary 
financial disclosure practice and link it to theory. 
Secondly, it aims to provide additional evidence on the 
economic factors underlying voluntary financial information 
disclosure.
This project aims to advance the general understanding 
of accounting practice in a new research setting. In 
particular, the focus of the research will be to investigate 
the voluntary financial disclosure practices of a sample of 
companies in the Unlisted Securities Market (USM). The 
Unlisted Securities Market is the second-tier market of 
securities operated by the International Association of 
Stock Exchanges (London Stock Exchange).
A brief look at a sample of companies annual reports 
indicates that companies disclose information in addition to 
what they are mandated to disclose. There are many motives 
and factors that could contribute to firms' decisions to 
voluntarily disclose information. However, little is known
1
about the extent of this additional disclosure, the nature 
of the factors involved and the degree to which these 
factors influence voluntary disclosure.
This research, specifically, will examine the extent of 
voluntary information disclosure by a sample of USM 
companies. Further, an attempt will be made to estimate the 
extent of the relationship between voluntary information 
disclosure and some corporate characteristics represented by 
accounting and non-accounting measures. The characteristics 
under consideration include size, gearing, profitability, 
directors' equity, extent of diversification (geographical 
and lines of business), industry sector, and other non- 
financial attributes. The necessary data will be extracted 
from the sample companies' annual reports.
1.2 IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH
The importance of this research arises for two reasons: the 
focus on the USM and its policy implications for 
regulations. It was decided to study the financial 
information disclosure practices of USM companies for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, USM companies are, in general, 
smaller than those listed in the Main Market (full 
listing). However, the number of companies listed on the USM 
represents an important section of the stock market and, 
now, there are about 400 companies which trade their 
securities through the USM.
Further, an important feature of USM companies is that, 
on average, they tend to be managed by shareholders who own
2
a significantly larger shareholding than their counterparts 
in the main market. According to the Listing Agreement of 
the London Stock Exchange, only 20% of the share capital of 
companies seeking listing in the USM is required to be in 
public hands. Therefore, managers and directors interests in 
these companies is usually substantially greater than that 
of the main market companies.
In addition, most of the existing research on the 
subject of voluntary financial disclosure has concentrated 
on the disclosure practices of the large companies. 
Researchers have considered the disclosure behaviour of 
small companies as only a by-product to their investigations 
of large companies disclosure patterns. It is felt, 
therefore, that there is a need to study an important 
section of the stock market at a time when the USM is 
growing in terms of the number of participants and when no 
other research has addressed the disclosure practices of 
this market.
For empirical accounting research to be useful, also, 
it must help and assist policy makers and others who are 
interested in accounting policy making. Kelly (1980) argues 
that positive research is needed at all stages of the 
accounting policy making process. Empirical research must, 
also, add to or reinforce what policymakers already know. 
Further, Griffin (1987) argues that research must have the 
capacity to help form a common frame of reference for 
standard setting. Empirical research, also, can be utilised 
to support that frame of reference with factual knowledge of 
current practices and how accounting standards might affect
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these users. These positive questions represent the would be 
assumptions of a new disclosure ruling which is a normative 
issue. The values of many economic consequences studies to 
policy makers are reduced, in contrast, because they offer 
little guidance in predicting the effects of a proposed 
accounting pronouncement and their findings can be open to 
numerous alternative interpretations.
The normative issues, however, take into consideration 
the interests of all parties affected and are concerned with 
the relationship of politics and accounting, a subject 
outwith the intent of this research.
Specifically, evidence from empirical research can 
enhance the knowledge of those involved in policymaking in 
several ways: (1) by shaping perceptions of the relationship
between accounting and reporting and the capital market; 
(2) by examining the predictive ability of accounting 
information; (3) by assessing the economic consequences of 
accounting standards; (4) by examining the extent of 
constituents' agreement on the consequences of a proposed 
accounting standard; and (5) by identifying feasible, 
potentially acceptable alternatives (Griffin, 1987).
The linkage of theory and practice in this research is 
intended to produce an understanding of financial accounting 
reporting practices which hopefully will help policymakers 
in their continuing work to achieve their objectives. One 
issue causing continuous controversy is the amount of 
information that companies are required to disclose in their 
annual reports. Legislation, since the enactment of the 
first Companies Act, has increased the levels of disclosure
required from public companies. Further, the establishment 
of standard-setting bodies which promulgate accounting 
standards has speeded this process. In this context, two 
policy documents warrant referring to.
In 1974 the Accounting Standards Steering Committee 
(ASSC), appointed a sub-committee to prepare a wide-ranging 
discussion paper (ASSC, 1974). The paper stated that the 
purpose of the study was to re-examine the scope and aims of 
published financial reports in the light of recent 
developments and conditions. Another aim stated was that the 
discussion paper would consider the most suitable means of 
measuring and reporting economic conditions of business 
enterprises.
The report was published in 1975 under the title The 
Corporate Report and suggested wide-ranging and progressive 
recommendations. Recently, Alexander (1986) argues that only 
a little of what the report suggested has actually been 
implemented. The Report recommended that corporate reports 
contain information such as: a value added statement, an
employment report, a statement of transactions in foreign 
currency, a statement of future prospects, and a statement 
of corporate objectives (The Corporate Report, 1975).
Another more recent study, Making Corporate Reports 
Valuable (ICAS, 1988), also suggests that current accounting 
practices are not satisfactory. The study concludes that 
companies' reports are inadequate in that they do not supply 
the proper information (content and format) to users of the 
reports. For example, it is suggested that companies should
5
disclose information on their markets, comparative 
statistics with competitors, areas of uncertainty, research 
and development activities and some of the items included in 
The Corporate Report (1975).
For this research, it is expected that it will assist 
in understanding why companies choose to disclose 
information voluntarily. It will also assist the 
policymakers who are concerned with regulating companies' 
financial information disclosure by, firstly, examining the 
extent of companies' agreement on any proposed accounting 
standard and, secondly, by identifying feasible, potentially 
acceptable alternatives.
1.3 PRIOR RESEARCH AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
One can look at the disclosure of information from two 
angles, the supply side and the demand side. From the 
supplier point of view, disclosing information is an action 
that has both advantages and disadvantages (costs). However, 
from the demand point of view, information is assumed to be 
always beneficial to users in general and to investors in 
particular.
1.3.1 Role of Information
The role of information can be recognised at two levels: 
individual and aggregate. For the individual level, 
information in general, and accounting information in 
particular, are recognised to provide users with the 
necessary information to permit informed investment 
decisions (The Corporate Report, 1975; FASB, 1976; Sharpe, 
1978; ICAS, 1988). Further, financial information is
6
formally acknowledged to alter the parameters of the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Beaver, 1981; Griffin, 1987; 
Griffin and Castanias, 1987).
As for the aggregate use of accounting information, 
this is the subject of most market reaction studies, i.e., 
information content studies (Benston, 1976; Ball and Brown, 
1968; Firth, 1976; Emanuel, 1984; and Daley, 1984). Such 
studies have emphasised their investigation on, for example, 
the relationship between share returns and sales data, 
management's forecasts and share prices, and segmental data 
and share prices.
In summary, and according to the above empirical 
studies, one could argue that information is beneficial and 
used by both individuals and markets. The provision of 
information, however, is more contentious and controversial.
1.3.2 Voluntary Disclosure Studies
The voluntary disclosure of information is referred to as 
the disclosure of information (financial and otherwise) by 
companies in the absence of disclosure rules or in excess of 
what they are required to disclose by regulation. According 
to the economic rational expectations model, one could 
argue that the reporting of non-required financial 
information and incurring the associated costs implies that 
management view disclosure as useful. This rational 
expectations model is featured in the two theories of 
voluntary disclosure: capital market based theories and
theories of the firm and agency theory.
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Capital market based theories of voluntary disclosure 
argue that firms disclose information voluntarily in the 
hope that this will reduce the uncertainties attached to 
their shares. For example, Choi (1972) argues that companies 
disclose information because information reduces the 
uncertainties surrounding them, and consequently, reduces 
companies' cost of capital. In his investigation, he found 
that there is a relationship between the increase in the 
amount of information disclosed and a firm's cost of 
capital.
Further, according to Spence (1975), economic agents 
would voluntarily signal information concerning the quality 
of their products to other agents to publicise their 
products and to attract public attention. For companies, one 
product is their securities and shares. Penman (1978) used 
this theory to explain voluntary disclosure of earnings 
forecasts by companies. He found that disclosing firms enjoy 
significantly positive abnormal returns. Kripke (1979), 
commenting on the subject, suggests that companies disclose 
information voluntarily because in doing so they generate 
benefits by obtaining the funds they need. Suppliers of 
funds would not lend unless they have the appropriate 
information concerning the viability of the businesses they 
are lending the money to.
Smith (1976), however, suggests that managers have 
incentives to direct the flow of information to minimise 
investors' worries. If companies disclose their true 
unfavourable financial positions, he adds, they could 
increase their cost of capital, i.e., investors would
8
require a premium to compensate for the extra risk revealed 
by disclosing the true financial position. Therefore, 
according to Smith, managers are likely to disclose only 
the information that would reduce investors' concerns and 
conceal or delay disclosing the true position. Dhaliwal 
(1978), however, rejects this assertion and suggests that 
subsequent disclosure of the unfavourable information by the 
passage of time, for example, might result in a higher cost 
of capital rather than a reduction.
Theories of the firm are also employed to explain
voluntary disclosure. Managerial theories of the firm, for 
example, explain management's perception of their role and 
the benefits they yield from their firms. According to the 
theory, disclosure of information plays an important role in 
improving managerial status and solving the problems which 
arise as a result of the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and management (Williamson, 1967). Also,
disclosure of information is seen as one form of defence
against the threat of take-over (Marris, 1964 and
Williamson, 1986).
A related theory employed to explain voluntary 
disclosure is agency theory. According to this theory,
disclosure of information is one of the methods used by
management to reduce the agency costs (Ball, 1987). 
Managements' share in equity, according to the theory, is a 
determining factor of the amount of information disclosed 
voluntarily. Political costs are, also, considered to
influence the amount of information disclosed voluntarily.
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Empirically, Cerf (1961) in the U.S.A. was the first to 
investigate the relationship between adequacy of disclosure 
and a firm's economic characteristics. He found a positive 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and size, number 
of shareholders, and listing status. Singhvi and Desai 
(1971), examining the same phenomenon, used a modified 
measure of disclosure and added new company characteristics 
to the study. They demonstrated that the extent of 
disclosure was associated positively with Cerf's variables 
and the new added variables, earnings margin, rate of return 
and size of auditing firm. However, of the six variables, 
listing is the primary explanatory one.
Buzby (1975), however, for the purpose of constructing 
a list of items of information deemed useful, referred to 
the literature and interviewed a group of financial 
analysts. In contrast with the previous studies, Buzby found 
no relationship between the extent of disclosure and listing 
status. However, size was positively associated with 
disclosure.
In the U.K., Firth (1979) examined voluntary disclosure 
and concluded that size and listing status are two 
contributing factors that are positively associated with 
voluntary disclosure. Leslie (1979) investigated voluntary 
disclosure in an international setting. His results support 
the notion that voluntary disclosure is associated with a 
firm's size.
Recently, Gray and Roberts (1986) explored voluntary 
disclosure of information by British multinationals, by 
examining corporate perceptions of the costs and benefits of
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voluntary disclosure. Their results indicate that size is 
positively associated with voluntary disclosure. However, 
profitability measured by trading profit to turnover ratio 
was significant to a lesser extent.
1.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The first hypothesis of this study concerns the extent of 
voluntary information disclosure by USM companies, i.e., USM 
companies disclose information voluntarily in excess of what 
they are required (by regulations) to disclose. Formal 
measurement of the practice allows researchers to determine 
the extent of voluntary disclosure and its variation among 
firms.
The second group of hypotheses concerns the 
relationship between levels of voluntary disclosure and 
companies' attributes. Based on the previously stated 
literature, it is hypothesised that the amount of voluntary 
disclosure is related to the following (explanatory) 
attributes: size, foreign operations, gearing,
profitability, diversification, directors' share of equity, 
existence of executive share option schemes, existence of 
non-executives on the Board of Directors, tax status, 
industry sector and the auditing firm.
To test the hypotheses, a variety of financial measures 
were used as proxies for the explanatory variables. The 
measures were chosen after consulting the literature and 
previous empirical studies.
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1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The design of this project is divided into three parts: 
sample selection, measuring voluntary disclosure, and 
explaining why disclosure occurs. Sample selection is 
concerned with choosing the companies that will be 
investigated from the population of USM companies. Measuring 
disclosure involves identifying items of importance that 
firms have voluntarily disclosed in the annual reports. 
After identifying voluntary disclosures, the next step is to 
aggregate these disclosures into some kind of index. The 
end product of the first part of the study is a disclosure 
index for each company in the sample and a measure of how 
much information was voluntarily disclosed.
The third part of the research involves an attempt to 
explain why some companies have higher disclosure scores 
than other companies. Measures were devised which correspond 
to firm attributes: size, foreign operations, gearing, 
profitability, diversification, directors share of equity, 
existence of executive share option schemes, existence of 
non-executives on the Board of Directors, and the auditing 
firm.
To test the hypothesised relationships, two statistical 
methodologies were followed. The first was concerned with 
detecting the general trend and finding the appropriate 
measures to represent the explanatory variables. This 
involved applying the appropriate nonparametric tests. This 
step was essential because these tests are the most 
appropriate for some of the variables. The second type of 
tests involved regression analyses using the ordinary least
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square method (OLS). As there is more than one explanatory 
variable, multi-regression techniques are applied.
1.6 MAIN FINDINGS
This study identifies the existence of a significant amount 
of voluntary disclosure occurring during the period of the 
study by all of the sample companies.
In addition, increasing levels of voluntary disclosure 
are associated, as was expected, with: size, foreign
operations, directors' share of equity, industry sector, and 
to a lesser extent with geographical diversification and 
gearing. However, profitability was negatively associated 
with levels of disclosure.
Further, the statistics lend no support to the other 
proposed relationships between levels of voluntary
disclosure and: the auditing firm, existence of non­
executive directors, tax status, and existence of
substantial shareholding. Some of the tests indicate 
conflicting results.
Finally, there were some discrepancies in the results, 
for some of the variables, between the nonparametric tests 
and the regression analyses.
1.7 RESEARCH OUTLINE
The plan of the study is to begin with a review of the 
economic foundations of financial disclosure, and in 
particular, theories of voluntary disclosure, through to
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sample selection, the measurement of disclosure, and, to 
statistical analyses.
An outline of the study is as follows:
1) Firstly, the role of information and theories of 
voluntary disclosure are analysed. A review of sources of 
demand for information is provided in Chapter Two. In the 
same chapter capital market theories of voluntary disclosure 
and the opposing arguments are examined. Chapter Three 
reviews the recent and current theories of the firm that 
support voluntary disclosure and claims that disclosure of 
information takes place as an ordinary organisational 
function.
2) The next two chapters introduce the setting of the 
research. Chapter Four outlines the nature of USM companies, 
the subjects of the research, the motivations behind 
establishing the market, and provides a general description 
of the companies listed in the market. Next, chapter five 
describes the regulation governing disclosure of information 
of public limited companies in the U.K., and in particular 
that of the USM companies. This represents the regulatory 
framework of the study which includes: Companies Acts, 
Accounting Standards, and The London Stock Exchange Listing 
Agreement (USM companies).
3) Chapter six develops the methodology of measuring 
voluntary financial disclosure and addresses the practical 
problems of implementing the methodology. This chapter, 
also, outlines the hypotheses of the study, the sample 
selection, and data collection.
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4) Chapters seven to ten test the previously stated 
hypotheses. Companies' attributes are described in chapter 
seven. Chapter eight measures voluntary disclosure and 
tests the first group of hypotheses concerning the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. In chapter nine, a summary of the 
non-parametric tests used is provided. Also reported are 
the results of applying these tests in examining the second 
group of hypotheses. Chapter ten reviews the design and 
implementation of the regression analyses. In this chapter, 
two multi-regression models are developed to test the 
hypotheses.
Finally, the last two chapters discuss and summarise 
the results. Chapter eleven reviews the likely explanation 
of the results and makes comparisons with previous 
studies. Further, research implications are provided in this 
chapter. Chapter twelve presents the conclusions, the 
limitations of the research and future research suggestions.
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CHAPTER
TWO------------------------
CAPITAL MARKET BASED 
THEORIES OF
VOLUNTARY FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The amount of financial information disclosed by companies 
has increased during the last two decades. One reason behind 
this phenomenon is the increase in the number of government 
regulations and of professional accounting bodies' 
pronouncements requesting companies to disclose specific 
information concerning companies' activities. However, some 
writers suggest that there may well be incentives for 
companies to disclose information voluntarily if they 
perceives it to be in their own interests to do so (e.g. 
Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Penman, 1978; 
Leftwich, 1983; Ball, 1987).
If a company decides to disclose information, this is 
likely to result in the company incurring direct monetary 
costs. Where the information is already used for internal 
purposes, the direct cost involved is limited to 
dissemination expenses. Other costs include the most 
frequently cited objection to disclosure, that of 
competitive disadvantage, i.e., the use of the additional
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information by competitors to the disadvantage of the 
company disclosing the information (Gray, McSweeney, and 
Shaw 1984 and Gray and Roberts, 1986).
Further, as the information used by management is not 
always the same as that used by outside users, disclosing 
additional information that is not used by management
involves further expenses, i.e., gathering, production, and 
dissemination. In practice, this situation is very unlikely 
to arise because any information required by outsiders, in 
particular that is concerned with forecasting future cash 
flows, assuming a good management team is in charge, is 
likely to be available for internal use (ICAS, 1988).
This research identifies two main theories that explain 
why companies indulge in the activity of disclosing
financial information voluntarily, and why there are 
incentives for companies to disclose information concerning 
their operations in the absence of a mandatory system of 
regulation. The first theory is based on capital market
research. Capital market research concludes that firms gain 
from disclosure of information by reducing their cost of 
capital and by popularising their securities. This chapter 
reviews this theory and its implications. Secondly, theories 
of the firm consider voluntary disclosure of financial
information as a specialist function performed by firms and 
as part of a contractual relationship between a firm's 
constituents: management, shareholders, employees, and the
general public (Ball, 1987). Theories of the firm are 
discussed in the next chapter. These two theories are not 
alternative models in the sense that each one, separately,
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explains voluntary financial disclosure. The two models are 
likely to coexist at the same time and overlap each other.
However, before examining the two main theories of 
voluntary financial disclosure, a brief discussion of the 
role of financial information is presented. The generally 
accepted role of financial information is to provide users 
with information. This role of information represents the 
demand function and the source of pressure on suppliers to 
produce and furnish such information.
2.2 ROLE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
The importance of financial information is evidenced by the 
existence of the relationship between share prices and 
financial information. This is the economic context in which 
investors evaluate accounting information and make 
decisions. The use of accounting information by investors is 
apparent when they assesses prospective returns or cash 
flows from investment opportunities. However, in an open 
competitive economy, investors cannot be viewed 
individually. Their collective actions determine market 
prices and the returns they realise. Therefore, the role of 
financial information can be looked at from two levels: 
individual (micro) level and aggregate (macro) level.
2.2.1 Investors Use of Accounting Information
The role of accounting and financial reporting is recognised 
as providing users with the necessary information for their 
decisions (The Corporate Report, 1975; FASB, 1978 and ICAS, 
1988). The FASB recognises investors in general and their
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advisers as the main users of financial information. 
However, The Corporate Report (1975) identifies seven 
separate user groups as the users of financial information,
i.e., the equity investor group, the creditor group, the 
employee group, the financial analysts group, the business 
contact group, the government, and the public. The Corporate 
Report defines users of financial information as those who 
having reasonable right to information concerning the 
company. According to The Corporate Report, a reasonable 
right exists where the activities of a firm affect the 
interest of a user group.
Investors and creditors are also recognised as priority 
groups by public auditing firms. Arthur Andersen (1984) 
emphasises that investors and creditors, present and future, 
are the principal users of financial information.
What kind of information do these users require? 
Traditionally, the buy-sell-hold decision of shareholders 
has focused on information about the past activities of 
management as the steward to whom capital has been entrusted 
(Chen, 1972). That information should reveal managements' 
custodial abilities, effectiveness, and efficiency. This is 
the stewardship or feedback role of financial information.
Further insights into the stewardship role of financial 
information have been provided by recent developments in 
theories of the firm, and in particular agency theory. 
Agency theory highlights the role of financial information 
in economic relationships or contracts between principals 
(shareholders) and their agents (management). According to 
the theory, shareholders have recognised needs for financial
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information to monitor management compliance with their 
contractual duties and obligations.
A second role that produces demand for financial 
information is known as the decision-making or predictive 
role of financial information. Investors, according to this 
role, need information of a forward-looking nature that 
helps them assess future events, actions, or cash flows. For 
example, FASB (1978) argues that investors need information 
to assess the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of 
prospective cash flows. To have potential benefit, 
information must be capable of changing individual's 
assessment about future events and uncertainties.
Formally, this role is predominantly concerned with the 
relevance of accounting information for one group of users 
of financial information, investors at large. The relevance 
of accounting information is reflected in changes in stock 
market prices. Financial disclosure permits informed 
investment decisions by improving estimation of the 
parameters of the capital asset pricing model CAPM (Beaver, 
1981 and Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Financial disclosure 
should be designed to improve the estimation of the 
systematic risk B for the individual firm. A better estimate 
of a share's current B would enable investors to make 
better estimates of its expected rate of return in future 
periods. Such information would allow investors to minimise 
their portfolio's risk, and to form more efficient 
portfolios, that is, the lowest possible variance for a 
given expected rate of return.
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The improvement in estimation is usually carried out by 
specialists, e.g., fund managers, financial analysts, 
investment banks, and pension funds managers. Some suggest 
that this group of users is the largest and the most 
important of all users. For example, Harris and Associates 
(1985) indicate in a survey of business and financial 
leaders in the U.S.A. that 82% of the leaders singled out 
the security analysts and their institutional clients as the 
most important users of financial information.
Another role suggested by the literature for financial 
information is the one adopted by Ijiri (1975) and others 
(e.g., The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 
1980). This role stresses accountability towards current and 
prospect shareholders as the primary role for financial 
information which is assumed to be broader than the 
stewardship role-where accountability is toward current 
shareholders.
While demand by individuals represents part of the 
financial information demand function, decision-makers 
behaviour cannot be viewed apart from the market in which it 
occurs. The collective actions of individuals determine the 
wider role of financial information in the securities 
markets. This role is the subject of the next section.
2.2.2 Financial Information and Securities Markets 
An analysis of market response to financial information 
disclosed by companies can provide an indication of whether 
there is demand for financial information from securities 
markets or not. Beaver (1972) identified this implicitly 
when he stated that the role of information is to help in
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establishing a set of security prices, such that there 
exists an optimal allocation of capital between firms and an 
optimal allocation of resources among investors. Therefore, 
financial information should be disclosed so that 
informational and allocational efficiencies of the market 
will be maintained.
Informational efficiency requires that the stock market 
be a fair-game; the expected reward (return) is solely 
dependent on the risk the investor assumes (Fama, 1970). 
Allocational efficiency requires that the proper set of 
information from a cost-benefit point of view is presented 
so that security prices and returns will optimally allocate 
resources throughout the economy. The role of disclosure is 
to reduce informational uncertainty by increasing the amount 
of relevant information so that betas can be estimated more 
accurately (Kalyman, 1971; Beaver, 1981; and Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986).
Empirically, information content research endorses the 
role of information in changing the parameters, mean and 
variance, of the share return distribution. Research in this 
area distinguishes between studies that deal with the 
announcement of earnings and those that deal with other 
accounting data.
Benston (1967) and Ball and Brown (1968) performed the 
earliest studies in U.S.A. to examine the relationship 
between share returns and data from firms' annual reports. 
They predicted and found that unexpected increases in 
accounting earnings were accompanied by positive abnormal
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rates of return and vice versa. Beaver (1968) studied market 
reaction by examining the relationship between annual 
earnings announcements and volume of trading. He reported 
that there is a significant increase in trade in shares in 
the week of earnings announcements.
Brown and Kennely (1972) examined the information 
content of quarterly earnings announcements using Ball and 
Brown's methodology. They argued that if asset prices are 
instantaneously adjusted as price sensitive information 
flows to the market, then, changes in prices reflect a flow 
of relevant information pertinent to price formation. They 
concluded that quarterly accounting numbers have information 
content.
Beaver, Clark and Wright (1979) extended the 
investigation of the relationship between accounting 
information and share prices by examining the relationship 
between the magnitude of unexpected earnings and the 
magnitude of the abnormal rate of return. Their study 
indicated a positive association between unexpected earnings 
change and abnormal returns.
Other studies examining the relationship between 
earnings announcements and share prices include Brown 
(1970), Jordan (1973), Hagerman (1973), Foster (1975), 
Emanuel (1984) and Hawawini (1984). Firth (1976) was the 
first to study the relationship for firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. He concludes that financial reports 
have information content and this information is used by the 
market in evaluating the firm making the particular 
announcement as well as similar types of firms. Further,
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Firth (1982) examined the information content of the release 
of a company s annual announcement in its different stages, 
preliminary announcement, annual earnings announcement, and 
annual general meeting, in the U.K. He found that at all 
stages substantial information was conveyed to the market. 
Patell and Wolfson (1984) examined dividends announcements 
as well as earnings announcements effect on share prices. 
Their results provide further evidence of the information 
content of earnings and dividends announcements. However, 
they reported that dividends announcements induced weaker 
response than earnings announcements.
Studies of management's forecasts also indicate that 
share prices incorporate a broader information set than the 
annual reports information. Examples of such studies include 
Patell (1976), Penman (1980), Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya
(1982), Morse (1982), Waymire (1984) and Brown, Foster, and 
Noreen (1985).
Further, several studies (Collins and Simmonds, 1979; 
Ajinkya, 1980; Daley, 1984) have examined whether 
disaggregated financial data have any information content. 
According to these studies, the market seems to use and 
distinguish among profitability components. For example 
Collins (1975) examined the value of disclosing sales and 
earnings data by line of business (LOB) segment, and found 
such disclosure desirable and beneficial for anticipating 
earnings changes. However, Foster and Vickrey (1978) 
provided statistically weak evidence that LOB information in 
10-k reports supplied to the SEC in the USA is of any value.
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More recently, Rayburn (1986) investigated the 
association between operating cash flows and accruals and 
share prices. She suggested that any information that 
earnings provide about operating activities that is 
incremental to the information provided by cash flows is a 
function of the accrual adjustment process that transforms 
cash flows to earnings. The aim of the study was to know 
whether accruals provide information to aid investors in 
estimating future cash flows over and above the cash flow 
information contained in annual reports. Her results support 
the notion that an association exists between operating cash 
flows and aggregate accruals and between abnormal returns.
Lipe (1986) extended information content research by 
examining the information content of earnings components 
namely gross profit, general and administrative expenses, 
depreciation expense, interest expense, income taxes and 
other items. His objective was to find out if the 
decomposition of earnings provide additional information 
beyond that provided by the aggregation of the earnings 
components. Lipe concludes that components explain more of 
the variation in returns than is explained by earnings 
alone.
Further evidence concerning the impact of accounting 
disclosure are the information content studies of investors' 
reaction to the changes in accounting methods. While some 
changes in accounting methods may merely serve cosmetic 
purposes, others will have cash-flow consequences which is 
the most important consequence of information disclosure.
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Beaver and Dukes (1972) and Kaplan and Roll (1972) 
examined the association between stock returns and earnings 
based on the deferral versus the flow through method of 
accounting for the investment tax credit and found that 
there is no permanent effect on share prices. This is an 
indication that the market can read through the reported 
figures. Further, Archibald (1972) studied the price effects 
that a change from accelerated to straight line depreciation 
method had on firms. Since the change will have the effect 
of increasing reported earnings, if the market cannot read 
behind the figures, it will cause the share price to rise. 
His results show that the patterns of observed prices after 
the change were not significantly different from zero. 
Therefore, he could not reject the hypothesis that the 
observed patterns were the results of a random behaviour. 
This demonstrates that the market perceives accounting 
changes as having no economic impact and being merely a 
book-keeping change. This lends support to the efficient 
market hypothesis. Ball (1972), also, concluded that 
investors were able to distinguish between the real and the 
cosmetic effects on earnings.
For accounting changes which have substantive direct 
cash flow effects, these effects are generally due to tax 
implications of the accounting changes. However, the results 
of studies investigating switches from LIFO to FIFO and from 
FIFO to LIFO provide conflicting evidence (Sunder, 1973 and 
1975; Abdel-khalik and McKeown, 1978; Brown, 1980; and 
Ricks, 1982a).
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In summary, the empirical evidence suggests that 
financial information is an economic good that is demanded 
and used at the micro level to assist individual decision 
makers, and at the macro level to assist in allocating
efficiently society s economic resources by affecting market 
share prices. Financial information, therefore, is useful 
and there is demand for such information.
In a competitive economy, and from suppliers of
information perspective, one can infer that no firm will
voluntarily incur the costs of disclosure unless they 
believe that disclosures will be beneficial to the firm.
Voluntary disclosure is only likely to occur, therefore, if 
benefits outweigh costs. Benefits to companies derived from 
disclosure of information are the rationales for voluntary 
disclosure suggested by the voluntary disclosure theories.
2.3 VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE IN A BROADLY-BASED CAPITAL MARKET
It is suggested that as disclosure is beneficial to 
investors, it is also beneficial to corporations (Buzby, 
1974). One plausible incentive for firms to disclose 
information voluntarily would be to popularise their shares 
and products and assure investors of their success. This 
action is referred to in the literature as the signalling 
theory. Such behaviour by management is an application of 
the signalling and screening models in an accounting 
context. Specifically, there are two reasons for firms to 
voluntarily disclose financial information. The first 
incentive would be to reduce the informational risk that 
every firm faces in the investors' minds over whether their
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estimates of the future earnings include all factors that 
are likely to influence the firm's earnings ability. 
Secondly, if a firm popularises its securities by keeping 
investors and financial analysts informed, the confidence of 
such groups of users in the firm is likely to rise. 
Thereafter, investors would be more likely to support and 
subscribe to the company when it decides to raise capital in 
future.
One could assume, accordingly, that the essential 
purpose of voluntary financial disclosure is to reduce the 
informational risk of the investors in securities. This 
leads to lower risk, which in turn lowers the cost of
capital to firms. Companies, therefore, have an important 
incentive to disclose information. This incentive represents 
the following main hypothesis of this research:
HI COMPANIES DISCLOSE INFORMATION VOLUNTARILY 
DESPITE THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH DISCLOSURE.
After this introduction to the benefits achieved by
companies when they disclose financial information, a
detailed analysis of signalling theory is presented below.
2.3.1 Signalling Theory
Research in the area of signalling is concerned with some 
specific problems involved when an economic agent wants to 
convey some information to another agent. As an example of 
those problems, assume that worker productivity is the 
information to be conveyed (Spence, 1973, 1975 and Riley
1975, 1977). A worker having high productivity wants to
disclose this to his employer so that the worker can command 
a higher wage. The problem is that all workers want to claim
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high productivity in order to receive the higher wage. 
Employers are, then, unable to trust workers who report 
their productivity levels to them, being forced to ignore a 
worker s stated productivity as a means of determining his 
wage.
Since workers with high productivity are hurt by this, 
they want a method of convincing the employer that they 
truly have high productivity. They can find one if a signal 
exists. Instead of announcing the value of their 
characteristics, the agent signal this value using another 
characteristic, called the signal. In order for the signal 
to be able to truthfully distinguish among the agents, those 
who have a higher value for the characteristic of interest 
must be able to more cheaply give a higher valued signal. In 
the productivity example, education is typically the signal. 
It is assumed that it costs less for workers with higher 
productivity to attain a given level of education. Then, 
even though all individuals want to signal high 
productivity, only those actually having high productivity 
can afford to obtain enough education to signal it. Because 
of the larger expense, it is suboptimal for those with lower 
productivity to invest in enough education to signal high 
productivity. The signal therefore fulfils the function of 
distinguishing agents along the desired characteristic.
In the context of financial information, the signalling 
model assumes that managers follow the market value rule. 
That is, they act to maximise the market value of their 
firms in making information production and dissemination 
decisions. Penman (1978) employed this signalling theory to
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explain voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts by firms. 
His model is an adaptation of the signalling and screening 
models of Spence (1973, 1974) and Riley (1975, 1977) to the 
capital market setting and is considered the foundation to 
the subject of signalling and financial information. The 
next section illustrates Penman's theoretical model and its 
implications.
2.3.2 Penman's Basic Model
Penman's model assumes that managers follow the above 
mentioned market value rule. It is also assumed that firm 
managements have knowledge of an economic characteristic (<f>) 
relevant to the valuation of their firms, but this is not 
known to outsiders at the beginning of the pre-disclosure 
period. The characteristic (<j>) is determined by the nature 
of the firm's production and investment decisions and is 
treated as fixed and unchangeable relative to the time 
period considered. Moreover, in the absence of information 
regarding the amount of (0) which a firm offers, it is 
assumed that the market values each firm according to the 
mean valuation of firms V assessed over <p. However, given 
the market value rule, the valuation, V, is not an 
equilibrium valuation for every firm. Further, Penman says, 
managements who possess an amount of 0 which is greater than 
the market's assessment have an incentive to signal that 
information to the market. But for the signal to be a 
reliable proxy, the net benefits to signalling must be 
positively correlated with the amount of characteristic a 
firm possesses and the amount of actual signalling 0. Thus 
the model assumes that not only is signalling costly, but
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also, the marginal costs of signalling are negatively
correlated with the amount of <f> possessed by a firm. 
However, the cost of the signalling function for a given 
value of <f> is the same for all firms. Finally, to give the 
signal information content, it is assumed that for some 
range of 0 , the net benefit of signalling is negative,
therefore, guaranteeing a finite optimum.
In the single period case (i.e. treating the pre­
disclosure period as a single period), the signalling
process begins with managements who possess information 
about <f> which they believe to be favourable (net of 
signalling cost) relative to the capital market's
assessments V. Given rational expectations, managers who 
possess information which is adverse to V will withhold from 
signalling with the hope of not being singled out, since 
identification would result in the valuation of their firms 
at something less than V . However, when some firms signal, 
the market reassesses them and revalues V over the remaining 
firms. This provides an incentive for further firms to 
signal. As long as the net benefit of signalling is positive 
for firms at all levels of the signal a, the process 
continues through a number of repetition until all firms, 
except the firm with the lowest amount of a, have signalled 
at the equilibrium. Therefore, voluntary disclosure of each 
firm is correlated with an upward revaluation of the market 
value of the firm on its disclosure date, even if the firm 
has an unfavourable disclosure relative to other firms in 
the market.
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Penman indicated that the single period model, as 
discussed above, is essentially that of Spence as modified 
by Riley. The 0 in Spence's model, however, is a potential 
employee s natural ability or productivity which does not 
change over his working life. In the capital market 
framework, the amount of relevant economic attributes and 
characteristics possessed by firms may change over time. 
Therefore, subdividing the pre-disclosure period into a 
series of separate production and investment periods, each 
of which provides new <f>, will help overcome the shortcoming 
in Spence's model.
In the multiperiod model, Penman suggests, all 
managements will learn that in spite of the signalling 
behaviour, the relative situation of their firm's attributes 
and characteristics in the distribution over all firms will 
be disclosed in equilibrium by the signalling activities of 
other firms. Thus managers may decide to signal irrespective 
of the amount of a they possess and so consciously rank 
themselves on 0. If so, the resultant equilibrium is 
described as the full disclosure or full screening 
equilibrium. Alternatively, Penman suggests that a no­
signalling equilibrium may result through collusion if 
social costs exceed social benefits of signalling. The no- 
signalling equilibrium is however not likely to be stable 
due to private incentives.
The empirical results of Penman (1978) suggest that 
full disclosure (i.e. whether the voluntary mechanism 
results in the disclosure of the forecast information 
possessed by managements of all firms) does not result
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through voluntary earnings forecast disclosure. The returns 
on the securities of forecasting firms during the fiscal 
year which the forecasts were made were, on average, higher 
than those on the market as a whole, other things being 
equal. Clearly, firms with relatively poor earnings 
prospects, relatively low security returns, and by 
implication, relatively low amounts of value-relevant 
attributes do not on average volunteer forecast information. 
However, the firms which do not voluntarily issue forecasts 
are, in fact, screened out as a group by the forecasting 
actions of others. Penman notes that a no-forecast is in 
fact a forecast that screens firms into this group and 
values them accordingly. More specifically, his results 
suggest that the voluntary forecasts that may be classified 
as low relative to other forecasts in his sample are not low 
relative to all firms in the market. They lie around the 
median of the cross-sectional distribution of the markets 
forecasts of all firms' earnings. The unobserved forecasts 
are really the low forecasts relative to the market's 
forecasts of all firms' earnings.
Penman, examining the behaviour of standardised 
residuals, observed that forecasting firms do, on average, 
enjoy statistically significant positive abnormal returns 
during the three months on either side of the voluntary 
forecast date, and not only on the day of the forecast 
announcement. In particular, good news firms were 
continually revalued upwards through the period and received 
relatively sharp upward revaluation on or about the forecast 
date. Furthermore, although the bad news firms on average 
exhibit negative residuals prior to and on the forecast
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date, the negative cumulative residuals declined to
approximately zero subsequent to the forecast.
In another study, Patell (1976), on voluntary forecast 
disclosure, showed that there was a statistically 
significant upward price change during the week of forecast 
disclosure beyond that explained by the movement of the 
market as a whole. Good news firms enjoyed generally
positive price relative residuals during the two months 
prior to the forecast announcement, while bad news firms 
experienced generally negative residuals during the
preceding two months. Nevertheless, both sets of firms 
enjoyed an upward price revaluation during the immediate 
announcement week. The price trend established prior to the
forecast continued following the forecast release. Thus,
the empirical results of Patell (1976) and Penman (1978) are 
generally supportive of each other, particularly as regards 
their overall sample and good news firms. Their results 
differ only with respect to the price movement of their bad
news firms at the times of, and subsequent to, the
announcement. In the Patell study, the bad news firms 
enjoyed upward price revision in the period of the 
announcement and negative residuals subsequently. In the 
Penman study, the bad news firms experienced a slight 
downward revaluation with the announcement, which decreased 
after the voluntary forecast announcement.
The above difference in the empirical results may be 
due to the differences in the time periods, data, and the 
samples studied. In any event, the evidence is consistent 
with signalling theory and the market value rule. Firms
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disclosing seemingly bad news may be trying to prevent 
drastic downward price revisions that the market might be 
making about their prospects
While the formulation of signalling theory in the 
accounting context was only started with Penman's study, 
other studies before that recognised this incentive to 
disclose financial information but in the framework of the 
relationship between information, risk, and return. The 
following section review the literature that addresses this 
relationship.
2.3.3 Information Risk Theory
Penman's assertion that forecasting firms, on average, enjoy 
positive abnormal returns on their securities indicates how 
voluntary disclosure is likely to reduce informational 
uncertainty attached to a particular security. Financial 
disclosure, therefore, should allow better estimates of the 
possible effects that future uncertainties will have on 
future operations. Horngren (1957) was the first to 
recognise this relationship. He states:
"If analysts are kept well informed, the 
following is likely to occur:
1. Analysts generally will be more interested in 
firms that disclose as opposed to those which do 
not.
2. Analysts' favourable attitudes result in higher 
price earning ratio.
3. Well informed analysts are more prone to know 
what to expect in a company's performance. Such 
a situation militates against the wild 
fluctuations which arise from startling company 
news.
4. Over the long run an individual company's stock 
price will be relatively higher. This tends to
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keep both the management and stockholders 
contented. It also enhances the future
marketability of a subsequent issue of the 
company shares."
(Horngren, 1957, pp 35).
Horngren s analysis, although expressed in times of 
speculation with no empirical evidence, applies in
situations where a company's securities are traded in a 
broadly-based capital market. In the formal mean-variance 
portfolio model, information disclosure helps to improve 
resource allocation among firms. Any decision which a 
company can make to reduce 13, reduces that firm's required 
return on any investment project or cost of capital. Benston 
(1973) contends (though, without empirical evidence) that 
firms have been conscious of the effect of disclosure on 
their betas. He suggests that many large corporations 
disclosed information, such as total assets and sales before 
the disclosure of such items was required by law. These 
items are some of the variables which are assumed to have an 
effect on a firm's beta.
In supporting the claim that cost of capital decreases 
when disclosure is increased and risk is reduced. Duff and 
Philips, Inc. (1976) stated, in a report prepared for 
Aruther Anderson and Company, that:
"Consistently good financial reporting should 
have a favourable long-run effect on the 
company's cost of capital. This cost is 
relative, i.e., consistent with the company's 
opportunities and risks in relation to 
alternative investment opportunities in the 
market. Over a period of time, good reporting 
leads to informed investors who, because they 
understand the company, will pay a fair price 
for its securities. They trust the information 
received from the company and its management. 
Minimum or inconsistent reporting often leads to 
some loss of investors confidence in the quality
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of company information and, ultimately, in the 
price they will pay in the market. They reserve 
judgement on the management. Credibility is a 
subtle intangible of great importance to any 
company, and corporate reporting practices have 
a major effect on it. We have often observed 
this connection between credibility, corporate 
reporting and cost of capital. Usually, 
companies lose credibility during a period of 
adversity when investors believe they are not 
getting forthright information. Later, when the 
recovery in investment position lags recovery in 
the business, the company realises that it must 
improve its reporting policies. Some of these 
companies are now leaders in the quality of 
their shareholder communication, and their 
credibility has been re-established. Good 
corporate reporting is a long-term policy 
applicable to good times and bad."
(Duff and Philips, Inc, 1976, pp 71)
Public disclosure of financial information is not 
necessary if the owners of the business are also its 
managers, because the financial data is available to them on 
a personal review basis. Nor is disclosure necessary when 
ownership is separated from management, but the owners are 
few in number, own a substantial share of the firm's 
capital, and have long holding period horizons. In this 
situation, personal review of the financial records is still 
efficient in that it is less costly than published data, and 
sufficient to satisfy the information needs of the investors 
(although audited reports might still be useful at this 
point to ensure the accuracy of the data).
For companies with a substantial number of individual 
shareholders, the cost of communication is lowered by 
production of a document available to all shareholders 
instead of relying upon personal inspection of the financial 
records. Moreover, to enable the speedy liquidation of 
ownership positions and to permit short holding period 
horizons, then the potential audience for disclosure can be
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expanded to include non-owners as well as owners (Leslie, 
1979). Further disclosure, thus, becomes an effective policy 
when one of the objectives of a company is to raise large 
sums of capital from well informed investors who can make 
independent decisions.
There is, however, an argument against the positive 
relationship between increased information and reduction of 
uncertainty (Leslie, 1979). Leslie suggests that not all 
information reduces uncertainty. For example, the discovery 
of an oil field increases informational uncertainty until 
the size of the field is resolved. However, he argues that 
on average, the disclosure of information will reduce 
informational uncertainty, particularly in capital markets 
with disclosure systems that are not as well developed as 
those in the United States. His research considers the 
European capital market as less developed than the American 
capital market.
Firms which voluntarily disclose information will be 
those that want to raise capital in the market-place. Firms 
selling debt or equity will have more interest in increasing 
disclosure and immediately reducing capital costs than firms 
which intend to use little external financial funding. From 
a firm s perspective, to minimise the risk of not selling 
their new issues of securities, management would ensure that 
adequate information is available to the underwriters and 
the investors.
Empirically, Choi (1972) was the first to study the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and cost of
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capital in an international setting and a broadly-based
capital market, i.e., where many shareholders own small 
proportions of the issued equity. Choi exhibited,
indirectly, the need for capital by the firm's need for
access to an external capital market. He states that:
"Increased firm disclosure tends to improve 
subjective probability distribution of a 
securities expected return streams in the mind 
of an individual investor by reducing the 
uncertainty associated with that return stream.
For firms which generally outperform the
industry average, it is also argued that 
improved financial disclosure will tend to
increase the relative weighting which an 
investor will place on favorable firm statistics 
relative to other information which he utilizes 
in making judgements with respect to the firm.
Both of the forgoing effects will entice an 
individual to pay a larger amount for a given 
security than he would otherwise pay, thus 
lowering a firm's cost of capital."
(Choi, 1973, pp 45)
A reduction in cost of capital can have two effects. 
First it would add projects to a firm's demand for funds. Or 
for firms with fixed demand for funds (fixed amount of 
funds available), disclosure of information voluntarily 
would reduce their cost of capital so that the firm will be 
able to undertake additional capital projects and maximise 
its profits (Barry, 1974). Accordingly, firms that are 
likely to disclose information voluntarily are those that 
would add the most projects, given a cut in their cost of 
capital. Growing small businesses and capital-intensive 
businesses are examples of such companies. This demand for 
capital is not restricted to large companies.
Kripke (1979) supports Choi's argument. He states that 
information will be supplied voluntarily by issuers 
interested in the capital market when there is a consensus
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among suppliers of capital or other transactors in the 
capital markets that this information is necessary to them 
for lending and investment decisions; issuers will supply it
because the alternative is to forego access to the capital
markets. This situation arises where companies are looking
for outside finance and when they are likely to use capital
markets to raise capital.
In a recent study, Trueman (1986) argues that 
management has incentives to voluntarily release
information, and in particular internally generated 
forecasts of earnings, as long the forecast release is 
costless. He suggests that this is due to the fact that the 
market value of the firm is influenced by investors' 
perceptions of management's ability to anticipate future 
changes in the firm's economic environment and adjust 
production plans accordingly. Management motivation to
disclose earnings forecast stems not from the desire to 
inform investors about the revised expectations but from the 
desire to signal to investors that management has received 
new information. That is, management is fulfilling its duty, 
i.e., gathering the relevant information, and concentrating 
its efforts to achieve and accomplish shareholders 
objectives. This analysis implies that management will be 
willing to disclose both bad and good news.
Another risk that companies are likely to avoid is
improperly pricing a new shares issue. Firm s risk here is
that it will receive less cash than it could have and 
investors earn more return for the risk level they have 
assumed. Stated differently, higher security prices would
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mean that a primary security issue could be priced higher, 
and that the net proceeds from the issue would be higher. 
Thus, the firm would experience larger receipts from a given 
issue and, hence, experience a lower cost of capital.
2.3.3 Management's Discretion over Disclosing Information 
While there is an incentive for firms to disclose 
information voluntarily, some argue that management is aware 
of the effects the information has on securities prices and 
would disclose only good news. Ferris (1975) investigated 
managerial discretionary actions and the incentives for such 
actions. He studied a group of U.K. companies which 
published prospectuses during the period 1972 to 1973. He 
concludes that:
"Seventy-one percent of the sample indicated 
that their firm utilized some type of 
discretionary action to reduce forecast 
deviations: (a) 22 firms manipulated their
operating decisions and activities; (b) 16 firms 
issued operating policies expressly directed at 
minimizing expected forecast deviations; and (c)
16 firms attempted to suppress profits or avoid 
expenditures in order to reduce deviations."
(Ferris, 1975, pp 49)
The above statement confirms two points. Firstly, that 
management exercises discretionary power over disclosing 
information. Further, it supports the previous suggestions 
that a securities own deviation is a relevant risk measure. 
This is what is suggested by Dhaliwal (1978) . He says that
management's intention of reducing cost of capital is
apparent through its behaviour of reducing any expected
profit deviations.
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Smith (1976), along with a number of economists 
supports the above analysis that management has strong 
incentives to minimise the possibility of investor's worries 
by directing the flow of information to eliminate 
fluctuations in performance results, thereby, misleading 
investors with respect to the relative riskness of the firm.
Penman (1980), also, investigated the claim that 
voluntary forecasts are biased and that management only 
publishes forecasts when they have good news. He suggests 
that earnings forecasts do not result through voluntary 
mechanisms, that firms with poor earnings prospects and 
relatively low security returns do not reveal their relative 
position through an earnings forecast. Further, Verrecchia
(1983), supports the idea that managers exercise discretion 
in the disclosure of information. The effect of disclosure 
on the price of assets the manager controls, Verrecchia 
adds, is the main motivation behind the manager's action to 
disclose or withhold information.
Jaffe and Merville (1974), long before Smith (1976), 
addressed this risk sharing theme between management and 
investors. They suggest that:
’’Over time, firms which release only good 
information will be identified as such by the 
market. At one extreme, good information from 
these companies will tend to be discounted by 
the market, because investors realise that 
2^ 0pressed bad information concerning the company 
also exists. At the other extreme, repressed bad 
information can be identified by the market. For 
example, suppose that a firm releases quarterly 
earnings figures exactly three months early, if 
the reports are good. When a new three month 
period begins and no information is forthcoming, 
the market can infer that a bad earnings report 
is being withheld and hence bid down the stock
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price. In addition, it may be difficult to keep 
information secret if is produced."
(Jaffe and Merville, 1974, pp 59)
Dhaliwal (1978), also, refutes Smith's argument (and 
the later two studies) and suggests that if managers 
controlled or simply did not publish adverse financial data 
to hide poor performance from investors, subsequent 
disclosure of such information due to the sanction of some 
regulation might result in a lower market price for the 
related securities and a high cost of equity capital. 
Further, Ross (1977) agrees that once the manipulation and 
misrepresentation are discovered, investors confidence in 
the quality of company information will be lost and that 
will lower the price they will pay for its securities. 
Consequently, manipulation of financial information is 
likely to increase the cost of equity capital rather than 
lower it.
2.3.5 Firm's Characteristics and Voluntary Disclosure 
After it has been established that disclosure of financial 
information helps investors in assessing a security' risk, 
i.e. beta, and is likely, as suggested, to reduce cost of 
capital for companies, this section reviews the relevant 
literature that links some of firm s characteristics 
(suggested by the literature to be related to firm s risk. 
Ben-Zion and Shalit, 1975; Foster, 1987) with voluntary
disclosure.
2.3.5.1 Diversification
One area of major relevance to informational risk is the 
extent of diversity of business activity (Ben-Zion and
43
Shalit, 1975). Companies that operate in several 
geographical areas or have interests in many lines of 
businesses are likely to disclose information voluntarily to 
inform the markets that they are diversified and to signal 
their true financial position. Also, segmental information 
would help investors to evaluate each segment's risk, 
uncertainty, revenue, and return. By disclosing such 
information, especially concerning their geographical and 
business diversification, these companies are likely to 
achieve both, satisfaction of investors' demands for more 
information and reduction of the uncertainty attached to 
their securities.
Empirically, Dhaliwal (1978), examined the impact of 
line-of-business disclosure on the cost of equity capital. 
For the purpose of his study, he developed a surrogate for 
the cost of equity capital. He used the predicted standard 
deviation of a firm's returns as a justifiable surrogate, an 
idea developed by Bierman (1974). Bierman suggests that 
investors, on the average, tend to under-diversify their 
portfolios. Based on this conclusion, Dhaliwal used a 
security's own standard deviation of returns as a relevant 
risk measure and, therefore, as another surrogate for the 
cost of capital. Dhaliwal concluded that segmental reporting 
had a favourable effect on the cost of equity capital. 
These effects are consistent with the premise that more 
disclosure reduces uncertainty about securities. The two 
hypotheses representing the above proposition to be tested, 
therefore, are:
44
H2 THERE IS A POSITIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN LINE 
OF BUSINESS DIVERSIFICATION AND VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE.
H3 THERE IS A POSITIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN GEO­
GRAPHICAL DIVERSIFICATION AND VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE.
2.3.5. 2. Gear ing
Another common measurement of risk used by the financial 
community is the debt-equity ratio (gearing). Lenders do not 
keep lending unlimited amounts of loans to companies; the 
higher the debt-equity ratio the more risky the business 
becomes (Popoff and Cowan, 1985 and Foster, 1987). As 
disclosure is made to reduce risk and uncertainty, one can 
relate the extent of voluntary disclosure, therefore, to the 
extent of gearing. One could conclude, therefore, that 
companies with high gearing have an incentive to disclose 
information voluntarily. The disclosed information would be 
intended to explain why gearing is high, outline future 
prospects, and for forecasting expected revenues resulting 
from these additional borrowings. The hypothesis 
representing this relationship tested in this research is:
H4 THERE IS A POSITIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN 
GEARING AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE.
2.3.5.3 Size
Company size is considered a factor in determining a firm s 
vulnerability to internal and external changes. Most 
important, size is likely to influence companies' ability 
to expand and progress. For large companies, expanding their 
operations requires larger amount of funds than small 
companies. Or, capital needs of large companies are greater 
than those of small companies. For example, a large company
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planning for 10% growth in sales would require more working 
capital, in absolute terms, than the requirement of a 
smaller one aiming at the same growth rate. One could argue, 
therefore, that large companies' are likely to use markets 
to raise funds more than smaller companies.
As a result, and to attract investors to finance their 
growth, large companies are expected to disclose more 
information voluntarily than small companies.
Another reason for the possibility of large firms 
disclosing more information voluntarily than smaller firms 
would be related to the cost of producing such information. 
This results from two factors: first, large companies incur
lower information production costs as a percentage of the 
firm's total cost, and secondly, because of the lower 
absolute information production costs in large companies as 
their internal information and data collection systems are 
more advanced than those of the small companies.
Further, as large firms possess more information 
because of the volume of their activities and the 
sophistication of their internal information systems, they 
are likely to disclose more information voluntarily than 
small companies.
Empirically, Buzby (1975) among others (Cerf, 1962; 
Choi, 1972; Firth, 1976; Gray and Roberts, 1986) studied 
this relationship between voluntary financial disclosure and 
size of companies using different research settings. All the 
previous studies conclude that there is a positive 
association between size and the amount of voluntary
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disclosure.
In this research the hypothesis representing the 
relationship between size and voluntary disclosure tested 
is:
H5 THERE IS A POSITIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SIZE 
AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE.
2.3.5.4 Industry Sector
Lastly, the industry sector of a company is a vital 
determinant of a company's risk. Some industry sectors are 
considered, by their nature, more risky than others (Popoff 
and Cowan, 1985 and Foster, 1987). For example, high- 
technology industries are considered more risky because of 
shorter product life cycles and technological obsolescence 
due to the rapid changes in technology. Further, oil and gas 
companies, as their activities are associated with a 
strategic product that carries some political uncertainty, 
are expected to bear higher risk, political and business, 
than, for example, brewing companies.
The hypothesis representing the above proposition to be 
tested, therefore, is:
H6 THERE IS AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INDUSTRY 
SECTOR AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE.
2.4 SUMMARY
In summary, this chapter has identified the voluntary 
disclosure of financial information as a means of reducing a 
company's cost of capital which is the main objective of the 
information risk theory of voluntary disclosure. Moreover,
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the signalling theory provides a plausible explanation for 
management incentives to supply information voluntarily, the 
information that reduces the risk attached to the firm's 
securities.
Further, the chapter has developed the main research 
problem of this project and some of the other hypotheses 
that were tested, namely, the association between voluntary 
disclosure and firm characteristics that are related to a 
firm's risk beta.
As indicated earlier, capital market based theory is 
not the only explanation of voluntary financial disclosure. 
Theories of the firm gave researchers, also, a perspective 
on the role of financial information and reporting that is 
somewhat different from the perspective that emphasises 
information for investment decisions. The next chapter 
discusses theories of the firm in some detail and shows how 
they can be employed to explain the disclosure of financial 
information.
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THREE_______ ________ _ _______
THEORIES OF THE FIRM AND 
VOLUNTARY FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Theories of the firm attempt to develop an articulated and 
coherent view of firms and why they behave in a particular 
manner, i.e., what is specific and unique to the firm. Or in 
Coase's words, "to discover why a firm emerges at all in a 
specialised exchange economy" (Coase, 1937, p. 335). It is 
postulated that the business firm- in its typical form, the 
corporation - is managed, or at least should be managed, in 
the sole interest of the body of shareholders; employed 
workers and salaried managers are recruited from markets by 
the corporation solely to serve as instruments in achieving 
this goal.
This economic model of the firm has two aspects, 
"descriptive" and "normative". The descriptive aspect posits 
that the axiom of shareholders' sovereignty is a reasonable, 
scientific assumption on the basis of which essential 
characteristics of complex operations of the business firm 
can be explained and predicted. According to this model, the 
remuneration of employee's services is seen to be determined
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externally in the market-place, and all residual income 
accrues to the shareholders. The behaviour of the firm is 
then understood as reactions to market stimuli in order to 
maximise the residual gain. Disclosure of financial 
information can be viewed as one of these reactions.
The model viewed as a normative device, on the other 
hand, admits that actual corporate behaviour may deviate 
from the norm of shareholders' utility maximisation, but 
asserts that not only corporate performance, but also 
overall efficiency of the economy, would be improved if the 
divergence were to be checked. The implication is that the 
manager ought to (be made to) act as a shareholders' agent 
and that the workers should refrain from making excessive 
wage demands beyond the competitive rate through the intra­
firm bargaining apparatus.
The interest in firm behaviour started in the early 
1930s with the famous work of Coase (1937). Following that 
article a quiet period followed until the late sixties when 
the trend was reversed. With the growth in managerial and 
behavioural theories and the advancement of ideas on firms 
in comparison with markets, a new and substantial amount of 
literature has appeared since the 1970s. This development 
has resulted in revisions of the general understanding of 
firm behaviour.
The theories to be considered in this chapter seek to 
construct a rational conception of voluntary financial 
disclosure, based upon Coase s theory of the firm. According 
to the theories, the survival of the accounting function in 
general, and in particular the disclosure of information by
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firms, implies that this function is a component of a firm's 
efficient contracting process (Ball, 1987). These theories 
include the classical theories of the firm, namely, the 
managerial and the behavioural theories, and the newly 
developing agency theory. The following section review the 
classical theories and voluntary disclosure while agency 
theory is outlined in a later section.
3.2 CLASSICAL THEORIES OF THE FIRM AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
The following analysis adopts classical theories of the firm 
literature and employs these theories to explain voluntary 
financial disclosure and the incentives behind voluntary 
disclosure in general. For the purpose of this research the 
discussion will be divided into two parts. First, the 
managerial theories of the firm and their relationship with 
the disclosure of information are discussed. Next, the 
behavioural theories of the firm, their differences from the 
managerial theories, and how they could be applied to 
explain financial disclosure by firms are discussed.
3.2.1 The Managerial Theories
Theories of the firm can be characterised by two common 
features:
2. The firm is seen as a technological black box 
which combines market factors of production (with 
firm-specific resources) to produce market-able 
outputs. Its technological possibilities are 
usually represented by the production function, 
which specifies the amount of output correspond­
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ing to each feasible combination of factor 
inputs.
2. The rates of remuneration for the factors of 
production explicitly recognised in the theory, 
such as capital and labour, are assumed to be 
determined on a market that is external to the 
firm.
According to the theories, the sales price of the 
firm's output is assumed to be determined either by the 
market or by the firm facing a certain demand condition 
prevailing in the market. Two functions are usually 
attributed to the entrepreneur: risk-bearing and control.
However, an important feature of modern capitalism is the 
fade-out of the owner-managed firm from the mainstream of 
the economy, and the rise to a position of dominance of the 
large corporate enterprise. As a result, the management of 
activities of firms is becoming increasingly complicated, 
and therefore entrusted to professional managers. On the 
other hand, since the optimal portfolio for any investor is 
likely to be diversified across shares of many companies, an 
individual investor generally has no interest in personally 
overseeing the detailed activities of any firm. Managers 
appear to have captured the power to form corporate policy 
decisions.
3.2.1.1. Sales Revenue Maximisation Model
The Sales Revenue Maximisation Model, Baumol (1967), is 
based on the separation of decision making from control. 
Baumol developed the model after his own observations of the 
factors determining managerial salaries, prestige and
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status. According to this model, there are a number of 
reasons why managers may rank sales performance so highly. 
For example:
1. Salaries and status may depend on the size of the firm, 
determined by the growth of sales.
2. Growth of sales will tend to make it easier for the 
firm to attract external finance.
3. Distributors and retailers are more attracted to 
products with relatively high sales turnover.
4. Growth of sales is likely to result in an increase in 
market share which in turn would achieve competitive 
advantage to companies.
GROWTH IN PROFITABILITY HYPOTHESIS:
Using the above model one could argue that management is 
likely to disclose information voluntarily concerning sales 
and growth and the relevant indicators so as to signal to 
the concerned groups its activities and achievements and in 
that, the management attain extra salary, status, and 
prestige. However, disclosing growth in turnover alone would 
not convey the message to outsiders unless it is accompanied 
by disclosing information on profitability and its growth. 
This is due to the close relationship between sales turnover 
and profitability. It is argued that this relationship is 
an important indicator of a company's prospects and its 
potential as it shows how management is controlling the 
additional costs associated with the growth in revenues 
(Popoff and Cowan, 1985). Additional information, 
furthermore, is needed to describe in some detail in what 
areas or products the growth has occurred and any 
implications for the company, and its competitive position, 
or market share.
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However, Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986) argue that
large firms may prefer accounting practices that reduce 
reported profit to reduce their political exposure. Public 
scrutiny, it could be argued, would be directed towards 
profitable firms because society would claim that high 
profitability is a result of excessive pricing. This would 
encourage governments to regulate prices to appease public 
criticism. However, the applicability of this argument in 
the U.K. is debatable.
As the economy, since the beginning of the current 
decade, has been steered toward less government
intervention, one would find it difficult to accept that 
public pressure is an influencing factor. Further, political 
pressure, if it exists, would be directed towards large 
firms who are in a monopoly position.
According to the above analyses, the following 
hypothesis will be tested to investigate the relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and profitability:
HI THERE IS AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FIRM'S PROF­
ITABILITY AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE.
3.2.1.2. Managerial Utility Maximisation Model
Voluntary disclosure, also, is likely to reduce the moral 
hazard problem between management and shareholders. This is 
a direct application of the Managerial Utility Maximisation 
Concept (MUMC) developed by Williamson (1967).
The main assumptions of this model are that the 
shareholding group is unable to exercise direct control over 
management and that firm is operating in a market structure
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which is not highly competitive. In such circumstances 
Williamson examines the ways in which managers are able to 
pursue their own goals subject to being able to maintain 
control of the firm. According to Stein (1969), the personal 
goals of management, whether written or not, have a 
profound impact on the direction in which a firm moves and 
the way it operates. However, it is unlikely that management 
can ignore totally the influences of other groups. In 
particular, the interests of shareholders, employees, 
consumers, and the Government may determine the objectives 
of a firm or at least constrain the discretionary power of 
management. Therefore, the MUMC model is based on the 
maximisation of a managerial utility function which is 
dependent on:
1. Expenditure on staffing.
2. Managerial emoluments.
3. Discretionary investment spending.
Collectively the above categories of expenditure 
represent activities for which management has a positive 
preference. More formally, the model can be expressed as 
follows:
Maximise U = U (S,M,ID)
subject to Pr > Pmin + T
where:
S= staffing expenditure, especially on specialist 
administrative staff under control of management.
M= Management emoluments, consisting of the economic 
rent portion of managerial salaries (i. e. , payments 
above the minimum necessary to keep the managers in 
their present jobs) and corporate consumption in the 
form of "benefits in kind", which may have tax
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advantages and/or attract less attention from other 
groups in the firm.
Id= discretionary investment expenditure of profits, 
that is, the ability to allocate profits above the 
amount required to cover dividends to shareholders and 
the funding of projects necessary to fulfil 
expectations of the growth of the business. An example 
of this form of expenditure would be the undertaking 
of a challenging project even though it has poor 
profits prospects.
Pr= reported profits as published by the firm.
PBin= minimum (after tax) profit required to meet the 
expectations of shareholders.
T= corporate tax.
It is worth noting that this is a broad objective 
function in which the goals of management are placed in the 
context of profit.
Basically, the Williamson model is an explanation of 
how management can divert potential or realised profits from 
shareholders; for example, assume that the potential profit 
for a period is Pp , then Pr = Pp-M. Clearly, therefore, it 
is in the interests of the management to increase Pp if they 
want to increase M during that period. The ability to do 
this is reinforced by the high probability that only senior 
management is privy to information about potential profit.
Given the assumption of a fragmented shareholder group, 
it is likely that divulging information is one area where 
management has discretionary power. Disclosure of 
information by management, accordingly, helps management to 
signal to outsiders, e.g., shareholders, that M = 0 and
therefore Pr = Pp . The disclosing of information becomes 
more appropriate and more likely as outsiders' share in the 
company rises (this relationship has been stated as a
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hypothesis in a later section).
3.2.1.3. Corporate Growth Maximisation Model
The management's share of capital hypothesis can also be 
supported by the corporate growth maximisation model. At a 
time of continuous take-over raids, financial disclosure may 
help management in their defence against predators and 
reduce the risk of being dethroned. Marris (1964) suggests 
that managers are concerned about their job security in the 
sense of keeping control of the firm. The potential threat 
to this security is seen as the possibility of a take-over 
raid by another company, resulting in a new management team 
or reduced powers of the original management. The motivation 
for a take-over raid arises from a depressed share valuation 
of the firm below its economic value as judged by the 
bidding firm. In this context Marris argues that managers 
must find the right balance in their dividend/retention 
policy. Management failure to pay attractive dividends to 
shareholders, especially in cases where shareholders are 
only interested in short-term gains, will tend to depress 
the share valuation relative to other firms with a similar 
risk profile. If, therefore, job security alone were the 
determinant of managerial benefits, dividends would be 
maximised to support the share price and minimise the risk 
of take-over. But the primary goal of managers is that of 
increasing the size of the business and this involves a 
trade-off with dividend payouts assuming that managers find 
retained earnings the most attractive source of funds for 
expansion.
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As a solution to this dilemma, the disclosure of 
information becomes the appropriate way by which management 
communicate the relevant facts and explain the situation to 
the shareholders. This becomes important when a threat of 
take-over is more visible, i.e., where managers have no 
controlling or substantial shareholding in the company. By 
disclosing information, management distances the threat of 
take-over and holds on to its managerial power, and at the 
same time, the retained earnings that are necessary to 
continue the growth process.
One could suggest, however, that by disclosing the 
actual financial position, management might be in a 
disadvantaged position if the disclosed information reveals 
their incompetence. The opposing argument, nevertheless, is 
that sooner or later the real condition would be revealed in 
some way or another and management would not benefit by 
covering up the bad news. Any cover-up is likely to badly 
damage management's reputation and therefore their future 
employment prospects.
3.2.2 Behavioural Theories
The managerial models outlined above present a more 
realistic framework to capture the significance of 
managerial discretion and financial disclosure in situations 
where the ownership group is fragmented. To this extent the 
models are useful additions in terms of both their 
explanatory powers and their predictive qualities. Like the 
early informational risk and stewardship models, the 
managerial models yield specific predictions based on the 
objective function. For example, it was deduced from the
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sales model that management would disclose information 
concerning growth so as to signal to the concerned groups 
its success. The managerial models also introduce the 
possibility of an objective function consisting of 
conflicting goals, as in the Marris Model, with the complex 
trade-off between growth and valuation. A common feature of 
the models, however, is the development of a single 
objective function to be maximised in line with the 
completely rational behaviour of economic man.
The behavioural models, in sharp contrast, reject the 
concept of expressing corporate objectives as a single 
function to be maximised. This results from the 
behaviourists' rejection of the concept of "economic man" 
and their preference for the concept of "satisfying" 
behaviour as developed by Simon (1957). According to Simon, 
the decision makers set a "satisfactory" goal and searches 
for possible courses of action that will satisfy this goal.
Building on the foundations laid down by Simon, Cyert 
and March (1963) developed a general model of the firm from 
the perspective of organisational theorists. Their central 
theme is that the process of decision making within a large 
firm is the key factor determining the translation of 
information into decisions.
Cyert and March view firms as a coalition of different 
interest groups including managers, shareholders, employees, 
creditors, the government, etc. Unlike the managerial 
models, Cyert and March do not see a single universal 
objective function emerging from this situation but rather a 
sequential attention to different goals according to the
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perceived importance of that individual or group to the
coalition at the time. They argue that the objectives of the 
coalition are determined by three factors:
1. The bargaining process by which the composition and 
general terms of the coalition are fixed.
2. The internal organisational control process by which 
objectives are formulated and elaborated.
3. The process of adjustment to experience by which the 
coalition agreements may respond to environmental 
changes.
With regard to the composition of the coalition, 
different groups are likely to pursue their interests with 
different levels of influence. The concept of "side 
payments" is used to explain how an individual or group
might be pacified in circumstances when their personal 
interests are not completely satisfied. Side payments may 
take the form of cash or other means, such as increased 
status in the formal organisation or the appearance of 
increased status by such things as office size and 
furnishings.
If the individual or group has more influence on the 
coalition the side payments may take the form of some policy 
commitment. The shareholder group is seen as a relatively 
passive group whose demands are easily met for most of the 
time by policy commitments. The remaining members of the 
coalition, who want more than side payments, are labelled
the management or "active" group and it is this group that 
has most influence on the primary objectives of the
business. According to Cyert and March, instead of seeking 
maximum profits, management seeks to achieve a small number
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of operational goals framed in terms of aspirations levels 
for the period. Therefore, there is a high probability that 
goals will be conflicting to some extent. It could be 
argued, then, that the activity of disclosing financial 
information results from the above situation. As the 
different groups are likely to pursue their interests, and, 
at the same time, the "active" group, the management, has 
the most influence, the function of disclosing information 
serves to alleviate the doubts of the other groups, mainly 
the shareholding group (this view differs from agency 
theory, which will be explained in later sections, in that 
management is recognised implicitly here while in agency 
theory management is acknowledged explicitly as an important 
economic agent in coalition). Management would disclose 
information to satisfy these groups and allay their fears. 
Further, the information would aim to indicate that 
management's main objective is maximisation of shareholder 
wealth. As suggested earlier, this task becomes more 
essential when outsiders' share of capital is increased.
MANAGEMENT'S SHARE OF CAPITAL HYPOTHESIS:
Using the previously described models, namely, the 
managerial utility maximisation model, the corporate growth 
maximisation model, and the behavioural theories, one could 
hypothesise the relationship between management's share of 
capital and voluntary financial disclosure as follows:
H2 THERE IS A NEGATIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN 
MANAGEMENT'S SHARE OF CAPITAL AND VOLUNTARY 
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE.
The behavioural models serve also to explain the 
development of financial disclosure over time. With regard
61
to the composition of the coalition, there have been some 
changes recently, with the public in general and 
shareholders in particular gaining more influence in the 
coalition, and their opinion is being notably observed (The 
Financial Services Act, 1986). This change has led to 
increasing the prescribed amounts of obligatory disclosure.
As a description of modern firms, the Cyert and March 
model scores highly in terms of its realism. Furthermore, it 
offers some interesting insights into the way in which 
corporate objectives are formulated and the causes of change 
over time.
3.4 AGENCY THEORY AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
This section discusses the use of accounting information 
within the framework of the stewardship function, or, agency 
theory. One important facet of this theory is that 
accounting theory has come full circle back from the 
normative prescriptive approach to the agency theory 
approach, the old stewardship function, as the major goal of 
accounting.
According to agency theory, firms are viewed as legal 
artefacts designed to provide a contractual basis for 
sharing risks and providing incentives. Although accounting 
information is useful for predictive as well as 
retrospective purposes, i.e. the investment decision demand, 
this theory emphasises that it is this contractual use that 
is the principal objective of accounting information. For 
decades, leading theoreticians tried to prove that unless
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financial accounting and information in particular serve 
shareholders in their investment decisions, it has little 
raison d'etre. The agency theory reinstates this stewardship 
function and illuminates it from an entirely different and 
refined perspective. In comparison with classical theories 
the manager in principal-agency theory is recognised 
explicitly as an active partner, while in the classical 
theories the manager appears only implicitly as an agent to 
the shareholders (Aoki, 1983).
A study group of the AICPA in the USA issued a report 
which indicated that reporting on management's stewardship 
has long been recognised as a principal purpose of financial 
reporting and that stewardship refers to the competent 
management of resources and the implementation of plans for 
maintaining and using them (AICPA, 1973). This concept of 
management's stewardship was emphasised earlier by Freze and 
Mautz (1972). They argue that the view of accounting 
statements is that they represent a stewardship report by 
management in which it accounts for its use of the resources 
trusted to it by the owners of the company. The Councils of 
the Professional Accounting Institutes (1969) in their 
memorandum to the U.K. Board of Trade had suggested that the 
proposed Companies Act should include two types of 
companies, proprietary and stewardship and that they 
differed fundamentally from each other in that the 
stewardship company's owners do not participate in 
management but entrust it to outside appointees. They 
concluded that disclosure of information by the management 
of stewardship companies should be appropriate to their 
characteristics. Managers are fiscal agents for the owners
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of the firms.
To examine the relationship between the stewardship 
function and financial reporting, an understanding of the 
historical development of the stewardship concept is 
warranted. This relationship is discussed in the next 
section. In addition, agency theory, the modern label of the 
stewardship concept (Ronen, 1979) will be discussed in a 
later section.
3.4.1 Early Development of the Concept
Chen (1975) traces the concept back to the beginning of 
Christianity. The proposition of Christian theologians is 
that all property belongs to God, and God is the real owner. 
God created the earth and things, the goods and resources 
therein, and gave them to man as gifts. Therefore, man is 
the steward of God and has only derived ownership. In order 
to use this properly, possession of the property is 
necessary. Human ownership emerges when possession of 
property takes place. Possession is, however, not an end in 
itself. Rather, it is a means to make the use of property 
possible. In other words, the human owner, hereafter 
referred to as owner, has his responsibility to use the 
property in order to justify his right of possession. This 
is probably the original concept of the stewardship 
responsibility.
The stewardship concept, as have other related 
concepts, such as property and ownership, has changed over 
time. Changing economic conditions may require changes in 
social philosophy, or a prevailing social responsibility may
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influence economic conditions. During the Medieval Period, 
feudalism was a system of government comprising a group of 
nobles. These nobles were agents of their lords to whom they 
assumed a stewardship responsibility. The noble had a 
responsibility of taking care of the welfare of the property 
(Clough and Cole, 1952; cited in Chen, 1975). During this 
period the stewardship concept was characterised by the view 
that both the owner's and the society's benefits are to be 
served.
As a result of the development of Capitalism, this 
concept of serving both the owner and society has faded 
away. Under the new concept, the purpose of using property 
is entirely for the owner's interest. Adam Smith (1880), 
cited in Chen (1975) strengthened this concept, i.e. the 
natural right of an individual to acquire and utilise 
property .
The above-mentioned concept of stewardship was 
highlighted by the special records and books of accounts for 
the new accounting period. Those books and records were used 
to know what goods the merchants had in hand in the previous 
accounting period and provided information and a check on 
subordinates (Yamey, 1962). During seventeenth and 
eighteenth century accounting, the account-books revealed 
the scope of the stewardship concept which was reflected in 
the stewards concern over valuation methods and profit-and- 
loss estimations (for a review of accounting practices in 
this period see: Yamey, 1962).
The contemporary small businesses economy is a 
continuation of the last century concept of stewardship.
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This philosophy states that every economic agent in the 
economy is rational enough to maximise his personal self- 
interest, which Adam Smith considers is the primary 
inspiration force to economic growth. Besides small 
businesses expansion, a new spirit of capitalism has emerged 
since the end of last century. This new spirit has 
materialised through the growth of business in terms of size 
and the rise of joint stock companies. A new business 
organisation form has accompanied these new big companies, 
where a managerial class has evolved. Owners have had no 
continuous or close contact with the affair of their 
business or with the accounting books. To a large extent, 
owners have to rely for news of the outcome of the activity 
of their company on information supplied by the management. 
As a result, small shareholders are no longer owners of 
corporations in the traditional sense. They grant the 
management all power to control and utilise companies' 
resources. The ownership of companies, accordingly, is 
highly dispersed and the power of conducting companies' 
affairs is shifted to management. Management becomes the 
steward of the shareholders with the responsibility to 
realise their objectives, and the financial statements are 
sometimes referred to as reports of management's stewardship 
(Chen, 1975). The implication of the stewardship concept of 
accounting leads to management's reporting and disclosure 
policy.
3.4.2 Post-1970 Developments
The more recent contributions to the economics of the firm 
focus attention on three general areas: principals and
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agents, markets versus firms, and strategic firm behaviour. 
The area that is related to the subject of information, and 
financial information in particular, is the area of 
principals and agents, or agency theory. The discussion will 
be concerned with relationship between owners (principals) 
of the firm's capital and the managers (agents) of the firm. 
The agency model applies also to the relationship between 
manager and managed, but this area is outwith the scope of 
this research.
According to this theory, the principal commands the 
agent to take actions on the principal's behalf, motivated 
by a monetary reward. The environment in which all such 
actions are undertaken is one subject to uncertainties. In 
addition, the two actors, principal and agent, are likely to 
have differing information on matters of this uncertain 
world.
3.4.3 Basic Concepts
An important concept in this theoretical framework is that 
separation of control and risk-bearing between the manager 
and the shareholder is explicitly recognised. In this 
respect, the principal-agency theory parallels the classical 
theories. However, in the classical theories the manager 
appears only implicitly as an agent to the shareholders, 
while in the case of the newly developing principal-agency 
theory the manager is recognised explicitly.
Furthermore, explicit consideration of the consequences 
of uncertainty and information are essential for an 
understanding of the firm. Including uncertainties in the 
model means the outcomes are not linked in a deterministic
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manner with the inputs. As a result, knowledge concerning 
outputs does not explicitly indicate anything about effort 
or skill. If a soccer team wins a game of football, that 
does not necessarily mean they were the best team. 
Equivalently, if a firm reports big losses, this may be 
because of the strength of the pound, over which it had no 
control. Should the management be sacked? Accordingly, 
information and uncertainties are important factors that 
affect resource allocation within firms and they give rise 
to a number of problematic features, i.e. different economic 
actors do not share in common the same sets of information.
Information asymmetry is basic to an understanding of 
the agency model through which many perspectives of the 
organisation of the firm have been considered. Also, 
information asymmetry is the motivating force behind 
screening and signalling models which provide an explanation 
of a number of aspects of observed firm behaviour, the 
subject of a later section.
3.4.4 The Agency Model
The simplest model assumes that self-interested individuals 
enter into an implicit or explicit contractual arrangement 
where a principal delegates to an agent the responsibility 
for selecting and implementing an action. The agent is 
rewarded by the principal, with the principal being the 
residual claimant to the outcome of the agent's action, 
after payment of the reward. The principal's problem is to 
negotiate a contract defining the agent's compensation, 
knowing that their interests are not in complete agreement.
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In solving the problem, both actors are assumed to be 
motivated by self-interest. Therefore, the agent selects an 
action, given his/her private information and the 
compensation plan, in order to optimise utility. Also, in 
the light of the agent's self-interested actions, the 
principal selects a compensation plan to maximise utility.
The principal-agent problem, according to the game 
theory, is a two-person game. As principal and agent are 
driven by self-interest rather than communal interest, the 
game is a non-co-operative one. However, Aoki (1983) see the 
firm as a coalition of interests and accordingly analyses 
the relationships between the actors in terms of a co­
operative bargaining game. Although this explanation is 
contradicting the contractual viewpoint, both ideas look at 
the firm as encompassing a collection of interests.
From the viewpoint of the outcomes, the game is 
considered a non-constant sum game, as different actions 
give rise to different total outcomes.
In the economics of the firm literature, one can 
observe two approaches in analysing agency theory. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) call their approach the positive theory 
of agency and emphasise the institutional details of 
contracting and control. Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and 
Ross (1973) label their approach the principal-agent theory. 
This method tends to be more formal and helps to clarify the 
precise informational assumptions required for any 
particular model. However, both approaches look for 
contracts which minimise agency costs. Raviv (1985) views 
both approaches as one and assumes that they aim at
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developing a positive theory of how contracts are designed 
for the best interests of all actors involved. The framework 
of agency theory is that firms render themselves into 
nothing more than a nexus of contractual relationships.
The two basic problems associated with the 
informational asymmetries of agency models are commonly 
called moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard 
arises when the principal and the agent share the same 
information up to the time when the agent selects an action, 
but after that the principal is only able to observe the 
outcome not the action itself. A shareholder, for example, 
cannot observe a manager's daily activities but is able to 
observe the outcome. The principal has inferior information 
to the agent. The agent knows the action chosen, but the 
principal is unable to tell from observing the outcome alone 
which combination of action and state of the world has 
occurred. As a result, costless information about effort is 
always of value to the principal. In addition to the agent's 
effort, the pay-off to shareholders, which comes from the 
output, depends on outside factors.
The other problem, adverse selection, arises when the 
agent can use some information in selecting an action while 
the principal has no access to such information. .Then, even 
if the agent's action and the outcome are jointly observed, 
the principal cannot know whether the action was optimal 
given the agent's private information. For example, a 
shareholder may not share a manager's information that a 
higher profit might have been attained with a specific 
method of foreign exchange management, in which case the
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manager has a strong incentive to suppress such information.
According to new developments in the theory of the 
firm, (Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Williamson (1964, 1975);
Jensen and Meckling (1976, 1979); Fama (1980); Fama and
Jensen (1983); and Ball (1987)), there are different 
incentives to establish different organisational forms (e.g. 
corporations, partnerships, etc.) and there are costs 
generated by those organisational forms. One particular set 
of costs that arise from the conflict of interest among the 
various parties contributing to the firm is the costs of 
monitoring and enforcing the contracts between the key 
economic actors (the agent and the principal). These costs 
are called agency costs and they include the costs of 
structuring, monitoring and bonding a set of contracts 
between the parties involved.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) present a clear analysis of 
agency costs. According to them, there are three types of 
agency costs:
1. Monitoring Costs. These costs are paid for by the 
principal for monitoring the agent using procedures 
such as budget restrictions, operating rules, and 
reporting financial information (a report of the 
output).
2. The bonding costs borne by the agent to ensure that the 
principal's interest will not be harmed or to provide 
for retribution if such harm occurs. Such costs include 
audit costs and cost of explicit bonding against 
malpractice. An additional cost that is likely to be
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borne by the agent is the cost of disclosure if it is 
more cost effective for management rather than external 
parties to provide information.
3. The reduction in the value of the firm's shares which 
arises if current and potential investors detect that 
managers receive benefits and perquisites more than 
their share in the firm's capital.
According to Jensen and Meckling, the main assumption 
of the agency relationship is that all parties behave 
rationally and they expect others to behave the same way. 
This rationality assumption implies that the agency costs of 
a contractual agency will be included explicitly into the 
contract itself. For example, the pricing of debt would 
include the anticipation that equityholders would try to 
transfer wealth from the bondholders.
Another important result from the application of 
rational expectations is that security holders will not, on 
average, lose as a consequence of the managers pursuing 
their own self-interest. In the capital markets, the 
security price incorporates an unbiased expectation of the 
manager's actions and the consequences for the value of the 
security.
Similar problems arise if the firm is owned by 
diversified investors (multi-person) who do not manage it. 
Investors must hire a manager and their contract with him 
determines his motivation. Consequently, an incentive- 
informative report (concerning the business) will be 
valuable to them, and the more incentive-informative the
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report is the more valuable it will be. The owners can 
diversify, hence, they do not seek to share risk with the 
managers. But they will still value a report of the output. 
A report of the output is incentive-informative, 
particularly if the manager could otherwise retain the 
output for his own use, and a report of the output would be 
a key element in the risk sharing agreement that exists 
among the owners.
To gain further insight into the demand for financial 
accounting information, other variations of the basic 
principal-agent model warrant reviewing. First, the basic 
model considers a single period, but most accounting issues 
involve interrelationships between the actions and events in 
one period and the results in subsequent periods. Multi­
period models are considerably more complex than the basic 
model and only a limited amount of analysis has been done on 
them (Lambert, 1981; Fama, 1980; and Wilson, 1980). Since 
post-decision information for one period becomes pre­
decision information for all subsequent periods, the 
distinction between post-decision and pre-decision 
information in a multi-period context becomes less clear. 
This implies that planned production of additional public 
information at a particular point in time has value to a 
decision maker if it can be used either to enforce better 
prior contracts (stewardship demand) or to make better 
subsequent decisions (decision-making demand). Informative­
ness with respect to the state includes all events that 
influence aggregate output and asset specific variations in 
output, and agents actions are likely to be important
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information characteristics in multi-period contexts.
A second important variation in the basic model is the 
recognition of contracts with creditors, such as banks and 
bond holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 
1979; Holthausen, 1981; and Leftwich, 1981). Creditors often 
share risks with managers and owners of a firm because,
while their contracts may require fixed payments, these
amounts cannot be paid if the firm goes bankrupt. Management 
actions can influence the probability of bankruptcy, and
action that increases the value of the common stock can
sometimes increase probability of bankruptcy. Creditors 
recognise this and the prices of the capital they provide 
depend on their beliefs about the actions that will be 
taken. In order to obtain a favourable price the owners of a 
firm may be motivated to restrict the actions taken by 
management. Post-decision accounting information is often an 
important means of implementing those restrictions, e.g., 
credit arrangements often impose restrictions, such as a 
liquidity ratio, using accounting data.
3.4.5 Criticism of Agency Theory
Before reviewing the implications of agency theory, and for 
the purpose of completing the discussion, it is necessary to 
outline some of the criticism of the theory. As with any new 
theory, agency theory has created as much controversy as 
interest. However, most of criticism of the theory is 
directed at the methodology of the theory and at some of its 
basic assumptions.
The criticism of agency arises from two related areas. 
The first controversy stems from what Watts and Zimmerman
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considered to be a good theory and from their basic 
assumptions. The objective of the positive agency theory is 
to explain and predict accounting practice. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) suggest that the positive agency theory is 
distinguished from the classical normative theory. A 
normative theory seeks to prescribe what ought to be which 
in turn depends on both the objective and the objective 
function of the theory. In response, Whittington (1987) 
contends that agency theory is not free from value 
judgements or prescriptive implications. He argues that at 
the most basic level, the question asked implies a prior 
view of what is an interesting hypothesis, and at the level 
of empirical testing, value judgements can influence the 
choice of maintained hypothesis. However, agency theory 
literature has always assumed strong beliefs in efficient 
markets and the single period capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). Puxty (1985) echoes this point of view as well as 
Christensen (1983). Tinker, Merino and Neimark (1985) also 
suggest that the notion of a positive accounting theory is 
an illusion because researchers cannot be value-free or 
socially neutral. They list some value judgements and 
"articles of faith" that underline most of capital market 
research. One of such articles of faith they refer to is the 
assumption that the stock market remains an important 
economic institution under modern capitalism when only a 
small fraction of new capital raised is secured through the 
stock market: the primary source of funds being retentions.
Christensen (1983) argues that researchers face 
problems at two levels. At the primary level, are problems
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that concern the accounting entities. The second level deals 
with meta-problems which he considers related to the 
accountants, managers, and users. He suggests that the 
positive theory approach to accounting is of the kind in the 
meta-level where it is concerned with describing, 
predicting, and explaining the behaviour of accountants and 
managers, but not that of accounting entities.
For the purpose of this research, agency theory will be 
used without taking sides on the issue of positivism or 
normativity of the theory. This is considered to be 
secondary to the issue of the substance of the theory. This 
research, as it will be seen later on, uses variables that 
represent the firm as an integral economic unit. These 
variables reflect the interaction amongst firm constituents 
or the behaviour of accounting entities. The size of firm at 
any date represents a summation of the transactions that 
have involved investment decisions, financing decisions, and 
a wide range of economic factors.
3.4.6 Agency Theory Implications
The implications of agency theory are far reaching and cover 
all areas of finance, accounting and auditing. As this 
research is concerned with issues related to external 
financial accounting no attempt will be made to address the 
implications in the other areas.
The first important implication of agency theory is on 
financial disclosure and the need for regulating the 
disclosure of information. Relying on Coase (1937, 1950),
communicating information arises between the various parties 
as an efficient solution to these conflicts-of-interest.
76
Financial information that is included in annual reports is 
hypothesised to have arisen as part of this voluntary 
contracting process and it still serves to lessen some of 
the costs of control in modern corporations. It may be 
possible to increase the welfare of the principal without 
reducing the welfare of the agent by allowing communication 
between the principal and the agent. Disclosure of 
information at the time of pay-off realisation allows 
principals to make better estimates of the effort levels 
selected by the agents. This, therefore, allows a greater 
degree of risk sharing to take place without weakening the 
motivations to agents to act in the interests of their 
principals. The release of such information can help to 
eliminate any adverse selection problems arising from the 
agents access to insider information.
As accounting numbers represent the outcome of agent's 
actions, both the shareholders (the principals) and the 
management (the agents) rely upon the figures to administer 
the agency contract. Specifically, the accounting statements 
play an important part in monitoring the agent. Public 
dissemination of accounting numbers, is likely to help 
create an informed secondary market for shareholders' and 
bondholders' investments (Ball, 1987). Further, the numbers 
in the accounts is suggested to be used by the principal to 
set restrictions on the agent and are the base to compensate 
him. In the case of bondholders, the accounting numbers 
govern how much extra debt the company can borrow. It is 
argued, therefore, that management would manipulate the 
accounting methods that produce the accounting numbers so
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that they achieve their objectives, i.e. higher 
compensations from the shareholders and ability to borrow 
more funds from debtholders and creditors. Recent studies
have tried to test this phenomenon and explain the use of
specific accounting methods (Zimmerman, 1980; Hagerman and 
Zmijewski, 1979; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1980; Collins, 
Rozeff and Dhaliwal, 1981; and Leftwich, 1983). The studies 
have found an association between the use of accounting
methods and the contractual agreements between firms and
debtholders.
3.4.7.1 Size Hypothesis
The balance of evidence from other studies, in particular 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Dhaliwal (1980), Lilien and
Pastena (1982), Daley and Vingeland (1982) and Healy (1985), 
is that companies do choose accounting methods in order to 
reduce agency costs and not in a random manner. Firm size is 
considered as the variable that most consistently and
positively affects agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
They posit that because large firms need for external 
financing is greater than the need of small companies, 
agency costs for large companies is higher than that of 
small companies. To reduce these added agency costs, one 
could argue therefore, that large companies are likely to 
disclose more information than small companies.
Empirically, Salamon and Dhaliwal (1980) investigated
the relationship between size and voluntary disclosure. They 
concluded that a positive relationship exists between size, 
as a proxy for dependence on outside capital, and voluntary 
disclosure.
78
A related device used by management to reduce agency 
costs is voluntary auditing. Using an independent external 
auditor, it could be argued, is an activity that involves 
disclosing information voluntarily through the auditors. To 
reduce the monitoring costs arising from agency conflicts of 
interest, management may offer to have the firm audited by 
an external independent auditor. Chow (1982) used the agency 
theory model to investigate management's incentives to 
employ external auditors voluntarily. He postulated that 
auditing was more probable for larger firms since the 
marginal costs of auditing decrease for larger firms and 
there is a greater total potential wealth transfer, i.e., 
wealth transfer from debtholders and shareholders to 
management.
Chow's non-parametric tests indicate that voluntarily 
audited firms had statistically significantly larger size. 
His logit analysis also resulted in a statistically 
significant positive relationship between these variables.
The hypothesis representing the relationship between 
size and voluntary disclosure in an agency theory context 
is:
H3 THERE IS A POSITIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SIZE 
AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
3.4.7.2 Management's Share of Capital Hypothesis
One notion that is suggested affects the disclosure of 
information is the extent of outsider share ownership. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) have shown analytically that 
agency costs increase with the increase in the outsiders
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ownership share. They deal with the situation in which an 
entrepreneur raises funds by selling shares in the firm. The 
entrepreneur sells off most of the firm, retaining a 
fraction of the capital and continues as manager. The 
incentives for the manager to work and to consume perks at 
the firm's expense change as a result of going public. The 
manager receives the same benefits from avoiding work and 
from consuming perquisites whether the firm is wholly owned 
or partially owned by the manager. However, the manager 
shoulders only the fraction of the cost comparable to his 
share in the firm. If potential investors expect they are 
dealing with such kind of managers, an opportunistic 
manager, they will undervalue the firm's shares. This 
reduction in the value in the shares is called the residual 
loss, which is one element of the agency cost. To reduce 
this cost, managers disclose information to reveal their 
actual work and consumption of perquisites and alleviate 
outsiders suspicion. This suggests the hypothesis:
H4 THERE IS A NEGATIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN 
MANAGEMENT'S SHARE OF CAPITAL AND VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE.
3.4.7.3 Tax Status Hypothesis
A related indication of the extent of managers 
controllability of firm's affairs is tax status. According 
to the Inland Revenue regulations (Income and Corporation 
Taxes Act 1970, Section 282), a "close company" is one which 
is under the control of five or fewer persons or their 
associates or is under the control of its directors. A 
listed company is not a close company if shares carrying not 
less than 35% of the voting power are unconditionally and
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beneficially held by the public.
The consequence of this classification is that a close 
company is required to distribute at least 50% of trading 
income less Corporation Tax and all of its investment income 
less tax, unless large retentions can be shown to be needed 
for the continuing requirements of the business. If 
insufficient income is distributed, the company is assessed 
as having distributed the required total; the difference is 
apportioned to the shareholders, treated as paid to them.
If a company is a "close company", therefore, the 
statue assumes it is closely controlled by few shareholders 
or their agents, the management. Those few who control the 
company, accordingly, have direct access to the books and 
there is no need for the company to disclose any additional 
information to the public at large. Therefore, the 
hypothesis to test this argument is:
H5 THERE IS AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN A COMPANY'S 
STATUS, "CLOSE COMPANY" OR "NOT CLOSE COMPANY",
AND VOLUNTARY FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE.
3.4.7.4 Number of Substantial Shareholders Hypothesis
Another notion associated with outsiders share of capital is 
the number of persons (natural or legal) who own a 
substantial shareholding in the company, apart from the 
managers. It would be valid to assume that the larger the 
share of an investor in a firm the more vital this 
investment to her/him which in turn will lead to monitoring 
the investment more closely. The importance of substantial 
shareholdings and the role of such holdings is recognised by 
Company Act 1985 and the City. According to the Act,
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shareholders of 5 per cent or more of any public limited 
company should declare their identity. Recent suggestions in 
the financial press have indicated a growing concern over 
these substantial holdings and the government is now 
suggesting a reduction of the share to 3 percent.
Further, the management of the investee would look out 
for any movement of such investments with vigour mainly to 
watch any movements that could lead to a take-over bid. 
Managers, for fear of being removed from their jobs would 
try to keep such an important group of investors informed. 
This explanation echoes the previously discussed Corporate 
Growth Maximisation Model where disclosure of information 
is seen as a defence against predators. This suggests the 
following hypothesis:
H6 THERE IS A POSITIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE 
NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIAL SHAREHOLDERS AND VOLU­
NTARY DISCLOSURE.
3.4.7.5 Executive Share Option Schemes Hypothesis
The use of accounting information in contracts between 
agents and principals is suggested by Smith (1982) and Fama 
(1983). They argue that the compensation to managers is 
linked to firm performance. This is very clear in firms 
where the managers are the owners and equity agency cost is 
very small. In the case of manager-controlled companies, 
where the ownership is scattered, the agency cost of equity 
is high; here, agency cost is the perquisite consumption of 
managers and is borne by the owners. Healy (1980) suggests 
that owners in this case link the compensation of managers 
to their performance measured by the accounting numbers.
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Another way of using accounting numbers in the 
contracting process is through profit sharing and share 
options. Fama (1980) suggests that managers gain from 
profit-increasing accounting methods if their share in the 
profit is tied to their performance which, in turn, is 
measured by the accounting numbers. In the case of share 
options, accounting numbers are assumed to affect share 
prices and therefore using profit-increasing accounting 
methods would increase the managers' utility. Supporting 
this argument is the increasing concern of company 
management with the formulation of accounting standards 
which indicates at least a belief that financial reports do 
provide significant information for the evaluation of 
company performance (Zeff, 1978; Solomons, 1986).
The recent economic literature has analysed debt and 
management compensation contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Smith and Warne, 1979; and Fama, 1980). In explaining 
the form of those contracts, theorists assume information is 
produced to the point where private marginal costs equal 
private marginal benefits, and given that information, the 
market price of securities and the market compensation for 
managers incorporate rational expectations of future events.
One popular form of incentive schemes used by companies 
is the Executive Share Option (ESO) scheme. According to 
this plan, executives are given the option to buy shares 
from the company for a predetermined price and within a 
specific period of time. As a result of this arrangement, 
managers will be encouraged to increase the profitability of 
the business which would be reflected in the share price
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and, eventually, increase their personal wealth. In this 
situation, disclosing information concerning the business 
would help in reducing future uncertainties (as was argued 
in the previous chapter) and help the markets to value the 
shares upward reflecting their real value. This suggests:
H7 THERE IS A POSITIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE 
EXISTENCE OF EXECUTIVE SHARE OPTION SCHEMES AND 
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE.
3.4.7.6 Gearing Hypothesis
Agency costs arise from relationships other than that 
between managers and shareholders. Fama and Miller (1972) 
among others (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and 
Warner, 1979) have suggested that agency costs are higher 
for companies with proportionally more debt in their capital 
structure. Consider a company that is currently able to meet 
its debt commitments but will not be able to meet a future 
payment. Failure to repay debts will put a firm into 
bankruptcy. Also assume that a value-increasing investment 
is available at the current time but will not be available 
when the firm fails to meet the debt repayment and is put 
into bankruptcy. If the manager owns shares, he has no 
incentives to make the investment because all the returns 
accrue to the debtholders. Instead, the manager has an 
incentive to forego the investment and pay as large a 
dividend as legally possible at the current time. That 
action reduces the total value of resources available to the 
parties to the firm, or results in agency costs as 
debtholders will discount the value of debt to take account 
of this possibility.
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As management has an interest in not reducing a firm's 
value, disclosure of information could be used, accordingly, 
to avoid any reduction in the value of its investment. This 
relationship was also hypothesised by Leftwich, Watts, and 
Zimmerman (1981). However, their empirical results did not 
support their predictions.
For this research, the following hypothesis is to be 
tested:
H8 THERE IS A POSITIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN GEARING 
AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE.
3.4.7.7 Diversification Hypotheses
Public concern would also be directed to companies 
diversified in more than one line of business. This would be 
the result of investors and the political groups worrying 
over the margins the company is making from the different 
products or markets (Watts and Zimmerman, 1976). Excessive 
profit in any of the divisions could attract criticism and 
would render the company to more scrutiny and investigation. 
Also important is a firms' market share in the different 
products it produces. Any suspicions of monopoly over any 
product, service, or market would lead to a reference to 
special investigations and as a result would damage the 
company's reputation and its financial position. To clarify 
their positions and avoid such problems, companies are 
expected to disclose more information concerning their 
operations and mainly information in relation to divisions.
However, the counter argument’to the above opinion is 
that companies would not disclose detailed information as 
this will help their competitors (Gray and Roberts, 1986).
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Revealing such information could encourage rivals to pursue 
profitable products or strategies and cause more difficulty 
for the company. Moreover, disclosing segmental information, 
and especially in cases where some segments are making 
excessive profit, would invite public concern and could 
result in a government investigation.
To validate the above analysis the following hypothesis 
will be tested:
H9 THERE IS AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE EXTENT OF 
LINE OF BUSINESS DIVERSIFICATION AND VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE.
Political pressure and exposure applies also to 
geographically diversified firms. Disclosure of information 
may be intended to convey to the public and the political 
institutions how the company is contributing to the national 
economy. Also, geographically diversified companies may 
believe that disclosure would encourage other firms to trade 
with such companies because of their widespread experience.
From another point of view, disclosure of information 
may be inspired by the expectations of positive effects 
toward the company from foreign countries, as a consequence 
of the firm's experience in handling foreign operations. 
Operating in more than one geographical market becomes a 
prestigious activity that companies are willing to 
publicise.
For the opposing argument, one could say also that 
disclosing information regarding company's operations and 
activities in delicate regions would attract public concern.
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For competitors, disclosing geographical information would 
induce them to explore the profitable markets and avoid the 
loss-making areas.
Accordingly the next two hypotheses to be tested are:
H10 THERE IS AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN GEOGRAPHICAL 
DIVERSIFICATION AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE.
Hll THERE IS AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FOREIGN 
OPERATIONS AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE.
3.4.7.8 Non-Executive Directors Hypothesis
Looking at corporate annual reports and reading the 
financial press, one can observe that companies are 
increasingly including non-executive directors on their 
Board of Directors. The job of such directors is usually 
advisory. They bring and convey to the executive directors 
their experience which comes from their public and business 
life. These directors would also bring their wider business 
knowledge which may include better ideas and current (best) 
practices from other companies. Although the final decisions 
concerning accounting policies and disclosure are usually 
taking by the executive directors (Gray and Roberts, 1986), 
it is reasonable to conclude that non-executive directors, 
by virtue of their positions and presence, would influence 
their fellow executives and motivate them to disclose 
information about the firm for the purpose of reducing 
public concern in relation to the firm's activities. This 
variable represents one of the monitoring devices used by 
management to reduce agency costs (Leftwich et al, 1981). 
The hypothesis to test the above assessment is:
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H12 THERE IS A POSITIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE 
PRESENCE OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND 
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE.
3.4.7.9 Size of the Auditing Firm
Lastly, an additional incentive have been suggested by the 
literature as influencing disclosure of financial 
information, namely, the auditing firm (Singhvi and Desai, 
1971 and Firth, 1979). They argue that large auditing firms 
are more conscious of the public concern for information, 
and accordingly, they would press their clients to disclose 
more information. This will result in the enhancement of 
their position as the leaders of the profession. This 
suggests:
H13 THERE IS A POSITIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE 
SIZE OF AUDITING FIRM AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE.
3.5 SUMMARY
This chapter has analysed theories of the firm that explain 
voluntary financial disclosure. These theories are based on 
the idea that financial disclosure is one of the functions 
that is performed by firms as part of their normal course of 
business. Theories of the firm perceive the role of 
financial reporting and disclosure somewhat differently from 
the perspective that emphasises information for investment 
decisions (capital market theories).
Classical theories of the firm consider financial 
accounting as a tool (contracting process) to reduce 
conflicts of interest among the main parties of a firm 
(i.e., managers and shareholders). Efficient contracts 
reduce the conflicts of interest, thereby providing managers
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and other parties with incentives to maximise the value of 
resources that is shared among the parties. Therefore, 
managers and other parties to the firm have incentives to 
provide financial reporting that is cost effective in 
maximising the value of the firm.
While classical theories recognise management as one of 
the parties involved in the contracting process, it appears 
in the analysis only implicitly as an agent to the 
shareholders. In the case of the newly developing principal- 
agency theory, however, management is recognised explicitly 
as an active agent trying to maximise its share in the value 
of the firm's resources.
All theories of the firm, however, can be viewed as 
different facets of the transaction costs theory. Disclosure 
of financial information voluntarily is a contractual 
process intended to reduce contractual costs, and therefore, 
maximise the value of the firm. The difference between the 
theories is that each one gives different weights to the 
firm's constituents.
Relying on theories of the firm, it has been 
hypothesised that there is an association between voluntary 
financial disclosure and firm characteristics, i.e., size, 
gearing, profitability, extent of diversification, 
management's share of capital, number of non-executive 
directors, company's status, existence of share option 
schemes, number of substantial shareholdings, and size of 
the auditing firm. These proposed relationships are the 
hypotheses that will be tested and reported on in this 
research.
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THE UNLISTED SECURITIES MARKET
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In financing their operations, companies rely upon many 
sources. The three main sources of capital in the UK are 
internal funds, loan capital, and securities issues. The 
bulk of new capital funds of U.K. industrial and commercial 
companies comes from the internal sources and a major part 
of the rest from bank loans. TABLE 4.1 shows that funds 
raised by new issues have varied between 1980 and 1988. 
However, in 1988 they accounted for 8 per cent of the total 
funds raised by companies.
TABLE 4.1
Sources of Finance for U K. Companies (1980--1988)
Year Internal UK Capital Bank Other Total
Funds Issues Borrowing
1980 64 5 22 9 100
1981 65 5 18 12 100
1982 63 3 23 11 100
1983 78 6 5 11 100
1984 74 3 19 4 100
1985 70 9 17 4 100
1986 59 11 20 10 100
1987 53 17 20 10 100
1988 51 8 40 1 100
Source: Financial Statistics, HMSO, various issues.
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The above figures, however, do not show separately 
funds raised from new issues outside the U.K. However, even 
given this small contribution, the new issues market is 
still important and it occupies a large proportion of daily 
business and financial press comments, especially for small 
businesses.
The problem of finance for small companies is more 
acute than for large companies. While large companies and 
multinationals have easier access to other sources of funds, 
e.g. bank loans, small companies tend to need more equity 
capital appearing in their balance sheet as a signal of the 
owners' commitment to the company. Owners' investment in 
the company shows their seriousness and their willingness to 
bear part of the risk in the company which will, in turn, 
help the company to get access to other sources of capital. 
Also, small companies, usually expanding companies, are 
assumed to be more risky than large established ones (Popoff 
and Cowan, 1985). Therefore, share issues are a primary 
source of funding for them.
Suppliers of funds, and mainly the financial 
institutions, have their own reasons for not investing in 
small companies. An important one is that it is not economic 
for them to slice their funds into the relatively small sums 
required, especially with the high cost of assessing risk 
(Hoare Govett, 1988).
The problem of realising investments in the small 
companies is also an inhibiting factor for financial 
institutions and specialist funds who might invest in small
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companies. An investor in such businesses may lock
him/herself in, especially where there is a thin market for
the shares in the companies.
As a result of the above difficulties, small companies 
are forced to rely upon their own resources and their
owners-managers. Where these resources are limited, it has 
been difficult for such firms to grow and expand.
This problem has been a subject of concern in U.K. for 
a long time. The last major attempt by the government to 
study the problem was the setting up of the Wilson Committee 
in 1979. The Committee recognised that small companies are 
at a considerable disadvantage in financial markets (Wilson 
Committee, 1979). The Committee recommended tax relief for 
investors in Small Firm Investment Companies and a guarantee 
scheme for loans to such companies. At the time, the
Committee observed that there had been very few small firms 
seeking a quotation around the minimum size qualifying for 
listing. It was thought that the high cost of listing was a 
contributing factor.
4.2 THE UNLISTED SECURITIES MARKET
In its report, the Wilson Committee suggested that the 
Department of Trade with other parties should consider how 
best to promote the facilities of dealing in unlisted 
securities under rules 163(2) and 163(3). These transactions 
were an element in the Over-The-Counter (OTC) market.
The recommendations of the Committee were the basis of 
a consultative document published by the Stock Exchange
92
(Stock Exchange, 1979), and that was to lead to the 
establishment of the Unlisted Securities Market (USM) in 
1980. As recommended, the objective of creating this second- 
tier market was to provide opportunities for quotation for 
smaller companies for which the costs of entry and 
regulation in the main market were too high.
When companies decide to list their shares on either 
the USM or the main market they have to compare the benefits 
and costs of each listing. For small companies considering 
flotation and which have the necessary qualifications for 
the main stock market, an official listing on the USM is 
likely to be advantageous. Certainly the USM is the UK's 
secondary market and an eventual move to the "big board" is 
a legitimate goal for most successful companies. However, 
several significant limitations should be borne in mind. 
Limited marketability as a function of size and the amount 
of free equity, i.e. equity that is available to the public, 
will remain the same in both markets, USM and the main 
market. Further, the number of market makers are not likely 
to increase in the main market over night.
A discouragement to join the USM would be the policy of 
some institutional funds that limit the extent of their 
investment on the USM and therefore, would reduce USM shares 
marketability. To counter this problem, there has been 
over the past few years a substantial rise in the number of 
specialised company investors in the form of specialised 
funds investing in USM companies.
For the case of dynamic small companies which actively 
want to use the stock market the mechanics of acquisitions
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on the USM can be both simpler and less costly than those 
for the main market. Producing a significant number of 
listing particulars during a year is not a cost free 
exercise (Hoare Govett, 1988).
For the more important issue of visibility, there are 
around 1200 stocks on the main market with a capitalisation 
of £170m or less, and small USM size companies run a serious 
risk of simply being lost to view (ICC, 1987). The USM is an 
excellent smaller company universe and is followed as such 
by the financial press.
The specific reduction in the burden on companies 
wishing to join the USM, in comparison with joining the main 
market, is described below.
Firstly, a company joining the main listing is required 
to have at least 25 per cent of its equity in the hands of 
the public. While there is no minimum required for USM 
companies, the guidelines suggest having at least 10 per 
cent in the hands of the public or external investors. 
Another minimum requirement relaxed by the Stock Exchange is 
that of market capitalisation. For USM companies, no lower 
limit is specified, however, no company with less than 
£500,000 has been floated. Fully listed companies in 
comparison are required to have a £500,000 market 
capitalisation.
Another requirement for USM companies is to have a 
trading record of at least three years before joining the 
market. Companies having a trading record of less than three
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years can join the market under certain conditions. However, 
companies are expected to have audited figures that are not 
more than nine months old. In contrast, companies seeking a 
full listing are required to have a trading record for five 
years before joining the market and have audited figures of 
not more than six months old.
To reduce entry costs to small companies, the Stock 
Exchange has established special requirements that would 
minimise the burden on such companies. Firstly, no entry fee 
is required to join the USM while joining the main listing 
involves costs of about £15,000. On the other hand, an 
annual fee of £1,500 is required for the USM listing 
compared to fee scales from £500 to £3,500 for fully listed 
firms. Another type of cost that firms incur when deciding 
to join the USM is that of preparing accountant's reports. A 
long-form accountant's report is not required by the USM 
while this is required in the case of a full listing.
The USM started up with 23 companies admitted in the 
last few months of 1980. TABLE 4.2 shows the number of 
entrants to and exits from the USM since 1980 at 30 
September 1988 (Hoare Govett, 1988).
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TABLE 4.2
Entrants to and Exits from the USM since 1980 and 
Number Remaining at the 30 June 1987
Number
ENTRANTS:
Introduction 87
Placing 501
Offer for sale 89
Total Entrants 677
LESS: OUTS
Acquired 112
Reorganised 29
Suspended 12
Transferred to full list 124
Total Exits 277
Remaining 400
Source: Hoare Govett (1989).
4.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF USM COMPANIES
The companies floated on the USM are varied in character. 
Individual company market capitalisation varies enormously 
with the extremes marked by Stanhope at JEllOlm and Pertogen 
at £0.8m (at the end of September 1988) (Hoare Govett, 
1989). The average capitalisation per company for 1987/8 was 
£7.75m whilst free capital, i.e., that proportion not 
directly held by directors/related interests was 41% per 
company.
As regards profitability, a few of the companies have 
suffered losses, and most of these have been oil exploration 
or property companies. TABLE 4.3 analyses the companies by 
industry and pre-tax profits one year prior to flotation. 58 
per cent of these companies have had profits of between 
£200,000 and just under £lm. (Peat Marwick, 1986).
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TABLE 4.3
Number of USM flotations to 31 March 1985 by pre-tax profits 
one year prior to flotation and sector (E'000)
Loss 1-199 200-400 500-999 1,000+ Total
Hire purchase 
& leasing 1 1 1 3
Beers, wines 
& spirits _ 1 1 3 2 7
Building, timber 
& roads _ 2 3 6 3 14
Chemicals <5 
plastics 1 _ 3 2 6
Drapery & stores 1 1 6 9 4 21
Electricals 4 10 23 30 6 73
Engineering - - 1 - - 1
Food & groceries 1 1 6 2 3 13
Hotels & catering - 4 2 1 - 7
Miscellaneous
industrials 9 15 20 20 2 66
Insurance - - 1 1 2 4
Leisure - 4 9 2 8 23
Motor & aircraft - - 3 3 - 6
Newspapers - - 1 1 - 2
Paper, printing & 
advertising _ 1 14 3 2 20
Property 6 7 5 3 3 24
Textiles - - - 1 - 1
Trusts, finance & 
land 1 4 3 3 1 12
Investment trusts - - 1 1 - 2
Oil & gas 7 4 1 6 3 21
Plantations 1 1 - - - 2
Miscellaneous - 1 1 2 2 6
Total 31 57 105 100 41 334
Per cent 9.28 17.06 31.44 29.94 12.28 100.0
Notes: (1) the data for 30 per cent of the companies related 
to a period of less (or in some cases more) than one year.
(2) The totals include companies for which profits were nil. 
These amounted to 5.1 per cent of the number of companies.
(3) Profits in foreign currencies were converted at exchange 
rates obtaining after the end of the period.
* Source: Calculated from Peat Marwick McLintock (1987).
The USM provided some 81% growth in share prices in 
1986/87 (17% for 1985/86) against around 54% for the All-
Share index (21% for 1985/1986) (Hoare Govett, 1989).
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However, due to the October 1987 Crash, the rise for the 
first nine months of 1987/88 was only 17.4% against 8.7% for 
the All-Share index. Further, the growth in average size in 
the 12 months up to September 1987 was +114% in contrast 
with the 82% rise in market price performance as measured by 
the DataStream Leaders Index (Hoare Govett, 1988).
Originally, the USM was dominated by oil and gas 
companies. Later on, financial, property, leisure and 
electrical companies, and especially those in computers, 
grew in importance. However, in terms of its most recent 
history, the main feature of the USM has been its 
increasingly broad profile. Most recently, service companies 
in the design, consultancy and advertising sectors have been 
prominent among flotations.
For number of employees, very few of the companies 
floated have had large numbers of employees; 67 per cent 
have had less than 200 employees in the U.K.
Lastly, on closer examination one can notice the 
increasing significance of the international representation 
on the USM and mainly from the USA. A total of 33 foreign 
companies from the U.S.A. (17), Ireland (13), Canada (2), 
and France (1) were listed at the end of September 1988. 
The attractions of the USM to smaller companies from the USA 
is obvious: entry procedures are both less onerous and less 
costly.
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4.4 ADVANTAGES OF SECURITIES MARKETS-FOR THE ECONOMY
The implications of securities markets in general and the 
Unlisted Securities Market in particular on the performance 
of firms and in turn on the economy as a whole are of major 
importance. One implication is the allocative efficiency of 
the stock market. There are three ways in which securities 
markets (primary or secondary) can influence the use of 
funds supplied to firms (Peasnell and Ward, 1985). The first 
is the demand by investors in the secondary market for up- 
to-date information from companies. New issues for any
company are few; but as USM companies are in the expanding 
stage, and in order to ensure future issues success, firms 
must comply to investors' demand for information to be 
listed. Stock Exchange regulations go some considerable way 
beyond the Companies Act requirements. These disclosures are 
widely disseminated and will be used by analysts 
continuously to monitor the performance and financial
results of companies which also leads to direct questioning 
of management concerning their use of the resources 
available to them.
The second way the markets can influence the use of 
resources is in the feeding back of information to 
companies' managements. This starts with the financial
analysts who analyse and appraise the shares of companies.
In their appraisals and published reports, analysts can 
substantially influence share prices. Share price movements 
are one indication of management performance. As a result, 
companies may react to share price movements, and in 
particular a sustained fall in the price, by appointing new
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management or changing the present management policy.
A third and more important effect of securities markets 
on the allocative efficiency of resources occurs in cases of 
take-over. Companies launch take-over bids for different 
reasons, such as: establishing a foothold in a new market, 
acquiring a rival company to eliminate competition, or to 
expand in a growth industry. However, companies justify 
their bids by suggesting that the bidding company will be 
able to achieve better utilisation of the assets than the 
existing management. The take-over, the threat of take-over, 
and the timing of launching the bid is usually affected to 
some degree by the state of the stock market.
4.5 ADVANTAGES OF FLOTATIONS-FOR THE COMPANIES
The advantages of flotation for USM companies and their 
shareholders are considerable. The main attractions are 
outlined in this section. Firstly, for the existing 
shareholders, listing of their company's shares enables them 
to realise the values of their shares easily which would 
otherwise be difficult to achieve. A related advantage of 
the USM to shareholders is the availability of a fair 
valuation of their shares. The USM has shown that companies 
with perceived potential for outstanding performance can 
command premium ratings (ICC,1987).
For companies and their growth ambitions, quotation 
makes it easier and usually cheaper to raise additional 
capital. Any possible subscriber to new equity capital would 
know that he/she can dispose of and realise the value of
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shares easily in future times. After quotation, further 
issues, such as rights issues and fixed interest stocks, can 
be at a lower cost than the initial flotation. As an 
illustration of the market's success as an avenue of fund 
raising for small companies, since 1980, USM companies have 
raised £1.85bn, comprising £1.12bn at flotation and a 
further £0.73bn in subsequent rights issues (Hoare Govett, 
1988).
Further, the empirical evidence suggests that companies 
seeking USM flotation are high growth firms (Hall and 
Hutchinson, 1988). Getting a stock market quotation improves 
a company's rating which results from the public awareness 
that companies who get listed adhere to high standards of 
disclosure and monitoring. The high publicity surrounding 
the issue tends to give companies a higher profile which 
should help in attracting new opportunities, e.g., fund
expansion by share issues where dividends yields required 
are substantially below interest rates supported on loan or 
overdraft finance (Peat Marwick Mclintock, 1985, 1987).
In addition, where a company is looking for expansion 
through take-over bids, having its shares listed would make 
such expansion easier and possibly cheaper. Shares may be 
issued as an alternative or partial means of funding the 
take-over. The expansion can be made, therefore, without 
using its cash resources or without new loans and
accordingly increasing gearing. During 1986/87 it is 
estimated that USM companies had made some 322 acquisitions 
involving £1000m. (Hoare Govett, 1989). However, the 
estimations for 1987/88 indicates that as much as 350
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acquisitions had been made at a total cost of around £845m. 
Further, most purchases have been with shares accompanied by 
a formula of deferred payments.
In the case of small single shareholder companies, 
which many USM companies are, flotation can allow 
shareholders to relinquish their control. This is desirable 
where family controlled companies face the problem of 
finding a succession party. Also, some companies may float 
their subsidiaries with share schemes as an incentive to 
their management.
For companies floated on the USM, there is an extra 
advantage from the cost point of view. It is significantly 
cheaper with less restrictive regulations. When companies 
advertise and promote their shares to the public in the 
national newspapers, the requirements of the USM are less 
than these for a full listing. Also, the proportion of 
equity that must be publicly held can be as little as 10 per 
cent compared with 25 per cent for a full listing. This is 
an important advantage for companies controlled by few 
shareholders who do not wish to relinquish too much equity 
early on and yet know that they can realise more wealth at a 
later date.
4.6 METHODS OF FLOTATION ON THE USM
There are three different methods for a company to obtain a 
listing on the USM. The first and cheapest method is an 
"introduction". According to this method, permission is 
given to a company to introduce its shares to the market and 
to start dealing in the shares that are already issued. For
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this method to be used, 10 per cent or more of the share 
capital must be already widely held by members of the public 
who are unconnected with the directors or major 
shareholders. This method had been used in 20 per cent of 
the flotations carried out in the USM (Peat Marwick 
McLintock, 1988).
The most popular method is, however, a "placing". A 
placing may be used only where total market capitalisation 
after the issue will not exceed £15 m. and the total value 
of the shares placed, which may be wholly or partly newly 
issued to raise additional capital, does not exceed £3 m. A 
company can achieve the necessary 10 per cent public holding 
of shares and permission for them to be traded in the USM by 
having them placed by an issuing house and immediately after 
that operation be admitted to the USM. The issuing house, 
stockbrokers or merchant bank, purchases the shares and 
sells them to its clients. The regulation requires that at 
least 25 per cent of the offered shares be placed with 
dealers (other than the issuing house) so that they may be 
purchased by the public. Placing accounts for about 65 per 
cent of flotations.
Lastly, the most expensive method is an offer for sale 
by "subscription". This method, used by about 15 per cent of 
companies, is the least popular and involves advertisements 
in the Financial Press. The necessary public holding of 
shares for admission to the USM can be achieved by offering 
them at a fixed price or a minimum tender price through an 
advertised offer for sale.
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TABLE 4.4 shows the costs associated with obtaining 
listing on the Official List and the USM. The examples are 
based on a company with market capitalisation of £10 m. at 
issue price and funds raised of £2.5 m. for the Official 
Listing and £2 m. for the USM. TABLE 4.4 also indicates that 
the cost of obtaining an official listing is higher in 
general and for all forms of quotation than obtaining a USM 
listing.
TABLE 4.4
Range of costs for obtaining a quotation on the USM and 
Official List (£'000)
Introduction Placing Offer for sale
1. USM:
Issuing house/sponsor 25-35 35-50 35-50
Stockbroker 0-10 0-20 0-20
Underwriting - - 40
Reporting accountants 5-15 20-40 20-40
Capital duty - 20 20
Solicitors 10-15 20-30 20-30
Advertising 4 4 20-60
Printing 2-5 15-25 30-30
Receiving bankers - 2-4 8-12
Public relations 2-5 5-10 0-10
Stock Exchange fee 1.5 1.5 1.5
Average Range 49.5-90.5 122.5-204.5 184.5-313.5
2. Official List:
Issuing house/sponsor 30-40 50-70 50-70
Stockbroker 0-10 0-25 0-25
Underwriting - - 50
Reporting accountants 20-40 20-40 20-40
Capital duty - 25 25
Solicitors 10-15 20-30 20-30
Advertising 4 30-50 70-100
Printing 2-5 15-25 20-30
Receiving bankers - 2-4 8-12
Public relations 2-5 5-10 0-10
Stock Exchange fee 4 4 4
Average Range 72-123 171-283 267-396
Source: Peat Marwick Mclintock (1988).
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Further, TABLE 4.5 describes the average cost of 
flotation on the USM for the year 1st July 1987- 30th June 
1988. For all types of flotation the larger the amount of 
money raised the larger the average cost. However, for the 
offer for sale method the average cost for the minimum money 
raised (£350,000 for raising up to £5 m) is around the 
average cost for raising the maximum amount in the case of 
placing (£344,000 for raising over £4 m).
TABLE 4.5
Average costs of flotation on the USM in the year: 
1st July 1987- 30th June 1988
Method of Money raised Total market Average
flotation capitalisation Cost
£000 £000 £000
Introduction N/A N/A 234
Placing 0- 1,000 130
1,001- 2,000 195
2,001- 3.000 277
3,001- 4.000 269
Over 4,001 344
0- 4,000 129
4,001- 8,000 187
8,001-12,000 255
12,001-16,000 307
16,001-20,000 294
Over 20,000 327
Offer for 0- 5,000 393
sale 5.001-10,000 608
15,001-20.000 850
0-15,000 331
15,001-30,000 898
30,001-45,000 532
Over 45,001 900
Source: Peat Marwick McLintock (1988).
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4.7 SUMMARY
This chapter has addressed, firstly, the general 
difficulties facing small companies in raising enough 
funds to carry out their projects and operations. 
Thereafter, the chapter discussed the motivations behind the 
creation of the USM market and its operation as expressed in 
the Wilson Committee report of 1979. Special attention was 
given to the advantages both to the economy and companies, 
of a stock exchange quotation and in particular the 
advantages of a USM listing.
The chapter has, also, outlined some of the USM 
companies' characteristics. Empirical evidence, for example, 
suggests that companies seeking USM listing are high growth 
firms. Finally, a comparison was developed, and in 
particular for the cost of listing, between listing in the 
fully Listed and unlisted securities markets.
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DISCLOSURE REGULATION AND 
THE UNLISTED SECURITIES MARKET
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The Companies Act 1985 lays down minimum statutory 
requirements for the preparation of company accounts. These 
requirements are supplemented by:
(a) Statements of Standards Accounting Practice;
(b) The Stock Exchange's Listing requirements.
This chapter reviews the disclosure requirements 
contained in the above sources of regulation. The discussion 
covers the requirements published up to 31 May 1985, as this 
is the cut off date for this research. The Act applies to 
groups of companies in the same manner as it applies to 
individual companies. However, throughout the chapter the 
terms company and group are used interchangeably.
For USM companies, the subject of this research, the 
disclosure requirements of the Companies Act 1985 apply in 
full. Also applicable in full are the Statements of 
Standard Accounting Practice (SSAPs). However, there are 
special Stock Exchange requirements which apply only to the
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USM companies. These requirements differ from the full 
listing requirements and will be discussed later in this 
chapter.
5.2 THE COMPANIES ACTS
Before looking in detail at the current disclosure
requirements for USM published accounts as specified in the 
Companies Act 1985, a brief look at the situation before 
1985 is warranted, as the current accounting regulatory 
environment in the U.K. is a result of the continuous
historical development in the meaning of accounting,
information, and regulation (APPENDIX 1 lists the 
developments of statutory regulation of accounting 
disclosure in the U.K.). The Companies Act 1948 was the 
basis of modern company legislation. It contained several 
detailed disclosure requirements, but, most importantly, it 
had the over-riding requirement to show a true and fair 
view. The meaning of a true and fair view is of crucial 
importance. One accounting interpretation of the true and 
fair view, which is a technical one, is that financial 
statements are prepared on the basis of generally accepted 
accounting principles, or, current accounting practice
(Popoff and Cowan, 1985). In short, it means whatever the 
accounting profession currently thinks it means (Taylor and 
Turley, 1986). Parliament had deliberately decided, 
following centuries of historical and legal tradition, that 
the precise definition of what is necessary in order to give 
a proper impression of the financial results and position of 
a business is a technical accounting matter and should 
therefore be left to accountants. Parliament would lay out
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guidelines, and would establish certain minimum
requirements, but would leave the fine tuning to the
accounting profession, either through published 
recommendations or general practice.
Flint (1982) states that U.K. financial reporting
practice has followed a path which makes those qualified by 
training and experience able to give an independent 
judgement about the conformity of the published statements 
with the general principle prescribed by the law. The
general principle Flint refers to is that which gives a
true and fair view.
5.2.1 Pre 1948
Company law has changed over time and since the introduction 
of a true and correct view in 1844. In 1948 the word correct 
was dropped and replaced by fair. The change has made this 
principle more flexible. Before 1900, Benston (1976) 
suggests, the social and economic conditions prevailing were 
laissez faire. This philosophy meant that the financial 
affairs of a business were considered to be its private
concern and that disclosure of information was competitively 
disadvantageous (Benston, 1976). As a result, there was an 
absence of any regulation in matters concerned with 
accounting and disclosure until 1900. The exceptions were in 
sectors of public interest, such as insurance and railway
companies, where failure would cause damage to the public at 
large.
At the beginning of the current century, attention was
focused on the efficient allocation of capital. As a result,
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the role of information was seen to be to encourage this 
allocation process. At the same time, the need for 
information was identified with those of investors looking 
for the maximum return on their capital. Regulations, 
consequently, changed to encompass the new social and 
economic needs.
The 1907 Act required a submission of the balance 
sheet, without clear format, to the Registrar of Companies. 
Moreover, in 1929, The Companies Act made it compulsory to 
prepare and submit a profit and loss account to 
shareholders. As with the balance sheet, no guidance was 
provided regarding the format and the contents.
Another reason for the development of company law was 
the series of scandals and business failures in the first 
half of the current century (Ross, 1965). He lists the 
failures at the Royal British Bank in 1856, the collapse of 
the City of the Glasgow Bank in 1878 and the Royal Mail case 
in 1921.
5.2.2 Companies Act 1948
The year 1948 is seen as the turning point in disclosure 
legislation. Disclosure requirements were introduced for the 
first time. The quality of the financial information was 
emphasised by requesting an audited profit and loss account.
In summary the Act included the following requirements:
1. All companies were required to prepare balance sheets 
and profit and loss accounts together with a director s 
report and an auditor's report and to present the above 
documents to the shareholders in the annual general
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meeting. Also, where one company had a controlling 
interest in another, the holding company was to prepare 
and present group accounts reflecting the group's 
financial position and profitability.
2. The newly prescribed accounts were extended to include 
individual items of information in the statements and 
supporting notes. Schedule Eight of the Act specified 
minimum disclosure requirements.
5.2.3 Companies Act 1967
The format of disclosure in the 1967 Act did not differ from 
that of 1948. However, disclosure requirements were extended 
to include more information as a response to the Jenkins 
Committee's recommendations (Companies Act 1967). Turnover 
and its method of computation, interest payable, auditors' 
fees, and charges in relation to plant and machinery were 
required to be included in the statement and accompanying 
notes.
With regard to group accounts, disclosure requirements 
were extended to include details such as subsidiaries' names 
and their country of incorporation.
Finally, the directors' report was given more weight by 
requiring more general information to be included in it. 
Information on turnover from exports and each major class of 
business were required. Also, directors interests in the 
business, such as business contracts and their 
shareholdings, were required. Commenting on the rationales 
of the 1948 and 1967 Acts, Taylor and Turley (1986) argue 
that one could notice that the earlier Act was concerned
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with reporting information that reflects the stewardship 
objective of financial disclosure. This was displayed by 
requiring disclosure of information such as fixed assets, 
current assets, and the movements in reserves. However, 
Taylor and Turley suggest that it is possible to view some 
of the disclosure requirements of the 1967 Act as being 
related to the objective of assessing future performance and 
cash flows rather than the objective of stewardship. 
Interest payable, breakdown of loans between short and long 
term, and the details of future capital expenditure are 
examples of future performance and cash flow related 
information. One could see, from the above events, a trend 
towards requiring information related to investment 
decisions.
5.2.4 Companies Act 1976
The 1976 Act introduced changes in the administration of 
companies' affairs rather than changes in the accounting 
aspects of companies' regulations. However, some disclosure- 
related matters were added. For example, an accounting 
reference date for each company was required. Further, new 
requirements were introduced in relation to accounting 
records in that these records must be sufficient to 
represent the company's activities as well as providing the 
basis for true and fair accounts.
5.2.5 Companies Act 1980
This Act represents the first influence of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) upon companies' legislation in the 
UK. The main thrust of the Act, which implemented the EEC 
Second Directive, was the reclassification of companies into
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private and public. One of the provisions of the Act was 
concerned with payment and maintenance of capital of public 
companies and with defining distributable profits.
For financial disclosure, the Directive and the Act did 
not introduce any new changes or new requirements.
5.2.6 Companies Act 1981
The EEC Fourth Directive was enacted with the purpose of 
regulating and harmonising financial accounting disclosure 
aspects of companies' affairs. As a result, a new Act was 
introduced in the UK to reflect the developments that had 
appeared in the Fourth Directive. This new Act introduced 
changes in information reporting practices which include the 
format of published accounts, the principles of accounting, 
and detailed disclosure requirements.
Firstly, the Act regulated the format of the annual 
accounting statements and limited the alternatives that 
companies could choose from. However, the practical impact 
of this change was generally minimal, as most companies were 
following a similar pattern or format at the time when they 
enjoyed the flexibility of the previous laws.
With regard to the basic principles of accounting and 
reporting, the Act incorporated the already accepted and 
recommended (by the profession) accounting principles in the 
statute book. Also, the true and fair view was stated as an 
overriding requirement and could be used to justify 
departure from other requirements in exceptional 
circumstances.
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The third impact was related to the disclosure 
requirements. On the one hand it modified the disclosure 
requirements for small and medium sized companies by 
reducing their public disclosure burden, i.e. filing with 
the Registrar of Companies. However, disclosure to 
shareholders was kept the same for all companies. On the 
other hand, financial disclosure was extended through 
requiring companies to report cost of sales in the profit 
and loss account and extended in the directors' report by 
including a review of the business and a statement on future 
prospects.
5.2.7 Companies Act 1985
Current financial reporting practice in UK is governed by 
the Companies Act 1985. After decades of development and 
expansion of the legal requirements in UK, the government 
and those involved in interpreting and applying company law 
felt the need to combine the previous 1948, 1967 and 1981
Companies Acts together. As stated by the government (Taylor 
and Turley, 1986) the objective of the consolidation of the 
previous Acts was to provide a thorough reorganisation which 
would allow shareholders to more readily identify and more 
easily understand their rights, and assist companies to more 
efficiently and effectively discharge their legal 
responsibilities and obligations. From this reasoning, one 
could deduce that the objective of financial reporting is to 
satisfy the stewardship objective. This, however, is 
contrary to the general perception that the trend in 
disclosure requirements has moved from fulfilling a 
stewardship objective to satisfying the needs of investors 
for information regarding future prospects and cash flows.
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Part VII of the Companies Act 1985 outlines the
accounting and disclosure legal requirements that are 
applicable to USM companies. In this part, no significant 
changes from the previous Acts were introduced. Rather, 
detailed disclosure requirements in relation to the format 
and contents of the accounts, the notes to accounts, and the 
directors' report are contained in Schedules (Schs) 4 to 10.
The overriding requirement of the Act is to show a true 
and fair view of the state of the company's affairs. This is 
expressed in Section (Sec) 228:
1. A company's accounts prepared under Sec. 227 shall 
comply with the requirements of Sch 4 (so far as 
applicable) with respect to the form and content of the 
balance sheet and the profit and loss account and any 
additional information to be provided by way of notes 
to the accounts.
2. The balance sheet should give a true and fair view of
the state of affairs of the company as at the end of
the financial year; and the profit and loss account
shall give a true and fair view of the profit and loss 
of the company for the financial year.
3. Sub-Section (2) over-rides:
(a) the requirements of Sch 4, and
(b) all other requirements of this Act as to the
matters to be included in a company's accounts or
in notes to these accounts;
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and accordingly the following two Sub-Sections have 
effect;
4. If the balance sheet or profit and loss account drawn 
up in accordance with those requirements would not 
provide sufficient information to comply with Sub- 
Section (2), any necessary additional information must 
be provided in that balance sheet or profit and loss 
account, or in a note to the accounts.
5. If, owing to special circumstances in the case of any 
company compliance with any such requirement in 
relation to the balance sheet or profit and loss 
account would prevent compliance with Sub-Section (2) 
even if additional information were provided in 
accordance with Sub-Section (4), the directors shall 
depart from that requirement in preparing the balance 
sheet or the profit and loss account (so far as 
necessary in order to comply with Sub-Section 2).
6. If the directors depart from any such requirements, 
particulars of the department, the reasons for it, and 
its effect shall be given in a note to the accounts.
The following section describes in some detail the 
financial disclosure requirements of the Act which must be 
complied with by USM companies.
5.2.7.1 The Format
Section 228 contains the requirement for accounts to be 
prepared in a standard format. However, a choice of formats 
is permitted: two balance sheet formats and four profit and 
loss account formats are available to choose from.
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Generally, USM companies adopt the format which they are 
most easily able to comply with, for example, by using the 
type of format used internally.
Also, corresponding amounts for the previous financial 
year must be shown for every item in the balance sheet, 
profit and loss account, and notes to the accounts. This 
implies using the same format consistently, unless, in the 
opinion of the directors, there are special reasons for a 
change, in that case details of the change and the reasons 
for it must be given in a note to the accounts (Sch 4).
5.2.7.2 Directors' Report
Section 239 requires that a directors' report is one of the 
documents to be included in each company's annual accounts. 
The report must disclose the principal activities of the 
group during the year (Sec 235,2). Sec 235,1,a requires, 
also, disclosure of a fair view of the development of the 
business during the year. However, the Act gives no guidance 
as to what constitutes a fair view. Looking at the sample 
companies, one would see that the directors' review is brief 
with comments concerning only material developments.
In respect of future developments, Sch 6,75,b requires 
directors to disclose an indication of likely future 
developments in the business of the group. This legal 
provision does not give any indication that firms should 
disclose any quantitative forecasts. Moreover, using the 
term likely gives the impression that it is up to the 
directors to decide on what to report.
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One important provision is the requirement to report 
the differences between the market value and book value of 
land. This item of information is required to be disclosed 
as precisely as practicable if, in the opinion of the 
directors, such information is of significance to the 
debenture holders (Sch 1,7,2). Market values are considered 
important to evaluate future cash flows.
Research and development (R&D) activities are required 
to be indicated in the directors' report (Sch 6,7,c). This 
requirement does not specify any type of disclosure, 
quantitative or qualitative, neither does it require 
disclosing future research plans.
Another area of disclosure with social importance is 
that related to employees and their conditions. Firstly, any 
company, where its average number of UK employees exceeds 
250 is required to disclose information concerning the 
employment of disabled persons. Also, the Act requires the 
disclosure of information about the continued employment 
and training of persons who become disabled whilst employed 
by the company. Information on the training, career 
development and promotion of disabled persons is required.
Secondly, the Act requires the disclosure of
information on employee involvement and the number of U.K. 
employees. This includes describing arrangements in respect 
of the following: providing employees systematically with
information of concern to them as employees; consulting 
employees on a regular basis; encouraging employee 
involvement in the company s performance through an 
employees' share scheme or by some other means.
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The Act, as a manifestation of promoting public 
confidence and accountability of the directors, requires 
the Directors report to include information on the 
directors interests in the company and on any other 
relationships that exist between the directors and the firm 
(Sec. 331). Apart from directors' names and their 
shareholdings in any group company, directors are required 
to disclose the transactions that might give rise to 
conflicts of interest between directors and their companies, 
i.e. substantial transactions involving assets in which 
directors are personally interested, loans and all kinds of 
financial assistance to directors and their connections. 
Sec. 346 lays down the rules on what is meant by 
connections. A connected person is someone who has a close 
relationship with a director and who might, therefore, be 
influenced by the director, e.g., a director's spouse, 
children; and a company in which the director and his 
connections hold at least 20 per cent of the equity or 
control at least 20 per cent of the votes.
5.2.7.3 Accounting Principles and Policies
The Companies Act 1985 sets out four fundamental accounting 
principles which must be applied and followed by USM 
companies. These principles follow closely the fundamental 
accounting concepts cited in SSAP2 (discussed elsewhere in 
this chapter). These concepts must be followed whether or 
not the accounts are prepared on a historical or current 
cost basis. The principles are:
a. The company shall be presumed to be carrying on its 
business as a going concern (Sch 4,10).
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b. Accounting policies must be applied consistently from 
one financial year to the next (Sch 4,11).
c. All items must be determined on a prudent basis (Sch
4.12). The following are examples of applying the 
prudent concept:
(i) revenue and profits must not be anticipated, but 
should be recognised by inclusion in the profit and 
loss account only when realised in the form of cash or 
of other assets the ultimate realisation of which can 
be assessed reasonably; and
(ii) all liabilities and losses which have arisen or 
are likely to arise in respect of the financial year to 
which the accounts relate or a previous financial year 
must be taken into account, including those which only 
become apparent between the balance sheet date and the 
date on which the balance sheet is signed.
d. All income and charges relating to the financial year 
covered by the accounts must be taken into account 
without regard to the date of receipt or payment. This 
is commonly referred to as the accruals concept (Sch
4.13).
The Act, also, sets out the accounting rules (Sch 
4,16,34). These rules are known as the historical cost 
accounting rules and the alternative accounting rules. 
Which-ever set of accounting rules is adopted, the 
accounting principles set out above remain of general 
application.
For accounting policies, Sch 4,6 requires that the 
accounting policies adopted in determining the amount to be
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included in respect to all material items shown in the 
balance sheet and in determining the profit and loss must be 
stated in a note to the accounts. In particular, the Act 
requires companies to explain the policies followed in 
respect to the following items:
a. Foreign currency translation and in particular the 
method used in the translation of the accounts of 
foreign enterprises and the treatment accorded to 
exchange differences should be disclosed (Sch 4,58).
b. Depreciation and diminution in value of assets (Sch 
4,36).
As the concern of this research is only in respect of 
the disclosure aspects of the annual reports of USM 
companies, the discussion will not be extended to the 
measurement methods required by the Act, i.e. cost of fixed 
assets.
The remaining part of this chapter will address in 
some detail the Act's requirements for disclosure that are 
related to the other parts of the annual report i.e. the 
balance sheet, the profit and loss account and the statement 
of sources and application of funds.
5.2.7.4 The Balance Sheet
Firstly, for each item shown as a fixed asset a company is 
required to disclose: its cost, its revaluation value, or
current cost at the beginning of the year; any revaluations 
during the year; and any disposals or acquisitions during 
the year. With regard to depreciation, the Act requires
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companies to disclose the amounts of depreciation at the
beginning of the year and any changes or adjustments for
disposals during the year. Research and development costs
are one of the main items in the annual reports that 
provide an important indicator of future cash flows. The 
Act requires disclosure of the treatment of the these 
expenditures and reasons for their capitalisation or
realisation as losses.
For investments, the Act requires that, wherever shown, 
they must be split between listed and other investments (Sch 
4,45). This segregation is an important procedure so that 
investors will be able to judge the fairness of the value of 
the investments, especially the listed ones. Also, 
disclosure is required in relation to investments in 
subsidiaries. However, disclosure of such information is not 
required if directors consider any investment not material 
and in companies incorporated outside the UK (Sch 10-12). In 
cases where the investment exceeds one-fifth of the allotted 
share capital of the investee company, in addition to 
disclosing the name and the proportion of nominal value of 
issued share capital of each class held, it is also required 
to disclose the aggregate capital, reserves, and results of 
the investee company in its most recent financial year (Sch 
5,16-17).
With regard to provisions for liabilities and charges, 
the Act requires the disclosure of the amount of funds 
retained to provide for future liability or loss which is 
either likely to be incurred, or certain to be incurred but 
uncertain as to the amount or timing (Sch 4,89). Also,
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disclosure of any movements on such provisions is required. 
However, the criterion for disclosing any item in the main 
accounts or the notes is the materiality of the item.
Another section of the balance sheet that indicates 
levels of future cash flows is the one that discloses 
information on creditors and obligations. Sch 4,48 requires 
disclosure of all liabilities separately for amounts 
falling due within one year and after one year. For each 
item, information is to be disclosed concerning terms of 
repayment, rates of interest payable, and general indication 
of security.
In relation to commitments and contingencies, the Act 
requires the disclosure of detailed information of charges 
on assets to secure liabilities of other persons and the 
stating of amounts if practicable (Sch 4,50,1). Moreover, 
disclosure is required of amount, legal nature and security 
given for contingent liabilities not provided and not 
considered remote. Sch 4,50,2 also requires the disclosure 
of any uncertainties and a prudent estimate of their 
effect, or a statement that estimation is not practicable.
5.2.7.5 Profit and Loss Account
In general, groups preparing consolidated accounts are 
required to prepare the group s profit and loss account, 
while the parent company's is recommended to be included in 
the annual accounts. According to the Act, four alternative 
formats are permitted for the profit and loss account and in 
the interests of clear presentation, it is undesirable for 
immaterial items to be shown (Sch 4,1-3).
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Companies are required to present a profit and loss 
account that must show the profit or loss on ordinary 
activities before taxation, any amount transferred or 
proposed to be transferred to or from reserves, and the 
aggregate amount of dividends paid or proposed (Sch 4,3). 
The profit and loss account must disclose, according to 
Schedule 4:
a. profit and loss after taxation but before extraordinary 
items.
b. the amount of any extraordinary items, and the
attributable taxation;
c. profit or loss after extraordinary items, reflecting 
all profit and losses recognised in the accounts of the 
year other than material prior year adjustments and 
unrealised surpluses on the revaluation of fixed 
assets.
Further information is required to supplement the
profit and loss account and must be given either in the 
profit and loss account or in the notes (Sch 4,3). For each 
class of business which in the "opinion" of the directors is 
substantially different from other business carried on there 
must be a disclosure of:
a. the amount of turnover attributable to that class; and
b. the profit or loss before taxation attributable, in the
opinion of the directors, to that class.
According to the Act, management are given a 
considerable discretion in specifying segments and what to 
report concerning each segment. In deciding what constitutes
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a different class of business or market, the directors must 
consider the manner in which the company's activities are 
organised (Sch 4,55). This can be taken to give the
directors considerable powers of discretion in interpreting 
what is meant by substantially different. For each 
geographical market which, in the opinion of the directors, 
is substantially different, the turnover attributable to 
that market must be shown (sch 4,55).
The Act, however, gives the directors of companies
considerable power to decide whether to disclose the above 
information. It states that where, in the opinion of the 
directors, disclosure of the above information on turnover 
and profit would be seriously prejudicial to the interests
of the company, the information need not be disclosed
provided the accounts include a statement to that effect 
(Sch 4,55,5).
In cases where other income represents a substantial 
part of the total revenue, the Act requires the analysis of 
this income in detail. Property rental income, investment 
income, and income from group companies and other sources 
must be shown separately (Sch 4,53,4-5).
The Act also requires analysis of the charges and 
expenses. The total of operating lease rental charges as an 
expense should be disclosed and analysed between amounts 
payable in respect of hire of plant and machinery and in 
respect of other operating leases (Sch 4,53,7). Also, 
interest payable and similar charges are required to be 
split between those payable to group companies and the rest
(Sch 4,53,2) .
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With respect to the employees and their conditions, 
companies are required to disclose the average number of 
persons employed in the financial year in the United Kingdom 
and abroad (Sch 4,56,1-2).
Related companies and group accounts were given 
considerable attention in the Act. It is required that group 
accounts be submitted if a company had subsidiaries at the 
year end, and is not itself a wholly owned subsidiary of a 
company incorporated in the UK (Sch 229,1-2). At the same 
time, a company may be omitted from the group accounts if 
directors consider inclusion would (Sch 229,3-4):
a. be impracticable;
b. be of no real value, due to immateriality of the sums 
involved;
c. involve expenses or delay out of proportion to value;
d. be misleading;
e. be harmful to the business of the company or its 
subsidiaries;
f. be meaningless on grounds of business differences.
Lastly, the Act specifies two sets of accounting rules 
that companies can adopt in preparing their accounts. 
Companies will normally continue to adopt the historical 
cost accounting rules, but are given the option to adopt 
instead the alternative accounting rules (Sch 4,29-34). The 
accounts may take, accordingly, one of the three following 
forms:
a. Historical cost accounts.
b. Historical cost accounts incorporating certain asset
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revaluations.
c. Current cost accounts.
The notes to the accounts must, according to Sch 4,33, 
describe the valuation bases and methods adopted with regard 
to:
a. fixed assets and depreciation;
b. stocks and work in progress;
c. current asset investments.
The Act, also, requires that where the balance sheet 
includes any items on a basis other than historical cost, 
the following information must be given in respect of each 
such balance sheet item (Sch 4,33):
a. the corresponding historical cost amount and, if 
relevant, accumulated depreciation; or
b. the difference between the historical amount(s) and the 
amount(s) included in the balance sheet; and except in 
the case of listed investments,
c. the years in which the assets were valued and the 
various values; and
d. in the case of assets valued during the year, the names 
of the valuers or particulars of their qualifications, 
and the basis of valuation used.
5.3 STATEMENTS OF STANDARD ACCOUNTING PRACTICE (SSAPs)
Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAPs) are 
recommended by the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC), and 
approved by the councils of its governing accountancy
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bodies; the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales (ICAEW), the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Ireland (ICAI), the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland (ICAS), the Chartered Association of Certified 
Accountants (CACA), the Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants (CIMA), and the Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA). The SSAPs, containing both 
accounting policy and measurement requirements, have become 
one of the major sources of authority for accountants, 
covering the major areas of accounting controversy. The 
ASC's constitution defines its objectives as follows: 
"Bearing in mind the intention of the governing bodies to 
advance accounting standards and to narrow the areas of 
difference and variety in accounting practice which will
wherever possible be definitive-
"a. To keep under review standards of financial 
accounting and reporting.
b. To publish consultative documents with the object 
of maintaining and advancing accounting standards.
c. To propose to the Councils of the governing bodies
statements of standard accounting practice.
d. To consult as appropriate with representatives of 
finance, commerce, industry and government and 
other persons concerned with financial reporting."
(Alexander,1986, p. 162)
The procedure for developing a Statement of Standard 
Accounting Practice (SSAP) is beyond the scope of this 
research. However, the ASC has progressively developed a 
very extensive consultative procedure in an effort to 
respond to an earlier criticism of lack of adequate 
consultation. In addition, efforts have been made to achieve 
an appropriate balance as between the preparers, users and 
auditors of annual reports, as between members from large 
and small organisations and as between the various sectors
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of the community interested in financial reports (Peasnell, 
1982).
As for the enforcement of accounting standards, there 
is no requirement in company law to comply with SSAPs. In 
contrast with the USA and Canada, there is a strong 
tradition in the UK of securing improvements in standards of 
commercial practice by a system of voluntary self-regulation 
through the appropriate professional organisations rather 
than by legislation. However, the general requirement in the 
Companies Act 1985 is that accounts should present a true 
and fair view and it is likely that the courts in 
interpreting what constitutes a true and fair view would be 
strongly influenced by SSAPs as an expression of the common 
opinion of the professional accounting bodies.
The professional accounting bodies themselves impose 
the SSAPs upon their members. Each of the institutes has 
issued an explanatory note to its members which requires 
them to comply with accounting standards. For example, the 
ICAEW states that it may enquire into apparent failures by 
members of the institute to observe accounting standards or 
to disclose departures therefrom. Since only members of the 
institutes may become public limited company auditors the 
requirement of compliance with SSAPs is a significant one.
In addition, the Stock Exchange expects the accounts of 
listed companies to confirm with SSAPs, and to disclose any 
significant departures.
The next section reviews in some detail the SSAPs 
disclosure requirements, arranged according to the subject
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they cover, that apply to USM companies (a summary review 
of the standards is provided in APPENDIX 2)
5.3.1 SSAPs Disclosure Requirements
In general, there is a certain overlap between the Companies
Act 1985 and SSAP requirements in relation to disclosure. 
The disclosure rules of the SSAPs that apply to USM
companies, for this purpose, can be divided into two main
headings:
a. Provisions common to SSAPs and the Companies Act 1985.
b. Provisions contained only in the SSAPs.
As the previous sections have addressed the 
requirements of the Companies Act 1985, this part will 
concentrate on the provisions that are contained only in the 
SSAPs.
Firstly, in the director's report, particulars of 
important events which have occurred between the end of the 
financial year and the date of approval of the accounts must 
be disclosed (SSAP 17 para 23). The statement requires the 
disclosure only of non-adjusting events, i.e. conditions 
which did not exist at the balance sheet date, and have 
arisen since; normally these events will not affect the 
accounts for the year but, nevertheless, it may be necessary 
to refer to them in the notes to the accounts.
Where disclosure covering such events is made in the 
directors report, SSAP 17 requires disclosure of:
a. the nature of the event;
b. an estimate of its financial effect, or a statement
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that such an estimate is impracticable; and
c. taxation implications.
A related standard is SSAP 2 which is concerned with 
the disclosure of accounting policies. Accounting to this 
standard, companies must disclose their accounting policies 
regarding post-balance sheet items such as liabilities and 
losses (SSAP 2 para 14). For the other accounting policies, 
the SSAPs follow closely the fundamental accounting concepts 
outlined in the Companies Act 1985.
In the balance sheet, SSAP 12 requires, for all fixed 
assets subject to depreciation, the disclosure of:
a. the depreciation method(s) used;
b. the useful lives or the depreciation rates used;
c. the effect, if material, on depreciation in the year 
of:
(i) a change in the method of depreciation;
(ii) a revaluation of fixed assets.
With regard to research and development (R&D) 
expenditures, SSAP 13 specifies that these costs may be 
included in a company's balance sheet in special 
circumstances. The standard sets out the criteria for 
determining such special circumstances, i.e. costs of 
locating and exploiting mineral deposits in the extractive 
industries and market research expenditure can be 
capitalised until the assertion of the ultimate commercial 
viability of the project. Another intangible asset that is 
required to be disclosed under SSAP 22 is purchased
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goodwill. The standard calls for disclosing purchased 
goodwill as a separate item under intangible fixed assets 
until fully written off. Where there are many acquisitions 
during the year, the amount of goodwill should be shown 
separately for each acquisition where material (SSAP 22 para 
40) .
SSAP 19 is dedicated to investment properties. 
According to this standard, investment properties should be 
carried in the balance sheet at open market value, and that 
carrying value should be noticeably displayed. This means 
showing investment properties separately in the analysis of 
fixed assets given in the notes.
An area that is covered entirely by the standards and 
which was not touched by the Companies Act is leasing. SSAP 
21 deals with leases from the point of view of the lessee 
and the lessor. Firstly, for a finance lease, i.e. at the 
inception of a lease the present value of the minimum lease 
payments, including any initial payment, amounts to 
substantially all (normally 90 per cent or more) of the fair 
value of the leased asset, the lease should appear in the 
balance sheet of the lessee as a tangible fixed asset and as 
an obligation to pay future rentals. Also, it is required, 
for each major class of leased asset, to disclose:
a. gross amount;
b. accumulated depreciation; and
c. depreciation allocated for the period.
Any other lease that does not satisfy the above 
criterion is considered as an operating lease.
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For financial leases, the following are required to be 
disclosed:
a. the gross amounts of assets held and the related
accumulated depreciation charges;
b. the cost of assets acquired; and
c. the accounting policy adopted.
As for the lessor, SSAP 21 requires companies to 
disclose the net investment of all types of leases.
With respect to group accounts and subsidiaries, SSAP 
14 requires disclosure of the names and the nature of 
business of the principal subsidiaries. In addition, SSAP 1 
describes the accounting requirements in relation to related 
companies. The standard states that the group's interest in 
the net assets other than goodwill of the associated company 
should be disclosed separately. Also, it is required to show 
the share of goodwill together with the premium paid (or 
discount) on the acquisition of the interest, and these two 
items may be aggregated in one figure.
Where an investment in a company is not treated as a 
related company investment, i.e. holding less than 20 per 
cent of the nominal value of the allotted share capital of 
the investee, the name of the investee, description, and 
proportion of the nominal value of the issued shares of each 
class held should be disclosed (SSAP 1). In addition, an 
outline of the nature of the business of the investee is 
required to be disclosed.
SSAP 9 deals with the disclosure of information in 
relation to stocks. According to paragraph 12, it states
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that where differing bases have been adopted for valuing 
different types of stocks and work in progress, the amount 
included in the accounts under each basis should be stated. 
The standard also requires companies to disclose:
a. the accounting policy, particularly for cost, net 
realisable value, attributable profits, and foreseeable 
losses;
b. stocks and work in progress classified in the balance 
sheet under appropriate headings; and
c. with respect to long-term contracts:
(i) cost plus attributable profits less foreseeable 
losses, and
(ii) progress payments received and receivable.
One area of accounting which has caused some 
controversy is the treatment of foreign exchange 
differences. SSAP 20 is the standard that addresses most 
aspects of foreign exchange whereas there is not one 
provision in the Companies Act 1985 that is devoted to this 
matter. The standard requires the disclosure of the net 
movement on reserves arising from foreign exchange 
differences. In addition, the net amount of exchange gains 
or losses on foreign currency borrowing less deposits should 
be disclosed, identifying separately:
a. the amount offset in reserves; and
b. the net amount charged/credited to the profit and loss 
account.
Financial commitments and guarantees play a major role 
in deciding a company's future cash flows. SSAP 18 requires
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that for any contingent liability the accounts should 
disclose:
a. the factors affecting the likelihood of the liability 
materialising, and
b. if an estimate of the financial effect cannot be made, 
a statement to that effect.
Likewise, for such contingencies, the estimated 
financial effect should be described before taxation and any 
tax implication. However, in the case of contingent gains, 
they should be disclosed if the realisation of the gain is 
probable. As with contingent liabilities, information 
regarding the following are to be disclosed: the estimated 
amount, the factors affecting the likelihood of the gain 
materialising, and if an estimation of the financial effect 
cannot be made, a statement to that effect.
The accounting profession, through the ASC, has 
recognised that a statement of sources and application of 
funds would be an advantage to users of the annual reports. 
Accordingly, SSAP 10 lays down a minimum standard of 
disclosure for the statement of sources and application of 
funds. It is required that such a statement should be a part 
of all audited financial accounts intended to give a true 
and fair view of a company s financial position. Where a 
company presents group accounts, the funds statement should 
be based on the group accounts. Also, in the event of the 
main accounts being current cost accounts, the statement 
should be compatible with the current cost accounts.
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As recommended by SSAP 10 the following items are 
required to be disclosed by USM companies:
a. the profit and loss for the year with adjustments for 
items which did not involve use (provide) funds;
b. dividends paid;
c. acquisitions and disposals of fixed or non-current 
assets;
d. changes in medium and long term capital structure;
e. changes in working capital;
f. purchases or disposals of subsidiary companies.
Lastly, accounting for the problem of fluctuating price 
levels has been the principal subject of debate amongst 
accountants, regulators, and users of the accounts for some 
years. SSAP 16, issued in March 1980, emerged from a series 
of proposals to tackle the problem of accounting in times of 
inflation. However, since 1985 the mandatory status of SSAP 
16 has been suspended and the standard was finally withdrawn 
in 1988.
5.4 THE STOCK EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS
The third source that promulgates information disclosure is 
the Stock Exchange. The Stock Exchange's Listing Agreement 
contains a number of requirements for the disclosure of 
information in the annual report and accounts of listed 
companies, some of which are also required by law or by the 
SSAPs. The listing agreement requirements of The Stock 
Exchange Unlisted Securities Market (The USM General 
Undertaking or The Green Book, see APPENDIX 3 for the text) 
are very similar to those of the main market. This section
136
will address the requirements of The Green Book which are 
not required by the SSAPs or the Companies Act 1985.
5.4.1 Directors' Report
According to The Green Book the directors' report of USM 
companies should include an explanation in the event that 
the trading results shown by the accounts differ materially 
from any published forecast made by the company.
Another requirement for listed companies is to disclose 
the unexpired period of any service contract of any director 
proposed for re-election at the forthcoming annual general 
meeting. This requirement does not apply to USM companies; 
this is one of the few requirements that USM companies are 
not obliged to comply with.
Where there are substantial holdings, i.e., 5 per cent 
or more of any class of capital having full voting rights, a 
statement should be given of persons holding or beneficially 
interested in such holdings and of the amounts of the 
holdings. For USM companies, this requirement applies 
insofar as it is known to the directors (The Green Book 
8:4). In cases of corporate substantial shareholders (where 
the substantial shareholders are companies), the requirement 
applies to USM companies as well as those with a full 
listing. Listed companies are required to give particulars 
in the annual report and accounts of:
a. any contract of importance between the company, or a
subsidiary, and a corporate substantial shareholder;
and
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b. any contract for the provision of services to the 
company or a subsidiary by a corporate substantial 
shareholder.
According to the listing agreement, a contract of 
importance means one per cent or more of the net assets, 
total purchases, sales, payments, or receipts. Also, 
corporate substantial shareholder means any body corporate 
that controls 30 per cent or more of the voting power, or 
the composition of the board.
Company status in relation to the Income and Corporate 
Taxes Act (1970) is required to be disclosed. For USM 
companies a statement should be made as to whether or not 
the close company provisions of the Act apply to the holding 
company and whether there has been any change since the end 
of the financial year. However, where there is a doubt by 
the directors about a company's status, the existence of the 
doubt and basis on which taxation provision have been made 
is to be noted.
5.4.2 The Balance Sheet
For the information disclosed in the balance sheet and 
accompanying notes, USM companies are required to disclose 
additional information in the group accounts in relation to 
their subsidiaries. The principal country of operations, 
where revenues are generated and costs incurred, of active 
material subsidiaries is required to be disclosed in 
addition to the country of incorporation.
In group accounts, also, information is required on 
investments in other companies (other than subsidiaries). If
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the investment exceeds 20 per cent of the investee's equity 
capital, the accounts of a USM company (or group) should 
also show:
a. its principal country of operation,
b. particulars of its issued capital and debt securities, 
and
c. percentage of each class of debt securities 
attributable to the company's interest.
With respect to liabilities and obligations, USM 
companies are required to provide a detailed analysis of 
bank loans and overdrafts, other borrowings, and the 
aggregate amounts repayable in:
a. one year or less, or on demand,
b. between one and two years,
c. between two and five years, and
d. five years or more (Section 10:E).
5.4.3 Profit and Loss Account
One major area of information disclosure addressed by the 
Stock Exchange is segmental reporting. For USM companies, 
the Stock Exchange requires information concerning a 
geographical analysis of net turnover and trading profit of 
those trading operations carried on outside the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland. However, there are no guidelines 
concerning the detailed application of this rule (The Green 
Book 10:C), and accordingly, it is up to the directors to 
decide on the segments and the application of the
requirement.
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5.5 SUMMARY
In this chapter, a review of the disclosure requirements by 
the regulatory bodies in U.K. was provided. The discussions 
have covered the requirements of the Companies Act 1985, the 
Accounting Standards, and the London Stock Exchange. The 
regulations of the first two bodies apply to all public 
companies, Fully listed and Unlisted. However, the Stock 
Exchange requirements refer separately to listed companies 
and there are special rules for the USM companies.
While most of the discussed disclosure regulations are 
mandatory, some are left to the discretion of management of 
USM companies. In particular, regulations recommend 
disclosing segmental information without identifying what to 
disclose or what constitutes a segment. Further, the 
disclosure of information concerning research and 
development is suggested but the scope and the detail of 
disclosure is left to management's judgement.
The previous chapters have considered the theoretical 
and empirical literature relevant to the voluntary 
disclosure of financial information in general and the 
benefits that companies and managers are likely to attain 
from voluntary disclosure. From the literature some relevant 
hypotheses have been derived. Further consideration has been 
given also to the establishment of the Unlisted Securities 
Market (USM), its functions, the advantages achieved by 
companies when they gain a listing on the USM, and how the 
USM differs from the Main market.
The following part of this research is devoted to the 
development of a methodology to measure voluntary disclosure
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and the implementation of this methodology. In addition, the 
testing of hypotheses developed earlier is discussed.
141
CHAPTER SIX
THE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE STUDY: 
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
6.1 INTRODUCTION 142
6.2 IDENTIFYING THE HYPOTHESES 143
6.2.1 Disclosure Hypothesis 143
6.2.2 Explanatory Hypotheses 143
6.3 SAMPLE SELECTION, DATA SOURCE AND 
PERIOD OF STUDY 151
6.4 MEASURING VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 160
6.4.1 Developing Measurement Criteria 161
6.4.2 Measuring Disclosure 163
6.4.3 Relative Weighting of Items 170
6.5 SUMMARY 174
CHAPTER
SIX----------- ------------------------------------------
THE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE STUDY:
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the research design and methodology 
used to answer the following research questions:
a. To what extent do USM companies disclose information 
voluntarily in their annual reports?
b. What firm characteristics are related to the voluntary 
disclosure of information.
Given the theoretical background discussed earlier and 
the regulations governing the disclosure of information in 
the U.K. and, in particular, what applies in the Unlisted 
Securities Market, the aim of this chapter is to 
operationalise the variables that influence the disclosure 
of information. Also, an attempt will be made to find ways 
to measure disclosure and the problems associated with such 
measurement methods. In particular, this chapter will 
address three issues in relation to the methodology of the 
research:
(1) Identifying the hypotheses and selection of variables.
(2) Sample selection, data collection, and period of study.
(3) Measuring voluntary disclosure.
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6.2 IDENTIFYING THE HYPOTHESES
Given the information asymmetry that arises between 
managers, owners, and debt holders and taking into 
consideration the previously discussed theories of 
disclosure, cross-sectional variation is expected in the 
voluntary disclosure practices of the sample companies. This 
section will define all the hypotheses that are tested in 
both the null and the alternative forms. The variables that 
are going to be used as proxies for the hypotheses will also 
be defined. The symbol Ho stands for the null hypothesis and 
Ha for the alternative.
6.2.1 DISCLOSURE HYPOTHESIS
l.The Extent of Disclosure:
The first general hypothesis, developed in Chapter Two, is:
1. Ho: Companies do not voluntarily disclose
information in excess of regulation.
Ha: Companies disclose information in excess of
regulation.
To test this hypothesis, a list of items likely to be 
disclosed by companies was prepared. The items in the list 
were included after reviewing the literature and the prior 
empirical studies. The next section of this chapter lists 
these disclosure items and the reasons for their inclusion.
6.2.2 EXPLANATORY HYPOTHESES
The second group of hypotheses concerns the relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and some of companies' 
characteristics. These characteristics or variables 
represent the indicators of companies incentives to disclose
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financial information.
Before reviewing the hypotheses and the variables used 
in the analysis, it is necessary to state that all the 
financial variables used are book-value measures extracted 
from the published accounts. It is valid to use book values 
even if it is preferable to use market values, e.g., assets 
replacement cost for size. This argument is based on the 
assumption and the empirical evidence that on a cross- 
sectional basis, book values seem to bear a very high 
correlation with market-based values (Williamson, 1981 and 
Palepu, 1986). Therefore, one could use, for example, the 
book value of assets in the analysis instead of the current 
value, the preferable measure for size, without altering the 
validity of the tests. In addition, the use of this 
procedure becomes more desirable where it is difficult to 
calculate market-based values, e.g., current cost for 
assets.
2. GEARING
2. Ho: There is no association between gearing and
voluntary disclosure.
Ha: There is a positive association between
gearing and voluntary disclosure.
Gearing represents how much a company is relying on 
borrowing, as against equity, in financing its operations. 
Two ratios are used to represent gearing, debt to equity 
ratio and debt to total asset ratio. All borrowings, which 
involve the company in a commitment for the payment of 
interest, long-term and short-term (as classified in the 
annual reports) is included in the calculations. For the 
purpose of this research, however, preference capital is
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included with equity not debt. As the research is concerned 
with conflict of interests between shareholders (broadly 
defined) and debtholders, and because debt to equity ratio 
is an indication of the security of creditors and 
debtholders, preference capital is considered part of this 
guarantee. However, if dividends are cumulative, preference 
capital would have the characteristics of a debt and 
therefore is included with debt.
In addition, all assets, fixed, current, and 
intangibles, were used to represent total assets.
3. SIZE
The following size hypothesis was developed in Chapter 2 
(capital market theories of voluntary disclosure) and 
Chapter 3 (theories of the firm):
3. Ho: There is no association between firms' size
and voluntary disclosure.
Ha: There is a positive association between
firms' size and voluntary disclosure.
The literature has suggested a number of different of 
measures to represent this variable (Chow, 1982; Popoff and 
Cowan, 1985 and Foster, 1986). This research has used sales 
turnover (excluding inter-group transfers and value added 
tax), the most common measure used by the financial press, 
to represent size as well as number of employees and total 
assets. For number of employees variable, the annual 
report's figure, which represents the average number of 
employees in the U.K. and overseas, was used in the 
analysis. Another variable used in the analysis was total 
assets less current liabilities. All asset measures
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exclude depreciation and include intangibles in their 
calculations.
4. PROFITABILITY
4. Ho: There is no association between firms' prof­
itability and voluntary disclosure.
Ha: There is an association between firm's prof­
itability and voluntary disclosure.
Profitability is usually measured by return on assets, 
return on sales turnover, and growth in profit (Popoff and 
Cowan, 1985 and Foster, 1986). Return is defined as the 
profit generated from utilising assets or from sales
turnover. Both operating profit (profit before extraordinary 
items and after interest and tax) and net profit after 
extraordinary items and taxation are used to represent 
return. Further, as the outcome of investment decisions is
likely to take more than one financial period to
materialise, the results of one period are not expected to 
represent fairly management's efforts. Therefore, growth in 
profitability would be more appropriate.
For this research, return on sales turnover and growth 
in earning per share (EPS) for the period under study are 
employed in the analysis as they both widely applied by the 
financial press in its assessment of companies performance. 
Growth (decline) in EPS is the percentage increase
(decrease) in EPS over the year under study. Additional 
measures used are return on assets, return on equity, and 
return on assets less current liabilities.
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5. LINE OF BUSINESS DIVERSIFICATION (LOB)
5. Ho: There is no association between line of
business diversification and voluntary
disclosure.
Ha: There is an association between line of
business diversification and voluntary
disclosure.
The Herfindahl index (Berry, 1974) was used to measure 
the line of business diversification. The greater this 
index, the more diversified is the business. The formula to 
calculate this variable is:
1/(IP2, )
where P± is the proportion of turnover in segment i. No 
attempt was made to change managements' classification of 
what is considered to be a segment. In calculating the 
index, the figures supplied by the company for the turnover 
of each segment were included. In some cases, where the 
companies had revealed only the profit margin for each 
segment, such figures were used instead of turnover.
6. GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSIFICATION
6. Ho: There is no association between geographical
diversification and voluntary disclosure.
Ha: There is an association between geographical
diversity and voluntary disclosure.
The Herfindahl index, similar to the one for line of 
business diversification, was calculated for this variable 
in respect of companies disclosing sufficient information 
concerning their overseas operations. The company s own 
classification of what is considered a segment was used. In
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most of the cases, the companies had used the continental 
classification for their overseas operations, e.g., North 
America and Asia, with the Middle East and the EEC as 
separate segments. Another related measure of 
diversification and multinationality is the amount of 
foreign turnover as a percentage of total turnover. The 
hypothesis representing this variable is the following:
7. Ho: There is no association between the percent­
age of foreign turnover and voluntary disc­
losure .
Ha: There is a positive association between the
percentage of foreign turnover and voluntary 
disclosure
7. MANAGERS' SHAREHOLDINGS
8. Ho: There is no association between managers'
share of capital and voluntary disclosure.
Ha: There is a negative association between
managers' share of capital and voluntary 
disclosure.
For this hypothesis, the managers' proportion of issued 
equity capital, exclusive of any non-voting shares and any 
share options, was used.
8. SUBSTANTIAL SHAREHOLDINGS
9. Ho: There is no association between the
existence of substantial shareholdings, 
apart from the management's holdings, and 
voluntary disclosure.
Ha: There is a positive association between the
number of substantial shareholders and 
voluntary disclosure.
Pop the purpose of this research, a substantial 
shareholding was assumed to be any holding of 5 per cent or 
more of the equity capital. This excludes managers holdings
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because this is the subject of another hypothesis. The use 
of 5 per cent is motivated by the provisions of the 
Companies Act 1985 which requires the names of holders of 
any interest amounting to 5 per cent or more to be 
disclosed.
To test this hypothesis, first, the number of 
substantial shareholders given in the annual accounts is 
used in the analysis. It was decided not to use the total 
percentage of substantial shareholdings because it is the 
existence of such shareholders and their relationship with 
management that is expected to explain voluntary disclosure. 
For further analysis, a dummy variable is used and set equal 
to 1 if there is, at least, one substantial shareholder and 
0 otherwise.
9. EXECUTIVE SHARE OPTIONS
10. Ho: There is no association between the
existence of Executive Share Option schemes 
and voluntary disclosure.
Ha: There is a positive association between the
existence of Executive Share Option schemes 
and voluntary disclosure.
A dummy variable is created for each company to
represent this feature. The value of this variable is set
equal to 1 if there is an executive share option and 0
otherwise.
10. THE AUDITING FIRM
11. Ho: There is no association between a company's
auditing firm and voluntary disclosure.
Ha: There is a positive association between a
company's auditing firm and voluntary 
disclosure.
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Firstly, a code from 1 to 8 was given to each company 
in the sample depending on which of the Big Eight firms was 
the auditing firm. Further, 9 was given for companies with
an auditing firm from outside the Big Eight firms. For
additional statistical analyses, a dummy variable was 
created for each company and set equal to 1 for companies 
with auditing firms from the Big Eight and 0 otherwise.
11. NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
12. Ho: There is no association between the existence
of non-executive directors on the Board of 
Directors and voluntary disclosure.
Ha: There is a positive association between the
presence of non-executive directors on the
Board of Directors and voluntary disclosure.
Usually companies disclose the names of their directors 
and the type of the directorship in the annual reports. The 
number of non-executive directors was used to denote this 
variable. A zero was assigned to this variable for companies 
without any non-executive directors.
12. TAX STATUS
13. Ho: There is no association between companies
tax status' (closed or not) and voluntary 
disclosure.
Ha: There is an association between companies
tax status' and voluntary disclosure. Closed
companies are expected to disclose less 
information voluntarily than not-closed
companies.
This variable represents the extent of Directors' 
control over the company from the point of view of the tax 
authority, the Inland Revenue. Usually companies disclose in 
the annual reports their opinion of their status though the 
final say about this matter is for the tax authority.
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Companies are assigned a dummy variable of 1 if they have a 
close company status and zero if not.
13. INDUSTRY SECTOR
14. Ho: There is no association between companies'
industry sector and voluntary disclosure.
Ha: There is an association between companies'
industry sector and voluntary disclosure.
For this variable, each industry was assigned a number 
or code to represent the industry in the analysis. Companies 
were classified according to the Peat Marwick McLintock 
industry classification (Peat Marwick McLintock, 1986). 
Industry sectors with less than five companies were excluded 
from the analysis.
6.3 SAMPLE SELECTION, DATA SOURCE AND PERIOD OF STUDY
As stated before, the purpose of this research is to study 
the voluntary financial reporting practices of companies in 
the Unlisted Securities Market. Share dealing in the USM 
began in November 1980. TABLE 6.1 shows the number of 
companies that joined the USM as well as the total money 
raised. As the table shows, the number of USM companies has 
grown considerably. During 1988 the number has increased to 
400 companies.
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TABLE 6.1
Number of Entrants and Money Raised
Year Number of 
Companies
Money Raised (fin) 
For Shareholders For Company Total
1980 23 6.2 4.8 11.0
1981 63 25.3 42.7 68.0
1982 62 37.4 38.8 76.2
1983 88 78.8 106.8 185.6
1984 101 75.6 83.8 159.4
1985 98 89.4 112.0 201.4
1986 94 143.5 149.3 292.8
1987 75 60.3 131.1 191.4
1988 75 89.0 150.0 239.0
Total 667 605.5 819.3 1424.8
Source: Hoare Govett, various issues.
In deciding on the cut off date for the sample
selection, a number of criteria were used:
1. Sufficient companies listed at the cut off date to
ensure the significance of results.
2. No major changes under discussion at the cut off date 
concerning disclosure regulation.
Accordingly, and because most companies end their
financial year between December and July, the cut off date 
was set to be between December 1985 and July 1986. The range 
was necessary because companies end the financial year at
different dates and choosing one single cut off date would 
not yield a sufficient number of companies. Further, the 
accounts of the cut off period would have captured the 
effects of the Companies Act 1981.
The research is of a cross-sectional type rather than a 
time series investigation covering more than one period. 
With a time series study, and where there is more than one
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variable involved, a difficulty arises in explaining the 
results. Changes in firms behaviour over time can be caused 
by the changes in the explanatory variables, by the time 
variable, or by a combination of the two. It is, also, 
likely that, over time, the number of macro-economic type 
factors that might have altered firms' disclosure behaviour 
is beyond reasonable control. The time required to overcome 
the outlined difficulties is beyond the limited time 
available for this research and, therefore, a cross 
sectional study becomes more appropriate.
The next task was to decide on whether to include all
the companies or to take a sample from the whole population,
which was 350 companies for this research. In scientific 
research, there are many good reasons and economic 
advantages in taking a sample rather than studying all of 
the population. Costs, including time, would be considerably 
higher in conducting research covering all of the 
population, when one could derive the same results with a 
sample representing that population.
Deming (1960) argues that the quality of research is
often better with sampling than with a census. Sampling,
where the number of cases is large, he adds, possesses the 
possibility of better testing, more thorough investigation 
of missing, wrong, or suspicious information, better 
supervision, and better processing than is possible with 
complete coverage. Research findings support this opinion. 
Assael and Keon (1982) claim that more than 90 per cent of 
the total survey error in one study was from non-sampling 
sources and only 10 per cent or less was from random
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sampling error. Another advantage from sampling is that it 
provides much quicker results than does a complete study.
The major problem, however, is that any sample may not 
be representative of the population from which it is drawn. 
The results would be that any statistic one calculates from 
the sample would be incorrect as estimates of the population 
parameter. According to sampling theory, when the sample is 
drawn properly, some sample items underestimate the
parameters and others overestimate them. Variations in the 
value of these items tend to counteract each other; this 
counteraction tendency results in a statistic that is
generally close to the population parameter. However, for 
these offsetting effects to occur, it is necessary (1) that 
there be enough numbers in the sample and (2) they must be 
drawn in a way to avoid overestimating or underestimating 
the parameters (Emory, 1985).
Emory suggests that the ultimate test of a sample is 
its validity, or its representation of the characteristics 
of the population. He adds that validity depends upon 
accuracy and precision.
Accuracy is defined as the degree to which bias has
been avoided in selecting the sample. Kerlinger (1973)
suggests that for a sample to be accurate, there must be no 
systematic variation. According to him, systematic variation 
is the variation in measures due to some known or unknown 
influences that cause the statistic to lean in one direction 
more than another.
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The second criterion of a good sample is precision of 
estimate. As a result of random fluctuations inherent in the 
sampling process, a sample statistic may be expected to 
differ from its parameter. This is referred to as error 
variance or sampling error (Emory, 1985). It reflects the 
influences of chance in drawing the sample members or what 
is left over after all known sources of systematic variance 
have been accounted for. Precision is measured by the 
standard error of estimate and the smaller this measurement 
is the better the sample.
The method used in selecting the sample for this study, 
where one draws a sample that conforms to certain criteria, 
is known as purposive sampling. This method is used to 
assure that the sample is representative of the population 
from which it is drawn. The logic behind this method is to 
guarantee that certain relevant characteristics describe the 
dimensions of the population exist (for this project these 
are the industry sector, nationality, and cut off date).
However, there is a shortcoming with this method of 
sampling. First, the idea that selection based on some 
criteria assumes representativeness of others is an argument 
by analogy. It gives no real assurance that the sample is 
representative of the variables being studied. For the 
current research, this method is the appropriate one to 
avoid certain undesirable influences that will be discussed 
later. Advocates of purposive sampling argue that while 
there is some danger of systematic bias, the risks are 
usually not that great. While random sampling may be 
theoretically superior, its technical requirements are often
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violated (Emory, 1985).
In selecting the sample for this research, the 
following steps describe the process followed and the final 
sample composition. As a first step, foreign companies were 
excluded from the study to avoid any direct influence from 
other regulatory authorities outside the U.K. Most of the 
foreign companies were American and Irish. Then a letter was 
sent to 350 companies asking them to send their annual 
reports for the financial year ended during the period 
December 1985 to July 1986. Out of the 350 letters a reply 
was received from 100 companies. A second letter was sent as 
a reminder to the non—respondents. As a result a further 70 
companies replied and sent their annual reports. Very few 
(3 companies) responded expressing their unwillingness to 
participate in the research.
The next step in the selection process was to decide on 
which companies should be included in the study. Finance and 
insurance companies were excluded to avoid any influence 
concerning their special status and because they are subject 
to additional regulations.
To discover the effect of industry activities on 
voluntary disclosure, a sufficient number of companies must 
be included in respect of each industry of interest. 
Industry categories with less than five companies (the 
minimum number statistically acceptable) were excluded.
This research follows the Peat Marwick Mclintock 
industry classification which appears in APPENDIX 4. After 
excluding the industries with very few representatives the
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sample was reduced to 122 companies divided between 
industries as TABLE 6.2 shows (the full list of the 
companies included in the study is provided in APPENDIX 5):
TABLE 6.2
Sample Companies by Industry
Code Industry No of companies
10 Beers & wines 5
11 Building & timber 11
13 Drapery & stores 15
14 Electricals 41
16 Food & groceries 9
20 Leisure 20
23 Paper & printing 13
31 Oil & gas 8
Total No 122
The final task in this section is to discuss the 
methods companies use to release information in general and 
the appropriateness of the annual reports as the source of 
data for this research.
Disclosure of information can be made via two main 
media: private and public communications. Private
communication is usually used in the negotiation of loan 
arrangements from finance houses and for funding particular 
projects. Finance houses, normally, seek information to 
evaluate risks associated with the borrowers projects. In 
most cases lenders get the information they request because 
there is no alternative to the borrowers but to comply and 
present the required information.
Companies also disclose information to some government 
departments in certain circumstances. For example, acquiring 
a license for a new drug requires the disclosure of secret
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information concerning the product and its safety. Moreover, 
some products may cause a public hazard and need a license 
to be produced such as engines.
The third method of private communication is to the 
companies own financial advisers. Firms need advisers
because they cannot handle all of their own financial
affairs in-house. Regulations may also require companies to
use independent advisers as in the case of joining the
Unlisted Securities Market. Companies wishing to be listed 
in the market are required to have a financial sponsor to 
help them prepare the proper documents and to arrange the 
flotation of their shares. During this process the advisers 
receive information regarding the company and its 
operations, projections, and any relevant information to 
help the sponsors and assure them of the viability of the 
share launch.
For all the above cases of private communication,
companies reveal the required information for specific 
reasons and such revelations are not aimed at the public at 
large. However, the second method of communicating
information is directed to the public which includes: 
current investors, future investors, the business community, 
the government, trade unions, and other groups. The 
disclosure of information to such groups is usually made 
through the financial press, prospectuses, and the annual 
reports. The most comprehensive of the channels is the 
annual report. The following reasons justify the use of the
annual reports as an important source of data to measure
voluntary disclosure.
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1. The financial press is used by companies for publicity 
and for reporting some events immediately after they 
have occurred. The frequency of reporting in the 
financial press is greater than by alternative methods. 
However, as the research is not looking at the timing 
of the disclosure and the fact that companies intend to 
include all of the year's news in the annual report
(Choi, 1973), the annual report should be a
comprehensive source of information.
2. Prospectuses are used to promote companies' shares 
prior to listing in a stock market. In particular, the 
intention is to increase the public awareness of the 
company and to attract more investors to buy their
shares, and hence, would include additional 
information. Prospectuses, however, do not indicate any 
regular pattern of disclosure behaviour as they are 
used only when companies wish to raise funds. Annual
reports, on the other hand, are a regular source of 
disclosure practices.
Accordingly, annual reports were used to measure 
voluntary disclosure, i.e., to identify the voluntary 
disclosure items selected, and to extract the independent 
or explanatory variables. This approach involves first a 
general reading for all the annual report of the sample 
companies to gain a general view of the contents. Then, a 
thorough reading of the reports was performed as well as 
highlighting the voluntary disclosure items and the relevant 
independent variables. The items of disclosure were then 
compared among the reports for the purpose of constructing a
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common list of items to represent the information likely to 
be disclosed voluntarily. During the process of constructing 
the list of items the relevant literature was also 
reviewed. Details of the procedure conducted is described in 
the following section.
6.4 MEASURING VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
Quantification is considered to be advantageous to 
researchers and policy makers. When variables and
relationships are expressed in numbers, it becomes easier 
and simpler in defining and specifying the objectives of the 
research and the relationships between the relevant 
variables. Sterling (1970) quotes Lord Kelvin as saying:
"I often say that when you measure what you are 
speaking about and express it in numbers, you 
know something about it, but when you cannot 
measure it, your knowledge is of a meagre and 
unsatisfactory kind."
(Sterling, 1970, p71)
Previous studies exploring disclosure, mainly in the 
USA, have used indices (e.g., Cerf, 1961; Choi, 1973; Buzby, 
1975) to measure disclosure. While this method results in 
the loss of much of the richness of the underlying data it 
is nevertheless economically justifiable when a study 
explores a set of hypotheses. The first step in developing a 
disclosure index requires measurement of the individual 
disclosure items. Measuring whether an item is disclosed is 
an on-off or nominally-scaled measure. Developing a 
numerical weight for each disclosure item reduces all 
disclosures to a common measurement scale. The next sub­
section is devoted to developing measurement criteria. Later
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sub-sections will discuss the determination of weights and 
the items included in the index.
6.4.1 Developing Measurement Criteria
There are four key measurement criteria that have to be 
considered in designing the disclosure index: relevance of
the element of information, the depth of a disclosed item, 
the clarity of what is disclosed, and the quality of what is 
disclosed.
As this research is concerned with capital market 
theories and theories of the firm in explaining voluntary 
disclosure, both theories have been employed to decide on 
what items of information to include in the disclosure 
index. In particular, the information should assist 
investors in assessing the ability of companies to generate 
cash flows in the future (Sterling, 1970). Relevance to 
investors has been determined in empirical research on the 
basis of some normative model of investor behaviour such as 
the mean-variance portfolio models. Lev (1974) and Hamada 
(1972) are the two main studies that have tested empirically 
the relevance of basic items such as operating leverage, 
debt leverage and dividend payout in assessing a firm s beta 
risk. In the absence of sufficient empirical testing, the 
literature is the only source of support of the relevance 
of the items in the index to investors decision models. The 
effect of each of the items upon investors' decision models 
will be the subject of a later section.
In addition, the information should assist current 
shareholders in evaluating management s performance and
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examining the extent to which management is fulfilling its 
stewardship responsibility.
The next criterion in the measurement process is the 
depth of information revealed about an item. Depth means 
disclosing the many facets or sub-elements of the item. For 
example, disclosure of foreign currency translation gains 
involves not only the amount of the gain but also the 
assumptions of the actual calculations. In the cases of 
current cost accounts, it is also important to disclose the 
assumptions underlying the accounts as well as the effects. 
Because a single element can be composed of sub-elements, 
the breadth or fineness of the scale used to separate one 
disclosure sub-element from another is important. The scale 
of measurement should capture any meaningful composition and 
differences between the sub-elements.
The solution to this problem is to assign partial 
weights to the sub-elements. Each sub-element is considered 
a new item of information.
The third measurement criterion is the clarity of the 
disclosed items. Clarity is important in properly 
communicating technical information to a relatively non­
technical audience. The measure of clarity is the likelihood 
of understanding the information revealed with the minimum 
of uncertainty.
What is important to this study is that clarity of 
items of information between the companies observed should 
not differ greatly. For the purpose of this research no 
formal evaluation of disclosure clarity will be presented,
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primarily because there is no accepted methodology to test 
for differences in clarity, and therefore, it has been
assumed that disclosure clarity is equivalent across firms.
The last important criterion is the quality of the
disclosed items. For example, is disclosure of the sales of
three lines of business by a firm with sales in five
segments (known through reading the chairman's statement) of 
the same quality as three lines of business disclosure for a 
company with only three segments?. The difficulty of
measuring quality is in setting a rule for ideal disclosure 
for many of the items in the index. However, there are few 
cases where quantitative expectations could be developed, 
and therefore measurement of disclosure quality is not 
included in the study.
Sterling (1970) summarises the process of measurement 
in four ordered steps:
1. Conception of a dimension for the disclosure of
economic information in annual reports.
2. Definition of the unit and scale of the measurement for
the main elements and sub-elements.
3. Agreement to express units numerically.
4. Descriptions and applications of an operation that 
discovers the number of units in a given object.
6.4.2 Measuring Disclosure
The procedure used to determine to what extent and in what 
way a firm has voluntarily disclosed information was the 
examination of the annual reports of the companies for the 
relevant disclosure items. To do this, a listing of all
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relevant disclosures was devised. A common form was used for 
all companies with an addendum for oil and gas companies 
because of the nature of their activities. In particular, 
licenses granted, production levels, and reserves are items 
of information relevant only to oil and gas companies.
As the research focuses on voluntary disclosure, those 
items included in the index are determined by referring to 
other studies and to the level of existing regulation 
governing disclosure. Prior studies used varied sources in 
deciding whether to include an item in their index. Cerf 
(1961) used a variety of sources to design his index, such 
as: questionnaire responses, interviews, literature surveys, 
content analysis of security analysts' reports and mainly 
the recommendations of expert groups. Cerf's index was 
comprehensive, although he did not include any sub-elements. 
Anderson (1962) relied extensively on interviews. His index 
is not a specific listing of items but rather a broad 
grouping of items.
Singhvi and Desai (1967) used Cerf's index, but, also, 
they added five additional items. Subsequent researchers, 
Buzby (1974), Chandra (1974), and Barrett (1976) have relied 
on previous studies and the literature to construct their 
indices. However, Choi (1973) only included items if they 
were logically related to the criteria of determining the 
safety margin in the case of bonds and the future cash flows 
of the company. In this study, the criteria used in deciding 
on the items to be included in the index is based on what 
prior studies have included and the relevance of items to 
the investors' decision model which is assumed to involve
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the following:
1. reducing the uncertainty concerning the performance of 
the business,
2. helping in a better estimation of future cash flows,
3. helping in the evaluation of future growth of the 
business.
APPENDIX 6 lists all the 53 items included in the 
study. The Information included in the index, classified 
into six groups, and their relevance are described below. 
These groups are: future plans and prospects, segmental
information, research and development information, foreign 
operations, assets descriptions, and other information.
1. Future Plans and Prospects:
Information regarding future plans helps to better estimate 
future cash flows. For example, forecasts are suggested as 
necessary inputs into users' decision making systems 
(Peasnell, 1981). Forecasts refers to management's 
projections of future events relevant to the firm. Also, 
future plans indicate the direction of operations and 
assists users in determining future growth areas (ICAS, 
1988). The Institute's document, Making Corporate Reports 
Valuable, suggests that management are much more concerned 
about the future than the past and that they employ this 
future-oriented information in planning the business. 
Therefore, such information is likely to be of considerable 
relevance to investors just as it is to management.
Included in this category is the prospects of 
industries in which the company is involved and the economy
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in general. Particularly included is any discussion of the 
industry s growth prospects, performance, and any
macroeconomic variables. This will help investors to 
evaluate the managers' perception of the factors affecting 
the company and to compare this perception with the general 
perception of the economy and the industry which can be 
found in the financial press.
Further items included in this group are discussion of 
basic management strategies, e.g., cost reduction, sales 
growth, diversification, rationalisation, etc.
2. Segmental Information:
Disclosing information related to business segments helps 
analysts and investors to better assess the company's risk 
(Dhaliwal, 1978; Gray, 1978; and Gray, 1984). In a recent 
study, although it was limited to a small number of
investment analysts, Day (1986) found that analysts need 
segment information as part of the input to their
forecasting process. Revealing details of segments would be 
useful because of its effects in reducing the risk and 
uncertainty of the business. For this research, the mere act 
of disclosing information regarding the segments is the 
important event rather than how well the business is 
diversified.
For line of business information, while regulation 
requires the disclosure of profit and turnover, it leaves to 
the management the responsibility to decide what constitutes 
a segment. In addition, regulation gives the management 
discretionary power on whether to disclose segmental
information or not.
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According to the Companies Act 1985, for each class of 
business, which in the opinion of the directors is substant­
ially different from other business carried on, there must 
be disclosed: (a) the amount of turnover attributable to
that class; and (b) the profit or loss before taxation 
attributable to that class (Companies Act 1985, Sch 4,55,1). 
For geographical segments, the Act requires the disclosure 
of information on the turnover attributable to the market 
if in the opinion of the directors the segment is 
substantially different. Where the classes of business or 
markets, in the opinion of the directors, do not differ 
substantially, it is possible to treat the segments as one 
class or market.
If, according to the Act, in the opinion of the 
directors, disclosure of the above information on turnover 
and profit would be seriously prejudicial to the interests 
of the company, the information need not be disclosed 
(Companies Act 1985, Sch 4,55,5).
Because of the discretionary power given to directors, 
it is considered that disclosing such information is 
essentially voluntary, and segmental information is 
accordingly included in the index.
3. Research and Development Information:
Research activities are carried out by companies in the 
expectation that such investments will keep the company 
competitive and will in turn generate future cash flows to 
the company. Revealing information regarding research and 
development (R&D) activities provides investors with the
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means to estimate future cash flows and the uncertainties 
associated with realising such revenues (Dukes, 1976 and 
Vigland, 1981). Information on R&D commitments aids 
investors to project future cash outflows and also the 
revenues and expected cash inflows.
Information on R&D includes results of research, 
general discussion of what the company has been pursuing in 
its R&D work as well as any special accomplishments.
4.Foreign Operations:
Overseas trading is a major activity of the British economy 
and most companies have in some way or another some 
interests in overseas trade. The two forms of involvement in 
such activities is through import/export or through making 
an investment overseas.
Two risks attach to the revenues generated from the 
foreign activities: (a) the currency exchange risk and (b)
the risk associated with repatriation of the revenues 
(Shapiro, 1984). Accordingly, disclosure of information 
concerning the locations of foreign investments and the 
gains or losses arising from currency exchange are of 
enormous usefulness to investors in reducing the 
uncertainties surrounding foreign operations. Also important 
is knowing how far the company is exposed to currency 
fluctuations through investment overseas or exporting. This 
may be represented to some extent by disclosing separately 
the gains and losses from transactions and translations.
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5. Assets Descriptions:
Revenue is generated through the efficient utilisation of 
assets. Therefore, any information concerning the assets 
including major assets, their use, locations, and useful 
life are of benefit to the users of the accounts. Such 
information would help to project future cash flows from the 
utilisation of the assets and to estimate their realisable 
values (ICAS, 1988).
For example, information on major products and patents 
would indicate to investors where the revenues come from and 
what would happen if there were changes in the demand for 
such products. Capital expenditure, i.e., investments, also, 
is a crucial issue with implications for future cash flows 
and uncertainty. Any information concerning projects in 
progress or future commitments would help in determining the 
area where the company is concentrating and whether these 
are growth areas.
In the case of oil companies, information on the 
licences they hold, which are assets with potential future 
cash flows, represents a major factor in deciding their 
value. This item represents how future supplies are secured.
6. Other Information:
Current cost accounting data are assumed to be of importance 
because they indicate the current value of the business 
(Fraser and Nobes, 1985; Basu, 1981; and Bublitz, Frecka, 
and McKeown, 1985). However, CCA information is not required 
to be disclosed but permitted to be attached to the main 
accounts.
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A critical factor which affects companies revenues is 
the demand for its products and services and whether such 
demand is stable. The Company's order book, major customers, 
target markets, and methods of distribution are examples of 
demand-related information. This includes competitive 
position of the firm' products, i.e., market share.
Historical data, although already in the public domain, 
would be beneficial to investors as they could use such data 
to instantaneously evaluate the progress of the company as 
well as inform them of any changes in the management's 
style. The implication of including such information in the 
annual report is that investors would use the information to 
estimate the risk associated with the business and therefore 
value the shares more accurately.
Finally, production levels and capacity for industrial 
companies indicate their efficiency in utilising the 
company's assets. This information helps in evaluating the 
company's ability to fulfil any unexpected demand to their 
products and the expected costs associated with such demand.
6.4.3 Relative Weighting of Items
After deciding on the content of the index (APPENDIX 6), 
the next problem which arises is the weight to be given to 
each item in the list since not all the items would have the 
same perceived importance to investors. Buzby (1975) is 
considered as the first study to address the problem of 
weighting (other studies are Chandra, 1975; Barrett, 1976; 
Leslie, 1979; Firth, 1979; McNally et al, 1982; and Firer 
and Smith, 1986).
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Firth (1979), in the U.K., surveyed a group of
financial analysts and asked them to weight the information 
items on a scale of one to five reflecting how important
they felt it was for investors that the item appear in
company annual reports. His results indicate that financial 
analysts assigned different weights to the information items 
in his index. In addition, Firer and Meth (1986), in a study 
of information disclosure in South Africa, found that 
investment analysts assigned different weights to the 
infromation items in their index.
Buzby (1975), in the U.S.A., used two indices with
different weightings when he examined the relationship 
between disclosure and firms attributes. In the first one 
he assigned equal weight to each item. For the second index, 
the relative importance of each of the items was estimated 
by a survey of professional financial analysts. The 
resulting survey responses and a literature review were used 
to assign weights to disclosures which were then applied to 
a sample of companies.
An interesting finding in Buzby's study, however, was 
that there were no significant differences in the 
statistical results when using the two indices separately.
Leslie (1979), also in the U.S.A., used two indices in 
his study, one with equal weighing and the other was 
weighted according to a survey of a group of financial 
analysts. His empirical investigation indicates that both 
indices produced similar statistical results with regard to 
the relationship between voluntary disclosure represented
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by the disclosure index and firms' characteristics.
The similarity of the results of the two methods,
i.e., assigning first an equal weighting and then an unequal 
weighting to the same item, as in the cases of both Buzby 
(1975) and Leslie (1979), is likely to be due to the fact 
that as the number of items in an index increases, the
relative importance of each item to the entire index is
reduced.
In general, however, there are shortcomings to the
weighting method using analysts opinions. The first is that 
the method is based on asking analysts to assign weights in 
a non-decision situation, which is an unrealistic setting. 
There is also a natural tendency for analysts to value most 
what is not currently disclosed to them (Buzby, 1975). This 
implies that analysts will assign higher weights to an item 
not currently disclosed than one which is currently 
disclosed. Buzby supported this argument where he shows that 
the group of items that were labelled "this is not a true- 
required item", i.e. currently disclosed, were weighted 3.33 
(of 5) and items "not required”, i.e. not currently 
disclosed, were weighted 3.41.
On the other hand, the main criticism of the equal 
weighting method is the inappropriateness of assigning 
equal weights in situations where some items are intuitively 
more important than other items.
For this study, and relying on the above discussion, it 
has been decided to use equal weighting for the disclosure 
index. It is argued that the number of items in the index is
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large enough so that equal and unequal weighting is likely 
to produce similar results.
To measure the extent of voluntary disclosure for each 
company, a rating worksheet, APPENDIX 6, was developed 
including the items of information discussed earlier.
At this stage, the problem arises as to how to deal 
with disclosure items which were not relevant for a 
particular company. To resolve this problem, a verification 
source must be available to refer to. For this research, 
scrutinisation of the accounts of the annual report, the 
Chairman's Statement, and the Directors' Report was 
considered to be a reasonable verification source.
The next step was to calculate the voluntary disclosure 
score for each company. To arrive at this score two numbers 
needed to be computed. One number was the maximum amount of 
information that could be presented by a given company as 
defined by the items of information applicable to that 
company. The second number represented the amount of 
information appearing in the annual report. These two 
numbers were used to form the voluntary disclosure score, 
which is a relative score, by expressing the amount of 
information disclosed in the annual report as a percentage 
of the maximum amount that could have been disclosed. The 
relative measure of voluntary disclosure served as the 
dependent variable in this research. Having the score in 
this format, i.e., a ratio format, which is the highest 
level in the statistical measurement classifications, is an 
advantage in the analysis stage.
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6.5 SUMMARY
This chapter has presented the design and the methodology by 
which the sample was collected, the hypotheses were 
identified and operationalised, and voluntary disclosure was 
measured. Practical problems of sample selection and data 
selection were addressed. The independent variables which 
were used to test the hypotheses were chosen. These 
variables are financial and non-financial measures that were 
extracted from the annual reports.
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CHAPTER
SEVEN-------------
CORPORATE ATTRIBUTES
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters have provided the theoretical 
background to voluntary disclosure, the regulatory 
framework, and the characteristics of the Unlisted 
Securities Market. In the previous chapter, the criteria 
for the sample selection and the methodology for measuring 
disclosure were addressed. This chapter, and the following 
four will describe the corporate attributes and disclosure 
practices of the sample companies and the statistics used 
to test the hypotheses of this research together with an 
analysis of the outcome of the empirical tests. The current 
chapter will, in particular, discuss the following:
1. The need for descriptive statistics.
2. The financial attributes of the sample companies.
7.2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Before reviewing the characteristics of the sample, the 
reasons for the descriptive univariate analysis are 
discussed. Firstly, in any study, attention will often be 
drawn from the start to one (or more) of the variables, and
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finding out for these variables something about the way the 
values differ from case to case may prove a beneficial 
first step towards tackling the main objectives of the 
study. Secondly, the interpretation of the results of more 
advanced analysis may be assisted by knowledge of the 
variation present in each variable entering the final 
analysis.
The starting point in the descriptive analysis is the 
fact that individual companies exhibit variation, that is to 
say they differ from each other to a greater or lesser 
extent and these similarities and differences are reflected 
in the corresponding values of the variables. The basic task 
of univariate descriptive analysis is to describe the 
variation in a set of values of one variable. There are two 
broad aspects of this analysis. The first is concerned with 
producing an appropriate set of summary statistics, for 
example, the mean and the variance, which show the main 
attributes of the data, and which may form a basis for 
comparisons between two or more samples.
The second aspect concerns uncovering patterns in the 
way values appear in respect of the sample, and then, 
generalising from the data set to the whole population. 
These patterns are used to describe the sample and for 
noting features of possible interest and raising questions.
7.3 COMPANIES' ATTRIBUTES
This section is devoted to analysing the financial 
attributes of the sample companies, namely; size, gearing,
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directors holding, foreign turnover, profitability, 
diversification. Other non-financial attributes, i.e., tax 
status, size of the auditing firm, number of substantial
shareholders, existence of executive share option schemes, 
and number of non-executive directors will also be 
described. The analyses are based on the descriptive
statistics of the sample companies (see APPENDIX 7) and on 
the summary tables provided herewith.
Three groups of statistics will be used in describing 
and summarising the sample: frequency distribution, central 
tendency measures, and measures of dispersion (see Shaw and 
Wheeler, 1985 for a detailed review of the appropriateness 
and properties of descriptive statistics). Frequency tables 
are usually used to summarise nominal or ordinal data such 
as the industry sector and number of the non-executive 
directors. When large numbers of observations are involved 
frequency tables are equally important and useful for data 
measured on both interval and ratio scales such as total 
assets and debt to equity ratio.
Measures of central tendency or average, however, 
provide a single number to describe the general magnitude of
all cases in a data set. One of the most commonly used
measures of central tendency for a set of data is the mean 
as it reflects the magnitude of every individual value and 
any data set can only have one mean.
In many circumstances it is important that one can 
describe the variation of data about their mean. For this 
purpose the standard deviation of the particular measure is 
used. For the extent to which the values in a frequency
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distribution are concentrated, which is of prime concern, 
two measures of dispersion, skewness and kurtosis, are 
employed. While Skewness measures the normality of a data 
set, kurtosis is the degree of peakedness of a frequency 
distribution and is related to deviation away from a 
perfectly symmeritcal curve.
7.3.1 Size
One of the striking characteristics of the sample is its 
size range. Different financial measures were used to 
measure size. Turnover is one of the most popular measures 
used because it represents a company's market transactions. 
The larger the company's turnover, the greater the influence 
the company is likely to have and the more it is likely to 
attract public and investor attention. Annual turnover for 
the smallest company in the sample is £12,000 and for the 
largest £195,178,000 . The mean is £18,699,000. TABLE 7.1
below shows the diversity of the sample with regard 
turnover.
TABLE 7.1
Total Turnover Summary Table
SALES TURNOVER (£) Frequency Percent
5,000,001 TO 10,000,000
10.000.001 TO 15,000,000
15.000.001 TO 20,000,000
OVER 20,000,000
UP TO 5,000,000 32 26.2
31 25.4
13 10.7
19 15.6
27 22.1
TOTAL 122 *100.0
Mean 
Std Dev
18,689,450
27,544,646
Skewness
Kurtosis
3.79
17.89
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For the skewness of total turnover, the distribution is 
positively skewed, i.e., more than 50 percent of the cases 
have turnover of less than the mean. As the TABLE 7.1 shows, 
around 80 per cent of the cases have turnover of less than 
£20,000,000 while the mean is £18,700,000. Further, the 
distribution has a high peak with a kurtosis value of 17.7. 
That is, most cases are located within a small range of 
values, from £lm to £20m, while the sample range is 
spanned from £12,000 to £195,178,00.
TABLE 7.2 
Total Assets Summary Table
TOTAL ASSETS (£) Frequency Percent
UP TO 5,000,000 39 32.0
5,000,001 TO 10,000,000 38 31.1
10,000,001 TO 15,000,000 16 13.1
OVER 15,000,000 29 23.8
TOTAL 122 100.0
Mean 12,419,976 Skewness 3.01
Std Dev 15,383,359 Kurtosis 9.97
The other measure of size used here is total assets. 
Total assets for the smallest firm is £360,349 and for the 
biggest £91,165,000. This Also indicates the diversity of 
the sample and was confirmed by other measures, namely, 
total equity (ranges from a deficit balance of £1,562,809 to 
£58,805,000) and total assets less current liabilities 
(ranges from a deficit of £872,906 to a surplus of 
£63,077,000).
regard to the distribution of the other measures 
of size, both total assets and total assets less current 
liabilities show similar degrees of skewness as total
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turnover. For example, around 80 per cent of the cases have 
total assets values of less than the mean (£12,419,000). 
However, the two variables have lower kurtosis values than 
does total turnover though their distributions are 
asymmetrical.
7.3.2 Gearing
The debt to equity ratio is one of the most popular measures 
of gearing. For the sample the minimum value for this ratio 
is 0.03 with companies shouldering debt of up to nine times 
the book value of their equity. The mean for the debt to 
equity ratio is 1.576.
TABLE 7.3 
Gearing Summary Table
DEBT TO EQUITY RATIO Frequency Percent
UP TO 0.50 12 9.8
0.51 TO 1.00 36 29.5
1.01 TO 1.50 29 23.8
1.51 TO 2.00 18 14.8
2.01 TO 2.30 7 5.7
OVER TO 2.30 19 15.6
TOTAL 121 100.0
Mean 1.58 Skewness 2.90
Std Dev 1.37 Kurtosis 12.69
As for the distribution of this measure, it shows a 
positive skewness (2.9), i.e., 80 per cent of the sample
have their ratios between 0.03 and 2. In addition, about 65 
per cent of the cases have debt to equity ratios below the 
mean (1.58). The distribution also has a high peak, i.e., 
most cases (85 per cent) have debt to equity ratios between 
0.03 and 2.30 while the sample's range is spread between
0.03 and 9. However, the skewness and peakedness is less for
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the other gearing measure, debt to total assets ratio, than 
that of the debt to equity ratio. For this variable the mean 
is 0.53, skewness value is -0.742, and kurtosis equals 1.41.
7.3.3 Directors' Holdings in the Company
This measure represents how much control the directors can 
exert over a company's affairs directly through voting in 
the Annual General Meeting (AGM). The higher this percentage 
is then the less the directors need authorisation from other 
shareholders to carry out their policies. In the sample, 
this measure ranges from 0.08 to 83.0 per cent. The maximum 
is considered very high which would not be observable in the 
main market companies. The mean for this measure is 37.96 
per cent which in itself a high percentage. This attribute 
is one major distinguishing feature of USM companies as they 
are allowed to join the market with a lower percentage of 
their capital in public hands.
TABLE 7.4
Director's Shareholdings Summary Table
DIRECTORS EQUITY (%) Frequency Percent
UP TO 15% 23 18.9
15.1% TO 25% 14 11.5
25.1% TO 35% 21 17.2
35.1% TO 45% 14 11.5
45.1% TO 60% 26 21.3
OVER 60% 24 19.7
TOTAL 122 100.0
Mean 37. 97 Skewness .07
Std Dev 22. 64 Kurtosis .93
The distribution and skewness of this measure, 0.07, 
indicates that the values are spread in a nearly normal
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distribution. Further, kurtosis for this variable is -0.93,
i.e., the distribution has a fairly moderate degree of 
peakedness. That is, the values of this variable are 
distributed across a wide flat range.
7.3.4 Foreign Turnover
Not all companies supplied information on their foreign 
operations (the subject of a later section). The mean value 
of foreign turnover as a percentage of total turnover is 
17.951. This indicates that USM companies are active in 
foreign markets to some considerable extent.
TABLE 7.5 
Foreign Turnover Summary Table
TURNOVER PERCENTAGE (%) Frequency Percent
NO FOREIGN TURNOVER 37 30.3
NO INFORMATION ON
FOREIGN TURNOVER 13 10.7
UP TO 10% 29 23.8
10.1% TO 30% 20 16.4
OVER 30% 23 18.9
TOTAL 122 100.0
Mean 17.95 Skewness 1.79
Std Dev 27.30 Kurtosis 2.41
As for the shape of the distribution of this attribute, 
the statistics indicate that the values are skewed 
positively with a cut-of point of around 10%, i.e., about
half the sample have between 0 and 10% of their turnover 
generated from foreign operations. Further, the kurtosis 
value shows a moderate peakedness in the distribution, i.e. 
the values are fairly spread across the sample s range.
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7.3.5 Profitability
The use of accounting data to describe profitability is in 
line with empirical evidence that analysts use accounting 
data in their selection of portfolios. Many measures of 
profitability were extracted from the annual reports. Growth 
in earnings per share (EPS) for the year under study ranges 
from a decline of 6.59 per cent to a positive growth of 5.13 
per cent. This is reflected in the profit figures of the 
year which range from a loss of £5,421,000 to a net profit 
after tax and extraordinary items of £10,114,000.
TABLE 7.6 
Growth In EPS Summary Table
GROWTH IN EPS (%) Frequency Percent
UP TO 0.50% DECLINE 18 14.8
0.51% TO 0% DECLINE 30 24.6
0.01% TO 2.50% GROWTH 20 16.4
2.51% TO 5.00% GROWTH 25 20.5
OVER 5.00% GROWTH 25 20.5
NO INFORMATION GIVEN
ON EPS GROWTH 4 3.3
TOTAL 122 100.0
Mean .03 Skewness -1.82
Std Dev 1.25 Kurtosis 13.25
The distribution of this measure indicates a negative 
skewness of 1.82 and a kurtosis of 13.25 which reveals a 
high degree of peakedness. This negative skewness has 
resulted, as the summary table shows, from the fact that 
more than half the companies in the sample (around 60 per 
cent) have a growth rate of more than the mean.
Another popular measure of profitability used by 
analysts is the rate of return on turnover, i.e., net profit
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after tax divided by turnover. For the sample, the mean rate 
of return is a loss of 3 per cent. However, the range for 
the sample was between a loss of 400 per cent to a positive 
return of 40.3 per cent.
TABLE 7.7 
Return On Turnover Summary Table
RETURN ON TURNOVER (%) Frequency Percent
LOSS OR ZERO RETURN 20 16.4
UP TO 3.50% 19 15.6
3.51% TO 8.50% 29 23.8
8.51% TO 13.0% 27 22.1
OVER 13.0% 27 22.1
TOTAL 122 100.0
Mean -.03 Skewness -5.19
Std Dev .54 Kurtosis 32.13
As in the case of growth in earnings per share 
variable, return on turnover has, also, a negatively, but 
more severely, skewed distribution with most of the cases 
located in the upper end of the scale and above the sample's 
mean. Further, the kurtosis points to a very peaked
distribution with around 60 per cent of the cases have a 
rate of return concentrated between zero and 13 per cent 
while the sample's range is between a loss of 400 per cent
and a positive return 40 per cent.
7.3.6 Diversification
According to the sample statistics, diversification is 
widespread among the companies. That is, companies 
activities and operations are spread among more than one
geographical area and line of business. Management s review 
and classification that is included in the Directors Report 
and in the Notes to the Accounts was used in calculating the
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geographical diversification index for each company in the 
sample. No attempt was made to redefine segments as it was 
felt that management's opinion is more appropriate than the 
researcher's own judgement.
TABLE 7.8
Geographical Diversification Summary Table
DIVERSIFICATION INDEX Frequency Percent
NO DIVERSIFICATION 
NO INFORMATION GIVEN
38 31.1
ON DIVERSIFICATION 14 11.5
1.001 TO 1.200 29 23.8
1.201 TO 1.700 20 16.4
OVER 1.700 21 17.2
TOTAL 122 100.0
Mean 1.38 Skewness 2.43
Std Dev .63 Kurtosis 6.41
For geographical and line of business diversification, 
the mean is 1.376 and 1.490 respectively. However, the range 
of the line of business diversification index is much wider, 
up to 9.995, than that of the geographical one which is 
4.340.
TABLE 7.9
Line of Business Diversification Summary Table
DIVERSIFICATION INDEX Frequency Percent
NO DIVERSIFICATION 
NO INFORMATION GIVEN
47 38.5
ON DIVERSIFICATION 34 27.9
1.001 TO 1.400 13 10.7
1.401 TO 1.900 15 12.3
OVER 1.900 13 10.7
TOTAL 122 100.0
Mean 1.49 Skewness 5.18
Std Dev 1.23 Kurtosis 31.07
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As for the distribution of the geographical
diversification index, about 65 per cent of the cases have 
values less than the mean (1.38). However, 11 per cent of 
the cases have no information on their geographical 
diversification.
With regard to the distribution of line of business 
diversification index, around 50 per cent of the cases have 
their values below the sample's mean (1.49). Though, the 
non-disclosing companies are about 28 per cent as compared 
to 11 per cent in the case of geographical diversification.
9.3.7 Other Attributes
In addition to the above characteristics, the analysis has 
revealed, firstly, that 67 per cent (82 companies) of the 
sample had substantial shareholders (holding more than 5 per 
cent of their share capital), other than their directors. Of 
these, 55 companies (45 per cent of the total) had one or 
two substantial shareholders (TABLE 7.10). Only 4 companies 
had more than 4 substantial shareholders.
TABLE 7.10
Substantial Shareholdings 
(More Than 5%)
Value Frequency Percent
0 40 32.8
1 28 23.0
2 27 22.1
3 11 9.0
4 12 9.8
5 2 1.6
6 1 .8
8 1 .8
Total 122 100.0
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Another item of information available concerning the 
sample is the type of auditing firm working for the USM 
companies. Sixty per cent of the companies (74 companies) 
were audited by one of the Big Eight firms (see TABLE 7.11). 
Three of the auditing firms, Deloitte Haskins & Sells, Ernst 
& Whinney, and Peat Marwick McLintock, had audited 40 
companies between them (33 per cent of the sample).
TABLE 7.11 
The Auditing Firm Summary Table
Frequency Percent
PEAT MARWICK McLINTOCK 15 12.3
DELOITTE HASKINS & SELLS 13 10.7
ERNST & WHINNEY 12 9.8
ARTHUR ANDERSEN 9 7.4
TOUCHE ROSS 9 7.4
ARTHUR YOUNG 6 4.9
COOPERS & LYBRAND 5 4.1
PRICE WATERHOUSE 5 4.1
OTHERS 48 39.3
TOTAL 122 100.0
Another feature of the sample is the relative
unpopularity of non-executive members of the Board of
Directors (TABLE 7.12). Only 37 per cent of the sample (45
companies out of 122) had non-executive directors on their
Boards for the period under study. Out of the 45 companies, 
35 companies had only one or two non-executive directors.
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TABLE 7.12
Number of Non-Executive Directors Summary Table
NO Frequency Percent
0 77 63.1
1 25 20.5
2 10 8.2
3 6 4.9
4 1 .8
5 2 1.6
8 1 .8
TOTAL 122 100.0
Executive share option schemes (ESO), were available to 
directors from 44 per cent of the companies (54 companies). 
However, one company did not disclose information on whether 
the scheme existed or not (see TABLE 7.13).
TABLE 7.13
Existence of Executive Share Option Summary Table
Frequency Percent
NO EXECUTIVE SHARE OPTIONS 67 
EXECUTIVE SHARE OPTION 54 
NOT DISCLOSED 1
54.9
44.3
.8
TOTAL 122 100.0
As indicated in the previous chapter, eight industry 
sector groups, having at least 5 companies each, were 
included in the sample. The classification of the companies 
was according to Peat Marwick's classification. The largest 
sector was electronics, represented by 41 companies or, 33 
per cent of the sample. The next largest sector was the 
leisure group with 20 companies, or 16 per cent of the 
sample. The oil and gas sector was represented by only 8 
companies, although, at the launching of the USM, this group
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was one of the largest. TABLE 7.14 shows the detailed 
composition of the sample.
TABLE 7.14
Industry Sector Summary Table
Code Number of 
Companies
Percent
BEERS, WINES, SPIRITS 10 5 4.0
BUILDING INDUSTRY 11 11 9.0
DRAPERY AND STORES 13 15 12.3
ELECTRICALS 14 41 33.6
FOOD AND GROCERIES 16 9 7.3
LEISURE 20 20 16.3
PAPER AND PRINTING 23 13 11.0
OIL AND GAS 31 8 6.5
TOTAL 122 100.0
Finally, an important characteristic is whether the 
companies were considered to be "close” or not from the tax 
point of view. Sixty per cent of the companies in the sample 
had the "close company" tax status (TABLE 7.15). Tax status 
is related to the extent that a company's managers own and 
control the firm.
TABLE 7.15
Tax Status Summary Table
Frequency Percent
NOT A CLOSE COMPANY 43 35.2
CLOSE COMPANY 73 59.8
NOT DISCLOSED 6 4.9
TOTAL 122 100.0
After discussing the financial and general attributes 
of the sample, the next step is to address the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in general and for each item in the
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disclosure index. This is the subject of the next chapter.
7.6 SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed the descriptive statistics that 
reflect the financial and general attributes of the sample. 
The USM was established to serve part of the corporate 
sector that cannot or is unable to join the main market, in 
particular, small growing companies with difficulties in 
financing their projects. The statistics indicate that this 
segment of the corporate sector is diversified with regard 
to size, gearing, directors' shareholdings, diversification, 
and profitability. The sample is also diversified with 
regard to industry sector, tax status, existence of 
executive share option schemes, number of non-executive 
directors, auditing firm and number of substantial 
shareholdings.
Further, for the case of business diversification, both 
geographically and line of business, the sample is well 
diversified. For example, foreign turnover figures indicate 
that USM companies are active to some extent in foreign 
trade. Line of business diversification is also evident in a 
considerable number of firms in the sample.
Lastly, the statistics confirm the notion that USM 
companies are distinguished by the owner-manager attribute. 
The mean for directors' share in equity is 37.96 per cent, 
which is high as USM companies are allowed to join the 
market with a lower proportion of their equity in public 
hands.
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Having discussed the financial and general attributes 
of the sample, the next step is to address the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in general, that is, testing the 
hypothesis of whether voluntary disclosure occurs.
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EXTENT OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter applies the methodology developed earlier to 
empirically investigate the first research question of the 
project, i.e., to what extent have USM companies disclosed 
information voluntarily during the period of the study. 
Formal measurement of voluntary disclosure, in contrast with 
informal observation, allows determination of the extent of 
disclosure. The importance of formal measurement is 
furthered as the number of voluntary disclosure items 
increases as the items can be summarised and reduced to one 
score which can then be used in formal statistical testing. 
Further, when the number of firms disclosing information 
voluntarily increases, the summary score can be used in 
empirically comparing the disclosure practices of a group of 
firms and examining the likely explanations for any 
differences in companies disclosure practices. In this 
research, formal measurement is useful in investigating the 
economic incentives of voluntary disclosure by way of 
applying advanced statistical techniques.
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8.2 VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE IN GENERAL
To examine the hypothesis that USM companies disclose 
information voluntarily a confidence test was performed. The 
test investigates whether the mean of voluntary disclosure 
scores is greater than zero, or:
HO: Mean = Zero 
HN: Mean > Zero 
With 99% confidence the results reject the null hypothesis, 
and therefore support the hypothesis that USM companies 
disclose information voluntarily.
Voluntary disclosure scores, measured by the actual 
amount of voluntary disclosure as a percentage of the 
maximum amount that could have been revealed, range from 
0.08 or 8 per cent to 0.535 or 53.5 per cent. Further, the 
results indicate that, on average, companies voluntarily 
disclosed 26 per cent of the amount that could have been
revealed. As for the shape of the frequency distribution, it
is nearly normal (skewness equals 0.60 and Kurtosis equals 
0.70)
The question arises as to whether this amount of
disclosure is adequate or not. The answer is subjective and 
depends on users' demand for information. For management, it 
could argue that "we disclose information voluntarily up to 
the level where the marginal cost of disclosing equals the 
marginal benefit generated from disclosing such information 
and this is our limit". As it will be shown in later
sections, this reason has appeared in some companies annual 
reports to justify not disclosing specific information, 
e.g., Current Cost Accounting information and segmental
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information.
From the users and investors point of view, they could 
argue that the disclosed amount of information is not 
adequate, or, in other words: "what we are interested in is 
the undisclosed information". The basic concepts of economic 
rationality would lead to the conclusion that the attained 
level of disclosure is the result of the interaction between 
the management from one side and the users' pressure from 
the other.
To explore the extent of disclosure in more detail, the 
items included in the disclosure index were divided into 
groups according to their nature. TABLE 8.1 presents summary 
statistics for each group and APPENDIX 8 shows the extent of 
disclosure for each item in the disclosure index.
TABLE 8.1
Summary Statistics for the Groups of Disclosure Items
Variable Mean Std No of* No of**
Dev Items Companies
FUTURE PROSPECTS .28 .17 6 107
EMPLOYEE INFORMATION .02 .13 2 23
LOB INFORMATION .21 .21 6 92
GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION .26 .18 6 111
R&D INFORMATION .19 .29 6 50
FOREIGN CURRENCY .19 .25 6 30
OIL & GAS INFORMATION .88 .35 1 7
OTHER INFORMATION .30 .11 19 81
TOTAL SCORE .26 .08 122
* Number of items in each group.
** Number of companies disclosing at least one item in each 
group.
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The first group appearing in the table is strategies, 
future prospects and plans. The mean disclosure for this 
group was 0.28 which is close to the mean of the total 
disclosure score. The information included in this group is 
mostly narrative that helps in assessing future cash flows. 
However, the results for this group, i.e., disclosing only 
28% of what they could have disclosed, are not encouraging 
and indicates that the companies are reluctant to reveal
their strategies. One of the reasons is likely to be that 
management views disclosure of information on their plans 
and strategies as being to their disadvantage.
The next group of items concerns the disclosure of
information regarding employment and training for companies 
with less than 250 employees. Information on such activities 
is required by law for companies with more than 250
employees. For this group, however, the level of disclosure 
is very low, i.e., with only 2 per cent, on average, of the 
information revealed.
This low level of employee information disclosure could 
be because either management has nothing to disclose, which 
is unlikely, or as a consequence of the prevailing
industrial relations in the U.K. during the current decade. 
It is widely recognised that management s relationship with 
employees and trade unions has changed during recent year. 
It could be that companies have become more sensitive to 
disclosing information with regard their training and 
employee conditions so to avoid any criticism from the trade 
unions.
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In addition, the low level of employee information 
disclosure could be due to management's believe that such 
information is not materially important.
Information on geographical diversification was 
disclosed at the same level, on average, as the mean of the 
total score, i.e., 0.26. The mean for the line of business 
(LOB) disclosure was 0.21 and the maximum value was 50 per 
cent. That is, information on geographical activity was more 
forthcoming than LOB information. Some companies disclosed 
the full amount of expected voluntary information and others 
disclosed nothing.
The reason for this low level of disclosure, one could 
argue, is that USM companies do not appear to accept the 
policy of revealing segmental information. As will be 
demonstrated in the next section, management views this 
information as either sensitive or irrelevant to investors.
Two groups of items of information related to research 
and development and foreign currency have equal means of 
voluntary disclosure. Each of the means equals 0.19. In 
other words, on average, companies had disclosed only 19 
per cent of what was expected from them. The areas of 
research and development and foreign currency have, as 
suggested previously, a profound implication on the 
assessment of a company's risk and the estimation of future 
cash flow. One could conclude, after looking at the data, 
that the prospects for more disclosure of information 
concerning such issues does not look encouraging.
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Oil and gas company disclosures, in addition to what 
other companies disclose, is related to the licences granted 
to them and their reserves. It seems that companies in this 
sector have accepted the premise that such information is 
useful to investors and there is no disadvantage to them in 
revealing the information.
The last category is dedicated to information with 
respect to assets, current cost accounting, historical 
information, and products and services information. This 
group has the highest mean amongst other groups with 30 per 
cent of the expected information released by the sample 
companies. Moreover, this group has a minimum disclosure 
value of 0.05, or companies disclosed voluntarily at least 5 
per cent of the information they had been expected to 
disclose while the value for the other categories was zero.
In summary, the indications are that companies do 
disclose information voluntarily and, on average, 26% of 
what they could have disclosed. However, the extent of 
disclosure for the individual items in the disclosure index 
varies considerably. One of the likely reasons for this 
variation is the perceived relevance of each item to 
management. This argument has appeared in more than one 
annual report.
The next section describes in detail the applicability 
of each item in the index to the companies in the sample and 
to what extent the companies have disclosed such items. 
Examples and extracts from the annual reports are also 
provided.
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8.3 THE EXTENT OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE FOR THE INDEX ITEMS 
As the companies in the sample were drawn from different 
industry sectors, it would be natural to expect companies 
not to disclose the same items in the disclosure index. 
This section will analyse in detail each item in the index 
and the extent of disclosure for these items. Further, 
extracts from the sample's annual reports is provided. The 
discussion will be divided according to the original index. 
The full details of applicability and extent of disclosure 
for each item are shown in APPENDIX 8.
8.3.1 Future Plans and Prospects
A large majority of the companies, 84.4 per cent or 103 
companies out of 122, disclosed information on their future 
plans prospects, and strategies. This item which represents 
the management's broad view of the future is of a narrative 
nature. Although narrative, it is suggested that this 
information is rated highly by analysts and the financial 
community (CIMA, 1986).
Strategies which represent the guidelines for future 
investment and finance decisions have appeared in many of 
the annual reports. However, statements on strategies were 
vague in some cases and very clear and definite in others. 
T&S Stores pic, for example, states that:
"(Our) philosophy is to keep abreast of current
retailing trends."
Another company from the building industry, London and 
Clydeside Holdings pic, states its strategy clearly and 
gives some indications of how the company is pursuing the 
strategy:
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"We have diversified in three minor ways since I 
(the Chairman) last reported to you. Firstly with 
a view to improving sales in Aberdeen we opened 
an Estate Agency since the end the year, trading 
under the name of Beacon Estates Limited. 
Secondly, the Mains of Scotstown public house 
owned by our subsidiary Kevmac opened during the 
year is beginning to establish its name in the 
Aberdeen area. Thirdly, a further diversification 
is now underway whereby we will be extending our 
range of quality homes on to several small sites 
where we see the opportunity to carry out small 
high class developments."
For future prospects, which is partly narrative and 
partly quantitative, 87.7 per cent of the sample, 107 
companies, disclosed information about prospects at least in 
relation to one of the following: the economy, the industry, 
or the company. The most recurrent item was information 
concerning the prospects of the company, 99 companies out of 
the 107, 92.5 per cent, disclosed this information in their 
annual reports. Disclosing information in quantitative terms 
was very unpopular, however, with only 8 companies revealing 
such information. This might be a result of the management's 
unwillingness to commit themselves to a specific target. For 
example, Ramus pic states the company's prospects and the 
effects of currency fluctuations on the company's their 
margins:
"Sales during the September quarter of 1986 are 
substantially ahead of the same period last year, 
and I am confident that we can meet the 
increasing demands of our market place through 
1987. As major importers, however, we must be 
concerned at the present weakness and volatility 
of sterling which could adversely affect our 
margins."
Some companies state their prospects and an indication 
of the changes they have made to suit future developments.
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For instance, one company from the electricals industry, DBE 
pic, states in its annual report that:
"(the company) is now structured to undertake a 
substantially higher volume of business. The rate 
of profit achieved in the last three months of 
85/86 is continuing. The results being obtained 
in the new financial year are bearing the fruit 
of investments over the past eighteen months."
Other companies, however, refer to the difficulties in 
predicting future prospects. Cowells pic states that "it is 
difficult to make predictions at this stage about the 
outcome for 1987, but I am pleased to say that all product 
areas have been very busy since the beginning of the year 
and the order books are very healthy."
Further, few companies indicated the prospects of 
specific products. A property group, Dunton Group pic, 
disclosed that "the Group is steadily expanding its property 
development activities and an increasing contribution to 
profit may be expected in future years. I (the Chairman) 
anticipate a maintained contribution from our brick and 
waste disposal interests."
Lastly, some companies refer to the competitive 
conditions that are prevailing in the industry. One brewer, 
Eldridge pic, claims that "the grass may be tinged with 
brown on our side of the hill due to the heat of the 
competition but it is rarely greener on the other side." A 
colourful statement, but is there a competitive-free 
industry?
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8.3.2 Employment Conditions
As indicated earlier, the employment of 250 individuals was 
used as a demarcation point to distinguish companies who 
disclose information on disabled employees or pensions 
plans. The Companies Act 1985 has specified that companies 
with less than 250 employees are not required to disclose 
such information. According to the sample, 59 companies, or
48.4 per cent had 250 or less employees. Only one company 
out of the 59 had disclosed information in relation to 
disabled employees and pension plans.
One item of information that applies to all companies 
is that related to training and industrial relations. 23 
companies or 18.9 per cent of the sample released 
information regarding this matter. One may presume, 
therefore, that this result is not encouraging and 
especially from the Trade Unions' point of view. For 
instance, Ramus Holdings pic refers to the industrial 
relation conditions by stating that "the group has continued 
to develop arrangements aimed at providing employees with 
regular information on matters concerning them as employees. 
Communications of this information is primarily dependent on 
newsletters, memoranda and regular management and training 
meetings." However, it is not clear what is meant by "as 
employees" and therefore, it is reasonable to question this 
line of reasoning.
In another example, Fergabrook pic acknowledges the 
importance of the welfare of its employees and describes the 
relationship between the directors and the employees. The 
Report of the Directors states that:
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"The Directors fully recognise the importance to 
the Group of all its employees and attempts to 
ensure that their views are taken into account 
when decisions are made which are likely to 
affect their interests.
Employees are encouraged to make their opinions 
known to the Directors and senior management and 
to be aware of the financial and economic 
performance of their divisions and the Group as a 
whole."
8.5.3 Line of Business Details
Segmental information with respect to line of business (LOB) 
is one of the major elements of the disclosure index. 92 
companies, or 75.4 per cent of the sample, released some 
information concerning LOB or gave reasons for not revealing 
such information. 44 companies gave the reason as 
inapplicability of such information.
At first glance, one may comment that this is a very 
high percentage (44 companies) and reveals the openness of 
companies. However, a question arises: would the companies
have disclosed information had they been diversified and 
operating many lines of businesses? Also, as the regulations 
have left the decision to the directors to decide on what 
constitutes a line of business, there is not enough 
information to judge the propriety of their decisions.
A good example for LOB information is available from 
Gibbs Mew pic. The company suggests that disclosing such 
items is a usual reporting practice and provides greater 
clarity:
"The table in the Directors' Report showing divisional 
profits has been re-stated to illustrate the results 
before interest in line with usual reporting practices 
and to provide greater clarity.:"
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1986 1985 1984 1983
£000 £000 £000 £000
Continuing Business 
Gibbs Mew 
Salisbury Brewery
Trading activities 629 580 549 559
Houses under management 111 100 58 67
750 680 652 626
Wm. Seymour
Soft drinks manf & dist 104 132 141 102
Profits from trading activities 854 812 793 728
Exceptional profits -- — 315 34
854 812 1108 762
Discontinued Businesses
Robert Porter/Campbell Trelawny — (414) (460) (255)
Profit before Interest 854 371 648 507
Three companies gave their reasons for not disclosing 
LOB information. The prominent phrase used was revealing 
such information would cause damage to the business. For 
example, London & Clydeside Holdings pic states that 
"turnover and pre-tax profit by activity is not disclosed as 
the directors consider this would be prejudicial to the 
interests of the company." The validity of this reason, 
however, cannot be objectively determined by outsiders.
Another reason for not disclosing LOB information 
expressed by Pineapple Group pic is that "in the opinion of 
the directors, the Group's activities are all related." It 
is difficult, however, to accept this assertion as any 
business could use this generally applicable reasoning. In 
addition, the company's annual report indicates that 
Pineapple pic is engaged at least two separate activities.
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As for the disclosing companies, a total of 50 
companies, 45 of them (90 per cent) disclosed information on 
line of business turnover. The next more frequently 
recurring item appearing in the annual reports of the 
disclosing companies was profit by line of business. 28 
companies provided information regarding their profits by 
line of business. However, other segmental items concerning 
assets and capital expenditures were rarely disclosed in 
the annual reports of the sample companies; only one company 
disclosed capital expenditure by line of business.
8.3.4 Geographical Information
Geographical disclosure was, to some extent, dominant in the 
sample. Out of 122, 111 companies (91 per cent) disclosed
information or gave reasons for not revealing the 
information. Inapplicability was the reason in 37 cases, and 
three other companies had other reasons for not providing 
geographical disclosure with the main reason being damaging 
the competitiveness of the business. Cowells pic states:
"in the opinion of the directors, disclosure 
of the turnover and profit attributable to 
geographical markets would be seriously 
prejudicial to the interests of the group."
Another reason expressed for not disclosing trading 
profits attributable to the various geographical markets is 
the difficulty in obtaining such information. One company, 
The Global Group pic, states that "due to the difficulty of 
apportioning overheads and expenses an accurate analysis of 
trading profits attributable to these areas has not been 
undertaken." Or, as appeared in the annual report of Asprey 
pic: "no geographical breakdown of turnover or contributions
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to profit has been provided as it is not possible to obtain 
an analysis, given the international nature of the group."
From these two examples, if they are the real explanation 
for not disclosing, it would appear that some companies have 
not found the appropriate cost allocation method or do not 
have adequate information systems in place.
For the disclosing firms, the item most disclosed was 
geographical turnover with 70 companies revealing this item. 
15 companies, also, had their profit analysed
geographically. However, further information was not 
forthcoming from the companies. Only two companies disclosed 
capital expenditure for their geographical segments and a 
similar number for the geographical distribution of their 
assets.
For the disclosing companies, the most common 
classifications in analysing turnover and/or profit had been 
the continental and the UK/Other classifications. In 
addition, some companies used a combination of continental 
and regional classifications. For example, Feedback pic 
analysed its turnover as follows:
In another case, A & M Group pic, the company analysed 
its turnover by both line of business and geographical area.
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1986 1985
% %
U.K.
Europe 
Americas 
Africa 
Middle East 
Far East
36.0 37.5
11.9 18.9
17.6 24.0
3.6 4.0
20.9 7.3
10.0 8.3
However, the analysis of profit had been omitted because the 
directors claimed that "disclosure of this information will 
not be in the best interest of the group."
8.5.5 Research and Development
The sample is composed of companies from different industry 
sectors with some industries having to incur research and 
development expenditures to maintain their existence and 
expand their share in the market. Out of the 122 companies, 
50 companies disclosed information on the applicability of 
R&D to their business or provided detailed information where 
it was applicable. Ten companies had suggested that R&D was 
not applicable and therefore no information appeared in 
their annual reports regarding this matter. The remaining 
forty companies revealed statements concerning R&D
activities, and the most common approach was to disclose 
narrative information. However, only 24 companies revealed 
their R&D expenditures. Very few of the sample companies, 
however, provided information about future R&D commitments.
For example, Telecomputing pic refers to its commitment 
to R&D and new markets but without giving information on the 
exact amount of resources directed to the activity: "as one
of the very few British software companies that does invest 
a high proportion of its turnover in research and 
development we know that our success in product development 
must be followed by exploitation of the product in North 
America."
Another company disclosed the amount of R&D and how 
this activity is considered to be vital to the company. Bio-
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Isolates pic, a company that is involved in food technology, 
states that "the Board considers that research continues to 
play a vital role in the Group's operations. Investment in 
research for the year amounted to £29,925 and was charged to 
profit and loss in the year."
8.4.6 Foreign Currency
No information was available on how many companies were 
involved in foreign currency transactions. From the annual 
reports of the sample, however, 30 companies (24.6 per 
cent) disclosed the amounts of their foreign currency gains 
or losses. As to the impact of foreign currency fluctuations 
on the companies operations, only nineteen companies, 15.6 
per cent of the total, disclosed their managements' opinions 
on the subject. All the comments were narrative without an 
in-depth analysis. For example, Ramus Holdings pic, 
wholesale distributors of British and imported ceramic, 
states: "as major importers we must be concerned at the
present weakness and volatility of sterling which could 
adversely affect our margins."
Another company, Laidlaw Thomson Group pic, disclosed 
the effect of currency fluctuations on their profits by 
stating that: "the export markets of 1986 were difficult
through a combination of strong and short term difficulties 
caused by excessive currency fluctuations which eroded the 
contribution to net profits in the period."
Finally, 23 companies provided information on the 
location of their foreign assets with brief descriptions of 
their operations.
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8.3.7 Assets Description
Detailed information on assets could be used to evaluate 
management s performance and help to determine the extent of 
the utilisation of the assets. The term assets is used for 
all types of assets such as: fixed assets, properties,
investments, capital expenditures, products, services, 
stocks, and patents.
For fixed assets, there was a variation in the extent 
of the breakdown of the assets from dividing them into two 
groups to seven groups such as separating tools from 
machinery. Sixty seven companies out of the 122 (54.9 per
cent) disclosed a very detailed breakdown of their assets. 
The judgements concerning this item was based on the 
researcher's experience after reviewing the annual reports 
and relying on the other information in these reports such 
as the nature of the business, extent and diversification of 
operations, and location of the operations.
For example, World of Leather pic gave the following 
detailed information with regard to its fixed tangible 
assets:
Long Leasehold Premises 
Short Leasehold Premises 
Improvements to Leasehold Premises 
Fixtures, Fittings, & Equipment 
Motor Vehicles
Freehold Industrial Buildings
Some companies disclosed information on their 
production capacity. For example, Jebsens Drilling pic, an 
oil and gas company, disclosed information concerning the 
capacity and rate of utilisation of some of its assets. The 
annual report states: "the utilisation for all our units
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fell from 84% in 1985 to 46% in 1986. At the present time 
the three semi submersibles are idle off Aberdeen and 
Falmouth. Additional work for the semi—submersibles could 
have been obtained during the year only at day rates which 
would have incurred even greater losses."
Another class of assets is the investments and 
properties for some companies. Disclosing information on the 
particulars of such assets, i.e. the investments, their 
locations, and the operational conditions of the properties, 
was evident in a large number of the annual reports. 57 
companies, or 46.7 per cent, revealed this kind of 
information. An example of such information is in the annual 
report of Moss Advertising pic, an advertising company, 
which discribe a subsidiary's investment and its expected 
contribution. Their report states that:
"our creative and design capabilities have been 
increased by the creation of a new subsidiary, 
Cieciala and Critchley Creative Services 
Limited. We have brought together an experienced 
team and made significant investment in high 
quality typesetting and design equipment. This 
investment is not expected to yield short term 
profits but will contribute significantly to our 
creative profile in the industry, attract high 
quality clients and make material contributions 
to profit in the longer term."
Capital expenditures are usually incurred with the 
expectation that such payments will contribute to the 
generation of future revenues. The levels of expenditure, 
the extent of completion of current projects, any problems 
in implementing projects, and future plans and expansion in 
respect of specific projects are examples of the items that 
concern the investment community. For example, in the
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Chairman s Statement, Cowells pic explains that "the Group 
continued its policy of prudent effective capital 
expenditure which should help to produce books and financial 
reports."
In the case of current projects, 54 companies provided 
detailed information on their current capital expenditures. 
For example, the chairman of Brewmaker pic reported the 
following:
"My October statement mentioned the factory we 
had acquired in Milbrook. Building work has now 
started, and we are investing approximately 
£400,000 on purchase, refurbishment and new 
machinery, to provide us with best manufacturing 
facility."
38 companies, or 31.1 per cent of the sample, disclosed 
information regarding their future expenditures. In the 
Directors' Report, for example, Bio-isolates pic disclosed 
that "management expects that cash flow from operations 
will be broadly neutral during 1987 as inventories are 
reduced and no further major capital expenditure is 
anticipated."
One item that scored highly in terms of disclosure was 
the description of each company's products and services. 
Although one would expect that companies publish such 
information as a means of publicity, it may be that in some 
situations revealing the details and specifications of the 
products could help competitors. Also, some products might 
be of a secretive and sensitive nature which could prohibit 
disclosure. However, 81 out of the 122 companies (66.4 per 
cent) disclosed such information.
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Lastly, details on stocks, which represent a 
considerable component of current assets for a large number 
of companies in the sample, helps in evaluating a company's 
ability to cover any expected increase in the demand for 
their products, or in cases of a decline in the demand, the 
effect of the decline on the company's liquidity and cash 
flow. Although net realisable value of the stock is a 
relevant measure for liquidity and cash flow, only 11 
companies (9.0 per cent of the sample) provide this 
information in their annual reports. A probable reason for 
the low percentage is that net realisable value of stock for 
the non-disclosing firms does not differ substantially from 
the book value as the inflation rate has been low and stable 
during the mid-eighties.
8.3.8 Other Information
Several items were included under this heading. Historical 
data covering the previous 3-5 years period were disclosed 
by 58 companies (47.5 per cent). This information is related 
to companies performance and includes a summary of profits, 
turnover, earning per share, and total assets. For the non­
disclosing firms, a likely reason for not disclosing such 
information would be companies assumption that such 
information is in the public domain and, therefore, there is 
no need to incur unnecessary costs.
Value added information, however, which represents the 
company's contribution to the national income, were not 
revealed at all. It seems that companies do not consider 
disclosing such information of any value to them. Another 
unpopular item was the disclosure of any disputes or
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difficulties facing the companies. Such disputes could arise 
with outsiders, i.e. legal disputes, or with the companies' 
employees. Only one company disclosed that there was a 
pending case of legal liability.
One subject that is consistently under review in 
academic circles is current cost accounting (CCA). Many 
academics have advocated publishing CCA information as a 
supplement to the conventional historical accounts or 
disclosing a summary in such accounts. However, the practice 
represented by the sample under study does not support the 
academics suggestions. Only 2 companies provided CCA 
information as a supplement to their historical accounts. A 
further 5 companies gave specific reasons for not disclosing 
CCA information. .
Different reasons were stated for not disclosing CCA 
information. For example, Moss Advertising pic explained 
that "the Board considers that the preparation of current 
cost accounts does not materially improve the information 
given to shareholders. Accordingly, the expense of 
preparation and audit of current costs accounts has not been 
incurred." Another company, Norbain Electronics pic, argued 
that "the directors have decided that it is not appropriate 
for the Group to comply with the requirements to publish 
current cost accounts, as they consider that the costs 
involved would be disproportionate to the benefits." Lastly, 
Feedback pic, stated that "these accounts have not been 
produced in view of the continuing suspension of SSAP 16."
For the non—disclosing firms, a likely reason for not 
disclosing, and assumed by management to be known to the
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public, is the low rate of inflation that had prevailed 
during the period of study, and therefore the irrelevance of 
CCA information.
Information regarding the demand for the products or 
services of a company may provide indicators of its market 
share and help to evaluate future cash flows. Information on 
companies' order books, which is one indicator of the extent 
of the demand for a product, were provided by 18.9 per cent 
or 23 companies of the total sample. For example, DBE 
Technology Group pic comments that:
"The order book now stands at some £5.3m, 
including three production contracts each in 
excess of £lm. To date, the success with 
programmes valued over £lm has been in the 
production area but we are also competing for 
several large engineering programmes that provide 
the potential for further growth."
Information on major customers and target markets is 
another indicator of market share. Such information appeared 
in the annual reports of 74 companies (60.7 per cent). Some 
companies, for example, disclosed a detailed list of their 
major customers.
Finally, information about take-over activities by a 
company or any take-over approach towards that company would 
be useful in evaluating the future prospects of the company 
and represents an indication of the market attitude towards 
its performance. Although companies are required to disclose 
information on such activities, the depth of the disclosure 
and managements analysis of the consequences and 
implications have varied from one company to another. 34 
companies, or 27.9 per cent, revealed information and
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detailed reviews of their take-over activities. Shandwick 
pic, for instance, presented a detailed analysis of the 
previous year s acquisitions including consideration paid in 
shares and cash, fair value and method of accounting for 
each transaction.
However, only 15 companies (12.3 per cent) disclosed 
the impact of the year's take-overs upon their 
profitability. For example, John Kent pic disclosed the 
contribution to turnover and profit before taxation of the 
acquisition of another company:
Turnover Profits 
£000 £000
D C Limited 488 39
The Company and other subsidiaries 16,733 1,063
17,221 1,102
8.4 SUMMARY
This chapter has tested the first hypothesis that concerns 
the extent to which voluntary disclosure had occurred for 
the sample companies. As a result from the formal 
measurement and testing, this research concludes that USM 
companies, represented by the sample, disclosed information 
voluntarily for the period under study by varied amounts and 
with an average of 26 percent of the amount that could have 
been disclosed.
Further, an analysis was provided of the extent of 
voluntary disclosure for each group of items of information 
in the disclosure index. Examples from the sample's annual 
reports were also provided. The results of the formal
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observation and measurement of voluntary disclosure indicate 
that USM companies disclose information voluntarily with 
variations in the levels of disclosure according to the type 
of information (segmental, plans and prospects, R&D, etc.). 
On average, 28 percent of the information on future 
prospects that could have been disclosed were actually 
disclosed. For research and development and foreign currency 
information, on average, 19 per cent of the information were 
revealed.
Employee information, however, is the least popular and 
appears in only one annual report. In contrast, oil and gas 
sector companies' voluntary disclosure average was 88 per 
cent of what could have been revealed.
A prominent reason cited by companies for not 
disclosing some of the information is that the costs 
involved would be disproportionate compared to the benefits 
derived. Further, disclosure of segmental information, for 
some companies, was stated as seriously prejudicial to their 
interests. Another reason stated was that companies do not 
consider the information materially improves shareholders' 
decision making processes.
An interesting reason cited by two companies for not 
disclosing segmental information is the difficulty of 
allocating overhead costs to segments. It is not clear 
whether this is a genuine reason or not. If it is, an 
accounting problem needs to be solved.
For the non-disclosing firms, one can only speculate 
the reasons for not disclosing. Cost of disclosure, either
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direct monetary cost or indirect in terms of competitive 
disadvantage could always be a genuine reason for not 
disclosing. Irrelevance of the information should also be 
considered to be a possible explanation.
After examining the extent of voluntary disclosure, the 
proposition of the first hypothesis, the second group of 
hypotheses, i.e., the factors associated with voluntary 
disclosure and the incentives for firms to disclose 
information voluntarily, are examined in the following 
chapter.
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CHAPTER
NINE-
CORPORATE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE BEHAVIOUR: 
THE NON-PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS
"People use statistics as a drunken man 
uses a lamppost, for support and not 
illumination."
(Sandford, 1978, p. xiii)
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The above quotation might be true, but that does not mean 
that statistics are not useful. Statistics themselves have 
no meaning until someone interprets them. They can, 
therefore, be used to support a line of argument as well as 
being an illuminating tool to explain a particular practice 
or phenomenon. The intention of this research is to use 
statistics reasonably, to understand the problem under­
investigation, and, at the same time, to keep in mind the 
limitations of such techniques.
The previous chapter tested the first hypothesis, i.e. 
to what extent voluntary disclosure had occurred in the 
period under investigation. As mentioned before, the second 
part of this research is concerned with the relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and firms' attributes. This is 
the subject of the remaining hypotheses. To test these 
hypotheses, two statistical approaches have been employed, 
non—parametric and parametric tests. While the next chapter
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is concerned with the advanced statistics (parametric), this 
chapter will be devoted to analysing the results of the 
nonparametric tests.
9.2 THE APPROPRIATENESS OF NONPARAMETRIC TESTING
Despite the wide application of parametric statistics in 
accounting and finance, they require certain conditions with 
regard to the distribution of responses in the population 
from which the research sample is drawn. The most common 
condition in this respect is normality of the population 
distribution and representativeness of the sample. The 
interpretation of the results of such tests depends upon the 
validity of these presumptions. Further, using parametric 
tests assumes that the variables being analysed result from 
measurement in at least an interval scale.
For their part, nonparametric tests are based on a 
model that only requires very general conditions with no 
specific form of the distribution from which the sample was 
drawn. Certain assumptions are associated with most 
nonparametric tests, namely, that the observations are 
independent and that the variables under study have 
underlying continuity, but these assumptions are weaker than 
those associated with parametric tests. (Siegel and 
Castellan, 1988).
Nonparametric tests, however, do have some 
shortcomings. Siegel and Castellan (1988) suggest an 
important one. For most nonparametric tests, they report, 
the data are changed from scores to ranks or even to signs. 
By doing so, nonparametric methods do not use all of the
218
information in the sample or that they throw away 
information.
However, it was decided to use non-parametric
statistics in the the current research to examine each 
hypothesis separately for many reasons. Unlike parametric 
tests, there are nonparametric tests that may be applied 
appropriately to data measured in an ordinal scale, and 
others to data in a nominal scale or categorical data, e.g., 
tax status and executive share option variables. Moreover, 
using non-parametric tests is likely to assist in obtaining 
a primary assessment of the hypothesised relationships. The 
results and findings of the initial assessment would be used 
in developing and designing the models used in the following 
chapter.
In addition, because of the limitations and conditions 
on using parametric tests, it was felt that it is necessary 
to examine the hypotheses using non-parametric tests before 
relaxing some of these conditions and applying the advanced 
tests. By doing so, it would be possible to compare the 
results of the two methods and arrive at a conclusion with 
regard to their usage in similar research projects.
9.3 STATISTICAL TESTS USED
The analyses of this chapter involve using more than one 
nonparametric test. As the hypotheses to be tested are 
rsprsssntsd by variables measured by different measurement 
scales, different tests were employed to suit each scale. 
Also, when applying more than one test for the same 
variable, one could see if, by doing so, different
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results are obtained. However, applying more than one test 
for the same variable involves, in most cases, transforming 
the data from one measurement scale to another, e.g., from 
interval to ordinal.
Nonparametric methods involve, generally, two types of 
tests: tests of association and inferential tests (Hickey,
1986). Tests of association refer to the degree of 
connection between changes in one variable and changes in 
another variable. In this research, for example, testing the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and size using 
Spearman's Rank Order test is a test of association. The 
second type of tests, inferential tests, are used when the 
research is directed toward making comparisons between 
groups, for example, comparing voluntary disclosure 
practices of two or more group of companies using the 
Kruskal-Wallis test, e.g., companies in different industry 
sectors. However, one could consider the second type of 
tests also as tests of association, as they investigate the 
relationship between industry sector and voluntary 
disclosure.
This section describes in some detail the tests used in 
the analyses. For the purpose of this research, the tests 
are arranged into three groups according to type of data. 
First reviewed are tests that are concerned with discrete 
variables where the data is represented in contingency 
tables. The second type of tests used examine differences 
between groups, i.e., inferential statistics. Lastly 
outlined is the test of association where both variables are 
required to be measured in an ordinal scale.
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9.3.1 Contingency Tables Based Tests
In this section, data to be tested should be constructed in 
bivariate (contingency) tables. That is. the frequency of a 
level of a variable is contingent upon being in a level of 
another variable. In this research, this could be 
illustrated by the hypothesis that the amount of voluntary 
disclosure is contingent upon the size of companies, e.g., 
small or large.
9.3.1.1 Chi-square Test
The most commonly cited test used in this group is the Chi- 
square test (X2 ). In this research, the test is used to 
examine the relationship between two categorical variables. 
This involves arranging the data into contingency tables. 
For example, in testing the relationship between tax status 
and voluntary disclosure, one has to, arbitrarily, split the 
sample companies into two groups: companies with a high
level of disclosure and companies with a low level of 
disclosure. The contingency frequencies table for the two 
variables would appear as follows:
Low
Disclosure Score
High
To discover whether the two variables are independent, 
the X 2 test statistic can be computed. The test refers to 
the difference between the expected frequency and the
observed frequency in each cell in the table.
Tax Status 
"Close" "Not Close"
Freq Freq
Freq Freq
2 2 1
A major problem with Chi-square is that if X2 is 
rejected, one can conclude that the variables are not 
independent and that a relationship between them exists. But 
how much of a relationship exists? What is needed is a 
method to measure the strength of the relationship between 
two variables such as Cramer's V.
9.3.1.2 Cramer's V
Cramer's V is a measure of association of a relationship for 
a contingency table where at least one of the variables is 
measured on a nominal scale. The V is a type A measure of 
association (Type A measures extent of the relationship and 
Type B indicates direction of the relationship) and as such 
does not indicate the direction (positive or negative) of 
the relationship (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). Further, this 
approach helps the researcher to be more careful when 
reporting a relationship that could have a statistical 
significance, but so slight as to be of little practical 
significance (Hickey, 1986).
Another way to conceptualise the concept of association 
is to think about a relationship between two variables in 
terms of prediction. If the independent and dependent 
variables are related, one can use the independent variable 
to predict the dependent variable. The next section outlines 
one of these measures used in this project.
9.3.1.3 Lambda
Lambda is a measure of association that has a proportional 
reduction of error interpretation (PRE), that is, does 
knowledge from an independent variable improve the ability
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to predict a dependent variable? The general formula for PRE 
statistics involves two rules for making predictions. Rule 1 
predicts the value of the dependent variable ignoring the 
independent variable, and rule 2 uses information from the 
independent variable to predict the value (or category) of 
the dependent variable.
9.3.1.4 Gamma
In the previous sections, methods for measurement the 
strength of association between variables with one variable 
at least measured on a nominal scale were reviewed. In this 
research, these tests are appropriate for testing some of 
the hypotheses, e.g., the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and tax status. However, in other hypotheses, the 
relationships involve contingency tables with both variables 
measured on an ordinal scale.
Gamma, like lambda, is a measure of association that 
has a proportional reduction of error interpretation. It 
also takes advantage of the nature of measurement (Siegel 
and Castellan, 1988) by recognising the sense of rank order 
that characterises an ordinal measure. The PRE 
interpretation for Gamma involves the relative reduction in 
errors in predicting the order of ranks of two cases on the 
dependent variable using the knowledge of the order of the 
ranks of the two cases on the independent variable (see Note 
1 for the calculation of PRE).
Limitations of Gamma:
Gamma, like all the ordinal measures of association based on 
cross—tabulated data, has the basic limitation of utilising
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only some of the information contained in the variables. It 
does not consider the magnitude of the differences between 
the categories. For example, common sense tells us that the 
differences between very small and large is greater than the 
difference between very small and small. Gamma, however, 
merely counts the number of differences and treats them 
equally. In this sense, gamma throws away information. 
Further, Gamma measures the association only for pairs that 
are untied. This has given impetus to the use of 
alternative measures of association between ordinal 
variables.
9.3.1.5 Taub
Taub approaches the problem of ties by directly requiring 
the number of cases that are tied on both the independent 
and the dependent variables to be counted and figured in the 
calculation of the amount of association between the 
variables. Further, TAUb has a PRE if the contingency table 
is square.
9.3.2 Inferential Tests
The idea of association between two variables can be put in 
a different format: Do small companies disclose as much
information as large companies? Or, do companies with 
executive share options disclose as much information 
voluntarily as companies without such schemes?
9.3.2.1 The Mann-Whitney Test (M-W)
This statistic is used to test for significant differences 
between two independent populations (see Note 2 for the 
statistical definition of independent) when the data are
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measured on an ordinal scale. The test is nonparametric 
because it is concerned with the distribution of 
measurements rather than a specific parameter such as the 
population mean or probability. The M-W test utilises the 
ranks of measurements for two groups, e.g., small companies 
and large companies, drawn from two populations (see Note 
3). If the two populations are alike then the two groups 
should be identical. Firstly, the distribution of ranks 
between the two groups is examined. If the ranks are equally 
distributed between the two groups, the null hypothesis of 
no difference cannot be rejected (Siegel and Castellan, 
1988).
This test is one of the most powerful of the 
nonparametric tests, and it is very useful alternative to 
the parametric t test.
9.3.8 The Kruska1-Wallis Test (K-W)
The Kruskal-wallis analysis of variance is an extension of 
the Mann-Whitney test. It is used to decide whether K 
independent samples are from different or identical 
populations. Specifically the technique tests the null 
hypothesis that K samples come from the same population or 
from identical populations with the same median. If the 
alternative hypothesis is true, at least two groups will 
have different medians. The test assumes that the variables 
under study have the same underlying continuous 
distribution; thus, it requires at least ordinal measurement 
of that variable.
The steps followed in calculating K—W statistics is the 
same as those of Mann—Whitney. However, the ranking is made
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to all groups in a single series instead of ranking two 
groups. Compared with the most powerful parametric test, the 
F test, the K-W test has a power efficiency of 95.5 per 
cent, i.e., the F test achieves the same statistical 
results with 95.5% of the sample size (Siegel and Castellan, 
1988).
9.3.9 Spearman's Rank Order Test
Rather than have the variables cross-tabulated as above, and 
predictability involve the order of pairs of ranks, rank 
order data involves computing the rank of a case. The rank 
order for all cases is then presented as an ordered array 
and comparisons between variables can be made. The question 
to be answered is: Are the cases ranked in the same manner 
for the variables. Spearman's rank order correlation 
coefficient, also called rho(p), is a measure of association 
between ordinal variables that measure the convergence of 
ranks between the variables for a set of cases. If a case is 
ranked high on the independent variable can one predict that 
the case will be ranked high (or low) on the dependent 
variable.
This test requires that both variables be measured in 
at least an ordinal scale so that the cases under study may 
be ranked in two ordered series. As with the other 
nonparametric methods, this test does not assume any 
normality in the distribution in the variables tested.
Having described the tests used, the next step is to 
choose the appropriate statistic to test each hypothesis. In 
most of the cases more than one test was applied, starting
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from the simple to the more powerful.
9.4 TESTS OF THE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE HYPOTHESES
The purpose of this section is to present the empirical 
results of testing the voluntary disclosure hypotheses. The 
hypotheses developed earlier were tested using the 
previously outlined statistics. Two computer statistical 
packages were used in the analyses, SPSS PC+ V2 and 
STATGRAPHICS. The dependent variable in each test is the 
disclosure score that was measured and discussed in Chapter 
7. The tests will attempt to assess whether the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is associated with companies' 
characteristics. To reject any null hypothesis, it was 
decided that the confidence level for any test statistic 
should be at least 90 per cent. However, in the analyses, 
the discussion refers to three levels of confidence 99 per 
cent, 95 per cent, and 90 per cent so it will be possible to 
compare the results of the different tests. The resulting 
detailed statistics for the non-parametric tests appear in 
APPENDIX 9. However, the following tables provide summaries 
of the non-parametric statistics for the financial and non- 
financial variables.
9.4.1 Size
The results of the previous chapter indicate that voluntary 
disclosure had occurred and that there were no non­
disclosure companies. Therefore, it was not possible to 
divide companies between disclosing and non-disclosing 
firms. To test the size hypothesis, different measures were 
used to represent size. Also, more than one statistical test 
was used to investigate the effect of size on voluntary
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disclosure. The following sections describe the variables 
used and the results of applying the different tests. The 
order of tests is according to their power starting from the 
less powerful.
9.4.1.1 Total Assets
To test the relationship between total assets and voluntary 
disclosure, the sample companies were split arbitrarily into 
two groups of equal size, 51 companies in each, using the 
50th percentile of total assets as a break point. It was 
decided that the lower group, below the median, represents 
the small companies and the upper one represents the larger 
companies. So each company was classified as small or large 
according to its location. For level of disclosure, the 
sample was also split arbitrarily into equal size groups, a 
low disclosure group and a high disclosure group according 
to the 50th percentile of voluntary disclosure.
The above classification of the sample has resulted in 
a 2 by 2 contingency table where Chi-Square based tests can 
be used to test the relationship between total assets and 
voluntary disclosure. Firstly, the Chi-square tests
indicate, as shown in TABLE 9.1, that total assets is 
associated positively with voluntary disclosure with 99 per 
cent confidence. Also, Gamma, which is a measure of 
association, indicates a high, 49 per cent, positive 
relationship between the variables. However, when using 
Taub , which is an improvement on Gamma, the association is 
reduced to 26 per cent with 99 per cent confidence.
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TABLE 9.1
fhe Ion-Parametric Summary Statistics: 
Two Groups Tests-Size
W M M M CHI-SQUARE GAMMA TAU B M-W
Assets 7.3949* 0.4919 0.2626* -2.7805*
Equity 3.9768** 0.3796 0.1969* -1.5387***
Turnover 2.6623* 0.3200 0.1641** -1.7640**
Assets less Current 
Liabilities 7.3950* 0.4919 0.2626* -2.3504*
Number of Employees 5.6648* 0.4405 0.2315* -2.3542*
* 99% Confidence
** 95% Confidence 
*** 90% Confidence 
M-W: Mann-Whitney Test
Another test performed on the two-group classification, 
small and large companies, is the Mann-Whitney test. This 
test shows that the two groups differ from each other with 
regard to voluntary disclosure and that there is a positive 
association between voluntary disclosure and total assets 
with 99 per cent confidence.
To explore the data set further, it was decided to 
split the sample, with regard to total assets, into three 
equal size groups instead of two. This was done by using the 
33rd and the 66th percentiles of the total assets variable. 
Therefore the sample companies were classified arbitrarily 
into three groups small, medium, and large according to 
size.
2 2 9
TABLE 9.2
The Non-Parametric Summary Statistics: 
Three Groups Tests-Size
VARIABLE CHI-SQUARE GAMMA TAU B K-W
Assets 5.0094 0.2305 0.1552** 6.3526**
Equity 2.7760 0.1813 0.1215** 3.0992***
Turnover 1.6821 0.0657 0.0440 1.7597
Assets less Current 
Liabilities 2.6143 0.1660 0.1113** 3.2155***
Number of Employees 7.5446** 0.2097 0.1419** 7.3173*
* 99% Confidence
** 95% Confidence 
*** 90% Confidence 
K-W: Kruskal-Wallis Test
When applying Chi-Square to the three groups analysis, 
the statistic did not reject the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between total assets and voluntary disclosure. 
However, both Gamma and Taub indicate a positive 
relationship. For Taub, the result is that if one knows the 
size of companies, the error in predicting voluntary 
disclosure can be reduced by 15 per cent with 95 per cent 
confidence.
Another test used in the analysis is the Kruskal-Wallis 
test, which is similar to Mann-Whitney but only applies 
when the comparison is between three or more independent 
groups. In comparing the three groups, small, medium, and 
large,, the test statistic indicates that total assets is an 
influencing factor on voluntary disclosure with 95 per cent 
confidence.
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Lastly, Spearman's rank correlation was used to examine 
the association between total assets and voluntary 
disclosure. As indicated before, this test is the most 
powerful non-parametric test for ordinal data because it 
uses more information in the data set than any another non- 
parametric test. According to Spearman's test, shown in 
TABLE 9.3, total assets has a 25 per cent correlation with 
voluntary disclosure at 99 per cent confidence level.
In summary, the statistics of all the non-parametric 
tests used to examine the relationship between total assets, 
representing size, and voluntary disclosure, indicate that 
total assets has a positive relationship with voluntary 
disclosure levels of the sample companies.
TABLE 9.3 
Spearman's Summary Statistics: Size
Size Variable Correlation
Assets 0.2524*
Equity 0.1909**
Turnover 0.1086**
Assets less Current 
Liabilities 0.2148*
Number of Employees 0.2449*
* 99% Confidence
** 95% Confidence
*** go% Confidence
9.4.1.2 Total Equity
The second variable used in the analysis to represent size 
is total equity. As with total assets, the sample was first 
divided arbitrarily into two equal size groups, using the
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50th percentile of total equity as a break point, and 
classifying the companies as small and large depending on 
their total equity. For voluntary disclosure, the same 
classification, low and high, devised for total assets was 
used in the analysis of this variable and all the following 
variables.
The Chi-square test was then applied to the contingency 
table. Its result, appearing in TABLE 9.1, indicates a 
positive relationship between equity and voluntary 
disclosure with 95 per cent confidence. Further, Gamma and 
Taub statistics support the existence of the relationship, 
but, to a lesser extent than total assets. For Taub, knowing 
total equity would reduce the error of predicting voluntary 
disclosure by 19 per cent with 99 per cent confidence.
In addition, the Mann-Whitney statistic supports the 
hypothesised relationship between total equity and voluntary 
disclosure. However, the confidence level is 95 per cent 
and not 99 per cent as in the case of total assets.
In the next stage of testing total equity, the sample 
was divided into three groups, small, medium, and large 
companies, using the 33rd and the 66th percentiles of total 
equity as break points. The companies were then classified 
accordingly. When applying the Chi-square test to this 
setting, its statistics do not support the existence of any 
relationship between total equity and voluntary disclosure. 
However, Gamma and Taub tests reject the null hypothesis. 
Taub indicates when predicting voluntary disclosure, that 12 
per cent reduction in error is achieved by knowing total
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equity (with 95 per cent confidence).
Additionally, when applying the Kruskal-Wallis test, 
its statistics show with 90 per cent confidence, that the 
three groups are drawn from different populations. That is, 
equity is associated with voluntary disclosure.
This positive relationship is further supported by 
Spearman's test. According to its statistic, there is a 19 
per cent correlation between the total equity and voluntary 
disclosure with 95 per cent confidence.
To summarise, total equity, according to the above 
tests, except the three-group Chi-square test, has a 
positive association with voluntary disclosure. However, its 
significance is less than total assets.
9.4.1.3 Turnover
In addition to the previous two measures, turnover was also 
used to represent the size hypothesis. TABLE 9.1 shows the 
statistical results when the sample was split into two 
groups, small size and large size companies, using the 50th 
percentile ©£ turnover as a break point, and after 
classifying the companies into small and large according to 
which group each company belongs. In the table, all the 
three Chi=square based tests, Chi-square, Gamma, and Taub , 
indicate that turnover is a significant factor in 
explaining the extent of voluntary disclosure. The Taub 
statistic suggests that a 16 per cent reduction in error in 
predicting voluntary disclosure is attained by knowing 
turnover with 95 per cent confidence. Further, the Mann- 
Whitney test confirms, with 95 per cent confidence, that the
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two groups are drawn from different populations. That is, 
there is a positive relationship between turnover and 
voluntary disclosure.
For the three-group tests, however, the statistical 
results of all the tests used, i.e., Chi-square, Gamma, 
Taub , Kruskal-Wallis, do not lend support to rejecting the 
null hypothesis of the relationship between size represented 
by turnover and voluntary disclosure (see TABLE 9.2 for each 
test's results).
Lastly, when applying Spearman's test to the data set, 
the results indicate a small positive 10 per cent
correlation between turnover and voluntary disclosure with 
95 per cent significance.
In comparing turnover with total assets and total
equity, the statistics show that it also has a statistically 
positive relationship with voluntary disclosure but to a 
lesser extent and lower level of confidence, but still
acceptable.
9.4.1.4 Total Assets Less Current Liabilities
When using this variable to examine the relationship between 
size and voluntary disclosure, most of the tests' results 
support the hypothesised positive relationship between the 
variables.
Firstly, the sample was split into two equal size 
groups. Thereafter, Chi-square based tests were applied to 
find out whether this variable is associated with voluntary 
disclosure. The statistics (see TABLE 9.1) indicates a 
strong positive relationship. For example, Taub is 26 per
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cent with 99 per cent confidence. In addition, when using 
the Mann-Whitney test to compare the two groups, its 
statistics indicate a significant difference between the two 
groups regarding voluntary disclosure with 99 per cent 
confidence.
As for the previous variables, the three-group 
classification was also applied on this variable. 
Accordingly, the sample was split into three equal sized 
groups. The first test used in this new setting was Chi- 
square and its results do not reject the null hypothesis. 
However, both Gamma and Taub support the existence of a 
positive relationship between total assets less current 
liabilities representing size and voluntary disclosure; 
Taub shows a 21 per cent reduction in error in predicting 
voluntary disclosure by knowing the value of total assets 
less current liabilities and with 95 per cent confidence 
(all tests results appear in TABLE 9.2).
Finally, Spearman's correlation between voluntary 
disclosure and total assets less current liabilities shows 
21 per cent association with 99 per cent confidence (see 
TABLE 9.3).
In summary, all tests performed for this variable, 
except the three-group Chi-square test, indicate a positive 
relationship with voluntary disclosure. In addition, in 
comparison with the other size variables, this variable's 
association with voluntary disclosure ranks second after 
that of total assets.
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9.4.1.5 Number of Employees
The number of employees has also been used to measure the 
size of firms. In examining the relationship between number 
of employees and voluntary disclosure, the sample was first 
arbitrarily split into two equal size groups. As indicated 
in TABLE 9.1, all Chi-square based tests support the 
hypothesised relationship between size represented by number 
of employees and voluntary disclosure with 99 per cent
confidence. Assuming that TAUb is the most powerful of the
Chi-square tests, a 23 per cent reduction in error is likely 
to occur when using number of employees to predict 
voluntary disclosure with 99 per cent confidence.
Further, the Mann-Whitney test was applied to find out 
whether the two groups are drawn from the same population. 
With 99 per cent confidence, the test statistics show that 
the two groups are not drawn from the same population, i.e., 
there is a positive association between number of employees 
and voluntary disclosure.
When dividing the sample into three groups using the 
33rd and the 66th percentiles of number of employees as
break points, all tests performed (see TABLE 9.2 for the
summary statistic) indicate that number of employees is also 
positively associated with voluntary disclosure. Firstly, 
the Chi-square test indicates a positive relationship with 
95 per cent confidence. In addition, the statistics of both 
Gamma and Taub support the positive relationship. For 
example, Taub indicates that 14 per cent reduction of error 
is likely to occur when number of employees is used to 
predict voluntary disclosure with 95 per cent confidence.
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Moreover, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used to compare 
the three groups and to detect any significant deferences in 
voluntary disclosure levels between the groups. With 99 per 
cent confidence, the statistic of the test suggests that 
number of employees is associated positively with voluntary 
disclosure.
Lastly, TABLE 9.3 shows that when number of employees 
was correlated with voluntary disclosure using Spearman's 
test, the results suggest that there is a 24 per cent 
correlation between the two variables with 99 per cent 
confidence.
To sum up, the results of all the non-parametric tests 
performed support the hypothesised relationship between 
size, represented by number of employees, and levels of 
voluntary disclosure. In comparing the number of employees 
with the other previously examined variables, number of 
employees ranks second among the five variables used to 
represent size. This ranking takes into consideration all 
tests performed, the extent of association, and levels of 
confidence.
In general and according to the above analysis, the 
null hypothesis that there is no relationship between size 
and level of voluntary disclosure can be rejected. The 
statistics of the non-parametric tests employed suggest that 
there is a positive relationship between size and voluntary 
disclosure. Further, all the variables used to represent 
size have produced positive results. However, the extent of 
the relationship and levels of confidence have varied
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according to the variable used to represent size and the 
test used.
9.4.2 Gearing
For the purpose of this research, and as indicated earlier, 
two measures were used to represent gearing: debt to equity 
ratio and debt to total assets ratio. The analysis in this 
section is divided into two parts. Firstly, the relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and the debt to equity ratio is 
considered. The debt to total assets ratio is considered in 
the second part.
9.4.2.1 Debt to Equity Ratio
To investigate the relationship between the debt to equity 
ratio and voluntary disclosure, more than one test was 
applied, and accordingly, some of the data was transformed 
to suit each test. The sample was firstly split,
arbitrarily, into two groups using the 50th percentile, the 
median, of the debt to equity ratio as a break point. 
Thereafter, each company was reclassified as small or large, 
also an arbitrary classification, according to the value of 
its debt to equity ratio with reference to the 50th
percentile.
Furthermore, the sample was divided into two groups 
according to the level of voluntary disclosure and by using 
the 50th percentile of voluntary disclosure as a break
point. It was decided to consider any disclosure value below
this median as low disclosure and any value above the median 
as high.
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For the test statistics, TABLE 9.4 shows the results of 
applying the appropriate Chi-square based tests on the two- 
group data set. All the tests, however, do not support the 
hypothesised positive relationship between debt to equity 
ratio and voluntary disclosure. In addition, the Mann- 
Whitney test statistic does not support the hypothesised 
relationship.
TABLE 9.4
The Non-Parametric Summary Statistics: 
Two Groups Tests-Gearing
VARIABLE CHI-SQUARE GAMMA TAU B M-W
Debt to Equity Ratio 00 0.0186 0.0093 -0.3656
Debt to Assets Ratio 00 00 00 -0.5812
M-W: Mann-Whitney Test
The above results were also confirmed when the sample 
companies were classified into three groups by using the 
33rd and the 66th percentiles of the debt to equity ratio as 
break points. Both Chi-Square based tests and the Kruskal- 
Wallis analysis of variance test, do not reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no relationship between gearing 
represented by the debt to equity ratio and levels of 
voluntary disclosure.
TABLE 9.5
The Non-Parametric Summary Statistics: 
Three Groups Tests-Gearing
VARIABLE CHI-SQUARE GAMMA TAU B K-W
Debt to Eguity Ratio 
Debt to Assets Ratio
3.8396
3.6523
0.0683
00
0.0459
00
1.9446
1.6321
K-W: Kruskal-Wallis Test
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In addition to the above tests, Spearman's correlation 
test was applied to to the data set without splitting the 
sample or transforming the data. According to the test 
statistic, which appears in TABLE 9.6, there is an 11 per 
cent positive association between gearing, represented by 
the debt to equity ratio, and voluntary disclosure with 90 
per cent confidence. This result confirms the hypothesised 
relationship.
TABLE 9.6
Spearman's Summary Statistics: Gearing
Gearing Variable Correlation
Debt to Equity Ratio 
Debt to Assets Ratio
0.1134***
0.0800
*** 90% Confidence
9.4.2.2 Debt to Total Assets Ratio
As with the debt to equity ratio, the same procedure was 
followed to examine the hypothesised relationship between 
the debt to total assets ratio and voluntary disclosure. 
Firstly, the sample was divided into two groups using the 
50th percentile of debt to equity ratio as a break point. 
Each company was then classified as small or large according 
to the value of its debt to assets ratio.
Thereafter, the two-group tests, Chi-square, Gamma, 
Taub , and Mann-Whitney, were applied to the data set. 
However, there statistics, which are presented in TABLE 9.4, 
do not support, with the minimum acceptable level of 
confidence, the hypothesised relationship.
240
The above results are also supported by the three-group 
tests. After dividing the sample into three groups using the 
33rd and the 66th percentile of the debt to1 equity ratio as 
break points, the appropriate tests were conducted to 
examine the hypothesised relationship. As TABLE 9.5 shows, 
the statistics of Chi-square, Gamma, Taub , and Kruskal 
Wallis test do not reject the null hypothesis, i.e., no 
relationship exists between voluntary disclosure and gearing 
represented by the debt to assets ratio.
Finally, the last test performed to examine the
relationship between the debt to assets ratio and voluntary 
disclosure was Spearman's correlation test. Its results, 
however, confirm the results of the previous tests and 
indicate no association at the acceptable level of
confidence (90 per cent).
To summarise the results of the non-parametric tests 
used to examine the relationship between gearing, 
represented by both debt to equity and debt to assets 
ratios, and voluntary disclosure, only one test supports the 
hypothesised relationship- When the debt to assets ratio was 
used to represent gearing, no test supports the presumed 
positive relationship. For the debt to equity ratio, all 
tests, except Spearman's correlation, reject the
hypothesised relationship. Spearman's test, however,
indicates a small but positive relationship, as was
expected, with 90 per cent confidence. Spearman's is the 
strongest among the tests used. However, the confidence 
level achieved to reject the null hypothesis of the 
relationship between gearing and voluntary disclosure is 90
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per cent, which is the least acceptable. Therefore, one 
should be cautious in interpreting this result.
9.4.3 Profitability
Many measures can be used to indicate profitability, some of 
them represent one period performance and some represent a 
pattern or trend. This research has employed growth in 
earnings per share (EPS), for the year under study, return 
on turnover, and return on total assets. In calculating both 
return on turnover and return on total assets, operating 
profit before tax and extraordinary items was used to 
represent return.
In examining the relationship between each of the 
profitability measures and voluntary disclosure more than 
one test was used. However, it was necessary, for some of 
the tests, to carry out some transformation of the data set.
Before reviewing the results of the tests performed for 
this variable, its worth recalling that no sign was expected 
for the relationship between profitability and voluntary 
disclosure.
9.4.3.1 Return on Assets
To examine the relationship between return on assets and 
voluntary disclosure, the sample was first split into two 
groups using the 50th percentile of return on assets as a 
break point. Then, each company was classified as having a 
low or high return on assets according to its own return on 
assets value and whether this value is located above or 
below the median. The sample was also divided into two 
groups using the 50th percentile of voluntary disclosure.
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TABLE 9.7
The Non-Parametric Summary Statistics:
Profitability-1
VARIABLE CHI-SQUARE GAMMA TAU B M-W
Return on Assets 
Return on Turnover 
Growth In EPS
0.0000
1.4117
0.3051
-0.0392
-0.2694
-0.1350
-0.0196
-0.1372***
-0.0671
-0.2009
-1.3412***®
-0.7334
***@ Only One-Way with 90% Confidence 
*** 90% Confidence 
M-W: Mann-Whitney Test
Chi-square based tests, Chi-square, Gamma, and Taub, 
were then applied to the new transformed data set. Their 
statistics, however, do not support the existence of any 
relationship between profitability and voluntary disclosure 
(TABLE 9.7 displays all the two-group tests performed). In 
addition, the Mann-Whitney test was conducted to find out if 
voluntary disclosure of the low profitability group differs 
significantly from that of the high profitability firms. The 
results, however, confirm the Chi-square based tests of no 
relationship.
To explore the data set further, three-group tests were 
also conducted. For this purpose, the sample was divided 
into three groups using the 33rd and the 66th percentiles of 
return on assets as break points. Each company was then 
classified as low, medium, and highly profitable according 
to the value of its return on assets with reference to the 
new classification.
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TABLE 9.8
The Non-Parametric Summary Table:
Profitability-2
VARIABLE CHI-SQUARE GAMMA TAU B K-W
Return on Assets 
Return on Turnover 
Growth in EPS
6.7639***®
1.5640
4.6474
-.2437
-0.0230
-0.1685
-0.1646**
-0.0153
-0.1134**
3.7893***®
0.0279
2.6353
***@ 90% Confidence (One Way) 
** 95% Confidence
K-W: Kruskal-Wallis Test
The results of the tests applied to the three-group 
setting is presented in TABLE 9.8. Firstly, the Chi-square 
test supports only a one way relationship. Further, Gamma 
and Taub confirm this conclusion and point to an inverse 
relationship with 95 per cent confidence (for Taub ). In 
addition, the Kruskal-Wallis test shows a one-way inverse 
relationship between return on assets and voluntary 
disclosure with 90 per cent confidence.
Finally, Spearman's test was applied to the data set as 
one group. Its results, presented in TABLE 9.9, shows that 
there is a 13 per cent inverse correlation between return on 
assets and voluntary disclosure with 90 per cent confidence. 
This result confirms that of the two groups tests.
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TABLE 9.9
Spearman's Summary Statistics:
Profitability-3
Profitability Variable Correlation
Return on Assets 
Return on Turnover 
Growth in EPS
-0.1368* * *
-0.0962
-0.0683
*** 90% Confidence (One Way)
9.4.3.2 Return on Turnover
Another criterion used to assess profitability of business 
firms is return on turnover. To examine the relationship 
between this variable and voluntary disclosure, the same 
procedure for testing return on assets was followed: first
using two-group test and then the three-group tests and 
finally the one group test.
For the two-group tests, the sample was first split 
into two groups using the 50th percentile of return on 
turnover. Then each company was classified as having low or 
high profitability according to its own return on turnover 
with reference to the break point. In addition, the sample 
was divided into two groups using the 50th percentile of 
voluntary disclosure.
To examine the hypothesised relationship, Chi-square 
based tests, Chi-square, Gamma, and Taub were first 
employed. However, their statistics, presented in TABLE 9.7, 
do not reject the null hypothesis of no relationship with a 
minimum acceptable level of confidence (90 per cent).
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Further, when applying the Mann-Whitney test to the data 
set, the null hypothesis could not be rejected.
When the three-group setting was applied to the data 
set, the sample was divided into three groups according to 
the 33rd and 66th percentiles of return on turnover as break 
points. As with the two-group tests, all tests performed, 
Chi-square, Gamma, Taub, and Kruskal-Wallis, do not reject 
the null hypothesis of no relationship between return on 
turnover and voluntary disclosure (the full results appear 
in TABLE 9.8).
Lastly, Spearman's test was conducted to find if there 
is any relationship between the two variables without 
transforming the data set. The result, however, confirms the 
previous tests and does not lend support to the hypothesised 
relationship with an acceptable level of confidence.
9.4.3.3 Growth in Earnings Per Share (PER)
The final measure of profitability employed in this research 
is growth in EPS in the period under study. The importance 
of this measure arises from its wide usage by the financial 
community. To investigate the relationship between this 
measure and voluntary disclosure, the sample was split into 
two groups using the 50th percentile of EPS as a break 
point. Each company was then classified as having low or 
high growth in profitability according to its EPS value with 
reference to the breaking point.
Subsequently, the following tests were performed on the 
new data set: Chi-square, Gamma, Taub, and Mann-Whitney
test. According to the results of these tests, all appear
246
in TABLE 9.7, the null hypothesis of no relationship between 
profitability, represented by EPS, and voluntary disclosure 
could not be rejected.
In addition, the three-group tests were also carried 
out. First the sample was split into three groups using the 
33rd and 66th percentiles of EPS as break up points. After 
that each company was reclassified as having low, medium, or 
high profitability according to its EPS with reference to 
the break points.
The appropriate tests were then conducted on the 
transformed data set and their results are presented in 
TABLE 9.8. According to the table, the Chi-square test 
indicates no relationship between the two variables. 
However, both Gamma and Taub reveal an inverse relationship. 
Taub indicates an 11 per cent negative association between 
EPS and voluntary disclosure with 95 per cent confidence. 
Further, when applying Kruskal-Wallis test, its results do 
not reveal any differences in the voluntary disclosure score 
between the three groups.
The final test conducted with regard to EPS was 
Spearman's test. Its statistics, however, which appear in 
TABLE 9.9, reveal that there is no significant correlation 
between voluntary disclosure and profitability as 
represented by EPS.
In summary, profitability was hypothesised to have a 
relationship with voluntary disclosure. To test this 
hypothesis, three measures representing profitability were 
used in the analysis. When comparing the results of the
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tests performed on these measures, return on assets shows a 
negative relationship with voluntary disclosure in the 
three-group and one group settings. For return on turnover, 
however, the results show a negative relationship only when 
the sample was split into two groups. Additionally, only 
Gamma and Taub tests reveal a negative relationship between 
earnings per share and voluntary disclosure.
Accordingly, one could reject the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between profitability and voluntary disclosure. 
In addition, the statistics of the various tests performed 
confirm a negative relationship. However, the extent and 
power of the relationship depends on the test and the 
variable used in the analysis.
9.4.4 Diversification
To examine the hypothesised relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and diversification, both line of business 
diversification index (LOB) and Geographical diversification 
index (GDI) were used in the analysis. Furthermore, three 
types of non-parametric tests were conducted: two-group,
three-group, and one-group tests.
9.4.4.1 Line of Business Diversification
The line of business diversification index that was devised 
in Chapter 7 was used in the analysis to measure line of 
business diversification. To test the effect of this 
variable on levels of voluntary disclosure, the sample was 
divided into three groups: non-diversified, low level
diversified, and high level diversified companies. For the 
non-diversified, the companies were already classified to
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that effect. However, for the other two groups, the 50th 
percentile of LOB index for the diversified companies was 
calculated. Then each company was reclassified as low level 
or high level diversified according to its LOB index and its 
location with regard the 50th percentile.
For the voluntary disclosure score, the sample was also 
split arbitrarily into two groups, low level and high level
disclosure, by using the 50th percentile of voluntary
disclosure as a break point. Then, the companies were split 
between the two groups according to the value of their 
respective disclosure scores and its location with reference 
to the disclosure score 50th percentile.
Following the above transformation, the appropriate 
tests were conducted and their statistics appear in TABLE
9.10. Firstly, the Chi-Square test supports rejecting the 
null hypothesis with 90 per cent confidence (one way). 
Further, both Gamma and Taub confirm the one way
relationship with Taub indicating a 10 per cent positive
relationship between LOB diversification and voluntary 
disclosure with 95 per cent confidence. In addition, when 
the Kruskal-Wallis test was used to compare disclosure 
scores among the three groups, the null hypothesis of no 
relationship could be rejected.
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TABLE 9.10
The Non-parametric Summary Statistics:
Diversification-1
VARIABLE CHI-SQUARE GAMMA TAU B K-W
Line of Business 
Geographical Div.
3.7565***
5.4020***
0.1877
0.2837
0.1063**
0.1664**
-5.8549***
7.1212**
* 99% Confidence
** 95% Confidence 
*** 90% Confidence 
K-W Kruskal-Wallis Test
The next type of investigation performed was the two- 
group tests. When using such tests, only the low and high 
level groups were used in the analysis. For levels of 
voluntary disclosure, disclosing firms were also classified 
arbitrarily into a low disclosure group and a high 
disclosure group according to the 50th percentile of 
voluntary disclosure for the diversified firms as a break 
point.
TABLE 9.11
The Non-Parametric Summary Statistics: 
Diversification-2
VARIABLE CHI-SQUARE GAMMA TAU B M-W
Line of Business 
Geographical Div.
0.3799
0.0000
-0.2308
-0.0169
-0.1013***
-0.0082
-1.1328
-0.1633
*** 90% Confidence 
M-W: Mann-Whitney Test
TABLE 9.11 reports the results of applying the two- 
group tests on the sample after implementing the above
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transformations. The statistics of the tests conducted 
indicate a mixture of results. For example the Chi-square 
and Mann-Whitney results do not reject the null hypothesis 
of no relationship between line of business diversification 
and voluntary disclosure. However, Gamma and Taub indicate 
that a negative relationship does exist between the 
variables with 90 per cent confidence for Taub .
In addition to the above tests, Spearman's correlation 
test was also performed without transforming the data set. 
Its results, presented in TABLE 9.12, indicate 27 per cent 
positive correlation between line of business
diversification and voluntary disclosure with 99 per cent 
confidence.
TABLE 9.12
Spearman's Summary Statistics: 
Diversification
VARIABLE CORRELATION
Line of Business 
Geographical Diversification
0.2768*
0.3888*
* 99% Confidence
In summary, the statistics of the tests performed 
reveal conflicting results with respect to the relationship 
between LOB diversification and voluntary disclosure. For 
example, the tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no 
relationship when the non-diversified firms were excluded 
from the analysis. However, when the non-diversified firms 
were included, the tests support rejecting the null 
hypothesis. As including the non-diversified firms in the
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analysis is more logical than excluding them, it could be 
concluded that there is a positive relationship between LOB 
diversification and voluntary disclosure.
9.4.4.2 Geographical Diversification
An index similar to that of LOB was used to represent 
geographical diversification in examining the hypothesised 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and geographical 
diversification. Also, for the three-group tests, the sample 
was divided into three groups: non-diversified, low level
diversified, and high level diversified companies. For the 
non-diversified, the companies were already classified to 
that effect. However, for the other two groups, the 50th 
percentile of the geographical index for the diversified 
companies was calculated. Then each company was reclassified 
as low level or high level diversified according to its 
geographical index and its location with regard to the 50th 
percentile.
For the voluntary disclosure score, the sample was also 
split into two groups, low level and high level disclosure, 
by using the 50th percentile of voluntary disclosure as a 
break point. Then, the companies were split between the two 
groups according to the value of their respective 
geographical index and its location with reference to the 
50th percentile.
Results of the three-group tests, presented in TABLE
9.10, reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and geographical diversification. 
Firstly, the Chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis
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with 90 per cent confidence. In addition, both Gamma and 
Ta.ub reject the null hypothesis. Taub indicates a 15 per 
cent reduction in error in predicting voluntary disclosure 
by knowing geographical diversification with 95 per cent 
confidence. Furthermore, when the three groups were compared 
with regard to voluntary disclosure by using the Kruskal- 
Wallis test, the null hypothesis of no relationship is 
rejected with 95 per cent confidence.
However, when the two-group tests were applied, the 
null hypothesis could not be rejected with an acceptable 
level of confidence (TABLE 9.11 shows the full results for 
the tests applied). As with line of business 
diversification, only the diversified firms were included in 
the analysis. This limitation is the likely reason for not 
rejecting the null hypothesis in the two two-groups setting.
Finally, Spearman's test statistic indicates that 
geographical diversification is highly correlated with 
voluntary disclosure. Correlation is 38 per cent with 99 per 
cent confidence. When this test was applied, all companies 
in the sample were entered in the analysis including the 
geographically non-diversified firms.
To sum up, the results of investigating the
relationship between diversification and voluntary 
disclosure reject the null hypothesis of no relationship 
between the two variables. In addition, the statistics 
indicate only a positive as opposed to the two way 
hypothesised relationship. Lastly, although the results 
reveal that the two measures used to represent 
diversification have a positive relationship with
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disclosure, geographical diversification has the higher 
level of association.
9.4.5 Percentage of Foreign Turnover
As discussed earlier (in Chapters Two and Three) this 
variable was stated separately from geographical 
diversification (tested in the previous section) as the 
underlying theory behind each one is not the same.
When the relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
foreign turnover was examined, three groups of tests were 
applied: two-group, three-group, and one-group type tests.
To apply the two-group type tests, the sample was split 
arbitrarily into two groups, low foreign turnover percentage 
and high foreign turnover percentage groups; first according 
to the 50th percentile of foreign turnover for all the 
companies in the sample and secondly using the 50th 
percentile of foreign turnover only for the companies with 
foreign operations. Then, each company in the respective 
sample was classified as having low or high foreign turnover 
percentage according to its own foreign turnover value. 
Each respective sample was split into two groups with regard 
voluntary disclosure score. Companies with disclosure score 
below the sample's 50th percentile are assumed to have low 
disclosure score and companies with disclosure score above 
the sample's 50th percentile are assumed to have high 
disclosure score.
The statistics of applying the appropriate tests to the 
above setting are presented in TABLE 9.13.
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TABLE 9.13
The Non-parametric Summary Statistics: 
Percentage of Foreign Turnover
Classified into: CHI-SQUARE GAMMA TAU B M-W/K-W
Two Groups n=85 3.0097** 0.4259 0.2125* -2.5884*
n=122 8.2474* 0.4904 0.2364* -3.2508*
Three Groups 12.1966* 0.4966 0.2983* 18.4849*
One Group:
Spearman's 0.4555*
* 99% Confidence
** 95% Confidence 
M-W: Mann-Whitney Test 
K-W: Kruskal-Wallis Test
As the table shows, the results of the two-group tests 
reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and percentage of foreign turnover. The 
Chi-square test, for example, rejects the null hypothesis 
with 95 per cent confidence for companies with foreign 
turnover and 99 per cent confidence for all companies. For 
the direction and extent of the relationship, both Gamma and 
Taub also reject the null hypothesis. Taub indicates 21 per 
cent and 23 per cent association respectively with 99 per 
cent confidence.
When using the Mann-Whitney test, its statistics also 
reject the null hypothesis of no relationship with 99 per 
cent in both classifications.
The three-group design was also examined and the 
results of all tests applied support the hypothesised 
relationship. The sample was first classified into two 
groups: companies without and companies with foreign
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turnover. Then, the second group was divided into two 
subgroups using the 50th percentile of the companies with 
foreign turnover as a break point.
For the test results, the Chi-square statistic rejects 
the null hypothesis with 99 per cent confidence. Gamma and 
Taub also reject the null hypothesis with Taub showing 29 
per cent association with 99 per cent confidence.
In addition, the Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance 
test was performed and indicates that a difference does 
exist between the three groups with regard to voluntary 
disclosure, i.e., there is a positive relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and percentage of foreign turnover, 
with 99 per cent confidence.
Finally, Spearman's test was applied to the original 
data set without any data transformation. Its results 
support all the above tests used and indicate a relatively 
45 per cent positive correlation between voluntary 
disclosure and percentage of foreign turnover.
The conclusion of this section, and according to the 
above results, is that the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and percentage of 
foreign turnover can be rejected with a high level of 
confidence.
9.4.6 Directors' Shareholdings
To examine the hypothesised negative relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and directors share equity three 
methods of testing were carried out. The first was to divide 
the sample into two groups, low level of directors equity
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and high level of directors' equity, using the 50th 
percentile of directors' equity as a break point. Then, the 
companies were classified as having a low or high level of 
director s equity according to the directors' equity of each 
firm and its value with regard the 50th percentile.
The same process was also carried out with regard to 
voluntary disclosure. The sample was split into two groups 
using the 50th percentile of voluntary disclosure as a break 
point. After both transformations, the appropriate tests 
were performed and their results appear in TABLE 9.14.
TABLE 9.14
The Non-Parametric Summary Statistics: 
Directors' Equity
Classified into: CHI-SQUARE GAMMA TAU B M-W/K-W
Two Groups
Three Groups
One Group: 
Spearman's
7.3949*
6.1415***
-.1994*
-0.4919
-0.2594
-0.2626*
-0.1750*
-2.4784*
3.3367***
* 99% Confidence
** 95% Confidence 
*** 90% Confidence 
M-W: Mann-Whitney Test (Two-group)
K-W: Kruskal-Wallis Test (Three-group)
The first test performed was Chi-Square. Its results 
show that directors' equity is associated with voluntary 
disclosure with 99 per cent confidence. Further, both Gamma 
and Taub confirm this results with Taub showing 26 per cent 
negative association at 99 per cent confidence level.
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In addition, the Mann-Whitney test was also conducted 
to compare the disclosure scores of the two groups. Its 
statistic also supports the Chi-square based tests and the 
hypothesised negative relationship with 99 per cent 
confidence.
The second procedure followed was to divide the sample 
into three groups, low, medium, and high directors' equity 
ownership, using the 33rd and the 66th percentiles of 
directors' equity as break points. Companies were also split 
into two groups using the 50th percentile voluntary 
disclosure score as a break point.
When applying the appropriate tests to the new data 
set, the results of these tests reject the null hypothesis 
of no relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
directors' equity ratio (TABLE 9.14). For example, the Chi- 
square test rejects the null hypothesis with 90 per cent 
confidence. Furthermore, Gamma and Taub reject the null 
hypothesis with Taub indicating 17 per cent association at 
99 per cent confidence level.
The Kruskal-Wallis test was also performed to find out 
if there is any significant difference in voluntary 
disclosure scores between the three groups. As was expected 
and hypothesised, the statistics of the test indicate that 
there is a difference in voluntary disclosure between the 
three groups, and therefore, one could reject the null 
hypothesis with 90 per cent confidence (TABLE 9.14).
Finally, Spearman's test was conducted on the original 
data. As was stated before, this test shows the extent and
258
direction of any correlation between two variables. For the 
two variables under study, the test's statistic suggests a 
19 per cent negative association between voluntary 
disclosure and directors' equity ratio. This result supports 
the results of all the previous tests.
The conclusion of this section, and according to the 
tests performed, is that the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and directors' 
equity could be rejected with statistically acceptable 
levels of confidence. In addition, the tests suggest that 
there is a negative relationship between the two variables 
as was hypothesised.
9.4.7 Substantial shareholdings
This variable represents the number of shareholders, apart 
from the directors, who own 5 per cent or more of a company. 
The range of this variable, for the sample companies, 
varies from zero to four.
To examine the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and this variable, a contingency table was first 
created for all the values in the range and for the created 
voluntary disclosure groups. As for voluntary disclosure, 
the sample was split into three groups using the 33rd and 
the 66th percentiles of voluntary disclosure. The resultant 
three groups were considered as representing low, medium, 
and high levels of disclosure.
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TABLE 9.15
The Non-Parametric Summary Statistics: 
Substantial Shareholdings
CHI-SQUARE GAMMA TAU B K-W Spearman's
8.2834 0.1445 0.1040* * 2.8204 0.0715
** 95% Confidence
K-W: Kruskal-Wallis (5 Groups)
The constructed contingency table was then examined 
using the appropriate tests (reported in TABLE 9.15). The 
first applied was the Chi-square test and its statistics do 
not reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between 
the two variables. However, both Gamma and Taub reject the 
null hypothesis with Taub indicating a 10 per cent positive 
relationship with 95 per cent confidence.
In addition, the Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to 
compare the disclosure scores of the five groups. Its 
statistics, however, do not support Taub, and therefore, do 
not reject the null hypothesis. Further, Spearman's test was 
applied and its statistics do not support the hypothesised 
positive relationship.
Based on the tests performed, the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and number of 
substantial shareholders was rejected by only one test 
statistic. The other tests, and most importantly Kruskal- 
W&llis which is more appropriate to the original data, do 
not reject the null hypothesis. As a result one should 
interpret the results of the positive test with caution.
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9.4.8 Executive Share Option Scheme
The variable representing this hypothesis is of a nominal 
type with two values: yes, if the scheme exists and, no, if 
it does not. Accordingly, not all the tests applied to the 
previous variables are appropriate for this one. The 
following tests were used in the analysis: Chi-square,
Lambda, Cramer's V, and Mann-Whitney (the results appear in 
TABLE 9.16).
TABLE 9.16
The Non-Parametric Summary Statistics: 
Executive Share Option Scheme
CHI-SQUARE LAMBDA CRAMER'S V M-W
0.0256 00 0.0145 -.1434
M-W: Mann-Whitney Test
To examine the hypothesised relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and the existence of share option 
schemes, two methods were used. First Chi-square, Lambda, 
and Cramer's V tests were applied, where the data must be in 
contingency table format. To implement these tests, the 
sample was split into three groups using the 33rd and the 
66th percentiles of voluntary disclosure score as break 
points.
When applying the Chi-square test, Lambda, and 
Cramer's V, their statistic do not lend support to rejecting 
the null hypothesis of no relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and the existence of share option schemes.
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The second method used was to apply the Mann-Whitney 
test without transforming the data. However, its statistics 
do not also reject the previous tests' results and, 
therefore, do not support the hypothesised relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and the existence of share 
option schemes
9.4.9 The Auditing Firm
In testing the hypothesised relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and the auditing firm, i.e., whether the auditing 
firm is one of the Big Eight or not, more than one approach 
was followed. The first approach used the contingency table 
format. For the auditing firm variable, firms were 
classified into two groups, companies audited by a Big Eight 
firm and companies not audited by a Big Eight firm. In 
addition, the sample was split into three groups using the 
33 rd and the 66th percentiles of the sample's voluntary 
disclosure.
The results of examining the devised contingency table 
appears in TABLE 9.17. As the table shows, the statistics of 
Chi-square, Lambda, and Cramer s V do not lend support to 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and the type of auditing firm.
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TABLE 9.17
The Non-Parametric Summary Statistics: 
The Auditing Firm
CHI-SQUARE LAMBDA CRAMER'S V M-W K-W
0.0256 00 0.0145 -.1434 8.3659
M-W: Mann-Whitney Test
K-W: Kruskal-Wallis (9 Groups)
The next technique used was to compare the disclosure 
score of the two groups of companies, i.e., companies that 
have been audited by a Big Eight firm and companies not 
audited by a Big Eight firm, using the Mann-Whitney test. 
Its statistic, however, supports the results of the previous 
tests, i.e., the null hypothesis could not be rejected.
In the last method, the sample was split into nine 
groups using the auditing firm variable, i.e., one group for 
each auditing firm and one group for the companies that have 
not been audited by a Big Eight firm. For this setting, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test was used to compare the disclosure 
scores of the nine groups and to find out if the individual 
auditing firms have any influence on the voluntary 
disclosure of their respective clients. As with the earlier 
methods, the statistic of the Kruskal-Wallis test does not 
rs j set the null hypothesis and does not reveal any 
significant differences in voluntary disclosure between the 
tested groups.
In summary, the statistics of the tests described in 
this section do not lend support to rejecting the null
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hypothesis of no relationship between the auditing firm and 
voluntary disclosure.
9.4.10 The Industrial Sector
To test the industrial sector hypothesis, two types of tests 
were performed. Firstly, the contingency table format was 
used. For this purpose, the sample was divided into two 
groups using the 50th percentile of voluntary disclosure as 
a break point. The industrial sector variable was 
represented by a nominal code for each Industrial sector. 
The appropriate tests were then applied to the generated 
contingency table. The results of these tests is shown in 
TABLE 9.18.
TABLE 9.18
The Non-par ametrIc Summary Statistics: 
The Industrial Sector
CM I—SQUARE LAMBDA CRAMER'S V K-W
I 6.4350 0.1915 0.2536 11.4393*
* 99% Confidence 
K-W: Kruskal-Wallis
As the table displays, both Lambda and Cramer's V 
suggest that there Is a relationship between industry sector 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure. However, the Chi- 
square test statistic does not reject the null hypothesis 
of no relationship between voluntary disclosure and industry 
sector.
The second method used to examine the effect of 
Industry sector on voluntary disclosure was to compare the 
voluntary disclosure scores of the industry groups. The
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Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to explore this method. 
However, to apply this test three industry sectors were 
excluded because their frequencies are less than ten 
companies each. The three sectors excluded are the Beers, 
Food, and Oil & Gas. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test 
(appearing in TABLE 9.18) reject the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and industry 
sector with 99 per cent confidence.
In addition, the test shows (in APPENDIX 9) that 
voluntary disclosure levels for the Electrical Sector were 
the highest among the sectors (mean rank for the sector 
equals 61 and the actual mean value for the sector is 0.29). 
The lowest voluntary disclosure score, according to the test 
is that of the Leisure industry. Its mean rank is 35 and 
actual mean for the industry is 0.21.
To determine the significance of each industry group 
and which groups are statistically different, additional 
calculations, using a special formula, were performed 
(Siegal and Castellan, 1988, p 213). This extension of 
the Kruskal-Wallis test is based on comparing the means of 
every two groups to find out if they are statistically 
different. When applying this technique to the sample, it 
was found that only two industrial sectors are statistically 
different from the other groups, i.e., the Electrical and 
the Leisure sectors.
The conclusion of this section is that the null 
hypothesis of no relationship between voluntary disclosure 
and industry sector can be rejected. In addition, not all
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industry sectors affect voluntary disclosure, but, according 
to the statistics of the Kruskal-Wallis test, two industries 
show more impact than the other sectors.
9.4.11 Tax Status
It was hypothesised that "close" companies, as defined by 
the tax legislation, are likely to disclose more information 
than "not close" companies. To test this hypothesis a 
contingency table for the two variables, voluntary 
disclosure and tax status, was formed. For this purpose, 
the sample was split into three groups, low level disclosing 
companies, medium level disclosing companies, and high level 
disclosing companies. This was done by using the 33rd and 
the 66th percentiles of voluntary disclosure as break 
points.
When the Chi-square test was performed on the 
contingency table, its statistics (reported in TABLE 9.19) 
support the hypothesised relationship with 95 per cent 
confidence. Moreover, both Lambda and Cramer's V reject the 
null hypothesis of no relationship.
TABLE 9.19
The Non-parametric Summary Statistics: 
Tax Status
CHI-SQUARE LAMBDA CRAMER'S V M-W
5.4922** 0.1050 0.2175 -2.2894*
* 99% Confidence
** 95% Confidence 
M-W: Mann-Whitney Test
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Finally, to compare voluntary disclosure of the two groups 
of companies, "close" and "not close", the Mann-Whitney 
test was performed on the original data set. According to 
its statistic, the null hypothesis could also be rejected 
with 99 per cent.
In summary, the null hypothesis of no relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and tax status could be 
rejected. This was confirmed by all the tests performed with 
the minimum acceptable level of confidence.
9.4.12 Number of Non-Executive Directors
It was hypothesised that there is a positive relationship 
between the number of non-executive directors and voluntary 
disclosure. As for the sample companies, the number ranges 
from zero to eight. However, the number of cases in the 
upper part of the scale, i.e., above two non-executives, is 
less than ten. Therefore, it was decided to combine those 
cases together in one group. This has resulted in the sample 
being divided into four groups: no non-executive directors
group, one non-executive director group, two non-executive 
directors group, and more than two non-executive groups.
To examine the hypothesised relationship, the Kruskal- 
Wallis test was performed on the four-group setting. The 
results of the test (appear in TABLE 9.20), however, do not 
reject the null hypothesis.
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TABLE 9.20
The Non-parametric Summary Statistics: 
Number of Non-Executive Directors
Number of Sub-groups K-W/M-W Spearman's
4 Groups 
2 Groups 
One Group
3.6901 
-1. 4964* * *
0.1567* *
** 95% Confidence
*** 90% Confidence 
M-W Mann-Whitney Test 
K-W Kruskal-Wallis Test
The next approach used was to divide the sample into 
two groups, one for the companies without non-executive 
directors, and the other for the companies that has at least 
one non-executive director. To examine the hypothesised 
positive relationship and compare disclosure scores of the 
two groups, the Mann-Whitney test was conducted. According 
to the test statistics, the null hypothesis could be 
rejected with 90 per cent confidence.
The Mann-Whitney result was also confirmed by 
Spearman's correlation test. Its statistics show that 15 per 
cent of the variation in voluntary disclosure is explained 
by the non-executive directors variable (with 95 per cent 
confidence).
9.5 SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the results of the first group of 
statistical tests applied to investigate the previously 
developed hypotheses. The tests used in this chapter were 
non-parametric and tested each hypothesis individually.
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Despite the limitations of such kinds of tests, they are the 
only statistics that can be used where variables are ordinal 
or nominal.
The results of the tests support the hypothesised 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and each of the 
following: size, percentage of foreign turnover,
geographical diversification, line of business
diversification, directors' shareholdings, the industry 
sector, existence of non-executive directors, and tax 
status. The significance and strength of the relationship 
varied, however, for the different variables.
In addition, it was hypothesised that there is a 
relationship between profitability and voluntary disclosure. 
The results, however, showed an inverse relationship with 
voluntary disclosure. One explanation of this result would 
be that management of profitable firms do not wish to reveal 
detailed information or indications of the sources of its 
success, and by doing so, protect its position from 
competitors.
Moreover, according to the statistical results, one 
could conclude that less profitable companies disclose more 
information than high profitable companies. As suggested 
earlier, the likely explanation for this result is that less 
profitable firms use disclosure of information as a means of 
informing the markets of their current difficulties. In 
addition, by disclosing additional information firms avoid 
any incorrect and unfavourable market speculations
concerning the causes of the low level of their 
profitability.
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The statistics, also, reject the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and gearing when 
the debt to equity ratio was employed to represent gearing 
but only when Spearman's test was used. However, when the 
debt to total assets ratio was, the null hypothesis could 
not be rejected.
Furthermore, the investigation did not support the 
presumed relationship between levels of voluntary disclosure 
and the following variables: existence of executive share
option schemes, the auditing firm and the number of 
substantial shareholders.
As indicated earlier, using non-parametric tests is the 
first statistical approach to test the hypothesised 
relationships. The next chapter will develop and design a 
regression model that will incorporate the hypotheses 
investigated in this research. In applying the next set of 
tests special attention will be given to the variables 
measured with nominal or ordinal scales, and their non- 
parametric statistics, as well as as the results of this 
chapter in general.
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1.
Errors using rule 1 - Errors using rule 2
PRE = ----------------- -- ------------------
Errors using rule 1
The resulting number indicates the proportional 
reduction of error and it represents the decrease in errors 
using rule 2 as a proportion of the errors using rule 1. If 
there is no relationship between the variables, the 
independent variable will not help in predicting the 
dependent variable and the (PRE) equal (0). If there is 
perfect association between the variables, there is perfect 
prediction of the dependent variable using information from 
the independent variable and PRE will equal 1.
As with all PRE measures of association, gamma has two 
rules for defining error, perfect association and no 
association.
No Association ) :
The order of ranks for a pair of observations 
is predicted without reference to the pair of 
ranks on the independent variable.
To calculate Ej, one first excludes the cases that have 
the same rank on the dependent variable or the independent 
variable (concordant pairs or Na ), calculates the number of 
the remaining pairs (discordant pairs or Nr) and divides the 
outcome by 2.
E, = .5 (Na-Nr)
Error defined by the perfect association rule is the 
number of errors made if one predicts that all pairs have 
the same order as on the independent variable.
Perfect Association (E2):
The smaller of the two quantities Na and Nr.
If Na >Nr , one would predict, for a pair of 
ranks on the dependent variable, the same 
order that was observed on the independent 
variable. If Nr<Na one would predict, for a 
pair of ranks on the dependent variable, the 
reverse of the order observed on the 
independent variable.
Also, Gamma, takes advantage of the nature of 
measurement. It recognises the sense of rank order that 
characterises an ordinal measure. Since ordinal variables 
are scales of differences in amount, the fact that some 
cases are higher than others is reflected in the definition 
of gamma.
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Gamma (Y):
Measuring the amount of association between 
two ordinal variables by calculating the 
predictability of the order of a pair of 
ranks on a dependent variable from knowledge 
of the order of the pair on the independent 
variable.
2. Two groups will be independent if all members of both 
groups are randomly chosen. A group of companies that 
contain geographically diversified and undiversified 
companies will yield a group of diversified companies and a 
group of undiversified companies that will be independent. 
The requirement of independent is that the choice of members 
of one group must not affect which in a second group. This 
does not mean, however, that the groups have to be drawn 
separately.
3. The calculation of M-W test starts by ranking together 
the data in both groups. by counting the number of 
observations in group one that are lower than each 
observation in group two. In this way, each value in the 
first group is compared to each values in the second. This 
procedure results in a value called U. If this value is 
found to be very large or very small, then the null 
hypothesis is rejected .
U has a sampling distribution that has the following 
parameters:
mean = |a= (nln2)/2
variance = au = 'T(nln2 (nl+n2+l) )/12
test statistic U = nln2 + (nl(nl+l))/2 - R1
rejection region az = (U - \x)/o\x
where: nl = size of group one, and 
n2 = size of group two.
The mean of the distribution will be (nln2)/2 if the 
null hypothesis of identical populations is true. This 
sampling distribution allows a Z test to see how many 
standard deviations U is away from |a.
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CHAPTER
TEN-------------------------------- --
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE BEHAVIOUR:
DESIGNING AND ANALYSING A REGRESSION MODEL
10.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter was a preliminary step towards 
investigating the relationship between levels of voluntary 
disclosure and firms' characteristics that were hypothesised 
to be associated with voluntary disclosure. The results of 
the previous tests support the hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and: size,
geographical diversification, percentage of foreign 
turnover, directors' equity, profitablity, and industry 
sector. There is also a relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and line of business diversification but with 
less significance. The other hypotheses that relate 
voluntary disclosure with, gearing, existence of executive 
share option schemes, the existence of non executive 
directors and the accounting firm could not be supported.
As non-parametric statistics are widely used in social 
sciences, their lack of use of all the information available 
in data sets has been a major source of dissatisfaction. For 
example, the non-parametric Spearman's test transforms data
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from the interval or ratio scale to the ordinal scale before 
it ranks the data. This transformation results in the loss 
of an important part of the data. In this research, also, 
the results of many non-parametric tests were dependent in 
many ways on subjective decisions, among them is how 
companies were classified as small and large and how 
companies' voluntary disclosure was also classified as low 
or high.
Non-parametric tests are useful as indicators and as a 
first step towards more rigorous investigations. If the data 
set is appropriate, i.e., availability of some 
characteristics such as measurement scale and type of 
distributions of variables, researchers can then advance the 
analysis with caution and use more rigorous tests. This can 
achieve three objectives. Firstly, applying additional 
statistical tests would serve as another source to support 
the previous tests. In addition, if the results of the 
previous tests could not be supported, this will lead to 
questioning both sets of statistics and the researcher 
should look for the sources of discrepancies, i.e., the 
theory or the methodology. Lastly, using the advanced tests,
i.e., regression analysis, would achieve what most 
researchers and policy makers aim to do, namely, 
quantification of the relationship between variables of 
social and economic importance, and therefore, simplifying 
this relationship.
The aim of this chapter is to test the hypotheses 
developed earlier. As each hypothesis was tested 
individually in the previous chapter, it is also necessary
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to test the hypotheses jointly. The observed voluntary 
disclosure, according to both theory of the firm and capital 
market based theory, is hypothesied to occur as a result of 
the variables operating jointly.
To test the hypothesised relationships jointly, the 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression model (OLS) was used. 
Regression using the Ordinary Least Squares technique is 
appropriate because of the nature of the data, i.e., the 
dependent variable is measured on a ratio scale and the 
independent variables are measured on ratio, interval, 
ordinal, and nominal scales. In addition, the OLS technique 
was chosen because other statistical methods, e.g. ordinal 
scaled probit, do not give better results with rank ordered 
data. Output of the OLS regression model is, also, easier 
to interpret (Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979).
The dependent variable in the regression equation will 
be the disclosure score that was calculated for each company 
in the sample. The independent variables will be discussed 
in the next section. The regression model will attempt to 
explain the extent to which the amount of voluntary 
disclosure is a linear additive function of some of the 
firm's characteristics chosen. Predicting values of 
voluntary disclosure is a secondary objective. The 
characteristics of the sample firms represent the main 
hypotheses of this research and have been decided upon after 
considering the results of the tests carried out in the 
previous chapter.
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10.2 SELECTING THE BEST REGRESSION EQUATION
The purpose of this section is to determine the best (most 
important or most valid) subset of the independent variables 
and the corresponding best-fitting regression model for 
describing the relationship between voluntary disclosure 
score (DS) and the independent variables. What is meant by 
best depends in part on the overall goal of modelling.
In general, there are two different goals of regression 
analysis, (1) to predict the dependent variables using a set 
of independent variables and (2) to quantify the 
relationship of one or more independent variables. The 
difference in the two goals arises because the first focuses 
on finding a model that fits the observed data and predicts 
future data as well as possible, whereas the second pertains 
to producing accurate estimates of one or more regression 
coefficients in the model. As for the current research, the 
objective is more in line with the second goal than with the 
first. The aim is to find a model that gives the best 
explanation for voluntary disclosure given the independent 
variables.
In addition to quantifying the relationships, the model 
should be a valid representation of the phenomenon it is 
measuring; that is, obtaining valid (i.e., accurate) 
estimates for one or more regression coefficients in the 
model and then making inferences about the corresponding 
parameters of interest.
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After deciding on the general design of the regression 
model and the independent or explanatory variables that were 
expected to influence voluntary disclosure, the following 
steps were followed to choose the best model:
1. Specify the maximum model.
2. Specify a criterion and strategy for selecting a 
final model.
3. Conduct the specified analysis.
4. Evaluate the reliability of the model chosen.
10.2.1 Specifying the Maximum Model
This section considers the process of determining the 
maximum regression model. The maximum model is defined to be 
the largest model (having the most explanatory variables). 
All other models can be created by deleting explanatory 
variables from the maximum one. The reason behind choosing a 
maximum model is mainly to avoid making Type II (false 
negative) errors. In a regression analysis, a Type II error 
corresponds to omitting an explanatory variable that has a 
truly non-zero regression coefficient in the population. In 
any case, overfitting a model (including variables in the 
model with truly zero regression coefficients in the 
population) will not introduce bias when estimating 
population regression coefficients if the usual regression 
assumptions are met. However, underfitting (leaving 
important predictors out of the final model) will introduce 
bias in the estimated regression coefficients.
There are, however, good reasons for working with a 
small maximum regression model. The need for reliability
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(discussed later) strongly argues for a small maximum model, 
and with a validity goal, the task is to focus on a few 
important variables. Validity can be achieved by avoiding a 
Type I error. A Type I error corresponds to including a 
predictor that has a zero regression coefficient. The desire 
for parsimony is another important reason for choosing a 
small maximum model. Unimportant (with very small 
correlation and R2 increment) but statistically significant 
predictors can greatly confuse the interpretation of 
regression results.
The general idea of reliability is that the number of 
independent observations needed must be larger than the 
number of regression coefficients. This notion has led to 
various guidelines about the size of a maximum model
(Hebden, 1981). The most basic constraint is that the error
degrees of freedom be positive, with a minimum of 10 degrees 
of freedom, namely,
n - k - 1 > 10
where,
n = the sample size, and 
k = the number of predictors
another rule is to have at least 5 observations per
predictor, or, n > 5k.
Assume, in the current research, that a maximum model 
involving 15 explanatory variables was considered. To have 
10 error degrees of freedom requires a sample of size 26, 
i.e., 10+16, while the n > 5k rule demands a sample of size 
76. The sample size in this research satisfied both rules
(as will be seen later).
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Lastly, an important notion to consider when specifying 
the maximum model is collinearity: there are many financial 
measures, i.e., explanatory variables, that might represent 
each of the hypotheses. In choosing what variables to 
include in the model, attention should be given to the 
problem of multicollinearity between the independent 
variables and one should avoid including multicollinear 
variables in the maximum model. The next section addresses 
this problem in more detail.
10.2.1.1 Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity is the name given to the problem that 
arises when two or more of the independent variables in an 
equation are highly correlated (Kleinbaum et al, 1988). If 
independent variables are collinear, they behave as if there 
is a linear relation between them. The relationship could be 
positive so that when one increases in value so does the 
other by a predictable amount; when one decreases in value 
by some amount, so does the other in a predictable way. The 
relationship could also be negative so that as one variable 
goes up in value, the other systematically goes down. The 
collinear variables move together- they act in many ways as 
a single variable. The result of multicollinearity is that 
it becomes very difficult to separate out the individual 
effects of each collinear independent variable; this 
situation is known as joint hypothesis testing.
The effect of this on the estimated results of 
regression analysis is of the utmost importance. The most 
important and direct result is the producing of 
unrealistically high standard errors on the partial
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regression coefficients. The abnormally high standard errors 
are sometimes sufficiently large to cause the calculated t- 
statistic to be smaller than the critical t-statistic. This 
results in mistakenly accepting the null hypothesis that the 
partial regression coefficient is effectively zero. 
Accordingly, one may interpret the results as showing no 
relationship between an independent variable and the 
dependent variable while in fact there is a relationship.
Another problem arising from multicollinearity is 
exceptional sensitivity to the data set being used in the 
estimation. This makes it very difficult to replicate 
results with different data sets on the same variables. As 
it has become widely accepted in scientific research in the 
social sciences that replicating results is as important as 
it is in the natural sciences; this sort of difficulty is 
most undesirable. If multicollinearity is a problem with 
either set of data, the partial regression coefficients 
estimated from one set may be different from those estimated 
from another.
Lastly, the results of the estimation depend greatly on 
the exact specification of the model being tested. A minor 
change in the model being estimated that would normally have 
very small effects on the parameter estimates will generate 
grossly different results when independent variables are 
collinear. In general, relatively minor changes in the 
specification of the model should not cause drastically 
different coefficients.
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In practice one can check for the presence of 
multicollinearity by scanning the correlation matrix, 
APPENDIX 10, for high values. However, there is no clear cut 
answer to this question. Each researcher has her/his own 
view of what constitutes a problem level of the correlation 
coefficient, r. For some, a high r is anything above ±0.500; 
for others it is above ± 0.800. Although there is far from 
agreement on a cut-off value of the simple correlation 
coefficient r, there is some consensus on the use of a value 
around ±0.600 (Eastman, 1984), and accordingly, this 
research will use this value as a cut-off point.
In APPENDIX 10, the first column represents the simple 
correlation coefficients between the dependent variable, 
i.e., the voluntary disclosure score, and each independent 
variable. An example of the multicollinearity in the
independent variables is apparent in the correlation between 
total assets less current liabilities, trading profit, and 
number of employees. Hence, the inclusion of these three 
variables in the equation at the same time will cause the 
estimation to suffer from the potential problems of 
multicollinearity. However, this will be explained more 
fully when deciding upon the specification of the regression 
models.
It seems, then, that if independent variables are
correlated problems arise. However, there are several 
options to solve such obstacles. The first, and obviously 
best is to get another data set on the same variables that
have no multicollinearity. This would be an ideal solution
if more data were to be available. However, this is almost
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never the case, especially in the social sciences.
A second possible solution to the problem is a second- 
best solution. This involves dropping out collinear
variables, but, however, not on a random basis. The 
theoretical underpinnings of the estimated model should be 
consulted and followed in deciding which variables are to be 
left out. The usual approach is to keep the strongest 
variables, with respect to the economics of the model, i.e.,
the theory of the model, in the estimated equation.
Furthermore, the results of the non-parametric tests will be 
considered when deciding upon entering the independent 
variables.
A further factor that should be considered when
building a regression model is the probability distribution 
of the disturbance variable  ^ (Hebden, 1981). Regression 
modelling assumes that this variable is normally distributed 
(this assumption is based on the Central Limit Theorem). 
This assumption is necessary for conducting the statistical 
tests of significance of the parameter estimates and for 
constructing confidence intervals (Cooper and Weekes, 1983). 
If this assumption is violated, the estimates of the 
parameters are unbiased and best, i.e., the estimater has 
the smallest variance, but one cannot assess their 
statistical reliability by the classical tests of 
significance, i.e. F, because this test is based on normal 
di stributions
However, even when the distribution is not normal, one 
can make use of the Central Limit Theorem and therefore use 
regression modelling (Koutsoyiannis, 1987 and Shaw &
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Wheller, 1985). According to this theorem even if the 
population is not normal, the distribution of the mean tends 
to the normal distribution as the sample size n tends to 
infinite. At first sight even the Central Limit Theorem 
might seem not very helpful, since in practice n is not
large. However, from applied research it has been found that
a good approximation has been found to be close for samples 
as small as 20 (Koutsoyiannis, 1987). As sample size in this
research is 122, which is well above the prescribed 20, one
can assume that n is distributed normally.
Additionally, as (a mainly absorbs influences of 
numerous unimportant variables, it is more likely that small 
H values will appear in any particular period than large 
values, since it is more likely that the researcher will 
make minor rather than major mistakes when deciding which 
are the most important variables to be included in the 
function (Koutsoyiannis, 1987). It is hypothesised in this 
research that all known important variables will be included 
in the regression model and therefore a small n would appear 
in the fitted model.
After this introduction to the requirements and 
assumptions of regression modelling, the next section 
outlines each hypothesis and the variable chosen to 
represent it.
10.2.1.2 The Independent Variables of the Maximum Model
In choosing the independent variables, the following steps 
were observed and taken into consideration. First, the 
results of the non-parametric tests of the previous chapter
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were used as a guide in choosing the independent variables 
that will be included in the model. The theory was also 
referred to when non-parametric tests provided discrepancies 
and inconsistent results. Lastly, the correlation matrix 
was used when collinearity between variables was suspected. 
The discussion will be arranged in the same order as the 
hypotheses presented earlier. All the independent variables 
were extracted from the annual reports and a list of them 
appears in APPENDIX 11.
In presenting the analysis, a mathematical expression 
is provided for each hypothesis before presenting the final 
regression model. Each equation shows the relationship 
between each variable chosen and voluntary disclosure. 
Although the analysis is multivariate, i.e., it incorporates 
together all known factors that are expected to influence 
voluntary disclosure, the initial equations are presented in 
a simple bivariate form for illustration.
Firstly, size of firms can be represented by total 
assets, total equity, turnover, total equity less current 
liabilities, or number of employees. According to the non- 
parametric tests all these measures showed a significant 
relationship with voluntary disclosure. However, including 
all of them is not appropriate because of the the presence 
of multicollinearity between the variables. As shown in 
APPENDIX 10 and in TABLE 10.1 (next page), all these 
variables are highly correlated with each other with 
coefficients starting from 0.5142.
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For the purpose of this research number of employees 
and turnover were included in the analysis separately in two 
different models. Number of employees has the strongest 
correlation coefficient with voluntary disclosure and 
therefore was included. Further, when the financial press, 
representing the investors group, refer to company's size, 
it usually attaches to it sales turnover or number of 
employees. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to use 
total turnover or number of employees as surrogates for 
size.
TABLE 10.1
The Correlation Matrix: Size
(1)
1.DISCLOSURE 1.0000 
SCORE ( 117)
P= . (2)
2. TURNOVER .1361 1.0000
( 117) ( 117)
P= .072 P= . (3)
3.TOTAL 
ASSETS
.1508 .7185 1.0000
( 117) ( 117) ( 117)
P= .052 P= .000 P= . (4)
4.TOTAL ASSETS .1293 .5142 .9443 1.0000
LESS CURRENT ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117)
LIABILITIES P= .082 P= .000 P= .000 P= . (5)
5.TOTAL 
EQUITY
.1274 .5281 .9359 .9770 1.0000
( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117)
P= .086 P= .000 P= .000 P= .000 P= . (6)
6. NUMBER OF .2747 .5225 .5909 .5360 .5669 1.0000
EMPLOYEES ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117)
P= .001 P= .000 P= .000 P= .000 P= .000 P= . (7)
7. GROWTH -.0690 .1125 .0477 .0157 .0140 .0826 1.0000
IN EPS ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) 
P= .230 P= .114 P= .305 P= .433 P= .441 P= .188 P= .
(Coefficient/ (Cases)/ 1-tailed Significance
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In addition, turnover was used in the analysis because 
one of the hypotheses to be tested is concerned with the 
relationship between turnover, representing growth in the 
context of managerial theory of the firm and voluntary 
disclosure.
However, total assets, with the second highest 
correlation with voluntary disclosure, is highly correlated 
with the measures of profitability that were also used in 
the analysis and therefore was not included. Its correlation 
coefficient with trading profit is 0.7826 and with net 
profit is 0.7245.
Mathematically, the regression equation that tests the 
influence of size on voluntary disclosure is:
(1) DSi = o + BEMPLi + uA, or 
DSi = o + 13TSi + Ui 
where;
DS = the disclosure score;
EMPL = number of employees;
TS = total turnover;
u = the error term in the OLS model; and
i = company subscripts.
The second difficulty which arises concerns the 
selection of the measure representing profitability. The 
following variables were first entered into the correlation 
matrix: growth in earnings per share, growth in trading
profit, growth in net profit, return on assets, return on
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turnover, return on equity, and return on assets less 
current liabilities. From the matrix, (a summary appears in 
TABLE 10.2) the measures do not show any statistically 
significant relationship with voluntary disclosure.
Table 10.2 
The Correlation Matrix: Profitability
(1)
1.Disclosure 1.0000 
Score ( 117)
P= . (2)
2.GROWTH -.0690 1.0000
IN EPS ( 117) ( 117)
P= .230 P= . (3)
3.GROWTH IN .0302 .9064 1.0000
TRADING ( 117) ( 117) ( 117)
PROFIT P= .373 P= .000 P= . (4)
4.GROWTH IN .0209 .4207 .3968 1.0000
NET ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117)
PROFIT P= .402 P= .000 P= .000 P= •
5.RETURN ON -.1069 .5534 .5600 .1902
TOTAL ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117)
ASSETS P= .126 P= .000 P= .000 P= .020
6.RETURN ON -.0225 .4760 .5431 .1849
(5)
1.0000 
( 117)
>= . (6)
.4959 1.0000
TURNOVER ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117) ( 117)
P= .405 P= .000 P= .000 P= .023 P= .000 P= .
(Coefficient/ (Cases)/ 1-tailed Significance
As with regard the results of the non-parametric tests, 
both return on total assets and growth in earnings per 
share, to a lesser extent, were supported by the Taub and 
Kruskal-Wallis tests. However, return on total assets, which 
is a historical measure, i.e., it employs the historical 
cost of assets in the calculation, does not represent 
management's performance as well as growth in earnings per
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share (Popoff and Cowan, 1985). The utilisation of the
assets is reflected in earnings. In addition, earnings per
share is what investors look for and the bottom line in
which they are usually interested.
For the collinearity of growth in earnings per share, 
the Matrix does not show any significant correlation between 
this variable and any of the variables entered or to be 
entered in the models. For this reason and all the above 
discussed factors, it was decided that the best variable to 
represent profitability in the regression modelling is 
growth in earnings per share. Accordingly, the regression
model that represents profitability is:
(2) DS± = a + BDEPSi + u± 
where;
DEPS = the growth in earnings per share; and 
the other symbols were as previously defined.
The third hypothesis examined concerned gearing or 
capital structure. Two variables are usually used to 
represent gearing, the debt to equity ratio and the debt to 
total assets ratio. When the two variables were tested using 
the non-parametric statistics, only one test, the Spearman's 
correlation, indicated that the debt to equity ratio is 
significantly associated with voluntary disclosure (with 90 
per cent confidence).
However, in the Correlation Matrix, neither variable 
shows any significant correlation with voluntary disclosure. 
But, both are highly correlated with each other (0.74 at .00 
significance).
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As for regression modelling, it was felt that including 
one of the variables is necessary because theories of 
voluntary disclosure support the hypothesised relationship. 
However, the variable included in the regression was the 
debt to total assets ratio. The underlying explanation for 
this selection is based on the argument that capital 
structure should represent the financing of the firm as an 
entity (the entity view). Any claims from debtors are 
against the firm (total assets) and not against the net 
assets, i.e., equity (the proprietary view). Therefore, debt 
as a percentage of total assets is a better measurement for 
gearing than debt to equity ratio. The regression equation 
representing capital structure would be:
(3) DS± = o + BDEASTi + u* 
where:
DEAST = debt to total assets ratio; and 
the other symbols were as previously defined.
For the case of diversification, three measures were 
used: line of business diversification, percentage of
foreign turnover and geographical diversification. APPENDIX 
10 indicates no multicollinearity among these variables and 
the other independent variables. Also, the strongest 
correlation was between foreign turnover and voluntary 
disclosure (0.34 at 0.00 significance level). The three 
measures were used because there is a theoretical 
justification, discussed earlier, for expecting a positive 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and these 
variables. In addition, the non-parametric tests support the 
hypothesised relationship for all the three variables.
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Accordingly, the regression equation that tests the three 
variables is:
(4) DS± = a + FSPERi + B2 LOBi + B3 GDIi + u± 
where;
FSPER = foreign turnover percentage;
LOB = line of business diversification index;
GDI = geographical diversification index; and 
the other symbols were defined earlier.
The next hypothesis tested was that related to
directors' shareholdings. Only one measure can represent 
this hypothesis, and that is the directors' share in the
equity. The correlation matrix reveals no collinearity 
between this variable and the other independent variables. 
This variable is one of the main variables intended to be 
investigated in this research, as it represents an 
operationalisation of a major argument from agency theory. 
Furthermore, both the Correlation Matrix and the non- 
parametric statistics indicate a negative relationship 
between directors equity and voluntary disclosure. To
examine this hypothesis the following regression model 
representing this hypothesis is:
(5) DS± = o - BDIREQi + u± 
where;
DIREQ = directors' shares in the equity; and 
the other symbols were as previously explained.
The industry sectors of electricals and leisure were 
found (using non-parametric tests) to have some associations
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with voluntary disclosure. However, when applying the 
regression model, a group of seven dummy variables was 
created to represent the industry sector (total categories 
minus 1) with one variable for each category. The values of 
the dummy are as follows:
Sector DYi dy2 dy3 dy4 DYs DY6 dy7
Beers & Wines 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Building Ind. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Drapery & Stores 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Electricals 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Food Ind. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Leisure 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Paper & Printing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Oil & Gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The use of dummies as explanatory variables in a linear 
regression model which also includes conventionally-measured 
regressors involves a basic assumption. The response of the 
dependent variable to the effect of each conventional 
regressor is constant, regardless of which dummy group a 
particular observation belongs to. In other words, the 
coefficients of the conventional regressors are fixed, 
whatever dummy group is involved. The way in which the 
dummies are assumed to act is by shifting the whole 
regression relationship parallel to itself- by altering the 
intercept, not any of the slope coefficients. The following 
is an example illustrating the above assumption.
Suppose voluntary disclosure is linearly related to 
size in all industry sectors (other things being equal), but 
the whole function shifts (parallel) according to the 
industry sector. Then the four parallel regressions (for 
illustration, only four sectors are included in the example)
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representing the industry effect, are:
(6.1) DS = a0 + BSIZE + u for others
(6.2) DS = a4 + BSIZE + u for the electricals sector
(6.3) DS = a5 + BSIZE + u for the food sector
(6.4) DS = a6 + BSIZE + u for the leisure sector
where the intercepts a0, a4, a5, and a6 differ but the slope 
with respect to size does not. One could fit these four
equations separately to four sets of data, but then it would 
be most unlikely that there would be four identical 
estimates for B, and it would not be possible to know how to 
use the data. It would be better to use the combined samples 
to estimate B. (More observations will, with other things 
being equal, make a more precise estimate). So combining the 
equations results in:
(6.5) DS = a0DY0 + a4DY4 + a5DY5 + a6 DY6 + B2 SIZE + u
As the dummy variables have only two values, 1 or 0; 
they take the value 1 for any observation that belongs to 
their particular dummy group (so all food companies will
have DY5 = 1, and for them, the other dummies =0).
Therefore, for any company from the food industry, the 
equation is:
(6.6) DSi = «o(0) + a4(0) + a5(l) + a6(0) + BSIZEi + uA
= a5 + BSIZEi + Ui
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and for any company from the leisure sector industry, the 
equation is:
(6.7) DS± = o6 + BSIZEi + Ui
Equations (6.6) and (6.7) are exactly the parallel 
equations (6.2) and (6.3) that were presented earlier; their 
intercepts differ (a5 , a6 ), but their slope is the same (13). 
Notice that equation (6.5) contains, it seems, no intercept.
The intercept is provided by one or other of the dummy
variables' coefficients: the coefficient of the food sector- 
dummy provides the food sector intercept. If an intercept is 
introduced, say a, as well as the other dummies in (6.5), 
one would find it impossible to get estimates of any of the
regression coefficients. The reason is that dummies, when
added to a regular intercept term, produce a case of perfect 
multicollinearity (Kleinbaum, et al; 1988).
Basically, the problem is that, although there are 
three dummy variables represented by three regressors, they 
do not convey separate pieces of information. If the 
industry sector dummy has the value of 1 for a particular 
observation then automatically the other dummies have the 
value of 0, and vice-versa. So, there will be no loss of any 
information if one of the dummies is dropped, and by doing
that, OLS will be able to work. The dropped dummy group is
measured as the norm, and the coefficients of the other
dummies measure shifts from this normal level.
The basic equation, therefore, includes dummy variables 
representing all but one of the industry sectors. Therefore, 
this single regression actually represents several parallel
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lines, each one referring to one of the industrial sectors 
and not in itself containing these dummies as regressors.
If a regular intercept, a, is included in the equation, 
and after dropping one of the dummy groups to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity, the model would be written as follows:
(6) DSi=a + BjiDYji + B2iDY2i + B3 L DY3 A +...+ R7 DY7 ± + u±
where DYn ± represents the dummy variable's value (0 or 1) 
according to the ith firm industry.
Dummy variables were also used to represent other 
variables hypothesised earlier to influence voluntary 
disclosure: the auditing firm; the existence of executive
share option schemes; and a company's tax status. Three 
groups of dummy variables were created to represent the 
three variables. As with industry sector, the following 
regression models represent the relationships between 
voluntary disclosure and each one of the hypothesised 
variables:
(7) DS± = a + BFIRMi + u± 
where;
FIRMi = the dummy variable representing the 
auditing firm;
= 1 if audited by one of the Big Eight 
Auditing Firms, or 
= 0 otherwise.
(8) DSi = a + BOPTIONi + u± 
where:
OPTIONi = the dummy variable representing the 
existing of executive share option 
schemes:
= 1 if there is a scheme, or 
= 0 otherwise.
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(9) DSa = a + BTAXi + uA
where:
TAX± = the dummy variable representing the tax 
status of the companies;
= 1 if a company is closed, or 
= 0 otherwise.
Adding all the variables to the regression equation 
results in two basic maximum models. The first uses total 
turnover to represent size, and the second uses number of 
employees. The equations are:
(10) DSi = a + BiTSi + B2DEPS± + B3 FSPERi + B4 LOBi
+ B5GDIi + B6 DIREQi + B7DEAST± + RsBYlt 
+ Bg DY2 i + B10 DY3 i + B11DY4i + Ba2DY5i 
+ Ba3DY6i + B14DY7i + B15FIRMi + B,6OPTION*
+ B j 7 TAXi .
(11) DSi = a + B3 EMPLi + B2DEPSi + B3FSPERi + B4LOBi
+ B5 GDIi + B6DIREQi + B7DEASTi + B8 DY3 *
+ B9 DY2 i + B10 DY3 i + Bj x DY4 i + B12DY5i 
+ Ba 3 DY6 i + B14DY7 i + Bj 5 FIRMi + B160PTI0Ni 
+ B 1 7 TAXi •
In regression modelling, one should try to fit and 
estimate the maximum possible number of models that feature 
the hypothesised relationships (Kleinbaum et al, 1988). To 
decide on the best model, a selection criterion is then used
(discussed in the next section) to chose the best model. As
for this research, it was decided to develop two models, 
incorporating two size measures because, one could argue, 
that each measure represents a different size attribute;
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turnover represents the turnover hypothesis developed 
earlier while number of employees represents investors
perception, represented by the financial press, of company 
size. If the two size measures were included in the same 
model, it would be difficult to interpret the results, as 
the two variables are highly correlated.
For the other hypotheses, however, one can assert that 
each variable chosen was the best representative for the 
hypothesis, e.g., gearing is best represented by the debt to 
assets ratio because the hypothesis is concerned with the 
claims against the whole company not against the equity.
10.2.2 Specifying a Criterion and Strategy 
for Selecting a Model
The next step in selecting the best regression model is to
specify a selection criterion. The criterion is a regression
measurement that can be calculated for each suggested model
and used to compare models. Obviously, the selection
criterion should be related to the goal of the analysis. For
this research the goal is to measure the influence of the
independent explanatory variables on voluntary disclosure,
or, how well the sample supports the theory of the
relationship between voluntary disclosure and the
independent variables. The model squared multiple
correlation R2 is the measure that states the degree to
which changes in a set of independent variables generates
changes in the dependent variable, the explanatory power of
the model. R2, however, can be misleading because adding
predictors, even useless ones, can never decrease R2. In
fact, adding variables will invariably increase R2 at least
296
slightly. The adjusted R2 can be used to overcome such 
problems. Adjusted R2 may actually fall if the additional 
explanatory power generated by an added variable is more 
than compensated for by the adjustment process.
The second criterion used is the partial correlation 
coefficient. It can be interpreted as the correlation 
between the ith independent variable and the dependent 
variable when the linear effects of the other independent 
variables have been removed from the ith and the dependent 
variables.
The strategy for selecting the regression model is
concerned with determining how many variables and also which 
particular variables should be included in the final model. 
Whenever practical, including the all possible-independent 
variables strategy is to be preferred over any other 
selection strategy. It is the only method guaranteed to find 
the model having the largest R2. However, entering a 
variable in the model may alter the F value of the model or 
the associated significance levels. F statistic, a measure
of goodness of fit, determines whether or not all the
partial regression coefficients are equal to zero. In more 
formal terms it tests the null hypothesis that
R2 133 ... Bn 0
To prevent altering F, the stepwise selection
regression procedure permits re-examination, at every step, 
of the variables incorporated in the model in the previous 
steps. At each step a partial F test for each variable 
presently in the model is made as though it were the most
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recent variable entered. That variable with the smallest 
non-significant partial statistic is removed, and the model 
is refitted with the remaining variables, the partial F's 
are obtained and similarly examined, and so on. The whole 
process continues until no more variables can be entered or 
removed.
For the purpose of the current research, and in order 
that a variable enter the regression equation, the 
probability associated with its F value must be less than or 
equal to 0.05. In addition, before an independent variable 
enters the equation, its tolerance with other independent 
variables already in the equation is calculated (The 
tolerance is the proportion of variability in an independent 
variable not explained by the other independent variables). 
The tolerance level used in this research is 0.01.
10.2.3 Conducting the Analysis
Having specified the maximum models and the criterion and 
strategy for selecting the variables, the models were 
examined using the SPSS PC+ V2 and the SPSSX computer 
programmes. The results of the analysis appear in APPENDIX 
12 and APPENDIX 13. This section reviews the results of the 
two regression models selected as the best maximum models 
and compares these results with the non-parametric 
statistics of the previous chapter.
The aim of the analysis is to test the hypotheses of a 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and the specified 
independent variables. Predicting specific values for any 
variable, while important, is a secondary objective. 
Therefore, the emphasis of the analysis will be on the
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magnitude of the relationships not the exact values of the 
coefficients.
10.2.3.1 The First Model
When using number of employees as the measure for size, the 
first model included the following independent variables: 
foreign turnover (FSPER), existence of executive share 
options (OPTION), number of employees (EMPL), the industry 
sector Electricals (DY4), debt to total assets ratio 
(DEAST), directors equity (DIREQ), the industry sector 
Leisure (DY6), and growth in earning per share (DEPS). The 
resulting model excluded the other variables: line of
business diversification (LOB), geographical diversification 
(GDI), the other industry sectors, the auditing firm (FIRM), 
and tax status of the company (TAX). The results of fitting 
the model are presented in the following equation that 
relates the predicted voluntary disclosure to the 
independent variables (the level of significance is in 
brackets):
DS = 0.19 + 0.00136(FSPER) + 0.0194(OPTION)
(.0000) (.0000) (.0035)
+ 0.000037(EMPL) + 0.029(DY4) + 0.095(DEAST)
(.0001) (.0294) (.0032)
- 0.0007(DIREQ) - 0.039(DY6) - 0.0082(DEPS)
(.0091) (.0194) (0.0892)
It should be noted that the coefficients in the above 
equation do not represent the relative importance of each 
variable. They are used solely for predicting the voluntary 
disclosure score given specific values for the explanatory 
variables. The extent and significance of the relationships 
appear in the columns labelled Partial and Sig T IN APPENDIX
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12. The following analysis of the results is arranged 
according to the variables entry into the regression 
equation.
TABLE 10.3
Statistics of the First Regression Model: 
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.364042E-03 2.36777E-04 .43480 .38004 .47647 5.761 .0000
OPTION .01941 6.50260E-03 .21979 .26927 .27036 2.985 .0035
EMPL 3.657897E-05 9.00774E-06 .29286 .25310 .35686 4.061 .0001
DY4 .02965 .01344 .17302 .31123 .20323 2.206 .0294
DEAST .09545 .03168 .23007 .04534 .27265 3.012 .0032
DIREQ -7.03827E-04 2.65209E-04 -.19606 -.15825 -.24222 -2.654 .0091
DY6 -.03919 .01652 -.17927 -.27006 -.21778 -2.372 .0194
DEPS -8.20979E-03 4.78842E-03 -.12389 -.06481 -.15923 -1.715 .0892
(Constant) .19037 .02136 8.913 .0000
RJ= 0.450
The statistics of the regression model (TABLE 10.3) 
indicate that foreign turnover (FSPER) has the strongest 
relationship with voluntary disclosure, and when first 
introduced in the equation in step 1, it had a partial 
correlation of 0.38 at the 0.000 level of significance. This 
means that 38 per cent of the variation in voluntary 
disclosure is explained by the foreign turnover percentage. 
The other statistics which appear in the "Variables not in 
the Equation Table" part in APPENDIX 12, also indicate that 
bringing the share option variable to the Equation would 
add 33 per cent explanation to the as-yet-unexplained 
variation in the dependent variable. (Note that the sign of 
the relationship is positive as was expected). However, the 
absolute contribution of the new variable is 0.096, which is 
the increase in R2 to 0.24.
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With regard to the non-parametric statistics performed 
in the previous chapter, the results of the regression 
modelling confirm those of the non-parametric. Both 
techniques support the hypothesised relationship between 
foreign turnover percentage and voluntary disclosure. In 
addition, the results of both methods indicate that foreign 
turnover has the strongest relationship with voluntary 
disclosure.
When adding a new variable to the explanatory 
variables, one would expect a change in the partial 
correlation coefficients if there is multicollinearity 
between the new variable and the previously added variables. 
For this regression an attempt was made at the beginning to 
avoid, as far as possible, including collinear variables in 
the equation. However, the results show a slight change in 
the partial correlations of the variables. When the 
executive share option variable (OPTION) was added, the
partial correlation of foreign turnover was increased from 
38 to 42.5 per cent.
This result of a positive relationship between the
existence of share option schemes and voluntary disclosure 
is contrary to the results of the non-parametric tests. The 
Non-parametric tests indicate no significant relationships 
between the two variables. In deciding which result to
accept, one should bear in mind that non-parametric 
statistics are more appropriate than parametric statistics 
when testing a relationship between a categorical
independent variable, e.g., existence of share option 
schemes, and a continuous dependent variable. As indicated
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earlier, dummy variables can be used to represent 
categorical data in regression modelling, but their results 
should be interpreted with caution. Regression modelling is 
appropriate when the dependent and independent variables 
are measured on a continuous scale, but can be used with 
categorical data (Kleinbaum et al, 1988).
The next step in the regression was adding number of 
employees (EMPL), as a measure of size, to the equation. 
This variable has a partial coefficient of 0.32 at the 
0.0003 level of significance. This variable's sign (a 
positive relationship) was as expected in the theory, the 
same as the signs of the variables included in the previous 
steps. Adding number of employees increased R2 by 0.079 to 
0.32, and at the same time increased the correlation of the 
foreign turnover variable. This collinearity is expected as 
large firms, usually, are those which operate 
internationally.
When comparing the results of the regression with that 
of the non-parametric, both procedures support the 
hypothesised positive relationship between size, represented 
by number of employees, and voluntary disclosure. In 
addition, both techniques show that number of employees is 
one of the major variables that influence voluntary 
disclosure.
Another variable that was expected to influence 
voluntary disclosure was the industry sector. Non- 
parametric tests supported the hypothesis that industry 
sector, and in particular the electricals sector (DY4) has a 
positive relationship with voluntary disclosure. The results
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of the regression support the non-parametric tests and when 
included in the equation, the R2 increased by 0.0038 to 
0.359. This increase appears to be small. However, the
partial correlation coefficient for the electricals industry 
is around 24 per cent. This variable, also, appears to have 
some collinearity with the foreign turnover and option 
variables. The correlation coefficients for both variables 
were decreased when the industry variable electricals was 
included in the equation.
The next variable of relative importance is that 
representing capital structure, the debt to total assets 
ratio (DEAST) . This variable has pulled R2 up to 0.407.
Also, the standard error for the model was reduced from
0.065 to 0.064. However, partial correlation between this 
ratio and voluntary disclosure was 0.18, or adding this 
variable explains 18 per cent of the as-yet-unexplained 
variation in the dependent variable. This result is,
however, contrary to the non-parametric statistics which do 
not reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between 
debt to total assets ratio and voluntary disclosure. When 
looking at the correlation value for this variable (in the 
column Correl), it shows a very low value of only 0.043, 
which supports the conclusion of the non-parametric tests. 
The increase in the value of the simple correlation (0.043) 
to the value of 0.18 (for the partial correlation) might be 
caused by a multicollinearity between this variable and the 
other variables already in the model and not because of a 
genuine relationship between gearing and voluntary 
disclosure.
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Directors equity (DIREQ), which is one of the major 
hypotheses in this research was entered in the regression 
equation in the sixth step. It has added 0.026 to the 
explanatory power of the model, R2. As was hypothesised, the 
sign of this variable appears negative, that is, there is an 
inverse relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
directors' equity. The partial correlation is -0.206, and 
adding it has little effect on the other partial 
correlations.
Another hypothesis confirmed by the regression model is 
the relationship between the leisure industry sector (DY6) 
and voluntary disclosure. The partial correlation for the 
leisure industry sector has a value of -0.27. This
relationship was expected and confirmed by the non-
parametric tests. However, it seems to have some
collinearity with a previous variable, the directors equity 
ratio. After including this variable, the partial 
correlation of directors' equity has increased from -0.206 
to -0.249. This indicates a collinearity, although small, 
between these two variables. The contribution of the leisure 
industry to the R2 is about 0.028 and has therefore 
increased it to 0.436.
The final variable entered into the model was the
growth in profitability (DEPS). The simple correlation 
coefficient for this variable is -0.064 and the partial one 
is -0.15. This indicates a collinearity between this
variable and the other variables in the equation. Also, the 
correlations show an inverse relationship with voluntary 
disclosure while it was hypothesised that profitability has
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a relationship with voluntary disclosure. The results of the 
regression, however, agree with the results of the non- 
parametric tests. Moreover, the effect of this variable upon 
R2 is very small and negligible.
The final regression equation (TABLE 10.3) shows the
partial correlations and the other statistics concerning the 
variables included in the model. All variables in the
equation have been included on the basis of their
significance (at 0.10 or less levels of significance).
In addition, TABLE 10.4 shows the statistics of the 
variables not included in the final regression equation. 
Most of the remaining variables have partial coefficients of 
less than ±0.08 with very low levels of significance. 
However, two variables were very close to entering the
equation. Firstly, there was company tax status (TAX) which 
has a correlation of 0.12 at the 0.18 level of significance. 
Previously, when using non-parametric tests, tax status 
appeared to have a relationship with voluntary disclosure.
TABLE 10.4
Statistics of the First Regression Model:
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial Min Toler T Sig T
LOB -.04921 -.06330 .78861 -.671 .5035
TAX .10298 .12621 .76149 1.346 . 1809
DY1 .07301 .08857 .74508 .941 .3487
DY2 3.4890E-03 .00430 .73066 .046 .9638
DY3 5.4741E-03 .00663 .69772 .070 .9442
GDI -.05712 -.07478 . 79036 - . 794 .4291
DY5 -.11833 -.15182 .73656 -1.626 . 1069
FIRM -.03941 -.05109 .79105 -.541 . 5893
3 0 5
In addition, the food and grocery industry sector (DY5) 
had a partial correlation of -0.15 at 0.107 level 
significance. This result is very close to warrant 
including in the equation. The Chi-Square tests, performed 
earlier, supported the existence of a relationship between 
this variable and voluntary disclosure.
The conclusion concerning the first regression model 
constructed is that it supports most of the relationships 
hypothesised in the theory. However, it does not reject the 
null hypotheses for some of the presumed relationships. The 
main finding is that the model, where number of employees is 
used to represent size, rejects the null hypothesis that 
concerns the relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
the following variables:
TABLE 10.5
Summary Statistics of the First Regression Model
1. Foreign turnover (FSPER) at 0.0000 level of significance
2. Share option schemes (OPTION) at 0.0035 level of significance
3. Number of employees (EMPL) at 0.0001 level of significance
4. The electrical industry (DY4) at 0.0294 level of significance
5. Debt to total assets ratio (DEAST) at 0.0032 level of significance
6. Directors equity (DIREQ) at 0.0091 level of significance
7. The leisure industry (DY6) at 0.0194 level of significance
8. Growth in EPS (DEPS) at 0.0892 level of significance
For the other variables representing the remaining 
hypotheses, the statistics do not reject the null hypotheses 
at an accepted level of significance (i.e., 0.10). These
hypotheses are concerned with line of business 
diversification (LOB), the tax status (TAX), geographical 
diversification (GDI), the audit firm (FIRM) and the rest of 
the industry sectors.
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As for the validity of the correlation coefficients in 
view of collinearity, there appears to remain a slight 
collinearity between some of the variables. This has caused 
a reduction in the partial coefficients of some of the 
variables when other variables were included in the 
regression.
Before reviewing the evaluation tests conducted to test 
the reliability of the previous model, the next section will 
address the second regression model in some detail. The 
evaluation of results is left to the section that follows.
10.2.3.2 The Second Model
The second model tested incorporates the same hypotheses 
investigated in the first model except that it used total 
turnover (TS) as the variable for size instead of using 
number of employees. Number of employees (EMPL) was dropped 
to avoid the known collinearity between the two variables. 
The analysis in this section concentrates on the differences 
between the two models as there are many similarities 
between the two equations (the statistics concerning the 
second model appear in APPENDIX 13 and a summary in TABLE 
10.6 ).
The first two variables entered the equation in the 
second model were foreign turnover (FSPER) and the existence 
of executive share option schemes (OPTION). This is the same 
as with the first model as these two variables have the 
highest correlation coefficients among the independent 
variables. These two variables together explain up to 24 per 
cent (R2=0.24) of the variation in the voluntary disclosure 
variable.
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TABLE 10.6
Statistics of the Second Regression Model 
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.341805E-03 2.41298E-04 .42771 .38004 .46192 5.561 .0000
OPTION .02416 6.48061E-03 .27362 .26927 .32970 3.729 .0003
DY6 -.06069 .01657 -.27759 -.27006 -.32450 -3.663 .0004
TS 5.042811E-10 2.23115E-10 .17091 .13097 .20710 2.260 .0257
DIREQ -7.88416E-04 2.74675E-04 -.21962 -.15825 -.25962 -2.870 .0049
DY5 -.05384 .02272 -.17389 -.15930 -.21670 -2.370 .0195
DEAST .07037 .03294 .16963 .04534 .19623 2.137 .0348
(Constant) .22393 .02097 10.680 .0000
Ra=0.404
When the non-parametric statistics were applied, the 
null hypothesis of the relationship between foreign turnover 
and voluntary disclosure was also rejected. However, the 
hypothesised relationship between executive share option 
schemes and voluntary disclosure could not be supported.
As a result of removing number of employees, which was 
in third place to enter the equation in the first model, 
total turnover (TS) moved to fourth place in importance, and 
accordingly, the industry sector of leisure (DY6) moved to 
the third place. Looking at APPENDIX 13, step 2, the partial 
correlation of the leisure industry (in the variables 
waiting to enter the equation) is higher than that of the 
remaining variables. Entering the industry sector leisure to 
the regression model contributed 0.036 to the explanatory 
power of the model, R2, which was increased to 0.272. This 
result is also consistent with the non-parametric tests 
which indicate that the leisure companies disclose less 
information than the companies in the other industry 
sectors.
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The next variable entered into the equation was total 
turnover (TS) with a partial correlation of 0.244 while its 
simple correlation was 0.1309. This indicates a 
multicollinearity between total turnover and one of the 
variables in the equation. However, the statistic of the 
turnover variable and the sign of its correlation support 
rejecting the null hypothesis of the size variable. With 
this variable the R2 increased to 0.32.
When compared with the non-parametric tests, both 
procedures reject the null hypothesis of no relationship 
between size represented by turnover and voluntary 
disclosure.
The Directors' equity (DIREQ) partial correlation lends 
support to the expected sign with a value of -0.21 which is 
slightly higher than the simple correlation between 
voluntary disclosure and the directors' equity variable. 
This result confirms the statistics of the previous model, 
and the non-parametric tests.
The industry effect appears again in this model when 
the variable representing the food industry (DY5) entered 
the equation with a partial correlation of -0.21 at a 0.0219 
level of significance. This variable did not enter the first 
model but was close to the critical level of significance 
(the non-parametric tests also indicated the significance of 
this variable). With this variable in the model, R2 
increased to 0.379 enhancing the explanatory power of the 
model.
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The final variable to enter the regression equation was 
the debt to total assets ratio (DEAST). The partial 
correlation of this variable is 0.19 while the simple 
correlation is 0.04; this indicates the presence of 
multicollinearity between this new variable and at least one 
of the variables already in the equation, which appears to 
be directors' equity. However, the size of collinearity does 
not appear to be more than 4 per cent.
When compared with the non-parametric tests, however, 
the debt to assets ratio was not a significant factor in 
influencing voluntary disclosure.
The overall explanatory power of the second model is 
less than that of the first one. (R2 equals 45 per cent for 
the first model and 40 per cent for the second) . The
equation that relates voluntary disclosure to the
independent variables is:
DS = 0.224 + 0.00134(FSPER) + 0.241(OPTION)
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003)
- 0.607(DY6) + 5.043E-10(TS) - 0.000788(DIREQ)
(0.0004) (0.0257) (0.0049)
- 0.054(DY5) + 0.07037(DEAST)
(0.0195) (0.0348)
As with any regression model, the coefficients do not 
represent in any way the relative importance of each
variable in the equation. In addition, all variables in the 
equation have been included on the basis of their 
significance, i.e., at 0.10 or less levels of significance.
As for the variables that have not been included in the
final regression equation, TABLE 10.7 shows the variables, 
their partial correlations and their levels of significance.
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TABLE 10.7
Statistics of the Second Regression Model: 
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial Min Toler T Sig T
LOB -.09185 -.11527 .82990 -1.234 .2199
TAX .06278 .07537 .76846 .803 .4234
DY1 2.5431E-03 .00303 .75364 .032 .9744
DY2 -.08402 -.10272 .81009 -1.098 .2746
DY3 -.09900 -.12058 .82990 -1.291 . 1993
GDI -.05474 -.06803 .79346 -.725 .4700
DEPS -.09301 -.11706 .80431 -1.253 .2128
DY5 .12416 .13722 .72832 1.473 . 1436
FIRM -.06949 -.08533 .82668 -.910 .3646
The main conclusion of the second regression model is 
that the null hypotheses of foreign turnover, existence of 
share option schemes, the industry sector of leisure, 
turnover, directors' equity, the industry sector of food, 
and the debt to total assets ratio, can be rejected with 
statistically significant levels of confidence. The extent 
of the relationships vary from 19 per cent for the debt to 
total assets ratio to 46 per cent for foreign turnover. The 
results, however, do not reject the null hypotheses for the 
other variables.
Before comparing and summarising the results of the two 
models and the results of the non-parametric tests, the next 
section outlines the tests performed to investigate the 
statistical reliability of the two models.
10.2.4 Evaluating the Reliability of the Models
After conducting the analysis and reviewing the results of 
the two regression models, additional tests were carried out 
to investigate the reliability of the equations. The
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reliability of any model is always related to whether the 
basic assumptions of regression analysis have been violated 
or not. Usually, analysis of the residuals is used to look
for any violations in the model.
For the linearity of the independent variables with the 
dependent variable, a plot of the predicted and residual 
values should show no relationship between them. Any pattern 
in the plot could indicate that the linearity assumption has 
been violated. The two models, according to the plots that 
appear in Appendices 14 and 15 show no violation of the 
linearity assumption.
The second assumption of the regression models is 
concerned with the normality of the distribution of the
residuals. The distribution of residuals may not appear to 
be normal for reasons other than actual non-normality, e.g., 
misspecification of the model, nonconsistent variance. 
Therefore, two tests were performed to investigate the
assumption of normality. Firstly, histograms were
constructed for the standardised residuals. The two 
histograms, for the two models, appear in Appendices 14 and 
15. It seems that the normality in the first model is 
slightly better than that for the second model. This result 
was confirmed by looking at the cumulative probability plots 
of the observed and expected residuals. Both plots appear to 
have near straight line results. However, the second plot 
(APPENDIX 15) indicates that there are observed residuals 
above the line more than the first plot (APPENDIX 14).
Finally, outliers can have an impact on the regression 
statistics. Spotting outliers can be achieved by looking at
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the histograms of the residuals (mentioned above) and they 
appear in the interval column and labelled "out". The 
histograms, for both models, indicate no outliers with very 
large positive or negative residuals.
10.3. REVIEW OF THE RESULTS
The resulting statistics of the two models reject the null 
hypotheses concerning the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and foreign turnover percentage, existence of 
share option schemes, directors' equity, the debt to total 
assets ratio, and the leisure industry sector. The strongest 
relationship is between voluntary disclosure and foreign 
turnover percentage with a partial correlation of 0.46 at 
0.0000 level of significance. Geographical diversification, 
which is another measure for foreign involvment, was not 
statistically significant (a summary of the non-parametric 
tests, the first model and the second model appears in TABLE 
10.8)
The second important variable is the existence of share 
option schemes at a 0.0003 level of significance. This 
variable was expected, according to the hypotheses developed 
in the early chapters, to have a positive relationship. 
Also, directors' equity and the debt to total assets ratio 
showed the expected relationships hypothesised in the 
literature.
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TABLE 10.8
Summary Results: Significance of Variables Tested
Variable Tested First Regression Second Regression The Non-parametric
Model Model Statistics
1. Foreign Turnover (FSPER) . . . . . . . . . Yes Yes Yes
2. Share Option Schemes (OPTION) . . . . . . Yes Yes No
3. Number of Employees (EMPL) ....... Yes N/E Yes
4. The Electrical Industry (DY4) . . . . . Yes No Yes
5. Debt to Total Assets Ratio (DEAST) .. Yes Yes No
6. Directors Equity (DIREQ) . . . . . . . . . Yes Yes Yes
7. The Leisure Industry (DY6) . . . . . . . Yes Yes Yes
8. Growth in EPS (DEPS) . . . . . . . . . . . Yes No Mix
9. Geographical Diversification (GDI) .. No No Yes
10. Line of Business Diversification (LOB) . No No Yes
11. Auditing Firm (FIRM) . . . . . . . . . . . No No No
12. Tax Status (TAX) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No No Yes
13. Turnover (TS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N/E Yes Yes
14. The Beers and Wine Industry (DY1) ... No No No
15. The Building Industry (DY2) . . . . . . . No No No
16. The Drapery and Stores Industry (DY3) .. No No No
17. The Food Industry (DY5) . . . . . . . . . No Yes No
18. The Oil and Gas Industry (DY7) . . . . . No No No
N/E: Excluded from the model.
Mix: The tests indicate inconsistent results.
Comparing these results to the results of the non- 
parametric tests applied in the previous chapter, indicates 
the same results for only three of the variables, i.e., 
foreign turnover, directors' equity and the leisure industry 
sector. However, tests of the executive share option schemes 
hypothesis contradicted the non-parameteric tests which 
showed a significant relationship. This hypothesis was 
tested in the regression model using a dummy variable. For 
such categorical variables, one should not eccept the 
resulting regression statistics at their face value as the 
non-parametric tests would be more appropriate (a detailed 
review of the results is provided in the following chapter).
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The other variable that appeared to have a significant 
inverse relationship with voluntary disclosure is the 
leisure industry sector. Companies in this sector seem to 
disclose less information than those in other industries. 
Statistics for this variable in all tests, non-parametric 
and regression, support this result.
For the size hypothesis, the tests indicate that this 
variable is a significant factor in influencing companies to 
disclose information voluntarily. Firstly, size has a 
significant relationship with voluntary disclosure in both 
regression models and the non-parametric tests. In the 
regression models, the two variables used to represent size, 
turnover and number of employees, displayed a significant 
relationship with the dependent variable. The same results 
were supported by the non-parametric tests.
Testing profitability gave conflicting results. It was 
significant when it was in the same equation with the number 
of employees variable representing size. The sign of the 
relationship was a negative one, i.e., there is an inverse 
relationship between size and voluntary disclosure. This 
result is the same as that of the non-parametric tests. When 
profitability was used with turnover, in the second 
regression model, it appeared to have no significant 
relationship with the dependent variable. Other 
profitability measures were used in all stages of the 
analysis, but no significant relationship seemed to exist 
between this variable and voluntary disclosure.
The electrical industry sector, which constitutes the 
largest group of companies in the sample, indicates a
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significant positive relationship in the first regression 
model. It has a partial correlation of 0.203 at the 0.029 
level of significance. The variable's correlation is the 
fourth largest among the seven variables in the group. The 
same result was supported by the non-parametric tests. 
However, this result should be treated with caution. The 
tests might have been influenced by the fact that this 
sector represents a large proportion of the sample.
The final variable that appeared to have a significant 
relationship with voluntary disclosure is the food industry 
variable. It was presented only in the second regression 
model with a -0.21 partial correlation coefficient and a
0.0219 level of significance.
Finally, as the tests of reliability discussed earlier 
indicated that the first regression model is statistically 
more reliable than the second, i.e., having a higher R2, it 
would be more appropriate to give more weight to the first
10.4 SUMMARY
This chapter has explained the process of developing and 
designing the regression models that stated the relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and the hypothesised 
independent or explanatory variables. Firstly, an analysis 
was provided of several measures that could represent the 
independent variables. Attention was given to the problem of 
multicollinearity when choosing the representative 
variables. The problem was avoided, although not completely, 
by devising two regression models representing in them all
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the hypotheses developed earlier in the literature. Size was 
represented by number of employees in the first model, and 
by turnover in the second model.
The main objective of the analysis was to measure the 
relationship between the dependent and the explanatory 
variables, using the OLS technique. No priority was given to 
prediction, per se, and the discussion was concerned solely 
with the partial correlation coefficients between the 
variables. A comparison was also presented between the 
results of the two regression models designed and estimated 
and the results of the non-parametric tests performed and 
described in the previous chapter. The reminder of this 
summary section provides a brief review of the results while 
a detailed discussion of the results and implication of the 
research are presented in the next chapter.
As indicated earlier, the first regression model is 
more reliable statistically than the second model. The R2 
for the first model is 45 per cent (and the adjusted R2 is 
41 per cent), i.e., the variables in the model explains 45 
per cent of the variation in voluntary disclosure of the 
sample companies. The analysis of both models supports the 
hypothesised relationship between levels of voluntary 
disclosure and each of the following economic variables: 
percentage of foreign turnover, size, directors' equity, and 
gearing. Also supported, but the results have to be 
interpreted with caution, is the hypothesis of the 
relationship between the existence of executive share option 
schemes and voluntary disclosure.
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For the profitability hypothesis, both the first 
regression model and the non-parametric tests reject the 
null hypothesis of no relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and profitability. In particular, the tests 
indicate an inverse relationship between profitability and 
levels of voluntary disclosure. As for the second regression 
model, however, its statistics do not reject the null 
hypothesis of no relationship.
Further, the leisure industry sector is found to be a 
significant factor negatively associated with voluntary 
disclosure. The electrical sector, on the other hand, is 
positively associated with voluntary disclosure. As with the 
share option variable, these results have to be looked at 
carefully because dummy varibles were used in the regression 
to express this variable.
Finally, with regard to the other variables, the tests 
do not reject the null hypotheses for the following: line of 
business diversification, geographical diversification, the 
auditing firm, tax status, existence of non-executive 
directors, existence of substantial shareholders and the 
other industry variables.
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CHAPTER
ELEVEN--------------------
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of the statistical tests performed support the 
hypothesised relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
the following: size, foreign turnover percentage,
profitability, existence of share option schemes, directors' 
equity, the debt to total assets ratio, and the leisure 
industry sector. The strongest relationship is between 
voluntary disclosure and foreign turnover percentage. 
Geographical diversification, which is another measure for 
foreign involvement, was not statistically significant. 
Comparing these results to the results of the non-parametric 
tests employed in Chapter 9 indicates similar results for 
only four of the above variables, i.e., foreign turnover 
percentage, directors' equity, the debt total assets ratio, 
and leisure industry. Opposite results, however, were 
indicated for the existence of executive share option 
schemes.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine in some 
detail each hypothesis tested and to analyse the results of 
the statistical tests conducted. Further, the results of 
this research will be compared with previous studies'
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results. Lastly, an attempt will be made to assess the 
policy implications of this research and how it contributes 
to the objective of building the foundation of a theory of 
voluntary disclosure.
11.1 EXPLANATIONS OF THE RESULTS
At first, a methodological issue must be acknowledged: as
the investigation involves what is known as joint hypotheses 
testing, every possible attempt was made to overcome this 
problem. Problems of joint hypotheses testing arise when one 
can not relate the extent of the dependent variable 
association, the voluntary disclosure score in this 
research, with a particular independent variable. There will 
be collinearity between the explanatory variables and 
therefore it is difficult to interpret the results.
Furthermore, the cross-sectional results are consistent 
with both capital market theories (risk reducing theory) and 
theories of the firm (contracting costs theory). 
Unfortunately, the tests are unable to differentiate between 
the two theories. That is, the researcher cannot tell which 
theory, contracting costs or risk reduction, provides a 
better explanation for voluntary financial disclosure. As a 
result, agency theory is given the same theoretical status 
as the decision making theory, i.e., risk reduction theory. 
However, there is no inherent conflict between the two 
theories.
As regards the acceptability of models developed to 
explain voluntary disclosure, Zimmerman (1982) suggests that 
one cannot expect accounting theories to achieve a high 
level of predictive ability, i.e., high R-squares. Not being
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able, he argues, to explain every observation, i.e., not 
having an R-square =1, is insufficient reason to reject a 
model or a theory. For example, the market model in finance 
has proven enormously useful even though it rarely is able 
to explain more than 30% of the variability of individual 
share returns.
Although Zimmerman does not give any reason for his 
suggestion, it might be due to the nature of social sciences 
research (which accounting and finance are branches of), 
which involves studying human behaviour. As human behaviour 
changes and evolves over time, it would be difficult to 
predict this behaviour with a high level of certainty. 
Therefore, one is inclined to accept the validity, although 
partially, of social and economic models with lower levels 
of predictive ability than that of the natural sciences.
11.1.1 Extent of Voluntary Disclosure
As indicated earlier, the results of this research support 
the main hypothesis that USM companies disclose financial 
information voluntarily. In general, the results support the 
positive accounting research properties, i.e., accounting 
practices represented by voluntary disclosure of information 
varies across firms and industries (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986), and to the extent, on average, of 26 per cent of 
what could have been revealed. The amount of information 
disclosed has varied between companies, which is not 
unusual. While this amount seems to be moderate, it is 
difficult to determine whether this amount is sufficient or 
not. Users and the experts on accounting information, e.g., 
independent auditors, have not agreed on what constitutes
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adequate disclosure (Kneer et al, 1985). .pa
Further, the results of this research confirm the 
results of earlier studies (e.g., Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971; Choi, 1972: Firth, 1979; Leslie, 1979; Gray and 
Roberts, 1986). However, all previous research settings were 
different. USM companies are, on average, smaller than those 
companies listed on main markets. Further, the price/earning 
ratios (P/E) for USM companies are higher than those of the 
Main market (Hoare Govett,1988).
One explanation for USM companies' behaviour in 
disclosing information voluntarily could be their need for 
capital. Although USM companies are small in comparison with 
the Main market companies, they indulge in disclosure 
voluntarily because they are, according to Hall and 
Hutchinson (1988) ill-liquid firms with high growth 
potential. This might be the case in spite of the 
proposition that for small companies, the costs of 
disclosure as a percentage of revenues, are likely to be 
higher than those of large firms.
Another and important contributor to the observed 
voluntary disclosure behaviour is a USM-specific feature,
i.e., the directors share in companies' capital. Directors 
of USM companies own a higher share, on average, of their 
companies' equity than their counterparts in the Main 
market. With regard to this variable, it is important to 
note that no other research has, prior to this study, 
included directors' equity in the analysis. This variable 
represents the fundamental constituent of theories of the
322
firm literature, and in particular agency theory. The 
statistics in this research support agency theory hypotheses 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1979, 
1981, 1986) that managers are likely to disclose information 
voluntarily to reduce agency costs which are a function of 
their share in their companies' market value.
A further explanation that applies to the USM and the 
Main market is that suggested by Bryant and Thornton (1981) 
and widely cited in the accounting literature. They argue 
that managers form expectations, assumed to be rational, 
concerning the accounting standards process which depend not 
only on their understanding of the process, but also on 
their ability to influence it through the exposure draft 
process, service on professional committees, or their 
association with public auditing firms that can advocate 
their positions indirectly. Accordingly, companies' managers 
have rational expectations concerning the possibilities of 
introducing new disclosure rules, and therefore, they may 
have decided to disclose the information expected to be 
mandatory or recommended to be disclosed. Recent and current 
debate has focused on recommending companies to disclose, 
for example, segmental information, statements of 
objectives, future plans and prospects, cash flow and 
liquidity and foreign currency information (The Corporate 
Report, 1975; Dept of Trade, 1976; Jeuda, 1980; ASC, 1979; 
ICAS, 1988).
Risk reduction and agency theory interpretations 
presented so far, however, do not contradict what Thomas 
(1983) refers to as contingency theory. Thomas postulates
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that certain disclosure practices in corporate reporting may 
be contingent upon each company's attributes and conditions 
(what agency theory calls or refers to as underlying 
economic conditions) of the reporting entity. For this 
research, these conditions can be represented by the high 
P/E ratio these companies have in comparison with that of 
the Main market (Hoare Govett, 1989). Accordingly, one could 
conclude that USM companies use voluntary disclosure to 
signal information concerning their performance and expected 
performance and growth so as to influence the market's 
assessment of the value of their shares.
As the above analysis has focused on the main 
hypothesis of this research, the next sections extend the 
analysis and elaborate on each one of the hypotheses 
developed earlier.
11.1.2 Size
The results of all tests conducted in this research support 
the notion that large USM companies are likely to disclose 
more information voluntarily than are small USM companies 
(bearing in mind that USM companies are in general smaller 
than the Main market companies). This result is comparable 
with most previous studies (Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and Desai, 
1971; Choi, Firth, 1979; Leslie, 1979; Atiase, 1985). The 
degree of association, however, and level of significance 
have varied according to what financial variable was chosen 
to represent this hypothesis with number of employees and 
sales turnover being the most highly correlated measures 
with voluntary disclosure.
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An explanation of the policy of voluntary disclosure by 
large companies is that it can be viewed as a consequence of 
their need for outside capital to finance their increasing 
demand for funds (Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 
1979, 1981, 1986). Therefore, to attract investors to
finance their capital needs, large companies disclose more 
information than small companies.
A further two factors are likely to cause such 
differences in voluntary disclosure between small and large 
companies. Firstly, the costs of disclosure, e.g., 
competitive disadvantage and cost of production, are 
relatively higher (as a percentage of revenues) for small 
companies than large companies (Firth, 1979). For example, 
small companies may feel that additional disclosure of their 
affairs will put them at a competitive disadvantage to large 
firms (Buzby, 1974) . In addition, the fact that large 
companies have more information to disclose because they 
have larger volume and more variety of activities means 
that it is likely that such companies disclose more 
information than small companies.
11.1.3 Gearing
The empirical investigation of this research supports very 
moderately the hypothesis that gearing is associated 
positively with disclosure of information. This result is in 
line with what has been suggested in the literature and 
based on the premise that gearing is an important 
determinant of companies equity risk (Ben-Zion and Shalit, 
1975). The more highly leveraged (geared) a financial 
structure, the greater the risk to shareholders (Rosenberg
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and Marathe, 1975).
Signalling theory postulates that increased disclosure 
of information is likely to signal to markets the quality 
of a firm's shares which is expected to reduce investors' 
uncertainty concerning the shares (Stiglitz, 1971; Penman, 
1978; Patell, 1979). The agency theory literature, however,
substitutes this reduction in uncertainty with the reduction 
in agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986).
The moderate result of this hypothesis differ from the
significant results of the empirical tests of Gray and
Roberts (1986). This may be due to the variable used to 
represent gearing. In Gray and Roberts, the debt to equity 
ratio was employed to measure gearing while the debt to 
total assets was used in this research. In addition, the 
difference in the r^esults might be due to the fact that the 
USM companies' gearing ratio is, on average, less than the 
gearing ratio of the Main market which was the research 
setting of the other studies (ICC, 1989).
The moderate relationship arrived at in this research 
could be explained by agency theory and a comment by
Schipper (1981). According to agency theory, a debtholders- 
shareholders conflict arises because the holders of fixed 
claims anticipate that shareholders will attempt to 
appropriate those claims by, for example, paying large 
dividends or issuing more senior debt. Schipper (1981) 
suggests that this conflict could best be solved by explicit 
contracts between the two groups rather than by increased 
disclosure. Therefore, one would not necessarily expect a
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clear relationship between gearing and voluntary disclosure.
11.1.4 Profitability
As indicated earlier testing profitability represented by 
growth in earnings per share (EPS) gave conflicting and 
inconclusive results. Voluntary disclosure was negatively 
related to profitability only in the first regression model. 
However, profitability was not a significant factor in the 
second regression model. In addition, the non-parametric 
tests for the profitability measures, growth in EPS, 
trading profit, trading profit to turnover, trading profit 
to assets, net profit to turnover and net profit to assets, 
the tests, also, did not support the hypothesised 
relationship.
Further, the results of this research with regard to 
profitability are inconsistent with the results of previous 
research (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Gray and Roberts, 1986). 
The inconclusive and inconsistent results could be due to 
the settings of the investigations and in particular to USM 
companies' attributes. An important characteristic that is 
related to profitability is growth in share prices. As 
indicated earlier, the USM provided some 81% growth in 
share prices in 1986/87 against around 54% for the All-Share 
index (Govett, 1989). Accordingly, one could argue that 
profitable USM companies do not see any need to signal their 
growth and profitability if the market already perceive them 
as profitable.
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11.1.5 Diversification
Three measures were used in the analysis to represent firm's 
diversification: an index for product diversification (LOB), 
an index for geographical diversification (GDI), and foreign 
turnover as a percentage total revenues (FSPER). The 
regression analysis showed only FSPER as having the expected 
positive association with voluntary financial disclosure.
A possible explanation for the insignificant
relationship between LOB and voluntary disclosure is that 
most USM companies specialised in a few products, i.e., 
LOB's mean is 1.490. Therefore, this variable is not a 
significant contributory factor to the cross-sectional 
variance in voluntary disclosure. This explanation could 
also be applied to geographical diversification (GDI's mean 
is 1.376).
For foreign turnover, the reason that why companies 
disclose information voluntarily may be that firms operating 
in more than one country require a relatively large volume 
of internal data (such as forecast, performance, and foreign 
currency information) in order to keep management informed 
with regard the foreign operations. The existence of this 
type of data for internal use may lower the cost of 
supplying it to the public (Buzby, 1974).
Finally, the fact that companies with foreign 
operations have larger amount of activities than companies 
without or with less foreign operations, they are expected 
to have more information available at their disposal, and 
accordingly, would disclose more information voluntarily.
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As for the conflicting results between the percentage 
of foreign turnover and the geographical diversification 
hypotheses, the likely possible cause of this inconsistency 
is the method used in calculating the percentage of foreign 
turnover and the geographical diversification index. While 
both variables represent geographical diversification of 
companies' activities, one would expect a significant 
correlation between them. However, according to the 
Correlation Matrix in APPENDIX 10, there is no significant 
relationship between the two variables. Therefore, the only 
possible reason for the discrepancy in the statistical 
results is the method of calculating the two independent 
variables.
11.1.6 Directors' Shareholdings
All tests performed point to a negative association between 
directors' share in equity and voluntary disclosure of 
information. These results confirm one of the major premises 
of contracting costs theories, i.e., management disclose 
information voluntarily to reduce agency costs which are a 
function of management's share in equity, which therefore 
maximises its utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986).
Two particular explanations of the results, also 
related to agency theory, are outlined here. The first 
motive for voluntary disclosure can be attributed to the 
fact that companies with a small management share in their 
equity make more extensive use of the securities market for 
external financing of their operations than companies with 
a larger management share. Companies with a large management
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share are likely to rely on managers' own wealth to avoid 
relinquishing control to outside parties.
Accordingly, as financial markets rely on and demand 
information, companies are likely to find it difficult to 
resist supplying information to the markets. The main 
objective of management in such situations is to obtain 
investors, raise their confidence in the company and secure 
their continuous support.
Secondly, one can compare the extent of directors' 
equity to listing status. As it was shown that listing 
status is associated with voluntary disclosure (Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971; Firth, 1979), one could argue that the smaller 
the directors' equity, the more likely that management 
consider the firm to be a public company with the 
responsibility of satisfying the public and the financial 
press in its demand for information.
11.1.7 Substantial Shareholdings
The tests carried out do not support the hypothesised 
relationship between the existence of substantial 
shareholders and the voluntary disclosure of information. 
As for gearing, one could use the same argument to interpret 
this result. Shareholders with significant stakes are likely 
to rely on private contracts between companies and such 
shareholders without resorting to public voluntary 
disclosure (Schipper, 1981).
11.1.8 Executive Share Option Schemes
This hypothesis is based on the proposition that 
managers, shareholders, and debtholders voluntarily enter
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monitoring and bonding contracts to reduce agency costs and 
therefore maximise each group's wealth. For example, Watts 
(1977) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986) discuss how management 
compensation tied to accounting profits can reduce the 
manager/firm-owner interest conflict. Share option schemes 
represents another type of arrangement and their existence 
may also indicate an attempt to reduce any significant 
conflict of interest.
The regression analysis performed suggests that share 
option schemes, represented by a dummy variable, is the 
second significant factor positively influencing voluntary 
disclosure. However, the non-parametric tests do not support 
the hypothesised relationship. As indicated before, using 
dummy variables in regression analysis is acceptable but 
should be interpreted with caution. Therefore, one should 
give more weight to the non-parametric tests than the 
regression modelling.
11.1.9 The Auditing Firm
According to the statistics, the auditing firm variable is 
not significant in determining the amount of information 
voluntarily disclosed by USM companies. The results of 
previous studies, however, are inconsistent. Firth's
(1979) results, for example, are consistent with the results 
of this research, while Singhvi and Desai (1971) support the 
notion of a positive relationship between auditing firm 
classification and voluntary disclosure.
One likely reason for the conflicting results is the 
time factor. The Singhvi and Desai study was conducted at a
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time when the Big Eight auditing firms were notably 
recognised and distinguished from the other auditing firms. 
However, since the late seventies many other firms have also 
evolved and become prominent. The results of Firth (1979) 
and this research might have been influenced by the emerging 
new conditions.
Another reason that may also explain the results 
relating to this variable is the increase in the general 
levels of disclosure and regulation. This new climate might 
have encouraged the other auditing firms to persuade their 
clients to disclose more information. Accordingly, the 
statistics for this variable do not lend support to 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no relationship between the 
auditing firm and voluntary disclosure.
11.1.10 The Industrial Sector
Testing the influence of the industrial sector on voluntary 
disclosure indicates, according to the non-parametric 
tests, that this variable is a significant factor with the 
electrical and leisure sectors being the most significant 
sectors.
For the regression analysis, a dummy variable was used 
in the models to represent the industrial sector. According 
to the analysis, the electrical sector is significant with a 
positive sign, similar to the non-parametric test, and the 
leisure sector is significant with a negative sign.
When evaluating these results, two points should be 
considered. Firstly, as the electrical sector constitutes a 
large part of the sample, one is likely to see a biased
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results toward this sector. Secondly, as both regression 
testing and the non-parametric tests show similar results, 
one should accept the results of this hypothesis with 
confidence.
11.1.11 Tax Status
According to this hypothesis, "close companies" are assumed 
to be closely controlled by directors and therefore will 
disclose less information voluntarily than those that are 
not close companies. This variable was expected to have the 
same effect as directors' equity. However, only the non- 
parametric tests showed this variable as a significant 
factor in influencing the voluntary disclosure of 
information.
The regression analysis, though, does not show this 
variable, expressed as a dummy variable, to be significant. 
Using dummy variables in the analysis might have influenced 
the results, and, accordingly, the results should be 
interpreted carefully. For categorical data, non-parametric 
statistics are assumed to be more powerful.
11.1.12 Non-Executive Directors
This hypothesis tests whether the existence of non-executive 
directors has a relationship with USM companies' voluntary 
disclosure behaviour. It was hypothesised that non-executive 
directors, representing a distinguished independent force, 
would encourage management (the executive directors) to 
disclose information voluntarily.
The statistics of all the tests performed indicate that 
non-executive directors have association with firms'
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behaviour in disclosing information. It appears that such 
directors role is limited to operational and advisory 
functions and not extended to policy issues of an accounting 
nature.
11.2 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
The implications of this research can be classified into two 
groups: theoretical and policy implications. Firstly, this
research is expected to contribute to the development of the 
economic theory of the firm. In particular, the evidence 
supports the notion that firms with different economic 
characteristics employ different accounting practices, i.e., 
the amount of information disclosed voluntarily varied 
according to firms' specific economic characteristics.
Further, as positive research results accumulate (including 
this research) one becomes more knowledgeable about how 
economic agents function, and therefore, this knowledge can 
be used as a reference for normative issues, i.e., matters 
involving prescribing the appropriate accounting 
pronouncements. This is concerned with the broader issue of 
"the objectives of accounting" or better known as 
"conceptual frameworks" (Peasnell, 1982). Where answers to 
the normative questions always depend on the choice of the 
criterion or objective function which is a matter of values, 
answers to positive questions, on the other hand, involve 
discovery of some aspect of how economic agents behave.
11.2.1 Policy Implications
The second contribution of this research stems from its 
potential policy implications. One policy model for
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accounting regulation suggested in the literature is known 
as the empirical approach (Buckley, 1980). Solomons (1980, 
1986) elaborates on this issue and argue that "empirical 
research can throw light on how decisions are presently made 
and what information is used to make them. It can throw 
light on the impact of an accounting standard on business 
behaviour and therefore, by implication, on the probable 
effect on behaviour of a standard that has not yet been 
issued. It can provide information about the opinions that 
various interest groups hold about actual or potential 
standards" (Solomons, 1980, p 7).
Understanding the behaviour of companies is what 
advocates of "positive theory of accounting standard 
setting" call for (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1979, 1986).
For example, they illustrate how their suggested model of 
positive theory is capable of predicting which type of firms 
would be in favour of general price level adjustments and 
which would be against.
The analysis and evidence in this research have direct 
implications for studies of accounting regulations. 
According to the results, one could expect that without 
externally imposed accounting requirements, managers, 
shareholders, and debtholders will include accounting 
procedures, i.e., disclosure of information, as part of 
their monitoring/bonding contracts.
However, it is crucial to stress that this research is 
not intended to determine the appropriateness of any 
particular policy model for disclosure of information
3 3 5
(voluntary versus mandatory). This issue is outwith the 
purpose of the research.
If policymakers of financial reporting and disclosure 
are to formulate effective rules, it would seem important 
for them to monitor existing practices so as to improve 
their understanding of the environment in which disclosure 
operates. Policymakers ignoring the evidence from current 
practices and considering further regulations are likely to 
neglect important costs and benefits arising from the 
existing market mechanisms.
As for this research, awareness of companies' 
behaviour would help in evaluating two important issues in 
standard setting: acceptability and comparability.
11.2.1.1 Acceptability
An examination of firms' behaviour indicates the extent to 
which a potential disclosure rule is likely to be acceptable 
(Solomons, 1986). Solomons cites the incident when the ICAEW 
members, which is one related party to any new standard, 
rejected the mandatory system of current cost accounting 
because the new system was not acceptable to the members 
(also cited in Peasnell, 1982).
In addition, if a rule proves unacceptable to the 
concerned parties, and it is sanctioned, because such a rule 
may have an impact on a firm's investment and financing 
decisions, compliance with the rule is unlikely (Leftwich, 
1980). An example of introducing unacceptable accounting 
rules is presented in Perks (1983). He shows that compliance 
with SSAPs, in general, was inadequate and suggests that the
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reason was the unacceptability of standards.
For example, the results of this research indicated 
that a large number of companies in the sample (84.4%) 
revealed their future plans and strategies. However, 
disclosing quantitative prospects does not seem to be 
acceptable for the sample companies with only 7.5% of the 
sample disclosing such information.
11.2.1.2 Comparability
The value of the information provided by each company to its 
shareholders is greatly enhanced if it can be compared 
easily with information from other companies (Solomons, 
1986). Knowledge of current practices, as this research can 
accomplish, is likely to help in pin-pointing the items that 
most companies are expected to disclose when a new rule is 
introduced and therefore make the information published by 
companies comparable.
Segmental information, for example, has been suggested 
to be of utmost importance to investors so they can assess a 
company's extent of diversification and compare it with 
other companies. The evidence in this research suggests that 
92 companies (75 per cent) have revealed some type of 
information regarding their line of business segments. 
Geographical segments information, in addtion, is disclosed 
by 111 companies (91 per cent). Therefore, this evidence 
reflects the existence of a high level of comparability 
between USM companies with regard to the information 
available concerning segmental operations.
In summary, this kind of research is often a starting
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point for policymaking because it catalogues the practices 
currently available and the extent of corporate acceptance 
of these practices.
11.2.2 Improving Annual Reports
The debate over improving annual reports and their contents 
in the U.K. has been continuous for a long period of time. 
Two important attempts to address this issue are relevant to 
this research and warrant discussing. The Corporate Report 
(1975), although it might be considered as out-of-date, 
recommended improving companies annual reports by widening 
their contents to include information concerning the 
following: (1) value added statement (2) employment
conditions report (3) foreign currency information (4) 
statement of objectives (5) prospects information (6) 
segmental information.
Thirteen years later, another study, Making Corporate 
Reports Valuable (ICAS, 1988), recommended improvements in 
company annual reports to include a variety of information, 
some of it suggested by the early The Corporate Report, 
e.g., statements of objectives and information on company 
prospects. The evidence from this research suggests that 
some of the information is already disclosed by the sample 
under study, e.g., segmental information, statements of 
objectives, and prospects information.
This research can assist in pointing the issues where 
companies are likely to co-operate and disclose the 
suggested information if a new disclosure rule is 
introduced. By comparing the results of this research with
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what is recommended by The Corporate Report (1975) and ICAS 
(1988) one can speculate the extent to which companies will 
agree with the recommendations, and which companies are most 
likely to support or oppose the implementation of a given 
proposal. In particular, levels of disclosure for any item 
should provide indications of whether to ask companies to 
disclose such item or not.
Before describing the implications, it is important to 
note that in reaching the conclusions of this section, it is 
assumed that most of the non-disclosed information is 
available for companies for internal use. In addition, it 
has been assumed that companies operate according to the 
rational expectations model, i.e., they are not likely to 
disclose information voluntarily unless they believe that 
disclosing the information is benefiting them.
According to the results of this research, it is 
expected that firms will tend to oppose introducing new 
disclosure standard or rule where the average voluntary 
disclosure score for this item is low, e.g., employee 
information, value added information, and current cost 
information. In contrast, requesting oil and gas companies 
to disclose information regarding their reserves is not 
likely to be opposed as they already disclose such 
information.
Further, knowing which companies disclose and which do 
not could be used by accounting regulatory bodies and other 
accounting policymakers to predict how corporations would 
react to proposed changes and allow these bodies to 
concentrate their efforts and target the firms who do not
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disclose. For example, and based on the results of this 
research, the following types of companies are liklely 
to oppose further disclosure of information:
1) small companies;
2) companies with large directors equity;
3) highly geared companies;
4) low profitability companies; or
5) companies with few foreign activities.
A final note and an important observation is that any 
new disclosure rule should consider, besides investor 
protection, the impact it may have on the ability of small 
business to raise capital. Do sophisticated investors have 
interests in small companies? Suggestions for increasing 
disclosure are based on the argument that investors (broadly 
defined to include current and prospective investors) need 
the information for their decision-making process. The 
results of this research indicate that companies are likely 
to disclose information if they believe that the information 
is of benefit to them and provided that the costs of 
disclosure do not exceed the benefits.
11.3 SUMMARY
This chapter has analysed and reviewed the empirical 
evidence produced by this research. The evidence supports 
the main hypothesis that USM companies disclose information 
voluntarily and by different quantities. The results are 
incapable of differentiating as to which theory, agency 
theory or risk reduction theory, provides a better 
explanation of voluntary disclosure.
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As regards theories of corporate reporting and 
disclosure, researchers must be prepared to question general 
theories. In spite of the pressure for increased disclosure 
and uniform accounting standards, there is increasing 
evidence and support for the idea that different companies 
have different economic characteristics which give rise to 
different accounting practices, e.g., disclosure of 
information voluntarily.
In this chapter, explanations were presented for firms' 
behaviour in disclosing information voluntarily, e.g., the 
need for capital and level of directors equity. A 
discussion, also, was presented for each of the hypotheses 
tested and suggested explanations were given.
Further, knowledge of existing practice is necessary to 
determine how firms will react to changes in the standard- 
making process. Unless management's motives are understood, 
compliance with new disclosure rules is in doubt. Based on 
this assumption, the research implications on policymakers 
were reviewed. In particular, if the regulatory bodies 
decide to mandate an increase in the amount of information 
disclosed, they are likely to encounter resistance from the 
small highly geared companies. Further opposition is 
likely to come from companies managed by owners with 
considerable shareholdings.
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CHAPTER
TWELVE  --------------------
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
12.1 RESEARCH PURPOSE
The purpose of this research has been to investigate and 
explore the financial reporting practices of the Unlisted 
Securities Market (USM) companies. In particular, the aim
has been to examine the extent to which voluntary disclosure
occurs and the associations between voluntary disclosure and 
some of firm's financial and non-financial attributes. These 
attributes have been suggested and hypothesised by the
accounting literature, i.e., capital market theories and
theories of the firm, to effect the extent of voluntary 
disclosure.
12.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To test the hypotheses developed from the relevant 
literature, a sample of 122 USM companies was selected from 
8 industries: Beers and Wines, Building and Timber, Drapery 
and Stores, Electricals, Food and Groceries, Leisure, Paper 
and Printing, and Oil and Gas.
Suitable variables, mainly financial measures, were
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also chosen to represent the hypotheses. To measure 
voluntary disclosure which is the dependent variable in this 
research, a disclosure index was devised to include items 
presumed to be relevant to investors. The annual reports of 
the companies were used to extract the relevant disclosure 
items and the independent explanatory variables.
To investigate the hypothesised relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and the independent variables, two 
statistical approaches have been followed. Firstly, non- 
parametric tests were employed to examine each hypothesis 
individually and to help select the appropriate measure to 
represent each variable in the second advanced set of tests. 
Thereafter, two alternative regression models were designed 
and fitted to express the hypothesised relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and the chosen independent measures. 
Attention was given to the problem of multicollinearity 
among the independent variables. The OLS regression 
technique was employed in conducting the analysis and 
estimating the variables' coefficients.
12.3 RESEARCH RESULTS
The conclusion of this study is that voluntary disclosure 
does occur and varies according to firms' characteristics. 
Further, voluntary disclosure occurs for every company 
sampled.
The results point to a substantial variation in the 
quantity of information disclosed by the companies in the 
sample. Firstly, there is a positive association between 
size of companies, using the criteria of number of
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employees, and total turnover to represent size, and the 
amount of financial information disclosed, although the 
significance of the results varied among the measures of 
size. This result supports most of the previous empirical 
research (e.g., Buzby, 1974; Gray and Roberts, 1986).
Another important result is the association between 
directors' shareholdings and the amount of voluntary 
disclosure. All the tests performed confirm each other and 
show that the percentage of directors' shareholdings has an 
inverse relationship with levels of voluntary disclosure. 
This supports one of the agency theory propositions that 
disclosure of information is used by managers to reduce 
agency costs, especially where the outsiders share in the 
capital increases. A related variable examined was the 
existence of executive share option schemes in the company. 
When using regression analysis, this variable indicated a 
significant relationship with voluntary disclosure. The non- 
parametric tests, however, showed no such relationship.
The percentage of foreign turnover, which represents 
the foreign involvement of firms, was found to have a 
positive relationship with voluntary disclosure. This 
variable has the highest correlation among the explanatory 
variables. When using the geographical index to measure 
diversity, the regression results, however, do not support 
the hypothesis that there is a relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and diversity. The Kruskal-Wallis non- 
parametric test, however, indicates a positive relationship. 
Line of business diversification showed the same 
discrepancy.
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Gearing, measured by the ratio of debt to total assets,
was also significantly associated, but to a lesser extent,
with voluntary information disclosure. With a higher debt 
ratio, management might perceive that more information is 
needed to reduce the risk attached to the firm's securities. 
Also, according to agency theory, higher levels of debt will 
increase agency costs, and as a result management will
disclose information to alleviate debtholders fears.
The last variable that had a significant relationship 
with voluntary disclosure was the industry sector. Two 
industrial sectors were found to have a relationship with 
voluntary disclosure. The electricals industry sector has a 
positive relationship, while the leisure sector has an
inverse relationship.
In addition, the statistics indicate that profitability 
represented by growth in earnings per share has an inverse 
relationship with voluntary disclosure. One explanation for 
this result is that profitable companies are sensitive to 
disclosing information that might help their competitors. 
Also, less profitable firms might be trying, through 
disclosure, to justify their poor performance.
One variable that was examined and indicated 
conflicting results was the existence of share option 
schemes. It was expected that this variable would have a 
positive relationship with voluntary disclosure. When this 
variable was tested in the regression by using a dummy 
variable to represent it, the statistics show that a high 
correlation exists between the existence of share option
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schemes and voluntary disclosure. However, the non- 
parametric tests do not support this conclusion and do not 
reject the null hypothesis of no relationship. Therefore, 
one should be cautious in interpreting the results of this 
variable.
The other variables tested did not display acceptable 
uniformity in the tests applied. For example, tax status was 
significant in one of the non-parametric tests. But when 
applying other tests, and in particular the regression test, 
tax status was not significant.
The type of auditing firm, whether it is one of the 
Big Eight or not, was not significantly associated with 
voluntarily information disclosure. This result contradicts 
several previous studies. One explanation would be that the 
big auditing firms are not exerting sufficient pressure on 
their clients or because the other firms are evolving and 
attaining the same status as the Big Eight firms.
Furthermore, statistical tests of the variables 
representing the existence of non-executives on the Boards 
of Directors and the existence of substantial shareholdings 
indicated no support to the hypothesised relationship 
between them and voluntary disclosure.
12.4 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
Firstly, the research is expected to contribute to the 
advancement of the economic theory of the firm, and in 
particular, to companies' motivations to disclose 
information voluntarily. The evidence supports the notion
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that different companies have different characteristics that 
lead to different accounting practices.
Further, for practical implications, acknowledging and 
understanding companies' behaviour is expected to provide 
policymakers with relevant information and assist them in 
formulating their policies. In particular, awareness of the 
existing accounting practices is likely to be beneficial in 
assessing the extent of acceptability and comparability of 
any proposed or potential disclosure standard.
According to the evidence of this research, it is 
expected that firms with the following characteristics are 
likely to oppose any new rule that would require them to 
disclose additional information:
1) small companies;
2) companies with a large percentage of directors equity;
3) highly geared companies;
4) low profitability companies; or
5) companies with few foreign activities.
12.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
The first limitation of this study is that it did not 
measure disclosure quality, that is, the amount of specific 
information content that a disclosure has (described more 
fully in Chapter 7). The research has assumed, for 
methodological reasons, that each disclosure of a specific 
item has the same information content. No available 
technology is capable of measuring the quality of the 
disclosure item. The difficulty arises because information 
content is dependent on each companies' distinctive 
conditions.
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The setting of the research is limited to specified 
industry sectors of the Unlisted Securities Market. The 
sample is a very limited group of companies. Therefore, one 
must be very careful in generalising the results.
Lastly, the analyses in this research have relied on 
statistical techniques. At all times, care was taken to use 
the appropriate tests. In order to overcome the limitations 
of a single technique, more than one test was applied to 
investigate the same variable, starting from simple 
procedures and progressing to more advanced tests. However, 
in some cases, contradictory results were concluded for the 
same variable, and in particular for two important 
situations.
When testing the relationship between diversity, 
represented by both line of business diversification and 
geographical diversification, the non-parametric tests 
indicated a positive relationship while the regression 
models did not include the two variables in the equations. 
Although OLS models use all the information available in the 
data set, and the non-parametric tests relax some of 
conditions concerning the data, the results of both tests 
have to be interpreted with caution.
The other hypothesis that must be interpreted with 
caution is the existence of executive share option schemes. 
When it was tested in the regression model, including it as 
a dummy variable, it had the second highest correlation 
coefficient. However, in the non-parametric tests, the 
results indicated that the variable had no statistically
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significant relationship with voluntary disclosure. In 
testing this kind of hypothesis, the problem of
investigating mixed variables (categorical and continuous) 
arises.
12.6 FUTURE RESEARCH
All the variables used in this research represent one period 
of time, except one variable used to measure growth in 
profitability. To understand any phenomenon, beside 
examining a cross-sectional variation, one needs also to 
observe it over a period of time so as to explain any 
changes that might have occurred.
For the tests performed, rather crude variable 
measures were used in the analysis, e.g., a zero-one dummy 
variable for the existence of share option schemes. 
Therefore, more refined tests need to be explored to capture 
the precise effect of such variables. Further, other 
measures for political costs needed to be developed. 
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) suggest that size does not 
represent fairly this variable.
As this research has concentrated on the USM, which is 
one segment of the capital market, future research should 
investigate other segments of the capital market, especially 
the newly emerging third-tier stockmarket.
The variables in this research and in most empirical 
studies are assumed to represent the behaviour of people, or 
the management. This is an act of approximation of behaviour 
and has many shortcomings. The argument supporting this
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contention is that these variables are a product of the 
interaction between the organisation, including the people 
inside, and the outsiders. The only method of investigation 
that would capture the real motives is by being one of the 
team. Interviews or questionnaires are helpful, but they do 
not reveal hidden motives. However, the methodology followed 
and the variables used in this research are assumed to 
measure and represent the actual motives of voluntary 
disclosure.
Since policymakers presumably are concerned with social 
welfare, they would be interested in including the social 
dimension in the analysis of information and voluntary 
disclosure. In future research, the scope of investigations 
should expand beyond the tri-party analysis, i.e., 
management-shareholders-debtholders. For example, relatively 
little effort has been directed at explaining the behaviour 
of the other parties in the standard setting process 
(auditors, regulators, analysts, etc.). Research in this 
subject is partially conditional on developing theories of 
the decision process of auditors and regulators , however, 
the economic theories of partnerships (e.g., audit firms) 
and the political process are less developed than theories 
of the firm.
Basic research is also needed as to in principal 
users' perceptions, e.g., perceptions of credit investment 
analysts, of what is considered adequate disclosure.
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APPENDIX 1
The Development of Statutory Regulation 
of Accounting Disclosure
Companies Acts Principal Provisions Objectives
1900 CA
1908 CA
1929 CA
1948 CA
1967 CA
1976 CA
1980 CA
Compulsory audit
Accounts of public 
companies to be 
filed with registrar
-Increased accounting 
regulations; profit 
statement required, 
though unaudited
-Details on assets 
and valuation; 
balance sheet to be 
"true and correct"
-Balance sheet and 
profit and loss 
account to be true 
and fair
-Detailed provisions 
on content of 
accounts established
-Group accounts 
required
Additional disclosure 
requirements
-Accounting reference 
periods
-Accounting records
Public companies 
defined
Separation of
management
from shareholdings
Public access to 
information given 
changing nature of 
companies
-Concern over secret 
reserves
-Measurement of 
performance over time 
recognised as 
important as well as
periodic valuation for 
stewardship
-Appraisal of 
investment performance
-Truth and fairness of 
overall picture rather 
than numerical 
accuracy
-Extending disclosure
Increasing disclosure 
of information
Clarification of 
existing statutes
EEC Second Directive
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1981 CA
1985 CA
Source:
•Specified format 
for accounts
■Compliance with 
requirements of EEC 
Fourth Directive
■Included accounting 
principles in law
■Overriding importance 
of "true and fair 
reasserted
-Classification of 
Companies
■Extended disclosure 
requirements
Consolidating 
1948-81 CAs
Consolidation of 
various statutes
Taylor & Truley (1986) pp 44-45.
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APPENDIX 2
Statements of Standard Accounting Practice
SSAP 1: Accounting for associated companies. Requires the
use of the equity method of accounting for associated 
companies. The revised standard uses the concept of 
"significant influence" to define associated company status, 
as opposed to the holding of between 20 per cent and 50 per 
cent of the equity voting rights used in the original 
standard.
SSAP 2: Disclosure of accounting policies. The basic
requirement laid down in this statement is that there should 
be disclosure in the accounts of the accounting policies 
followed for dealing with items "judged" material or 
critical in determining profit or loss for the year and in 
stating the financial position. The explanations given 
should be "clear, fair and as brief as possible". There is 
also a requirement that where the accounts are based on 
assumptions which depart from the four fundamental concepts 
(going concern, accruals, consistency, and prudency) the 
fact should be explained. It follows that, unless there is a 
clear statement to the contrary, there is a presumption that 
the four fundamental concepts have been observed.
SSAP 3: Earning per share. Only does it apply to Stock
Exchange listed companies. Earning per shares are required 
to be disclosed on the "net" basis for both the current and 
the previous period. A possibility of future dilution of 
earnings may arise in the following circumstances:
(a) where the company has issued a separate class of
equity shares which do not rank for dividend in the
period under review but will do so in the future.
(b) where the company has issued loans or preference 
shares convertible into equity of the company.
(c) where options to subscribe for equity share have 
been granted.
SSAP 4: The accounting treatment of government grants. This 
standard requires that revenue-based grants should be 
credited to revenue in the same period as the expenditure to 
which they relate is charged. For this the standard 
identifies two ways:
(a) by reducing the cost of acquisition of the asset by
the amount of the grant, or
(b) by treating the amount of the grant as a deferred 
credit and transferring a portion to revenue in each 
period of the asset's expected useful life.
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SSAP 5: Accounting for value added tax. SSAP 5 requires that 
VAT on taxable outputs should be eliminated from the 
turnover in the profit and loss account. Irrecoverable VAT 
on purchases must be incorporated in the cost of the related 
item.
SSAP 6: Extraordinary items and prior year adjustments. The 
standard firstly defines the extraordinary items and 
distinguish them from prior year adjustments. It requires 
that the accounts should show: profit before extraordinary
items, extraordinary items, and profit after extraordinary 
items. Attributable taxation on extraordinary items should 
be excluded. For prior year adjustments, it is required to 
show them in a separate statement from the profit and loss 
account.
SSAP 8: The treatment of taxation under the imputation
system in the accounts of companies. It is required to 
disclose separately UK corporation tax and overseas 
taxation. UK taxation must be split between tax on income of 
the year, investment income, and the relief on overseas 
taxation.
SSAP 9: Stock and work in progress. According to this
standard, the valuation of stocks and work in progress 
should be at the lower of cost or net realisable value and 
analysed by main categories. Long-term contract work in 
progress to be valued at cost plus attributable profit less 
foreseeable losses and progress payments.
SSAP 10: Statements of source and application of funds. Only 
companies with annual turnover of at least £25,000 should 
comply with this standard. It requires that a statement of 
sources and application of funds should be prepared and 
include the effect of profit, dividends, share issues and 
loans, acquisitions and disposals of fixed assets, and 
changes in working movements in net liquid funds.
SSAP 12: Accounting for depreciation. The statement gives no 
guidance on the depreciation methods to be used, but it 
requires that methods should be appropriate to the types of 
assets. It also requires that a provision be made for 
depreciation on all "fixed assets having a finite useful 
economic life". The following must be disclosed in respect 
of each major class of depreciable asset: the depreciation
methods used, the useful life or the depreciation rates 
used, total depreciation allocated for the period, and the 
gross amount of depreciable assets and the related 
accumulated depreciation.
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SSAP 13: Accounting for research and development. Requires 
that all expenditure on research be written off in the year 
that it is incurred. Development expenditure should also be 
written off in the year that it is incurred, except that it 
may be deferred to future periods on certain conditions 
specified by the statement.
SSAP 14: Group accounts. The statement is based on the view 
that consolidated accounts will normally be the best way to 
give a true and fair view of the results and state of 
affairs of the group. It specifies the rules governing the 
preparation of the accounts, the conditions of exclusion 
subsidiaries, and treatment of minority interests.
SSAP 15: Accounting for deferred taxation. The liability
method is required to be followed in computing the deferred 
taxation arising from timing differences between accounting 
profit and taxable profit.
SSAP 16: Current cost accounting. The compliance with this
statement is no longer mandatory. It was mandatory for 
listed companies and other large firms.
SSAP 17: Accounting for post balance sheet events. SSAP 17 
is based on the principle that the accounts must be prepared 
on the basis of conditions existing at the balance sheet 
date. It distinguishes between adjusting events and non­
adjusting events and the conditions under which to disclose 
such events in the annual report and accounts.
SSAP 18: Accounting for contingencies. It requires that a
provision should be made for a material contingent loss 
where firstly, it is probable that a future event will 
confirm the loss, and secondly where the loss can be 
estimated with reasonable accuracy at the date when the 
account are formally approved by the directors. Provision 
should be made in respect of any contingent gain. Where no 
provision is made for a material contingent loss, full 
disclosure should be unless the possibility of loss is 
remote. Disclosure should only be made in respect of a 
contingent gain where it is probable that the gain will be 
realised.
SSAP 19: Accounting for investment properties. The main
feature of this statement is that investment properties 
should be included in the balance sheet at their open market 
value and should not be depreciated. Depreciation is only 
required where a property is held as a lease.
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SSAP 20: Foreign currency translation. Firstly, for
individual companies exchange gains and losses should be 
reported in the profit and loss account. For consolidated 
statements, however, any exchange differences should be 
recorded as a movement on reserves.
SSAP 21: Accounting for leases and hire purchase agreements. 
This standard distinguishes between operating leases and 
finance leases. It requires detailed disclosure of lease 
transactions by both lessors and lessees.
SSAP 22: Accounting for goodwill. SSAP 22 states that non­
purchased goodwill should not be included in the accounts. 
Purchased goodwill, however, should not be carried in the 
balance sheet as a permanent item.
SSAP 23: Accounting for acquisitions and mergers. It draws 
the line between merger accounting and acquisition 
accounting and the conditions for using them. Also, it 
requires disclosure of the names of the combining companies 
and details of the considerations exchanged in respect of 
the combinations.
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APPENDIX 3
The Unlisted Securities 
Market General Undertaking
................................... (Name of company)
The following is an extract from the minutes of a meeting of
the board of directors held the ......  day of.....
19.....
In compliance with the requirements of the Council of the 
Stock Exchange, it was resolved that the company agrees to 
comply with the provisions set out below (each such 
provision in which reference is made to a note to be read 
and constructed in accordance with and subject to the 
related notes appearing in the document "the Stock Exchange 
Unlisted Securities Market").
1. Generally and apart from compliance with all specific 
requirements which follow, to keep the Stock Exchange 
informed by means of notifications to the Quotations 
Department ("the Department") of any information necessary 
to enable the shareholders and the public to appraise the 
position of the company and to avoid the establishment of a 
false market in its securities.
2. To notify the Department in advance of the date fixed for 
any board meeting at which the declaration or recommendation 
or payment of a dividend is expected to be determined upon, 
or at which any announcement of the profits or losses in 
respect of any financial period or part thereof is to be 
approved for publication.
3. To notify the Department immediately after approved by or 
on behalf of the board:
(a) any decision to pay or make any dividend or other 
distribution or to pass any dividend or interest 
payment;
(b) a preliminary announcement of profits or losses for 
any year, half-year or other period;
(c) any proposed change in capital structure;
(d) short particulars of any drawing or redemption of 
securities.
4. To notify to the Press the basis of allotment of 
securities in prospectus and other offers, and, if 
applicable, in respect of excess application, such notice to
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appear not later than the morning of the business day next 
after the allotment letters or other relevant documents of 
title are posted.
5. To notify the Department immediately after the relevant 
event of:
(a) particulars of acquisitions or realisations of 
assets as from time to time required (Note 1);
(b) any information required to be disclosed to the 
Stock exchange under the provisions of the City Code on 
Take-Overs and Mergers for the time being in force;
(c) any information known to the company which would be 
notifiable under the provisions of Section 33 of the 
Companies Act 1967 as amended by Section 26 of the 
Companies Act 1976 (author's note: see Companies Act 
1985) if the company were subject to such provisions;
(d) any change in the directorate (Note 2);
(e) any purchase by the company, or the group of which 
the company is part of its redeemable securities;
(f) any board decision to change the general character 
or nature of the business of the company or of the 
group;
(g) particulars of dealings by directors in any of the 
securities of the company traded in the Unlisted 
Securities Market.
6. To forward to the Department (through the company's 
brokers) four copies of proofs, for approvals, or all 
circulars to holders of the company's securities, documents 
relating to take-overs, mergers, offers, notices of meetings 
and forms of proxy.
7. To forward to the Department six copies of:
(a) all circulars, notices, reports, announcements or 
other documents at the same time as they are issued;
(b) all resolutions passed by the company other than 
resolutions concerning routine business at an annual 
general meeting.
8. To issue annual reports and accounts within the six 
months following the date of the end of the financial period 
to which they relate.
9. To prepare a half-year or interim report which must be 
sent to the holders of securities or interest as a paid 
advertisement in one leading daily newspaper not later than 
six months from the date of the notice convening the annual
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general meeting of the company.
10. To circulate with the annual report of the directors:
(a) a statement by the directors as to the reasons for 
any significant departure from standard accounting 
practices;
(b) an explanation in th event of trading results shown 
by the accounts for the period under review differing 
materially from any published forecast made by the 
company;
(c) a geographical analysis of turnover and of trading 
results of those trading operations carried on by the 
company (or group) outside the UK;
(d) the name of the principal country in which each 
subsidiary operates;
(e) the following particulars regarding each company 
(not being a subsidiary) in which the group interest in 
the equity capital amounts to 20 per cent or more:
(i) the principal country of operation;
(ii) particulars of its issued share and loans 
capital and, except where the group's interest 
therein is dealt with in the consolidated balance 
sheet as an associated company, the total amount 
of its reserves;
(iii) the percentage of each class of loan capital 
attributable to the company's interest (direct or 
indirect);
(f) a statement as at the end of the financial year
showing as regards [a] bank loans and overdrafts and
[b] other borrowing of the company (or group) the 
aggregate amounts repayable:
(i) in one year or less, or on demand;
(ii) between one and two years;
(iii) between two and five years; and
(iv) in five years or more;
(g) in respect to the financial year, a statement of
the amount of interest capitalised by the company (or
group) during the year, with an indication of the 
amount and treatment of any related tax relief;
(h) a statement as at the end of the financial year
showing the interests of each director in the share 
capital of the company and subsidiary companies 
appearing in a register maintained under the provisions 
of the Companies Act 1967 (or which would be required 
so to appear if the company were subject to the 
provisions of that Act), distinguishing between 
beneficial and non-beneficial interests; such statement 
should include by way of note any change in those
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interests occurring between the end of the financial 
year and a date not more than one month prior to the 
date of the notice of meeting or, if there has been no 
such change, disclosure of that fact;
(i) a statement showing particulars as at a date not 
more than one month prior to the date of the notice of 
meeting of an interest of any person, other than a 
director, in 5 per cent or more of the share capital of 
the company and the amount of the interest in question 
or, if there is no such interest, a statement of that 
fact so far as known to the company;
(j) a statement showing whether or not, so far as the 
directors are aware, the company is a close company for 
taxation purpose and whether there has been any change 
in that respect since the end of the financial year;
(k) particulars of any arrangement under which a 
director has waived or agreed to waive any emoluments; 
(1) particulars of any arrangement under which a 
shareholder has waive or agreed to waive any dividend.
11. To state in a note to the convening the annual general 
meeting the place and time at which copies or, as the case 
may be, memoranda of all service contracts will be available 
for inspection or, if there are no such contracts, to state 
that fact.
12. To send with the notice convening a meeting of holders 
of securities to all persons entitled to vote thereat proxy 
forms with provisions for two-way voting on all resolutions 
intended to be proposed.
13. In the absence of special Stock Exchange dispensation, 
to obtain the consent of the company in general meeting 
prior to:
(a) the company issuing for cash:
(i) equity capital (including capital having an 
equity element);
(ii) securities convertible into any such capital; 
or
(iii) warrants or options to subscribe for any 
such capital or convertible securities;
otherwise than to the equity shareholders of the 
company in proportion to their existing holdings and, 
where appropriate, holders of other equity securities 
of the company entitled thereto; or
(b) any major subsidiary of the company making any 
issue for cash so as materially to dilute the 
percentage equity interest of the company and its 
shareholders in such subsidiary.
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14. In the event of a circular being issued to the holders 
of any particular class of security, to issue a copy or 
summary^ of such circular to the holders of all other 
securities, whether listed or traded in the Unlisted 
Securities Market, unless the contents of such circular are 
irrelevant to such other holders.
15. To certify transfers against certificates or temporary 
documents and to return them on the day of receipt or, 
should that not be a business day, on the first business day 
following their receipt and to split and return renounceable 
documents within the same period.
16. To register transfers and other documents without 
payment of any fee.
17. To issue, without charge, certificates within:
(a) one month of the date of expiration of any right of 
renunciation;
(b) 14 days of the lodgement of transfers.
18. To arrange for designated accounts if requested by 
holders of securities.
19. To pay an annual fee to the Stock Exchange at the rate 
fixed from time to time.
20. To adopt rules governing dealings by directors in the 
securities of the company, whether listed or traded in the 
Unlisted Securities Market, in terms no less exacting than 
those of the Model Code issued by the Council of the Stock 
Exchange (Note 3).
I hereby certify that the above is a true and correct 
extract from the minutes of the board.
NOTES TO THE UNLISTED SECURITIES MARKET 
GENERAL UNDERTAKING
NOTE 1
(a) Reference should be made to the following tests in order 
to classify transactions entered into the company:
(i) the value of the assets acquired or disposed of, 
compared with the assets of the acquiring or disposing 
company;
(ii) net profits (after deducing all charges except 
taxation and excluding extraordinary items)
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attributable to the assets acquired or disposed of, 
compared with the profits of the acquiring or disposing 
company;
(iii) the aggregate value of the consideration given or 
received, compared with the assets of the acquiring or 
disposing company;
(iv) equity capital issued by the company as 
consideration for the acquisition, compared with the 
equity capital already in issue.
Notification to the Department is required when any of the 
above tests amounts to 5 per cent or more. The notification 
should be in the form of an announcement including details 
of the assets acquired or disposed of, how the consideration 
was satisfied, the value of the assets, and the profits 
attributable to those assets.
(b) If one of the above tests amounts to 25 per cent or 
more, the transaction is considered to be sufficient 
material to call not only for an announcement but for a 
circular to be sent to shareholders. The requirements for 
the contents of such circulars are contained in Section D of 
the document "The Stock Exchange Unlisted Securities 
Market". Circulars are required irrespective of whether the 
consideration was in cash or securities.
(c) The department must be consulted in advance where the 
relative tests amount to 100 per cent or more, or where a 
change of control might result.
(d) Transactions which involve, or involve an associate of , 
a director, substantial shareholder or past substantial 
shareholder of the company (or any other company being its 
subsidiary, holding company or a subsidiary of its holding 
company) should be subject to prior approval of the company 
in general meeting and the issue of an explanatory circular. 
Where it is proposed to enter into such a transaction the 
Department must be consulted as soon as possible, and prior 
to any contract being entered into.
NOTE 2
A new director may be required to submit a declaration to 
the Stock Exchange on the form available through the 
company's brokers.
NOTE 3
The terms of the Model Code are available in booklet from 
the Department.
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APPENDIX 4 
Peat Marwick's Industry Classification
Industry Sector Code Industry Sector Code
Hire purchase & leasing 9 Leisure 20
Beers, wines & spirits 10 Motors 21
Building & timber 11 Newspapers 22
Chemicals & plastics 12 Paper & printing 23
Drapery & stores 13 Property 24
Electricals 14 Textiles 28
Engineering & machine 15 Investment trusts 29
Food & groceries 16 Trust & finance 30
Hotels & caterers 17 Oil & gas 31
Industrials (Misc) 18 Plantations 33
Insurance 19 Miscellaneous 35
Source: Peat Marwick (1987).
APPENDIX 5
List of the Sample Companies
Abbeycrest pic 
Acorn Computer Group pic 
Adam Leisure Group pic 
Alphameric pic 
A & M Group pic
American Electronic,Components pic 
American British International pic 
Appletree pic 
Aspinall Holdings pic 
Asprey and Co pic 
ATA Selection pic 
Automagic Holdings pic 
Bennet and Fountain Group pic 
Bio-Isolates (Holdings) pic 
Blue Arrow pic,Blue Arrow House 
The Body Shop International pic 
Brewmaker plc.Brewmaker House 
Brikat Group plc.Brikat House 
Centeral Independent Television pic 
Charlie Brown's Car Part Centers pic 
Cheshire Wholefoods pic 
Cifer pic
Circaprint Holdings pic
Cluff Oil Holdings pic
Compsoft Holdings pic
Consolidated Tern Investments pic
Continental Microwave (Holdings) pic
Cowells pic
CPU Computers pic
Cranbrook Electric Holdings pic
Mill Group pic
Crown Television Productions pic 
Darton International pic,
DBE Technology Group 
DDT Group Ltd 
Denman's Electrical pic 
Druck Holdings pic 
Dunton Group pic 
EBC pic
Edinburgh Oil and Gas pic 
Eldridge, Pope and Co pic 
Electronic Data Processing pic 
Federated Housing pic
Feedback pic
Fergabrook pic
Floyd Oil Participations pic
Fuller, Smith and Turner pic
Cecil Gee pic
Gibbs Mew pic
The Globel Group pic
Godwin Warren Control Systems pic
Goodhead Print Group pic
Greenwich Cable Communication pic
Hampden Home Care pic
Heavitree Brewery pic
Holmes and Machant Group pic
Hunter Saphir pic
Instem pic
Jack L Israel Group pic
Jacques Vert pic
Jebsens Drilling pic
John Kent pic
John Perkins Meats pic
Kenyon Securities pic
KLP Group pic
Klark-Teknilk pic
Laidlaw Thomson Group pic
Leisure Investment pic
London and Clydeside Holdings pic
LPA Industries pic
Lysander Petroleum pic
Maxiprint pic
McLaughlin and Harvey pic
Media Techcology International pic
Merrydown Wine pic
Michael Peters Group pic
Microlease pic
Miles 33 pic
Millward Brown
Miss World Group pic
MMT Computing pic
Monument Oil and Gas pic
The Moorgate Group pic
Moss Advertising Group pic
Norbain Electronics pic
Osborne and Little pic
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Owners Abroad Group pic
Penny and Giles International
Pepe Group pic
Pericom pic
Piccadilly Radio pic
Piet Petroleum pic
Pineapple Group pic
Plasmec pic
Questel pic
Radio City pic
Radio Clyde pic
Radius pic
Ramus Holdings pic
Real Time Control pic
Rex Williams Leisure pic
Rivlin Holdings pic
Robert Horne Group pic
Sangers Photographies pic
Scanro Holdings pic 
Scantronic Holdings pic 
Shandwick pic 
Share Drug Stores pic 
Sherwood Computer Services pic 
Sigmex International pic 
T and S Stores pic 
Tay Homes pic 
TDS Circuits pic 
Telecomputing pic 
Thermal Scientific pic 
TMD Advertising Holdings pic 
Trilion pic
Tyne Tees Television,Holdings pic 
United Ceramic Distributors pic 
Viewplan pic 
Wayne Kerr pic 
World of Leather pic
Company Name
APPENDIX 6
Disclosure Index
Company Number ..........................
Year End ......................
General
1. Description of company history ..................
2. Charts or information about organisational structure
3. Future plans, strategies, and objectives..........
4. Information on future prospects- general statement. 
If yes, is this for:
5. Future prospect of the economy ...................
6. Future prospect of the industry .................
7. Future prospect of the company ..................
8. Information on company prospects- quantitative. ...
9. Information relating to company's order book ....
10. Information on major customers or target markets ..
11. Last year acquisitions and bids- narrative review
12. Last year acquisitions and bids- effects on profits 
Employment information
13. Is the number of employees less than 250
14. If yes, is there a statement about disabled and 
pensions conditions
15. Employment condition statement relating to training 
trade unions and industrial relations
Line of business information
16. Turnover by line of business ...................
17. Profits by line of business ....................
18. Assets by line of business .....................
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19. Capital expenditures by line of business ........
If no information are presented is the reason as
20. Inapplicability ...............................
21. Other reasons ..................................
Geographical information
22. Turnover by geographical area ..................
23. Profits by geographical area ...................
24. Assets by geographical area .....................
25. Capital expenditures by geographical area .......
If no information are presented is the reason given as
26. Inapplicability ................................
27. Other reasons...................................
R&D Information
28. Are R&D activities provided ...................
If yes, is this for
29. Information relating to R&D-narrative ...........
30. Information relating to R&D-last year's expenditure
31. Information relating to R«ScD-future commitments
If no, is the reason given
32. I n a p p l i c a b i l i t y  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
33. Other reasons .................................
Assets description
34. B r e a k d o w n  o f  a s s e t s  b y  t y p e  o f  a s s e t s  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
35. D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  m a j o r  p r o p e r t i e s  a n d  p r e m i s e s  .....
36. I n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  p r o j e c t s  ... 
i n  p r o g r e s s .
37. Plans for future capital expenditure projects ....
38. D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  m a j o r  p r o d u c t s  o r  s e r v i c e s  .......
39. D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  m a j o r  p a t e n t s  o r  r i g h t s  . . . . . . . . . . .
40. D i s c l o s u r e  o f  n e t  r e a l i s a b l e  v a l u e  o f  s t o c k  ......
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Foreign Operations
41. Amount of last year's foreign currency gains (loss)
42. If yes, is this separately disclosed for .......
translation and transactions
43. Information relating to foreign exchange impact ...
44. Description of foreign assets and locations .....
If no, is the reason given as
45. Inapplicability ................................
46. Other reasons ..................................
Other Information
47. Historical data relating to last 3-5 years ......
48. Current Cost Accounting (CCA) adjusted profits. ...
49. Reasons for not providing CCA information ....
50. Any value added information ....................
51. description of disputes or any legal proceedings. .
52. Information related to production levels and ....
capacity. (For Industrials)
53. Detailed information related to production and ... 
licences. ( For oil companies )
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APPENDIX 7
Companies' Profile
MEAN STD DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM VALID CASES
DEPS .028 1.247 -6.588 5.130 122
DTRPO .071 1.258 -6.106 3.348 122
TS 18689450.7 27544646.5 12000 195178000 122
TA 12419976.9 15383359.3 360349 91165000 122
TALCL 7145290.61 10206523.3 -872906 63077000 122
TE 6011762.10 9189485.77 -1562809 58805000 122
DERA 1.576 1.368 .030 9.990 121
TRPO 1239315.94 2454763.63 -4551000 16581000 122
NPXEX 729612.008 1667291.89 -5421000 10114000 122
DIREQ 37.961 22.639 .080 83.800 122
FSPER 17.951 27.296 .000 99.999 109
EMPL 320 657 .000 6597 119
LOB 1.490 1.229 1.000 9.950 88
GDI 1.376 .629 1.000 4.340 108
T0T8 .262 .081 .098 .535 122
DNPXEX .398 4.467 -25.022 35.839 120
RTA .097 .153 -.610 .519 122
RTS -.030 .539 -4.167 .403 122
RTE .223 .642 -3.538 4.461 122
RTALCL .221 .437 -.946 3.709 122
The above symbols represenet the following accounting figures:
DEPS: GROWTH IN EARNINGS PER SHARE 
DTRPO: GROWTH IN TRADING PROFIT 
TS: TOTAL TURNOVER 
TA: TOTAL ASSETS
TALCL: TOTAL ASSETS LESS CURRENT LIABILITIES 
TE: TOTAL EQUITY 
DERA: DEBIT TO EQUITY RATIO 
TRPO: TRADING PROFIT
NPXEX: NET PROFIT AFTER EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS
DIREQ: DIRECTORS EQUITY
FSPER: PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN TURNOVER
EMPL: NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
LOB: LINE OF BUSINESS DIVERSIFICATION INDEX
GDI: GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSIFICATION INDEX
T0T8: VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE SCORE
DNPXEX: GROWTH IN PROFIT AFTER EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS
RTA: RETURN ON TOTAL ASSETS
RTS: RETURN ON TURNOVER
RTE: RETURN ON TOTAL EQUITY
RTALCL: RETURN ON TOTAL ASSETS LESS CURRENT LIABILITIES
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APPENDIX 8
Extent of Disclosure
HISTORY OF THE COMPANY
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
TOTAL
Frequency
107
15
122
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
TOTAL
Frequency
84
38
122
FUTURE PLANS AND STRATEGIES
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
TOTAL
Frequency
19
103
122
FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE ECONOMY, INDUSTRY.
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
15
107
TOTAL 122
FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE ECONOMY
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
Frequency
103
4
Percent
87.7
12.3
100.0
Percent
68.9
31.1
100.0
Percent
15.6
84.4
100.0
OR COMPANY 
Percent
12.3
87.2
 ---
100.0
Percent
96.3
3.7
TOTAL 107 100.0
6. FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE INDUSTRY
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 83
DISCLOSED 24
TOTAL 107
7. FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE COMPANY
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 8
DISCLOSED 99
TOTAL 107
8. FUTURE PROSPECTS IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 99
DISCLOSED 8
TOTAL 107
9. COMPANY'S ORDER BOOK
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 99
DISCLOSED 23
TOTAL 122
10. MAJOR CUSTOMERS AND TARGET MARKETS
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 48
DISCLOSED 74
TOTAL 122
11. REVIEW OF LAST YEAR TAKEOVER ACTIVITIES
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 88
DISCLOSED 34
TOTAL 122
Percent
77.6
22.4
100.0
Percent
7.5
92.5
100.0
Percent
92.5
7.5
100.0
Percent
81.1
18.9
100.0
Percent
39.3
60.7
100.0
Percent
72.1
27.9
100.0
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12. EFFECT OF LAST YEAR TAKEOVERS ON PROFIT
Frequency Percent
NOT DISCLOSED 107 87 7
DISCLOSED 15 12\3
TOTAL 122 100.0
13. TRAINING & INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Frequency Percent
NOT DISCLOSED 99 81.1
DISCLOSED 23 18.9
TOTAL 122 100.0
14. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES LESS THAN 250
Frequency Percent
MORE THAN 250 EMPLOYEE 63 51.6
LESS THAN 250 EMPLOYEE 59 48.4
TOTAL 122 100.0
15. DISABLED AND PENSIONS CONDITIONS FOR COMPANIES 
WITH LESS THAN 250 EMPLOYEES
Frequency Percent
NOT DISCLOSED 58 98.3
DISCLOSED 1 1-7
TOTAL 59 100.0
16. DISCLOSING LOB INFORMATION
Frequency Percent
NEITHER DISCOLSING NOR REASONS 30 24.6
FOR NOT DISCLOSING 
DISCLOSED INFORMATION 92 75.4
TOTAL 122 100.0
17. WHY NOT PROVIDING LOB INFORMATION
Frequency Percent
INAPPLICABALE 43 91.5
OTHER REASONS GIVEN 4 8.5
TOTAL 47 100.0
372
18. DISCLOSING LOB DETAIL INFORMATION
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 42
DISCLOSED 50
TOTAL 92
19. TURNOVER BY LINE OF BUSINESS
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 5
DISCLOSED 45
TOTAL 50
20. PROFIT BY LINE OF BUSINESS
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 22
DISCLOSED 28
TOTAL 50
21. ASSETS BY LINE OF BUSINESS
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 50
DISCLOSED 0
TOTAL 50
22. CAPITAL EXPENDITURES BY LOB
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
23. DISCLOSING GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
Frequency
NEITHER DISCLOSING NOR REASONS 11
FOR NOT DISCLOSING 
DISCLOSED INFORMATION OR REASONS 111
TOTAL 122
49
1
TOTAL 50
Percent
45.7
54.3
100.0
Percent
10.0
90.0
100.0
Percent
44.0
56.0
100.0
Percent
100.0
0.0
100.0
Percent
98.0 
2.0
100.0
Percent
9.0
91.0 
100.0
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24. REASONS FOR NOT PROVIDING GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
Frequency Percent
OTHER REASONS GIVEN 
INAPP LICABALE
TOTAL
3
37
40
7.5
92.5
100.0
25. TURNOVER BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
TOTAL
Frequency Percent
1
70
71
1.4
98.6
100.0
26. PROFIT BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
TOTAL
Frequency Percent
56
15
71
78.9
21.1
100.0
27. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
Frequency Percent
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
TOTAL
69
2
71
97.2
2.8
100.0
28. ASSETS BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
TOTAL
Frequency Percent
69
2
71
97.2
2.8
100.0
29. APPLICABILITY OF R&D
APPLICABLE
INAPPLICABALE
Frequency Percent
40
10
80.0
20.0
TOTAL 50 100.0
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30. NARRATIVE INFORMATION ON R&D ACTIVITIES
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 1
DISCLOSED 39
TOTAL 40
31. LAST YEAR'S R&D EXPENDITURES
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 16
DISCLOSED 24
TOTAL 40
32. R&D FUTURE COMMITMENTS
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 38
DISCLOSED 2
TOTAL 40
33. BREAKDOWN OF ASSETS IN MORE DETAIL
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 55
DISCLOSED 67
TOTAL 122
34. MAJOR PROPERTIES AND INVESTMENTS
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 65
DISCLOSED 57
TOTAL 122
35. CAPITAL EXP PROJECTS IN PROGRESS
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 58
DISCLOSED 54
TOTAL 122
Percent
2.5
97.5
100.0
Percent
40.0
60.0
100.0
Percent
95.0 
5.0
100.0
Percent
45.1 
54.9
100.0
Percent
53.3
46.7
100.0
Percent
55.7
44.3
100.0
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36. FUTURE CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
Frequency Percent
NOT DISCLOSED 84 68.9
DISCLOSED 38 31.1
TOTAL 122 100.0
37 . DESCRIPTION OF PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
Frequency Percent
NOT DISCLOSED 41 33.6
DISCLOSED 81 66.4
TOTAL 122 100.0
38 . DESCRIPTION OF PATENTS AND RIGHTS
Frequency Percent
NOT DISCLOSED 97 79.5
DISCLOSED 25 20.5
TOTAL 122 100.0
39 . NET REALISABLE VALUE OF STOCK
Frequency Percent
NOT DISCLOSED 111 91.0
DISCLOSED 11 9.0
TOTAL 122 100.0
40 . DATA RELATING TO LAST 3-5 YEARS
Frequency Percent
NOT DISCLOSED 64 52.5
DISCLOSED 58 47.5
TOTAL 122 100.0
41 . VALUE ADDED INFORMATION
Frequency Percent
NOT DISCLOSED 122 100.0
TOTAL 122 100.0
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42. DISPUTES AND DIFFICULTIES
Frequency Percent
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
TOTAL
121
1
122
99.2
0.8
100.0
43. CCA DATA
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
TOTAL
Frequency Percent
120
2
122
98.4
1.6
100.0
44. REASONS FOR NOT DISCLOSING CCA DATA
Frequency
NO REASONS GIVEN 
REASONS GIVEN
115
5
TOTAL 120
Percent
95.8
4.2
100.0
45. PRODUCTION AND LICENCESES INFORMATION 
(FOR OIL & GAS COMPANIES)
Frequency Percent
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
TOTAL 8
12.5
87.5
100.0
46. FOREIGN CURRENCY GAINS OR LOSSES
Frequency
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
TOTAL
92
30
122
Percent
75.4
24.6
100.0
47. FOREIGN EXCHANGE IMPACT
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
Frequency Percent
103
19
84.4
15.6
TOTAL 122 100.0
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48. FOREIGN ASSETS AND THIER LOCATIONS
NOT DISCLOSED 
DISCLOSED
Frequency Percent
99 81.1
23 18.9
TOTAL 122 100.0
APPENDIX 9 
The Non-Parametric Statistics
1 SIZE
1.1 TOTAL ASSETS (TA)
1.1.1 Chi Squaret Tests 
(classified into two groups)
Chi-Square D.F. Significance Min E.F.
7.39494 1 .0065 29.000
8.41379 1 .0037 (Before Yates Correction)
Statistic Value Significance
Kendall's Tau B .26261 .0019
Gamma .49194
1.1.2 Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank Cases
52.60 61 TA = SMALL COMPANIES
70.40 61 TA = LARGE COMPANIES
122 Total
Corrected for Ties
U W z 2-tailed P
1317.5 3208.5 -2.7805 .0054
1.1.3 Chi Squaret Tests
(classified into Three groups)
Chi-Square D.F. Significance Min E.F.
5.00939 4 .2863 13.115
Statistic Value Significance
Kendall's Tau B .15523 .0274
Gamma .23054
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1.1.4 Kruskal—Wallis 1-way ANOVA
. Rank Cases
50.28 40 TA =
64.65 41 TA = ;
69.30 41 TA =
122 Total
CASES Chi-Square Significance
122 6.3522 .0417
Corrected for Ties 
Chi-Square Significance 
6.3526 .0417
1.2 TOTAL TURNOVER (TS)
1.2.1 Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank Cases
55.85 61 TS = SMALL COMPANIES
67.15 61 TS = LARGE COMPANIES
122 Total
U
1516.0
W
3407.0
Corrected for Ties 
Z 2-tailed P
-1.7640 .0777
1.2.2 Chi Square Tests
(classified into two groups)
Chi-Square
2.66218
3.28664
D.F.
1
1
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
Significance Min E.F,
29.000.1028
.0698 (Before Yates Correction)
Value
.16413
.32004
Significance
0355
1.2.3 Chi Squaret Tests
(classified into Three groups)
Chi-Square D.F.
1.68211 4
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Gamma
Significance
.7940
Value
04395
06570
Min E.F. 
13.115 
Significance 
.2933
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1.2.4 Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA
Rank Cases
55.72 40 TS = 1 SMALL
65.94 41 TS = 2 MEDIEUM
62.70 41 TS = 3 LARGE
122 Total
Corrected for Ties 
CASES Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance 
122 1.7597 .4148 1.7598 .4148
1.3 NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (EMPL)
1.3.1 Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank Cases
54.21 63 EMPL = SMALL COMPANIES
69.29 59 EMPL = LARGE COMPANIES
122 Total
Corrected for Ties
U W Z 2-tailed P
1399.0 4088 .0 -2.3542 .0186
Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA
Mean Rank Cases
51.33 43 EMPL = SMALL COMPANIES
61.60 39 EMPL = MEDIUM COMPANIES
72.34 40 EMPL = LARGE COMPANIES
122 Total
CASES
122
Chi-Square Significance 
7.3169 .0258
Corrected for Ties 
Chi-Square Significance 
7.3173 .0258
1.3.3 Chi Square Tests
(classified into three groups)
Chi-Square D.F.
7.54463
S t a t i s t i c
Kendall's Tau B
Gamma
Significance
1098
Value
.14198
.20977
Min E.F.
12.787
S i g n i f i c a n c e
.0395
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1.3.4 Chi Square Tests
(classified into two groups)
Chi-Square D.F.
5.64486
6.53968
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
Significance Min E.F.
.0175 28.049
.0105 (Before Yates Correction)
Value
.23153
.44057
Significance
.0054
1.4 TOTAL EQUITY (TE)
1.4.1 Chi Squaret Tests
(classified into two groups)
Chi-Square D.F,
3.97683
4.73276
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
Significance Min E.F
29.0000461
0296 (Before Yates Correction)
Value
.19696
.37967
Significance
.0151
1.4.2 Chi Square Tests
(classified into three groups)
Chi-Square D.F. Significance Min E.F
2.77600 .5960 13.115
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
Value
.12156
.18135
Significance
0663
1.4.3 Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank 
56.57 
66.43
Cases
61
61
TE = 1 
TE = 2
122 Total
Corrected for Ties 
y w Z 2-tailed P
1560.0 3451.0 -1.5387 .1239
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1.4.4 Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA
i Rank Cases
54.96 40 TE = 1 SMALL
60.66 41 TE = 2 MEDIEUM
68.72 41 TE = 3 LARGE
122 Total
Corrected for Ties 
CASES Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance 
122 3.0992 .2123 3.0994 .2123
1.5 TOTAL ASSETS LESS CURRENT LIABILITIES (TALCL)
1.5.1 Chi Squaret Tests
(classified into two groups)
Chi-Square
7.39494
8.41379
D.F.
1
1
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
Significance Min E.F.
.0065 29.000
.0037 (Before Yates Correction)
Value
.26261
.49194
Significance
.0019
1.5.2 Chi Square Tests
(classified into three groups)
Chi-Square D.F. 
2.61429 4
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
Significance
.6243
Value
11128
16606
Min E.F. 
13.115
Significance
.0843
1.5.3 Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test 
Mean Rank Cases
53.98
69.02
U
1401.5
61 TALCL = 1 
61 TALCL = 2
122 Total
W
3292.5
Corrected for Ties 
Z 2-tailed P
-2.3504 .0188
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1.5.4 Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA
Mean Rank 
54.50 
61.24 
68.59
Cases
40
41 
41
122
TALCL
TALCL
TALCL
Total
SMALL
MEDIEUM
LARGE
CASES
122
Chi-Square
3.2155
Significance
.2003
Corrected for Ties 
Chi-Square Significance 
3.2157 .2003
2. GEARING
2.1 DEBT TO EQUITY RATIO (DERA)
2.1.1 Chi-Square Tests 
(classified into two groups)
Chi-Square D.F. Significance Min E.F
.00000 1 1.0000 28.281 
.01046 1 .9185 (Before Yates Correction)
Statistic Value Significance
Kendall's Tau B .00930 .4594
Gamma .01862
2.1.2 Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank Cases
59.86 62 DERA =1.00
62.19 59 DERA =2.00
121 Total
Corrected for Ties 
U w Z 2—tailed P
1758.5 3669.5 -.3656 .7147
2.1.3 Chi Square Tests
(classified into three groups)
Chi-Square D.F.
3.83961
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Gamma
4
Significance
.4281
Value
.04591
.06833
Min E.F. 
12.893 
Significance 
.2858
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2.1.4 Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA
. Rank Cases
56.91 41 DERA= 1
58.97 40 DERA= 2
67.21 40 DERA= 3
121 Total
CASES
121
Corrected for Ties 
Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance
1.9446 .3782 1.9447 3782
2.2 DEBT TO ASSETS RATIO
2.2.1 Chi-Square Tests
(classified into two groups)
Chi-Square D.F.
.00000
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
Significance
1.0000
Value
.00000
.00000
Min E.F.
29.000
Significance
.5000
2.2.2 Mann—Whitney U — Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank 
59.64 
63.36
Cases
61 DEAST =1.00 
61 DEAST =2.00
U
1747.0
122 Total
W
3638.0
Corrected for Ties
Z
-.5812
2—tailed P 
.5611
3 PROFITABILITY
3.1 RETURN ON TOTAL ASSETS (RTA)
3.1.1 Chi-Square Tests 
(classified into two groups)
Chi-Square D.F.
.00000 1
Statistic
Significance
1.0000
Value
Kendall's Tau B
Gamma
-.01962
-.03926
Min E.F. 
24.500 
Significance 
.4218
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3.1.2 Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank Cases
50.89
52.07
49 RTA =1.00 
53 RTA =2.00
102 Total
U
1268.5
W
2493.5
Corrected for Ties
Z
-.2009
2—tailed P 
.8407
3.1.3 Chi Square Tests
(classified into three groups)
Chi-Square D.F. Significance Min E.F,
6.76393 4 .1489 9.118
Statistic Value Significance
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
-.16459
-.24368
.0315
3.1.4 Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA
Mean Rank Cases 
60.08 31 
48.46 37 
46.99 34
RTA = 
RTA = 
RTA =
1
2
3
102 Total
CASES
102
Corrected for Ties 
Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance 
3.7893 .1504 4.2744 .1180
3.2. RETURN ON TURNOVER (RTS)
3.2.1 Chi-Square Tests
(classified into two groups)7
Chi-Square D.F.
1.41176 1
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Gamma
Significance
.2348
Value
-.13725
-.26943
Min E.F. 
25.500 
Significance 
.0839
386
3.2.2 Mann—Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank 
55.43 
47.57
Cases
51 RTS =1.00 
51 RTS =2.00
102 Total
U
1100.0
W
2827.0
Corrected for Ties
Z
-1.3419
2—tailed P 
.1796
3.2.3 Chi Square Tests
(classified into three groups)
Chi-Square D.F. Significance Min E.F
1.56401 4 .8152 9.118
Statistic Value Significance
Kendall's Tau B -.01535 .4312
Gamma —.02305
3.2.4 Kruskal-Wallis 1—way ANOVA 
(Two Groups)
Mean Rank 
55.43 
47.57
U
1100.0
Cases
51
51
RTS = LOW PROFITABILITY 
RTS = HIGH PROFITABILITY
102 Total
W
2827.0
Corrected for Ties 
Z 2—tailed P
-1.3419 .1796
3.2.5 Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA
l Rank Cases
52.19 31 RTS = 1
51.38 39 RTS = 2
50.97 32 RTS = 3
102 Total
Corrected for Ties 
CASES Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance 
102 .0279 .9861 .0315 .9844
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4 LINE OF BUSINESS DIVERSIFICATION INDEX (LOB)
4.1 Chi—Square Tests
(classified into two groups)
Chi-Square
.37977
D.F. Significance
5377
Min E.F,
8.680
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
Value
-.10131
-.23077
Significance
.1917
4.2 Mann-Whitney U — Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank Cases
42.57 21 LOB = 2.000
36.22 54 LOB = 3.000
75 Total
U W
471.0 894.0 -1.1328
Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA
Mean Rank Cases
52.86 47 LOB = 1
74.36 21 LOB = 2
64.02 54 LOB = 3
122 Total
Corrected for Ties 
Z 2—tailed P
.2573
CASES
122
Chi-Square
5.8545
Significance
.0535
Corrected for Ties 
Chi-Square Significance 
5.8549 .0535
4.4 Chi-Square Tests
(classified into three groups)
Chi-Square D.F.
3.75656 2
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Gamma
Significance
1529
Value
.10628 
.18777
Min E.F
9.984
Significance 
. 1097
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5. GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSIFICATION
5.1 GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSIFICATION INDEX
5.1.1 Chi-Square Tests 
(classified into two groups)
Chi-Square 
.00000
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
D.F. Significance
1.0000
Value
-.00820
-.01695
Min E.F. 
14.167
Significance
.4702
5.1.2 Mann-Whitney U — Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test 
Mean Rank Cases
41.99 35 GDI = 2.000
42.87 49 GDI = 3.000
84 Total
Corrected for Ties
U W Z 2—tailed P
839.5 1469.5 1633 .8703
3 Kruskal-Wallis 1—way ANOVA
Mean Rank Cases
48.82 38 GDI = 1
66.59 35 GDI = 2
67.70 49 GDI = 3
122 Total
CASES
122
Chi-Square 
7.1212
Significance
.0284
Corrected for Ties 
Chi-Square Significance 
7.1216 .0284
5.1.4 Chi-Square Tests
(classified into three groups)
Chi-Square D.F. 
5.40263 2
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Gamma
Significance
.0671
Value
.16636
.28377
Min E.F.
16.639
Significance
.0263
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5.2 PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN TURNOVER
5.2.1 Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA 
(three groups, n=122)
. Rank Cases
44.59 37 FSPER = 1
60.38 48 FSPER = 2
79.86 37 FSPER = 3
122 Total
NO FOREIGN TURNOVER 
WITH UP TO 17%
WITH MORE THAN 17%
Corrected for Ties 
CASES Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance 
122 18.4838 .0001 18.4849 .0001
5.2.2 Chi-Square Tests
(three groups, n=l22)
Chi-Square D.F.
12.19613 2
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
Significance
.0022
Value
.29832
.49669
Min E.F.
17.590
Significance
.0003
5.2.3 Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test 
(two groups; 2,3; n=85)
Mean Rank 
36.92 
50.89
U
596.0
Cases
48 FSPER = 2 WITH UP TO 17%
37 FSPER = 3 WITH MORE THAN 17%
85 Total 
W
1883.0
Corrected for Ties 
Z 2—tailed P
-2.5884 .0096
5.2.4 Chi-Square Tests
(two gropus; 2,3; n=85)
Chi-Square D.F.
3.00974 1
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Gamma
Significance
.0828
Value
.21252
.42595
Min E.F.
14.365
S i g n i f i c a n c e
.0257
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5.2.5 Chi Square Tests
(two groups, n=122)
Chi-Square D.F. Significance Min E.F,
8.24737 2
Statistic
0162
Value
8.197
Significance
Kendall's Tau B .23644 .0029
Gamma .49043
5.2.6 Mann—Whitney U — Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
(two groups, n=122)
Mean Rank Cases
56.22 97 FSPER = 1.000
82.00 25 FSPER = 2.000
122 Total
Corrected for Ties
U W Z 2—tailed P
700.0 2050.0 -3.2508 .0012
6 DIRECTORS EQUITY (DIREQ)
6.1 Mann—Whitney U — Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank Cases
69.43 61 DIREQ = SMALL SHARE IN THE EQUITY
53.57 61 DIREQ = LARGE SHARE IN THE EQUITY
122 Total
Corrected for Ties
U W Z 2—tailed P
1376.5 4235.5 -2.4784 .0132
6.2 Kruskal-Wallis 1—way ANOVA
Mean Rank Cases
69.60 39 DIREQ 1
59.94 41 DIREQ 2
55.50 42 DIREQ 3
122 Total
CASES
122
C h i - S q u a r e  
3.3365
C o r r e c t e d  f o r  T i e s  
S i g n i f i c a n c e  C h i — S q u a r e  S i g n i f i c a n c e
. 1886 3.3367 .1886
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6.3 Chi-Square Tests
(classified into two groups)
Chi-Square D.F
7.39494
8.41379
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
Significance Min E.F.
.0065 29.000
.0037 (Before Yates Correction)
Value
-.26261
-.49194
Significance
0019
6.4 Chi-Square Tests
(classified into three groups)
Chi-Square D.F.
6.14154 4
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
Significance
.1888
Value
-.17502
-.25941
Min E.F.
12.787
Significance
.0152
7 SUBSTANTIAL SHAREHOLDINGS—HOLDING MORE THAN 5% (MORE5)
7.1 Chi Square Tests
(classified into five groups)
Chi-Square D.F.
8.28342 8
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B 
Gamma
Significance
4063
Value
.10403 
.14450
Min E.F.
3.607
Significance
.0898
7.2. Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA
Mean Rank Cases
58.34 40 M0RE5 = 0
57.64 28 MORE5 = 1
68.93 27 MORE5 = 2
70. 73 11 MORE5 = 3
57.28 16 MORE5 = 4
122 Total
CASES
122
Chi-Square
2.8204
Significance
.5883
Corrected for Ties 
Chi-Square Significance 
2.8205 .5883
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8 EXISTANCE OF EXECUTIVE SHARE OPTION
8.1 Chi Square Tests
Chi-Square D.F.
.02558
Lambda
Statistic
Statistic
Significance
.9873
Symmetric
.00000
Value
Min E.F.
17.405
With SCORE 
Dependent
.00000
Significance
Cramer's V .01454
8.2 Mann—Whitney U — Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank 
60.59 
61.51
U
1781.5
Cases
67 OPTION = 0 
54 OPTION = 1
121 Total
W
3321.5
Corrected for Ties 
Z 2—tailed P
-.1434 .8860
9 THE AUDITING FIRM
9.1 Chi-Square Tests 
Chi-Square D.F.
25139
Lambda
Statistic
Statistic
Significance
.8819
Symmetric
.00781
Value
Min E.F.
15.738
With SCORE 
Dependent
.01250
Significance
Cramer's V .04539
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9.2 Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank Cases
60.59
62.09
48 FIRM =0.0 
74 FIRM =1.00
122 Total
U
1732.5
W
2908.5
Corrected for Ties 
Z 2—tailed P
-.2280 .8197
9.3 Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA
Mean Rank Cases
47.96 13 FIRM = 1 DELOITTE HASKENS & S
79.72 9 FIRM = 2 ARTHER ANDERSON
75.67 6 FIRM = 3 ARTHUR YOUNG
47.42 12 FIRM = 4 ERNST & WHINNEY
65.90 15 FIRM = 5 PEAT MARWICK MeLINTO
67.00 9 FIRM = 6 TOUCH ROSS
73.10 5 FIRM = 7 PRICE WATERHOUSE
54.70 5 FIRM = 8 COOPERS LYBRAND
60.59 48 FIRM = 9 OTHERS
122 Total
CASES
122
Chi-Square
8.3659
Corrected for Ties 
Significance Chi-Square Significance 
.3986 8.3664 .3985
10 INDUSTRY SECTOR
Sector
BEERS AND WIENS 
BUILDING INDUSTRY 
DRAPERY AND STORES 
ELECTRICALS 
FOOD AND GROCERIES 
LEISURE.
PAPER AND PRINTING 
OIL AND GAS
Code Frequency Percent
10 5 4.1
11 11 9.0
13 15 12.3
14 41 33.6
16 9 7.4
2 0 2 0 16.4
23 13 10.7
31 8 6.6
TOTAL 122 1 0 0 . 0
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10.1 Chi—Square Tests 
Chi-Square D.F
6.43500
Lambda
Statistic
Statistic
Significance
.1689
Symmetric
.08491
Value
Min E.F.
5.170
With SCORE 
Dependent
.19149
Significance
Cramer's V 25367
Kruskal-Wallis 1—way ANOVA
Mean Rank Cases Code
46.32 11 IND = 11
45.03 15 IND = 13
61.01 41 IND = 14
35.58 2 0 IND = 2 0
50.15 13 IND = 23
100 Total
CASES
100
Chi-Square
11.4393
Significance
.0220
Corrected for Ties 
Chi-Square Significance 
11.4402 .0220
10.3 Analysis of Variance
(*) Denotes pairs of groups significantly 
different at the .050 level
Mean
.2126
.2421
.2496
.2715
.2974
Group
Grp
Grp
Grp
Grp
Grp
G G G G G
r r r r r
P P P P P
4 2 15 3
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11 TAX STATUS 
11.1 Chi Square Tests 
Chi-Square D.F.
5.49216
Lambda
Statistic
Statistic
Significance
0642
Symmetric
.07563
Value
Min E.F.
13.716
With SCORE 
Dependent
.10526
Significance
Cramer's V .21759
11.2 Mann-Whitney U — Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
Mean Rank 
67.81 
53.01
Cases
43
73
TAX = 0 
TAX = 1
NOT A CLOSE COMPANY 
CLOSE COMPANY
116 Total
U
1169.0
Corrected for Ties
W
2916.0
Z
-2.2894
2—tailed P 
.0221
13 NO OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
13.1 Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA
13.1.1 Five Groups
Mean Rank Cases
57.84 77 NOEX = 0
62.78 25 NOEX = 1
69.40 10 NOEX = 2
78.92 6 NOEX = 3
78.13 4 NOEX = 4
122 Total
CASES
122
Chi-Square
3.6973
Corrected for Ties 
Significance Chi—Square Significance
.4485 3.6975 4485
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13.1.2 Four Groups
Mean Rank Cases
57.84 77 NOEX = 0
62.78 25 NOEX = 1
69.40 10 NOEX = 2
78.60 10 NOEX = 3
122 Total
Corrected for Ties 
CASES Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance 
122 3.6961 .2962 3.6963 .2962
APPENDIX 10
The Correlation Matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Total 
Turnover
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.7185 
( 117) 
P= .000
.5142 
( 117) 
P= .000
.5281 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1384 
( 117) 
P= .068
.7410 
( 117) 
P= .000
.6670 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1623 
( 117) 
P= .040
(2) Total 
Assets
.7185 
( 117) 
P= .000
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.9443 
( 117) 
P= .000
.9359 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.0925 
( 117) 
P= .161
.7826 
( 117) 
P= .000
.7245 
( 117) 
P= .000
.2006 
( 117) 
P= .015
(3) Assets less 
Current 
Liabilities
.5142 
( 117) 
P= .000
.9443 
( 117) 
P= .000
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.9770 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.2119 
( 117) 
P= .011
.6579 
( 117) 
P= .000
.6257 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1578 
( 117) 
P= .045
(4) Total 
Eguity
.5281 
( 117) 
P= .000
.9359 
( 117) 
P= .000
.9770 
( 117) 
P= .000
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
-.2342 
( 117) 
P= .006
.6848 
( 117) 
P= .000
.6486 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1578 
( 117) 
P= .045
(5) Debt to 
Eguity 
Ratio
.1384 
( 117) 
P= .068
-.0925 
( 117) 
P= .161
-.2119 
( 117) 
P= .011
-.2342 
( 117) 
P= .006
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
-.0710 
( 117) 
P= .224
-.0720 
( 117) 
P= .220
-.0837 
( 117) 
P= .185
(6) Trading 
Profit
.7410 
( 117) 
P= .000
.7826 
( 117) 
P= .000
.6579 
( 117) 
P= .000
.6848 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.0710 
( 117) 
P= .224
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.9658 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1708 
( 117) 
P= .033
(7) Net 
Profit
.6670 
( 117) 
P= .000
.7245 
( 117) 
P= .000
.6257 
( 117) 
P= .000
.6486 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.0720 
( 117) 
P= .220
.9658 
( 117) 
P= .000
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.1278 
( 117) 
P= .085
(8) Non-Executive .1623 
Directors ( 117) 
P= .040
.2006 
( 117) 
P= .015
.1578 
( 117) 
P= .045
.1578 
( 117) 
P= .045
-.0837 
( 117) 
P= .185
.1708 
( 117) 
P= .033
.1278 
( 117) 
P= .085
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
(9) Directors' 
Equity
-.0926 
( 117) 
P= .160
-.1650 
( 117) 
P= .038
-.2161 
( 117) 
P= .010
-.1959 
( 117) 
P= .017
.2566 
( 117) 
P= .003
-.0626 
( 117) 
P= .251
-.0618 
( 117) 
P= .254
-.1804 
( 117) 
P= .026
(10) Option 
Schemes
.0187 
( 117) 
P= .421
-.0139 
( 117) 
P= .441
-.0297 
( 117) 
P= .375
-.0087 
( 117) 
P= .463
.0737 
( 117) 
P= .215
.0360 
( 117) 
P= .350
.0363 
( 117) 
P= .349
.0709 
( 117) 
P= .224
(11) Foreign 
Turnover
-.1540
( 117) 
P= .049
.0072 
( 117) 
P= .469
.0671 
( 117) 
P= .236
.0745 
( 117) 
P= .212
-.1277 
( 117) 
P= .085
-.0413 
( 117) 
P= .329
-.0294
( 117) 
P= .376
-.0423 
( 117) 
P= .325
(12) No of
Substantial
Sharehold-
-.0076 
( 117) 
P= .467
.0168 
( 117) 
P= .429
.0268 
( 117) 
P= .387
.0171 
( 117) 
P= .428
-.0441 
( 117) 
P= .318
.0104 
( 117) 
P= .456
.0172 
( 117) 
P= .427
.0614 
( 117) 
P= .255
(Coefficient / (Cases) / 1-tailed Significance)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(13) No of 
Employees
.5225 
( 117) 
P= .000
.5909 
( 117) 
P= .000
.5360 
( 117) 
P= .000
.5669 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.0724 
( 117) 
P= .219
.4779 
( 117) 
P= .000
.4457 
( 117) 
P= .000
.0537 
( 117) 
P= .283
(14) Line of Busi 
ness Diver­
sification
.- .0505 
( 117) 
P= .294
.0661 
( 117) 
P= .240
.0912 
( 117) 
P= .164
.1038 
( 117) 
P= .133
-.0262 
( 117) 
P= .390
.0661 
( 117) 
P= .239
.1087 
( 117) 
P= .122
-.1087 
( 117) 
P= .122
(15) Geographical 
Diversi­
fication
.0265 
( 117) 
P= .388
.1256 
( 117) 
P= .089
.1889 
( 117) 
P= .021
.1529 
( 117) 
P= .050
-.1313 
( 117) 
P= .079
.0526 
( 117) 
P= .287
.0506 
( 117) 
P= .294
-.1414 
( 117) 
P= .064
(16) Disclosure 
Index
.1361 
( 117) 
P= .072
.1508 
( 117) 
P= .052
.1293 
( 117) 
P= .082
.1274 
( 117) 
P= .086
.0482 
( 117) 
P= .303
.0590 
( 117) 
P= .264
.0559 
( 117) 
P= .275
.1142 
( 117) 
P= .110
(17) Debt to 
Assets 
Ratio
.1900 
( 117) 
P= .020
-.1216 
( 117) 
P= .096
-.2981 
( 117) 
P= .001
-.3552 
( 117) 
P= .000
.7454 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.0352 
( 117) 
P= .353
-.0586 
( 117) 
P= .265
-.0496 
( 117) 
P= .298
(18) Growth in 
EPS
.1125 
( 117) 
P= .114
.0477 
( 117) 
P= .305
.0157 
( 117) 
P= .433
.0140 
( 117) 
P= .441
.0784 
( 117) 
P= .200
.2717 
( 117) 
P= .002
.3292 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.0960 
( 117) 
P= .152
(19) Growth in 
Trading 
Profit
.1832 
( 117) 
P= .024
.1784 
( 117) 
P= .027
.1344 
( 117) 
P= .074
.1485 
( 117) 
P= .055
.0618 
( 117) 
P= .254
.3645 
( 117) 
P= .000
.4315 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.1127 
( 117) 
P= .113
(20) Growth in 
Net
Profit
.0563 
( 117) 
P= .273
.0704 
( 117) 
P= .225
.0306 
( 117) 
P= .372
.0447 
( 117) 
P= .316
.0218 
( 117) 
P= .408
.1335 
( 117) 
P= .076
.1816 
( 117) 
P= .025
-.0144 
( 117) 
P= .439
(21) Return on 
Assets
.0892 
( 117) 
P= .169
-.0104 
( 117) 
P= .456
-.0467 
( 117) 
P= .309
-.0222 
( 117) 
P= .406
-.0489 
( 117) 
P= .300
.3859 
( 117) 
P= .000
.4348 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.0326 
( 117) 
P= .364
(22) Return on 
Turnover
.0958 
( 117) 
P= .152
.0834 
( 117) 
P= .186
.0426 
( 117) 
P= .324
.0380 
( 117) 
P= .342
.0639 
( 117) 
P= .247
.2375 
( 117) 
P= .005
.2688 
( 117) 
P= .002
.0437 
( 117) 
P= .320
(23) Return on 
Equity
.0817 
( 117) 
P= .191
-.0408 
( 117) 
P= .331
-.0814 
( 117) 
P= .192
-.0691 
( 117) 
P= .230
.4651 
( 117) 
P= .000
.2722 
( 117) 
P= .001
.3166 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.0681 
( 117) 
P= .233
(24) Return on 
Assets Less 
Current
.0659 
( 117) 
P= .240
-.0626 
( 117) 
P= .251
-.1065 
( 117) 
P= .126
-.0863 
( 117) 
P= .177
.4660 
( 117) 
P= .000
.2565 
( 117) 
P= .003
.2885 
( 117) 
P= .001
-.0849 
( 117) 
P= .181
Liabilities
(Coefficient / (Cases) / 1-tailed Significance)
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(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) Total 
Turnover
-.0926 
( 117) 
P= .160
.0187 
( 117) 
P= .421
-.1540 
( 117) 
P= .049
-.0076 
( 117) 
P= .467
.5225 
( 117) 
P= .000
.0505 
( 117) 
P= .294
.0265 
( 117) 
P= .388
.1361 
( 117) 
P= .072
(2) Total 
Assets
-.1650 
( 117) 
P= .038
-.0139 
( 117) 
P= .441
.0072 
( 117) 
P= .469
.0168 
( 117) 
P= .429
.5909 
( 117) 
P= .000
.0661 
( 117) 
P= .240
.1256 
( 117) 
P= .089
.1508 
( 117) 
P= .052
(3) Assets less 
Current 
Liabilities
-.2161 
( 117) 
P= .010
-.0297 
( 117) 
P= .375
.0671 
( 117) 
P= .236
.0268 
( 117) 
P= .387
.5360 
( 117) 
P= .000
.0912 
( 117) 
P= .164
.1889 
( 117) 
P= .021
.1293 
( 117) 
P= .082
(4) Total 
Equity
-.1959 
( 117) 
P= .017
-.0087 
( 117) 
P= .463
.0745 
( 117) 
P= .212
.0171 
( 117) 
P= .428
.5669 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1038 
( 117) 
P= .133
.1529 
( 117) 
P= .050
.1274 
( 117) 
P= .086
(5) Debt to 
Equity 
Ratio
.2566 
( 117) 
P= .003
.0737 
( 117) 
P= .215
-.1277 
( 117) 
P= .085
-.0441 
( 117) 
P= .318
-.0724 
( 117) 
P= .219
-.0262 
( 117) 
P= .390
-.1313 
( 117) 
P= .079
.0482 
( 117) 
P= .303
(6) Trading 
Profit
-.0626 
( 117) 
P= .251
.0360 
( 117) 
P= .350
-.0413 
( 117) 
P= .329
.0104 
( 117) 
P= .456
.4779 
( 117) 
P= .000
.0661 
( 117) 
P= .239
.0526 
( 117) 
P= .287
.0590 
( 117) 
P= .264
(7) Net 
Profit
-.0618 
( 117) 
P= .254
.0363 
( 117) 
P= .349
-.0294 
( 117) 
P= .376
.0172 
( 117) 
P= .427
.4457 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1087 
( 117) 
P= .122
.0506 
( 117) 
P= .294
.0559 
( 117) 
P= .275
(8) Non-Executive -.1804 
Directors ( 117) 
P= .026
.0709 
( 117) 
P= .224
-.0423 
( 117) 
P= .325
.0614 
( 117) 
P= .255
.0537 
( 117) 
P= .283
-.1087 
( 117) 
P= .122
-.1414 
( 117) 
P= .064
.1142 
( 117) 
P= .110
(9) Directors' 
Equity
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.0343 
( 117) 
P= .357
-.0365 
( 117) 
P= .348
-.4792 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.1444 
( 117) 
P= .060
-.0122 
( 117) 
P= .448
.0500 
( 117) 
P= .296
-.1523 
( 117) 
P= .051
(10) Option 
Schemes
.0343 
( 117) 
P= .357
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
-.1006 
( 117) 
P= .140
.0421 
( 117) 
P= .326
.0699 
( 117) 
P= .227
-.0071 
( 117) 
P= .470
-.0129 
( 117) 
P= .445
.2845 
( 117) 
P= .001
(11) Foreign 
Turnover
-.0365 
( 117) 
P= .348
-.1006 
( 117) 
P= .140
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.0053 
( 117) 
P= .477
-.1011 
( 117) 
P= .139
.1630 
( 117) 
P= .040
.0194 
( 117) 
P= .418
.3483 
( 117) 
P= .000
(12) No of
Substantial
Sharehold-
-.4792 
( 117) 
P= .000
.0421 
( 117) 
P= .326
.0053 
( 117) 
P= .477
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.0027 
( 117) 
P= .489
-.0420 
( 117) 
P= .326
-.0710 
( 117) 
P= .224
-.0248 
( 117) 
P= .395
ing
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400
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(13) No of 
Employees
-.1444 
( 117) 
P= .060
.0699 
( 117) 
P= .227
-.1011 
( 117) 
P= .139
.0027 
( 117) 
P= .489
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
-.0296 
( 117) 
P= .375
-.0275 
( 117) 
P= .384
.2747 
( 117) 
P= .001
(14) Line of Busi -.0122 
ness Diver- ( 117) 
sification P= .448
-.0071 
( 117) 
P= .470
.1630 
( 117) 
P= .040
-.0420 
( 117) 
P= .326
-.0296 
( 117) 
P= .375
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.1668 
( 117) 
P= .036
.0036 
( 117) 
P= .484
(15) Geographical 
Diversi­
fication
. .0500 
( 117) 
P= .296
-.0129 
( 117) 
P= .445
.0194 
( 117) 
P= .418
-.0710 
( 117) 
P= .224
-.0275 
( 117) 
P= .384
.1668 
( 117) 
P= .036
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
-.0835 
( 117) 
P= .185
(16) Disclosure 
Index
-.1523 
( 117) 
P= .051
.2845 
( 117) 
P= .001
.3483 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.0248 
( 117) 
P= .395
.2747 
( 117) 
P= .001
.0036 
( 117) 
P= .484
-.0835 
( 117) 
P= .185
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
(17) Debt to 
Assets 
Ratio
.2432 
( 117) 
P= .004
.0709 
( 117) 
P= .224
-.3259 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.0018 
( 117) 
P= .492
-.0385 
( 117) 
P= .340
-.0677 
( 117) 
P= .234
-.1174 
( 117) 
P= .104
.0230 
( 117) 
P= .403
(18) Growth in 
EPS
.1082 
( 117) 
P= .123
.0285 
( 117) 
P= .380
-.0461 
( 117) 
P= .311
-.1472 
( 117) 
P= .057
.0826 
( 117) 
P= .188
.1815 
( 117) 
P= .025
.0828 
( 117) 
P= .187
-.0690 
( 117) 
P= .230
(19) Growth in 
Trading 
Profit
.0930 
( 117) 
P= .159
.0305 
( 117) 
P= .372
-.0420 
( 117) 
P= .326
-.1327 
( 117) 
P= .077
.2794 
( 117) 
P= .001
.1198 
( 117) 
P= .099
.0933 
( 117) 
P= .159
.0302 
( 117) 
P= .373
(20) Growth in 
Net
Profit
.0582 
( 117) 
P= .266
-.0628 
( 117) 
P= .251
-.0739 
( 117) 
P= .214
-.1470 
( 117) 
P= .057
.0769 
( 117) 
P= .205
-.0042 
( 117) 
P= .482
-.0352 
( 117) 
P= .353
.0209 
( 117) 
P= .412
(21) Return on 
Assets
.1784 
( 117) 
P= .027
.0858 
( 117) 
P= .179
-.0806 
( 117) 
P= .194
-.1338 
( 117) 
P= .075
.0353 
( 117) 
P= .353
.0555 
( 117) 
P= .276
-.0740 
( 117) 
P= .214
-.1069 
( 117) 
P= .126
(22) Return on 
Turnover
.1947 
( 117) 
P= .018
.0630 
( 117) 
P= .250
-.3738 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.0495 
( 117) 
P= .298
.0762 
( 117) 
P= .207
.0263 
( 117) 
P= .389
.0528 
( 117) 
P= .286
-.0225 
( 117) 
P= .405
(23) Return on 
Equity
.1877 
( 117) 
P= .021
.1123 
( 117) 
P= .114
-.1010 
( 117) 
P= .139
-.1188 
( 117) 
P= .101
.0031 
( 117) 
P= .487
.0220 
( 117) 
P= .407
-.1281 
( 117) 
P= .084
-.0643 
( 117) 
P= .246
(24) Return on 
Assets Less 
Current
.2045 
( 117) 
P= .014
.1296 
( 117) 
P= .082
-.1149 
( 117) 
P= .109
-.1267 
( 117) 
P= .087
-.0064 
( 117) 
P= .473
-.0012 
( 117) 
P= .495
-.1048 
( 117) 
P= .130
-.0699
( 117) 
P= .227
Liabilities
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(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
(1) Total 
Turnover
.1900 
( 117) 
P= .020
.1125 
( 117) 
P= .114
.1832 
( 117) 
P= .024
.0563 
( 117) 
P= .273
.0892 
( 117) 
P= .169
.0958 
( 117) 
P= .152
.0817 
( 117) 
P= .191
.0659 
( 117) 
P= .240
(2) Total 
Assets
-.1216 
( 117) 
P= .096
.0477 
( 117) 
P= .305
.1784 
( 117) 
P= .027
.0704 
( 117) 
P= .225
-.0104 
( 117) 
P= .456
.0834 
( 117) 
P= .186
-.0408 
( 117) 
P= .331
-.0626 
( 117) 
P= .251
(3) Assets less 
Current 
Liabilities
-.2981 
( 117) 
P= .001
.0157 
( 117) 
P= .433
.1344 
( 117) 
P= .074
.0306 
( 117) 
P= .372
-.0467 
( 117) 
P= .309
.0426 
( 117) 
P= .324
-.0814 
( 117) 
P= .192
-.1065 
( 117) 
P= .126
(4) Total 
Equity
-.3552 
( 117) 
P= .000
.0140 
( 117) 
P= .441
.1485 
( 117) 
P= .055
.0447 
( 117) 
P= .316
-.0222 
( 117) 
P= .406
.0380 
( 117) 
P= .342
-.0691 
( 117) 
P= .230
-.0863 
( 117) 
P= .177
(5) Debt to 
Equity 
Ratio
.7454 
( 117) 
P= .000
.0784 
( 117) 
P= .200
.0618 
( 117) 
P= .254
.0218 
( 117) 
P= .408
-.0489 
( 117) 
P= .300
.0639 
( 117) 
P= .247
.4651 
( 117) 
P= .000
.4660 
( 117) 
P= .000
(6) Trading 
Profit
-.0352 
( 117) 
P= .353
.2717 
( 117) 
P= .002
.3645 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1335 
( 117) 
P= .076
.3859 
( 117) 
P= .000
.2375 
( 117) 
P= .005
.2722 
( 117) 
P= .001
.2565 
( 117) 
P= .003
(7) Net 
Profit
-.0586 
( 117) 
P= .265
.3292 
( 117) 
P= .000
.4315 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1816 
( 117) 
P= .025
.4348 
( 117) 
P= .000
.2688 
( 117) 
P= .002
.3166 
( 117) 
P= .000
.2885 
( 117) 
P= .001
(8) Non-Executive -.0496 
Directors ( 117) 
P= .298
-.0960 
( 117) 
P= .152
-.1127 
( 117) 
P= .113
-.0144 
( 117) 
P= .439
-.0326 
( 117) 
P= .364
.0437 
( 117) 
P= .320
-.0681 
( 117) 
P= .233
-.0849 
( 117) 
P= .181
(9) Directors' 
Equity
.2432 
( 117) 
P= .004
.1082 
( 117) 
P= .123
.0930 
( 117) 
P= .159
.0582 
( 117) 
P= .266
.1784 
( 117) 
P= .027
.1947 
( 117) 
P= .018
.1877 
( 117) 
P= .021
.2045 
( 117) 
P= .014
(10) Option 
Schemes
.0709 
( 117) 
P= .224
.0285 
( 117) 
P= .380
.0305 
( 117) 
P= .372
-.0628 
( 117) 
P= .251
.0858 
( 117) 
P= .179
.0630 
( 117) 
P= .250
.1123 
( 117) 
P= .114
.1296 
( 117) 
P= .082
(11) Foreign 
Turnover
-.3259 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.0461 
( 117) 
P= .311
-.0420 
( 117) 
P= .326
-.0739 
( 117) 
P= .214
-.0806 
( 117) 
P= .194
-.3738 
( 117) 
P= .000
-.1010 
( 117) 
P= .139
-.1149 
( 117) 
P= .109
(12) No of
Substantial
Sharehold-
-.0018 
( 117) 
P= .492
-.1472 
( 117) 
P= .057
-.1327 
( 117) 
P= .077
-.1470 
( 117) 
P= .057
-.1338 
( 117) 
P= .075
-.0495 
( 117) 
P= .298
-.1188 
( 117) 
P= .101
-.1267 
( 117) 
P= .087
ing
(Coefficient / (Cases) / 1-tailed Significance)
4 0 2
(13) No of 
Employees
Diversi­
fication
(16) Disclosure 
Index
(17) Debt to 
Assets 
Ratio
(18) Growth in 
EPS
(19) Growth in 
Trading 
Profit
(20) Growth in 
Net
Profit
(21) Return on 
Assets
(22) Return on 
Turnover
(23) Return on 
Equity
(24) Return on 
Assets Less 
Current 
Liabilities
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
-.0385 
( 117) 
P= .340
.0826 
( 117) 
P= .188
.2794 
( 117) 
P= .001
.0769 
( 117) 
P= .205
.0353 
( 117) 
P= .353
.0762 
( 117) 
P= .207
.0031 
( 117) 
P= .487
-.0064 
( 117) 
P= .473
. -.0677 
( 117) 
P= .234
.1815 
( 117) 
P= .025
.1198 
( 117) 
P= .099
-.0042 
( 117) 
P= .482
.0555 
( 117) 
P= .276
.0263 
( 117) 
P= .389
.0220 
( 117) 
P= .407
-.0012 
( 117) 
P= .495
-.1174 
( 117) 
P= .104
.0828 
( 117) 
P= .187
.0933 
( 117) 
P= .159
-.0352 
( 117) 
P= .353
-.0740 
( 117) 
P= .214
.0528 
( 117) 
P= .286
-.1281 
( 117) 
P= .084
-.1048 
( 117) 
P= .130
.0230 
( 117) 
P= .403
-.0690 
( 117) 
P= .230
.0302 
( 117) 
P= .373
.0209 
( 117) 
P= .412
-.1069 
( 117) 
P= .126
-.0225 
( 117) 
P= .405
-.0643 
( 117) 
P= .246
-.0699 
( 117) 
P= .227
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.2611 
( 117) 
P= .002
.1932 
( 117) 
P= .018
.0983 
( 117) 
P= .146
-.0024 
( 117) 
P= .490
.2848 
( 117) 
P= .001
.1948 
( 117) 
P= .018
.2053 
( 117) 
P= .013
.2611 
( 117) 
P= .002
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.9064 
( 117) 
P= .000
.4207 
( 117) 
P= .000
.5534 
( 117) 
P= .000
.4760 
( 117) 
P= .000
.3864 
( 117) 
P= .000
.3924 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1932 
( 117) 
P= .018
.9064 
( 117) 
P= .000
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.3968 
( 117) 
P= .000
.5600 
( 117) 
P= .000
.5431 
( 117) 
P= .000
.3812 
( 117) 
P= .000
.3777 
( 117) 
P= .000
.0983 
( 117) 
P= .146
.4207 
( 117) 
P= .000
.3968 
( 117) 
P= .000
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.1902 
( 117) 
P= .020
.1849 
( 117) 
P= .023
.1337 
( 117) 
P= .075
.1329 
( 117) 
P= .077
-.0024 
( 117) 
P= .490
.5534 
( 117) 
P= .000
.5600 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1902 
( 117) 
P= .020
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.4959 
( 117) 
P= .000
.7174 
( 117) 
P= .000
.6952 
( 117) 
P= .000
.2848 
( 117) 
P= .001
.4760 
( 117) 
P= .000
.5431 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1849 
( 117) 
P= .023
.4959 
( 117) 
P= .000
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.2902 
( 117) 
P= .001
.2794 
( 117) 
P= .001
.1948 
( 117) 
P= .018
.3864 
( 117) 
P= .000
.3812 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1337 
( 117) 
P= .075
.7174 
( 117) 
P= .000
.2902 
( 117) 
P= .001
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
.9803 
( 117) 
P= .000
.2053 
( 117) 
P= .013
.3924 
( 117) 
P= .000
.3777 
( 117) 
P= .000
.1329 
( 117) 
P= .077
.6952 
( 117) 
P= .000
.2794 
( 117) 
P= .001
.9803 
( 117) 
P= .000
1.0000 
( 117) 
P= .
(Coefficient / (Cases) / 1-tailed Significance)
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APPENDIX 11
Company Data
Company Name .............
Company Number
USM Date of Entry..... .....
Year End ...................
Industry .......................
Total Sales ...........
Total Assets ..........
Total Assets less Current
Liabilities --------
Total Equity ..........
Debt/Equity Ratio ................
Trading Profit ............
Net Profit After Tax and
Extra-ordinary Items ----
Extraordinary Items .......
Accountancy Firm ...............
Non-Executive Directors ..........
Directors Equity .................
Percentage of Foreign Sales........................ *
Foreign Sales ..............
w/r _ co/ c Vi^ v a Vi a I H i  nrr . _ _ .......................w o r e  Xlletii -Vo UJIXCLI. c n v x u j . 1 ^  ............................
iNU UJL ..........................
Line of Business Diversification Index .. 
Geographical Diversification Index
*
*
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APPENDIX 12
* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * * 
RESULTS
THE FIRST MODEL
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. FSPER PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN TURNOVER
Multiple R .38004
R Square .14443
Adjusted R Square .13730
Standard Error .07549
Analysis of Variance
DF 
1 
120
R Square Change 
F Change 
Signif F Change
.14443 
20.25710 
.0000
Regression
Residual
Sum of Squares 
.11543 
.68377
Mean Square 
.11543 
.00570
F = 20.25710 Signif F = .0000
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Variables in the Equation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.192235E—03 2.64895E-04 .38004 .38004 .38004 .38004 4.501 .0000
(Constant) .24160 8.19950E-03 29.465 .0000
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial
EMPL .30098 .32322
DIREQ -.14198 -.15335
LOB -.03742 -.04012
DEAST .16742 .17347
TAX 8.6918E-03 .00928
DY1 -2.010E-03 -.00216
DY2 .01036 .01107
DY3 -.05220 -.05611
GDI -.11861 -.12823
DEPS -.04756 -.05137
OPTION .31199 .33548
DY4 .24916 .26467
DY5 -.12920 -.13922
DY6 -.22852 -.24534
FIRM -4.109E-03 -.00444
Min Toler T Sig T
.98668 3.726 .0003
.99811 -1.693 .0931
.98308 -.438 .6622
.91857 1.922 .0571
.97605 . 101 .9195
.99028 -.024 .9812
.97655 . 121 .9041
.98868 -.613 .5410
.99999 -1.410 . 1610
.99792 -.561 .5758
.98927 3.885 . 0002
.96540 2.994 .0033
.99337 -1.534 . 1278
.98616 -2.761 .0067
.99988 -.048 .9614
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Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
2.. OPTION EXISTANCE OF EXECUTIVE SHARE OPTION
Multiple R .49064
R Square .24072
Adjusted R Square .22796
Standard Error .07141
R Square Change 
F Change 
Signif F Change
.09629
15.09205
.0002
Analysis of Variance
DF 
2
119
Regression
Residual
Sum of Squares 
.19238 
.60681
Mean Square 
.09619 
.00510
F = 18.86401 Signif F = .0000
Variable 6
Variables in the Equation - - - - - - - - - -
SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial
FSPER 1.293634E-03 2.51945E-04 .41236 .38004 .41014 .42587
OPTION .02755 7.09258E-03 .31199 .26927 .31031 .33548
(Constant) .22564 8.77781E-03
T Sig T
5.135 .0000 
3.885 .0002 
25.706 .0000
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial Min Toler T Sig T
EMPL .28512 .32456 .97740 3. 727 .0003
DIREQ -.14951 -.17136 .98762 -1.889 .0613
LOB -.03810 -.04336 .97265 -.471 .6382
DEAST .14822 .16273 .91235 1.792 .0758
TAX .03796 .04285 .96273 .466 .6421
DY1 .02385 .02715 .97798 .295 .7685
DY2 .03235 .03660 .96405 .398 .6915
DY3 -.04235 -.04831 .97749 -.525 . 6003
GDI -.11362 -.13037 .98901 -1.428 . 1558
DEPS -.05389 -.06177 .98741 -.672 .5027
DY4 .17260 .18640 .88553 2 .061 . 0415
DY5 -.13034 -.14909 .98283 -1.638 . 1041
DY6 -.19430 -.21988 .97239 -2.448 .0158
FIRM -.05000 -.05677 .96861 - . 618 . 5380
406
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
3.. EMPL NO OF EMPLOYEES
Multiple R .56631
.07998 
13.89351 
.0003
R Square .32070
Adjusted R Square .30343
Standard Error .06783
R Square Change 
F Change 
Signif F Change
Analysis of Variance
DF 
3 
118
Regression
Residual
Sum of Squares 
.25631 
.54289
Mean Square 
.08544 
.00460
F = 18.56977 Signif F = .0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.391945E—03 2.40763E-04 .44370 .38004 .43865 .46982 5.781 .0000
OPTION .02621 6.74660E—03 .29680 .26927 .29478 .33677 3.885 .0002
EMPL 3.561272E-05 9.55431E-06 .28512 .25310 .28281 .32456 3.727 .0003
(Constant) .21353 8.94782E-03 23.864 .0000
Variables not in
Variable Beta In Partial
DIREQ -.11594 -.13940
LOB -.03188 -.03835
DEAST .16521 .19146
TAX .03589 .04284
DY1 9.3197E-03 .01 1 2 0
DY2 .03578 .04279
DY3 -.04439 -.05352
GDI -.10235 -.12407
DEPS -.07520 -.09088
DY4 .21011 .23829
DY5 -.11922 -.14405
DY6 -.18159 -.21704
FIRM -.01236 -.01470
the Equation
Min Toler T Sig T
.96851 -1.523 . 1305
.96174 -.415 .6788
.89906 2 . 1 1 0 .0370
.95172 .464 .6437
.96746 .121 .9038
.95238 .463 .6440
.96606 -.580 .5632
.97739 -1.352 . 1788
.97619 -.987 .3256
.87371 2.654 .0091
.97041 -1.575 .1180
.95982 -2.405 .0177
.96183 -.159 .8739
407
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
4.. DY4
Multiple R .59940
R Square .35928
Adjusted R Square .33737
Standard Error .06616
R Square Change .03857
F Change 7.04354
Signif F Change .0091
Analysis of Variance
DF
Regression 4
Residual 117
Sum of Squares 
.28713 
.51206
Mean Square 
.07178 
.00438
F = 16.40152 Signif F = .0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.257864E-03 2.40197E-04 .40096 .38004 .38753 .43576 5.237 .0000
OPTION .02083 6.88548E-03 .23587 .26927 .22388 .26935 3.025 .0031
EMPL 3.848851E-05 9.38144E-06 .30814 .25310 .30360 .35464 4.103 .0001
DY4 .03600 .01357 .21011 .31123 .19640 .23829 2.654 .0091
(Constant) .20561 9.22381E-03 22.291 .0000
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial
DIREQ -.12826 -.15849
LOB -.03524 -.04364
DEAST .15674 .18687
TAX .05388 .06596
DY1 .03111 .03827
DY2 .07698 .09303
DY3 6.4338E-03 .00772
GDI -.11026 -.13751
DEPS -.09859 -.12190
DY5 -.08222 - . 1 0 0 1 2
DY6 -.13545 -.15964
FIRM -.01642 - . 0 2 0 1 1
Min Toler T Sig T
.87059 -1.729 .0865
.87346 -.470 . 6389
.85806 2.049 .0427
.86695 .712 .4779
.86351 .413 .6807
.84135 1.006 .3164
.81688 .083 .9338
.87236 -1.495 .1376
.86269 -1.323 .1885
.83694 -1.084 .2807
.80141 -1.742 .0842
.87335 -.217 .8289
408
V3.Fiable (s) Entered on Step Number
5.. DEAST DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS RATIO
Multiple R .61778
.38165 R Square Change .02237
Adjusted R Square .35500 F Change 4.19712
Standard Error .06527 Signif F Change .0427
Analysis of Variance
DF
Regression 5
Residual 116
Sum of Squares 
.30501 
.49418
Mean Square 
.06100 
.00426
F = 14.31919 Signif F = .0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.402441E-03 2.47266E-04 .44704 .38004 .41410 .46595 5.672 .0000
OPTION .02015 6.80136E-03 .22819 .26927 .21633 .26525 2.963 .0037
EMPL 3.944723E-05 9.26765E-06 .31582 .25310 .31077 .36754 4.256 .0000
DY4 .03483 .01340 .20330 .31123 .18986 .23469 2.600 .0105
DEAST .06503 .03174 .15674 .04534 .14958 .18687 2.049 .0427
(Constant) .16934 .01991 8.507 .0000
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial
DIREQ -.16766 -.20615
LOB -.03542 -.04464
TAX .10212 .12260
DY1 .08902 .10558
DY2 .05710 .06960
DY3 -5.093E-03 -.00621
GDI -.08551 -.10668
DEPS -.13677 -.16823
DY5 -.08518 -.10556
DY6 -.13834 -.16594
FIRM -.02277 -.02837
Min Toler T Sig T
.85806 -2.259 .0258
.84658 -.479 .6327
.81801 1.325 .1879
.81690 1.139 .2573
.83742 .748 .4559
.81393 -.067 .9470
.85456 -1.151 .2523
.85805 -1.830 .0698
.83520 -1.138 .2573
.79972 -1.805 .0738
.85776 - .304 .7614
409
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
6.. DIREQ DIRECTORS EQUITY
Multiple R .63869
R Square .40793
Adjusted R Square .37704
Standard Error .06415
R Square Change .02628
F Change 5.10402
Signif F Change .0258
Analysis of Variance
DF
Regression 6
Residual 115
Sum of Squares 
.32601 
.47318
Mean Square 
.05434 
.00411
13.20550 Signif F = .0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.400649E—03 2.43006E-04 .44647 .38004 .41357 .47343 5.764 .0000
OPTION .02018 6.68416E—03 .22846 .26927 .21659 .27095 3.019 .0031
EMPL 3.718297E-05 9.16291E-06 .29769 .25310 .29117 .35392 4.058 .0001
DY4 .03638 .01318 .21233 .31123 .19803 .24923 2.760 .0067
DEAST .08025 .03191 .19344 .04534 .18043 .22830 2.515 .0133
DIREQ -6.01885E-04 2.66414E-04 -.16766 -.15825 -.16210 -.20615 -2.259 .0258
(Constant) .18438 .02066 8.922 .0000
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial Min Toler T Sig T
LOB -.03997 -.05147 .84658 -.550 .5832
TAX .11521 .14098 .80341 1.520 .1312
DY1 .07604 .09188 .79117 .985 .3266
DY2 .04077 .05053 .83659 .540 .5901
DY3 .03724 .04505 .80330 .481 .6311
GDI -.07133 -.09059 .83553 -.971 .3335
DEPS -.12686 -.15916 .83682 -1.721 . 0879
DY5 -.08188 -.10368 .83267 -1.113 .2681
DY6 -.18152 -.21774 .79964 -2.382 .0189
FIRM -4.741E-03 -.00600 .85774 - .064 . 9490
410
Variable ( s) Entered, on Step Number
7. DY6
Multiple R .66030
R Square .43600
Adjusted R Square .40137
Standard Error .06288
R Square Change .02807
F Change 5.67359
Signif F Change .0189
Analysis of Variance
DF
Regression 7
Residual 1 1 4
Sum of Squares 
.34845 
.45075
Mean Square 
.04978 
.00395
F = 12.58951 Signif F = .0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.361562E-03 2.38778E-04 .43401 .38004 .40108 .47109 5.702 .0000
OPTION .01972 6.55509E-03 .22334 .26927 .21165 .27125 3.009 .0032
EMPL 3.492780E-05 9.03197E-06 .27964 .25310 .27200 .34054 3.867 .0002
DY4 .02727 .01348 .15913 .31123 .14230 .18617 2.023 .0454
DEAST .08491 .03135 .20466 .04534 .19052 .24590 2.709 .0078
DIREQ -7.33047E-04 2.66902E-04 -.20420 -.15825 -.19318 -.24912 -2.746 .0070
DY6 -.03968 .01666 -.18152 -.27006 -.16754 -.21774 -2.382 .0189
(Constant) .19808 .02106 9.406 .0000
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial Min Toler T Sig T
LOB -.07253 -.09414 .79873 -1.005 .3169
TAX .08065 .09874 .78324 1.055 .2938
DY1 .04605 .05614 .78338 .598 .5512
DY2 -7.791E-03 -.00952 .74185 - . 1 0 1 .9196
DY3 -7.270E-03 -.00874 .70962 -.093 .9262
GDI -.07061 -.09188 .79817 -.981 .3288
DEPS -.12389 -.15923 .79111 -1.715 .0892
DY5 -.12381 -.15699 .74584 -1.690 .0938
FIRM -.02493 -.03212 .79930 - .342 . 7333
411
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
8 DEPS GROWTH IN EPS
Multiple R .67104
R Square .45030
Adjusted R Square .41138
Standard Error .06235
R Square Change .01430
F Change 2.93953
Signif F Change .0892
Analysis of Variance
DF
Regression 8
Residual 113
Sum of Squares 
.35988 
.43932
Mean Square 
.04498 
.00389
F = 11.57068 Signif F = 0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.364042E-03 2.36777E-04 .43480 .38004 .40180 .47647 5.761 .0000
OPTION .01941 6.50260E-03 .21979 .26927 .20820 .27036 2.985 .0035
EMPL 3.657897E-05 9.00774E-06 .29286 .25310 .28323 .35686 4.061 .0001
DY4 .02965 .01344 .17302 .31123 .15389 .20323 2.206 .0294
DEAST .09545 .03168 .23007 .04534 .21011 .27265 3.012 .0032
DIREQ -7.03827E-04 2.65209E-04 -.19606 -.15825 -.18510 -.24222 -2.654 .0091
DY6 -.03919 .01652 -.17927 -.27006 -.16544 -.21778 -2.372 .0194
DEPS -8.20979E-03 4.78842E-03 -.12389 -.06481 -.11958 -.15923 -1.715 .0892
(Constant) .19037 .02136 8.913 .0000
Variables not in
Variable Beta In Partial
LOB -.04921 -.06330
TAX .10298 .12621
DY1 .07301 .08857
DY2 3.4890E-03 .00430
DY3 5.4741E-03 .00663
GDI -.05712 -.07478
DY5 -.11833 -.15182
FIRM -.03941 -.05109
the Equation
Min Toler T Sig T
.78861 -.671 .5035
.76149 1.346 . 1809
.74508 .941 .3487
.73066 .046 .9638
.69772 .070 .9442
.79036 -.794 .4291
.73656 -1.626 .1069
.79105 -.541 .5893
412
APPENDIX 13
* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * * 
RESULTS
THE SECOND MODEL
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1. . FSPER
Multiple R 
R Square
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error
FOREIGN TURNOVER AS A PER OF THE TOTAL
.38004 
.14443 
.13730 
.07549
R Square Change .14443 
F Change 20.25710
Signif F Change .0000
Analysis of Variance
DF 
1 
120
Regression
Residual
Sum of Squares 
.11543 
.68377
Mean Square 
.11543 
.00570
F = 20.25710 Signif F = .0000
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Variables in the Equation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.192235E-03 2.64895E-04 .38004 .38004 .38004 .38004 4.501 .0000
(Constant) .24160 8.19950E-03 29.465 .0000
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial
TS .19669 .20992
DIREQ -.14198 -.15335
LOB -.03742 -.04012
DEAST .16742 .17347
TAX 8.6918E-03 .00928
DY1 -2.010E-03 -.00216
DY2 .01036 .01107
DY3 -.05220 -.05611
GDI -.11861 -.12823
DEPS -.04756 -.05137
OPTION .31199 .33548
DY4 .24916 .26467
DY5 -.12920 -.13922
DY6 -.22852 -.24534
FIRM -4.109E-03 -.00444
Min Toler T Sig T
.97449 2.342 .0208
.99811 -1.693 .0931
.98308 -.438 .6622
.91857 1.922 .0571
.97605 . 101 .9195
.99028 -.024 .9812
.97655 .121 .9041
.98868 -.613 .5410
.99999 -1.410 . 1610
.99792 -.561 .5758
.98927 3.885 .0002
.96540 2.994 .0033
.99337 -1.534 . 1278
.98616 -2.761 .0067
.99988 -.048 .9614
413
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
2.. OPTION EXISTANCE OF EXECUTIVE SHARE OPTION
Multiple R .49064
R Square .24072
Adjusted R Square .22796
Standard Error .07141
R Square Change 
F Change 
Signif F Change
.09629
15.09205
.0002
Analysis of Variance
DF 
2
119
Regression
Residual
Sum of Squares 
.19238 
.60681
Mean Square 
.09619 
.00510
F = 18.86401 Signif F = .0000
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Variables in the Equation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.293634E-03 2.51945E-04 .41236 .38004 .41014 .42587 5.135 .0000
OPTION .02755 7.09258E-03 .31199 .26927 .31031 .33548 3.885 .0002
(Constant) .22564 8.77781E-03 25.706 .0000
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial
TS .19380 .21955
DIREQ -.14951 -.17136
LOB -.03810 -.04336
DEAST .14822 .16273
TAX .03796 .04285
DY1 .02385 .02715
DY2 .03235 .03660
DY3 -.04235 -.04831
GDI -.11362 -.13037
DEPS -.05389 -.06177
DY4 .17260 .18640
DY5 -.13034 -.14909
DY6 -.19430 -.21988
FIRM -.05000 -.05677
Min Toler T Sig T
.96458 2.445 .0160
.98762 -1.889 .0613
.97265 -.471 . 6382
.91235 1.792 .0758
.96273 .466 .6421
.97798 .295 .7685
.96405 .398 .6915
.97749 -.525 .6003
.98901 -1.428 . 1558
.98741 -.672 .5027
.88553 2.061 .0415
.98283 -1.638 . 1041
.97239 -2.448 .0158
.96861 -.618 .5380
414
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
3.. DY6
Multiple R .52672
R Square .27743
Adjusted R Square .25906
Standard Error .06996
R Square Change .03671
F Change 5.99488
Signif F Change .0158
Analysis of Variance
DF 
3 
118
Regression
Residual
F = 15.10216
Sum of Squares 
.22172 
.57747
Signif F = 0000
Mean Square 
.07391 
.00489
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.214483E-03 2.48926E-04 .38713 .38004 .38179 .40971 4.879 .0000
OPTION .02553 6.99730E-03 .28906 .26927 .28549 .31838 3.648 .0004
DY6 -.04248 .01735 -.19430 -.27006 -.19160 -.21988 -2.448 .0158
(Constant) .23500 9.41114E-03 24.971 .0000
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial
TS .21091 .24412
DIREQ -.19537 -.22497
LOB -.07209 -.08292
DEAST .14973 .16850
TAX 1.7496E-03 .00199
DY1 1.5996E-03 .00185
DY2 -7.542E-04 -.00086
DY3 -.08095 -.09300
GDI -.11869 -.13956
DEPS -.05933 -.06968
DY4 .12540 .13326
DY5 -.15955 -.18532
FIRM -.07575 -.08746
Min Toler T Sig T
.95157 2. 723 .0075
.93395 -2.497 .0139
.94571 -.900 .3700
.89860 1.849 .0670
.93421 .022 .9829
.95825 .020 .9840
.94034 -.009 .9926
.93885 -1 . 0 1 0 .3144
.97173 -1.525 . 1301
.97047 - . 756 .4514
.81601 1.454 . 1485
.95428 -2.040 .0436
.95677 -.950 .3442
415
V&riable (s) Entered on Step Number
4* • Ts TOTAL TURNOVER
Multiple R .56612
.04306 
7.41420 
.0075
K square .32049
Adjusted R Square .29726
Standard Error .06813
R Square Change 
F Change 
Signif F Change
Analysis of Variance
DF 
4
117
Regression
Residual
Sum of Squares 
.25614 
.54306
Mean Square 
.06403 
.00464
F = 13.79586 Signif F = 0000
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Variables in the Eguation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.312578E-03 2.45087E-04 .41840 .38004 .40814 .44371 5.356 .0000
OPTION .02518 6.81574E-03 .28511 .26927 .28154 .32321 3.694 .0003
DY6 -.04622 .01695 -.21140 -.27006 -.20777 -.24441 -2.726 .0074
TS 6.222909E-10 2.28539E-10 .21091 .13097 .20751 .24412 2.723 .0075
(Constant) .22249 .01025 21.699 .0000
Variables not in
Variable Beta In Partial
DIREQ -.17826 -.21087
LOB -.09503 - . 1 1 2 1 2
DEAST .11316 .12901
TAX 9.9581E-03 .01167
DY1 1.8048E-03 .00216
DY2 -.01236 -.01455
DY3 -.10314 -.12158
GDI - . 1 2 2 1 0 -.14803
DEPS -.08206 -.09883
DY4 .17954 .19264
DY5 -.17193 -.20561
FIRM -.04364 -.05132
the Equation
Min Toler T Sig T
.93031 -2.323 .0219
.93676 -1.215 .2268
.88318 1.401 . 1638
.91642 . 126 .9002
.93781 .023 .9815
.92315 -.157 .8758
.92977 -1.319 .1897
.95157 -1.612 . 1097
.95066 -1.070 .2870
.78226 2.114 .0366
.94398 -2.263 .0255
.93955 -.553 .5810
416
Variable (s) Entered, on Step Number
5.. DIREQ DIRECTORS EQUITY
Multiple R .59221
R Square .35071
Adjusted R Square .32272
Standard Error .06688
R Square Change .03022
F Change 5.39820
Signif F Change .0219
Analysis of Variance
DF 
5 
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Regression
Residual
Sum of Squares 
.28028 
.51891
Mean Square 
.05606 
.00447
F = 12.53121 Signif F = .0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.267826E-03 2.41376E-04 .40413 .38004 .39297 .43833 5.252 .0000
OPTION .02521 6.69115E-03 .28546 .26927 .28188 .33020 3.768 .0003
DY6 -.05379 .01696 -.24604 -.27006 -.23732 -.28252 -3.172 .0019
TS 5.767377E-10 2.25216E-10 .19547 .13097 .19159 .23132 2.561 .0117
DIREQ -6.39950E-04 2.75437E-04 -.17826 -.15825 -.17383 -.21087 -2.323 .0219
(Constant) .24962 .01542 16.190 .0000
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial Min Toler
LOB -.10406 -.12544 .90014
DEAST .16875 .19079 .82993
TAX 3.4588E-03 .00414 .89804
DY1 -.03060 -.03681 .90981
DY2 -.03225 -.03859 .89603
DY3 -.06994 -.08261 .90584
GDI -.11352 -.14061 .93004
DEPS -.06422 -.07869 .93008
DY4 .17976 .19731 .78226
DY5 -.17316 -.21183 .91223
FIRM -.02653 -.03176 .92186
T Sig T
-1.356 
2.084 
.044 
-.395 
-.414 
-.889 
-1.523 
-.846 
2.158 
-2.324 
- .341
. 1778 
.0394 
.9646 
.6935 
.6796 
.3759 
.1305 
.3991 
.0330 
.0219 
. 7339
417
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
6.. DY5
Multiple R .61631
R Square .37984
Adjusted R Square .34749
Standard Error .06565
R Square Change .02914
F Change 5.40273
Signif F Change .0219
Analysis of Variance
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
Regression 6 .30357 .05059
Residual 115 .49563 .00431
F = 11.73948 Signif F = .0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.218307E-03 2.37878E-04 .38835 .38004 .37610 .43096 5.122 .0000
OPTION .02500 6.56829E-03 .28309 .26927 .27952 .33450 3.806 .0002
DY6 -.05924 .01681 -.27096 -.27006 -.25879 -.31220 -3.524 .0006
TS 6.053073E-10 2.21402E-10 .20515 .13097 .20077 .24704 2.734 .0072
DIREQ -6.44290E-04 2.70360E-04 -.17947 -.15825 -.17500 -.21693 -2.383 .0188
DY5 -.05361 .02307 -.17316 -.15930 -.17069 -.21183 -2.324 .0219
(Constant) .25506 .01531 16.656 .0000
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial
LOB -.09243 -.11375
DEAST .16963 .19623
TAX .01449 .01772
DY1 -.04620 -.05666
DY2 -.05702 -.06919
DY3 -.09968 -.11905
GDI -.08533 -.10636
DEPS -.06265 -.07854
DY4 .14113 .15374
FIRM -.05907 -.07126
Min Toler T Sig T
.88598 -1.222 .2241
.82991 2.137 .0348
.88379 .189 .8502
.88909 -.606 .5458
.87216 -.741 .4605
.88356 -1.280 .2031
.91216 -1.142 .2558
.91204 -.841 .4020
.73588 1.661 .0994
.89910 -.763 .4471
418
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
7.. DEAST
Multiple R .63539
R Square .40372
Adjusted R Square .36711
Standard Error .06465
R Square Change .02388
F Change 4.56539
Signif F Change .0348
Analysis of Variance
DF 
7
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Regression
Residual
Sum of Squares 
.32265 
.47654
Mean Square 
.04609 
.00418
F = 11.02658 Signif F = .0000
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta Correl Part Cor Partial T Sig T
FSPER 1.341805E—03 2.41298E-04 .42771 .38004 .40217 .46192 5.561 .0000
OPTION .02416 6.48061E-03 .27362 .26927 .26967 .32970 3.729 .0003
DY6 -.06069 .01657 -.27759 -.27006 -.26491 -.32450 -3.663 .0004
TS 5.042811E-10 2.23115E-10 .17091 .13097 .16346 .20710 2.260 .0257
DIREQ -7.88416E-04 2.74675E-04 -.21962 -.15825 -.20759 -.25962 -2.870 .0049
DY5 -.05384 .02272 -.17389 -.15930 -.17141 -.21670 -2.370 .0195
DEAST .07037 .03294 .16963 .04534 .15453 .19623 2.137 .0348
(Constant) .22393 .02097 10.680 .0000
Variables not in the Equation
Variable Beta In Partial Min Toler T Sig T
LOB -.09185 -.11527 .82990 -1.234 .2199
TAX .06278 .07537 .76846 .803 .4234
DY1 2.5431E-03 .00303 .75364 .032 .9744
DY2 -.08402 -.10272 .81009 -1.098 .2746
DY3 -.09900 -.12058 .82990 -1.291 . 1993
GDI -.05474 -.06803 .79346 -.725 .4700
DEPS -.09301 -.11706 .80431 -1.253 .2128
DY4 .12416 .13722 .72832 1.473 . 1436
FIRM -.06949 -.08533 .82668 - .910 . 3646
419
APPENDIX 14
MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
RESIDUALS STATISTICS: THE FIRST MODEL
Min Max Mean Std Dev
*PRED .1765 .4871 .2620 .0545
*RESID -.1298 .1371 .0000 .0603
*ZPRED -1.5673 4.1277 - . 0 0 0 0 1.0000
*ZRESID -2.0817 2.1980 .0000 .9664
Total Cases = 122
14.1 Outliers - Standardized Residual 
Case # *ZRESID
106 2.19801
66 2.13148
99 -2.08167
19 -1.86506
24 1.83423
36 -1.81377
29 -1.76989
9 1.74137
57 -1.72189
107 1.65918
14.2 Histogram - Standardized Residual
: = Normal Curve)NExp N (* = 1 Cases,
0 .09 Out
0 .19 3.00
0 .48 2.67
1 1.09 2.33 :
2 2.23 2 . 0 0 * :
6 4.08 1.67 * * * . * *
9 6.69 1.33 ******;**
9 9.84 1 . 0 0 *********.
* 13.0 .67 **********
* 15.3 .33 ***********
* 16.1 .00 ***************
* 15.3 -.33 **************:
* 13.0 -.67 *********** .
* 9.84 -1 . 0 0 *********;*****
7 6.69 -1.33 ******;
3 4.08 -1.67 ***
2 2.23 -2 . 0 0 * .
0 1.09 -2.33 .
0 .48 -2.67
0 .19 -3.00
0 .09 Out
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14.3 Normal Probability (P-P) Plot
Standardized Residual
1 . 0 sssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss**
s * s
s  * * s
s * * s
s ** s
.75 s . * s
s ***** s
0 s ** # s
b s ** . s
s s ** . s
e .5 s ** . s
r s ** . s
V s * . s
e s ** s
d g  * * s
.25 g  * * s
g  * * s
s * s
s . * s
g  * * * s
s*sssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss Expected 
.25 .5 .75 1.0
14.4 Standardized Scatterplot
Across - *RESID Down - *PRED
Out ssssssssssssssss . ssssssss . sssssssss
3 s 
s 
s
2 s 
s 
s
1 s 
s 
s
0 s 
s 
s
si s 
s 
s
s2 s 
s 
s
s3 s
s3 s2 si 0 1 2 3 Out
* *
s Symbol
s
s Max N
s
s . 1.0
s : 2. 0
s * 4.0
s
s
s
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s
s
s
s
s
s
s
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APPENDIX 15
MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
RESIDUALS STATISTICS: THE SECOND MODEL
Min Max Mean Std Dev
*PRED .1716 .4631 .2620 .0516
*RESID -.1478 .1466 .0000 .0628
*ZPRED -1.7504 3.8946 - . 0 0 0 0 1.0000
*ZRESID -2.2857 2.2680 .0000 .9706
Total Cases = 122
15.1 Outliers - Standardized Residual 
Case #______ *ZRESID
29 -2.28575
19 -2.28175
66 2.26799
99 -2.25204
101 2.10004
106 1.81047
15 -1.80299
116 1.70306
33 1.69499
57 -1.60194
15.2 Histogram - Standardized Residual
: = Normal Curve)NExp N (* = 1 Cases,
0 .09 Out
0 .19 3.00
0 .48 2.67
1 1.09 2.33 :
1 2.23 2 . 0 0 * .
6 4.08 1.67 ***.**
8 6.69 1.33 ******:*
* 9.84 1 . 0 0 *********:****
6 13.0 .67 ******
* 15.3 .33 ************* .
* 16.1 .00 ************** .
* 15.3 -.33 **************:*
* 13 .0 -.67 ************:**
* 9.84 -1 . 0 0 *********:**
8 6.69 -1.33 ******:*
2 4.08 -1.67 **
0 2.23 -2 . 0 0 .
3 1.09 -2.33 . **
0 .48 -2.67
0 . 19 -3.00
0 . 09 Out
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15.3 Normal Probability (P-P) Plot
Standardized Residual
1.0 SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS **
S * s
s ** s
s . * s
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.25 .5 .75 1.0
15.4 Standardized Scatterplot
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